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HANOVER AND PRUSSIA

1795-1803

A STUDY IN NEUTRALITY

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
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THIS MONOGRAPH
IS DEDICATED TO THOSE AT HOME
WHOSE SACRIFICES MADE POSSIBLE FOR ME
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PREFACE.

A PASSING remark in one of Professor Hans Delbrück's lectures on the revolutionary and Napoleonic era called my attention to the peculiar complications which resulted from the union of England and Hanover during the eighteenth century. The interest then aroused was at first turned most naturally toward the subject of the mutual influence which the two members of the Personal Union might be supposed to have exercised upon each other, and particularly to the question of Hanover's influence, cultural and political, upon the English dominions of its elector.

Thus it was that I entered upon a study of Hanoverian history after 1795 with the hope that the relations between the Electorate and England would give the investigation a wider outlook and deeper interest than that offered by the history of other minor German states in the period. The title and table of contents of this monograph will readily show how definitely I was obliged to abandon my expectation of seeing England come to the fore in a study of Hanoverian history in the years after the treaty of Basel. The study has, I hope, not the less breadth and interest, but these arise not from the relation of Hanover with England, but from the complete dominance of Prussia in Hanoverian politics, a dominance so complete that one can hardly speak of an independent Hanoverian policy in these years. The following

pages show primarily two things which my preliminary study of printed works had only suggested as possibilities. First, how and why the standpoint of Prussian interests furnishes the proper interpretation for Hanoverian history in the years between 1795 and 1803. It shows, secondly, and I think with equal conclusiveness, that Hanoverian history is the key to many things in Prussian policy in the same period, inasmuch as it is the history of the most important of those north German states whose geographical situation made their fate of supreme moment to Prussia.

In its title, then, and in the topics it treats, the following study is a result of the historical situation which the archival sources revealed; for the results here presented are based almost wholly on archival material, some of it published, but by far the greater part examined in the original manuscript copies. The material I have used was gathered during two summers spent in the archives of Hanover, Berlin, London and Dresden. These gleanings I have supplemented by the documents in volumes VIII. and XXIX. of the *Publicationen aus den königlichen preussischen Archiven* (these two volumes edited by Dr. Paul Bailleu) and by the *Papiers de Barthélemy*, published by the French Foreign Office under the editorship of M. Kaulek. The works of Malmesbury, Massenbach, Ranke, Hüffer, Ulmann, Vivénot, Ompteda, Martens, Bailleu, Wohlwill and many others, to whom the footnotes give due credit, have supplied, in whole or in part, documents otherwise inaccessible. I have referred carefully to all sources, printed or manuscript, and in the case of the latter I have often printed such excerpts as would enable the reader to test for himself the statements made in the text. Though obliged to use many different libraries, I

have endeavored to obtain uniformity in the references to works having different editions.

I can not refrain from expressing the modest hope that this monograph will help in a small way to call attention to a field of Prussian history which deserves, and will repay, more study than it has hitherto received. Prussian historians, after the style of Treitschke, have too often condemned the period of neutrality as one of unrelieved weakness and disgrace. Thus having wiped out what their modern and somewhat intense nationalism leads them to consider as one of the dark pages in Prussian history, they hasten on from the reign of Frederick the Great to the reforms of Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst and the more glorious years of the Wars for Liberation. Throughout the preparation of this study the writer has felt the need of an unprejudiced history of the reign of Frederick William II. and of the earlier years of his son's reign. Men like Hertzberg, Haugwitz, Hardenberg and the Duke of Brunswick would repay, in a lesser degree, perhaps, such treatment as Professor Lehmann has given Scharnhorst and Stein, and there is a place for briefer but equally conscientious studies of such men as Lombard, Struensee and von Dohm. Such investigations might help to give us that profounder knowledge of the political, military and social conditions in unreformed Prussia after Frederick the Great—the critical period in Prussia's history—without which we cannot understand the era of reform or the Greater Prussia of the nineteenth century.

In the preparation of this study I have been placed under obligations to many helpful friends and acquaintances. The collection of the material for it was made possible by the unfailing courtesy of those Prussian scholars into whose hands has been committed the keep-

ing of the state's archives. Drs. Doebner and Fink, in Hanover, and Drs. Bailleu, Loewe and Keller, in Berlin, have given me every assistance in examining and transcribing the documents in their charge. To Dr. Paul Bailleu I am further indebted, not only for his own publications in this field, but also for his kindness in reading and criticizing my chapters on the Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1801. Through the liberality of the English Foreign Office, and the kindness of the gentlemen in charge of the Public Record Office and of the manuscript room of the British Museum, those two invaluable collections were freely opened to me. In the preparation and printing of the following chapters, I have received the aid of two young American scholars whom I would name with gratitude, Dr. Charles G. Osgood, instructor in English in Yale University, and Dr. James T. Shotwell, instructor in history in Columbia University. To others whom I may not name I feel I owe much for assistance freely given. But more than to all others my thanks are due to Professor William M. Sloane, whose kindly criticism and encouragement have enabled me to present this study in its present form.

The calendar reminds me that by a happy chance I am enabled to conclude this preface on the centennial anniversary of the surrender of the Hanoverians to the French, the event which closes the period covered by this study.

GUY STANTON FORD.

BRISTOL, WISCONSIN, *July 5, 1903.*

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

IN the period between 1789 and 1803, no other minor German state so largely influenced the course of European affairs as the Electorate of Hanover. The reason for this lies not so much in the inherent greatness and force of the Electorate itself, as in a peculiar combination of circumstances by which the hitherto peaceful annals of Hanover are made to reflect like a mirror the history of Prussian policy, and, in a certain degree, the history of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe. The truth of this statement will be more apparent to one who recalls in outline certain historical events in the previous history of the eighteenth century, and studies the territorial results of these events upon the map of Europe in 1795.

The years 1714-1715 mark a turning point in the history of Europe. The age of Louis XIV. was ended and the eighteenth century had begun. By the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt, Frederick I. had secured for his dynasty the proud title of king of Prussia, thus sowing the seed of an ambition whose harvest fields were Rossbach, Belle Alliance, Königgrätz and Sedan. The house of Savoy had fixed itself in Piedmont, around which it was destined to group the rest of the peninsula under the aegis of a united Italy. Austria, through the grant of the Spanish Netherlands, was placed at the threshold of France; upon the House of Hapsburg rested the

obligation to defend the lower Rhine region against whatever infectious evil the festering Bourbon monarchy might disseminate. England had secured the key to the Mediterranean and the gateway to French Canada, and had assured to herself a line of Protestant princes. By the death of Queen Anne in 1714 this assurance became a reality through the accession to the British throne of a minor German sovereign, George William, Elector of Hanover. The historian of the eighteenth century will find in the development and interaction of the events here compassed in a single paragraph, many of the most interesting problems of the age. Of these, not the least important is the dynastic revolution just mentioned. It is this change, together with certain of its consequences, which has been chosen as the subject of the present study. The elevation of a German prince to the throne of England gave rise to a complex of political interests and antagonisms without parallel in history. On the one hand, the electorate of Hanover was bound to the Imperial House of Hapsburg by the constitution of the German Empire. On the other, its geographical situation made its every move a matter of the highest import to its most powerful neighbor and Austria's rival, the newly created kingdom of Prussia. Furthermore, the Elector's accession to the English throne involved his state in the fortunes of a power whose policy could be controlled by neither Hanover, Prussia nor the German Empire. Add to these complications the fact that England was entering upon a second Hundred Years' War with France and it at once becomes obvious that a history of Hanoverian-Prussian relations may furnish a vantage point from which to study European history at the close of the eighteenth century.

Geographical situation is a matter of so much import-

ance in determining national policy that it requires more than a passing notice in any treatment of the relations between two powers. The problems of Prussian statesmen in the eighteenth century were essentially modified, if not created, by the fact that her lands straggled a five days' journey across that territorial wilderness known as the Holy Roman Empire of the German People. The Prussia of Frederick the Great, to apply Parkman's brilliant words on France in America, had two heads, one on the bleak shores of the Baltic, the other amid the vineclad hills of Meuse. On the Vistula it faced the Empire of the Romanoffs, on the Rhine it was in the shadow of the tottering Bourbon monarchy. Its continuity was broken by the interposed territory of a dozen petty powers among which it wandered in uncertain length across the map, here broad and clear, there dispersed and indistinct, again lost in a congeries of ecclesiastical states. Such territorial disintegration not only created administrative difficulties which were in themselves a problem for the statesmen of Prussia, but it exposed the nation on two widely separated frontiers to dangers from enemies as powerful as Russia and France. Furthermore Prussia's own peace and quiet were conditioned upon the independence and neutrality of the minor powers enclaved within her limits; the difficulties of her leadership where there was no subordination would become almost insuperable if any of these states should attempt a policy hostile to her or should fall into the hands of her enemies.

In the very heart of the Prussian territory lay the German states of the king of England, vying with Saxony and Prussia in power and influence in northern Germany. Their uncertain length from Hamburg on the north to Göttingen on the south cut Brandenburg off

from Cleves and the Mark; their eastern boundary was at the gates of Magdeburg, their western at the walls of Minden. On the throne of Hanover were the descendants of Henry the Lion, men who had once thought to rival the House of Hohenzollern in the struggle for the leadership of Protestant North Germany. The elevation of the Guelfs to the throne of Great Britain had ended that dream, but the change had created for Prussia dangers far more serious than dynastic rivalry. Whether for good or ill, Hanover, and with it Prussia, must now reckon with the enemies of England on the continent. Justly or unjustly, any great power at war with Great Britain would find it convenient to treat Hanover as an English continental possession, and this policy by very reason of the geographical situation just described, Prussia could not regard with indifference. It was such a view of the relations between Hanover and England that France most naturally adopted and for which she found plausible grounds in the attempt of the first two Georges to direct English policy from the standpoint of Hanoverian interests. Nor was the divergence of policy between Hanover and England during the earlier years of the reign of George III. sufficient to prevent France from regarding Hanover as a convenient point of attack in her great struggle with an insular power whose navy rendered her inaccessible. Should Prussia at any time during the great wars between these powers desire to remain neutral, and to make secure her neutrality by protecting Hanover from invasion, she would have to stand between the English sovereign and his German domains, while on the other hand she guarded them against French hostility. Such a situation would make Prussian-Hanoverian relations of central interest in Prussian history.

The eighty years before the treaty of Basel, with which this study begins, furnish so many illustrations of the clashing or combining of the interests mentioned above that in selecting the years between 1795 and 1803 we are not creating a period unrelated to the previous history of Prussia and Hanover or unconnected with their later development; 1795 does not begin, nor does 1803 end, Prussian-Hanoverian relations. Possibly an illustration or two drawn from the reign of Frederick the Great may help us to understand how easily Prussia's interest in Hanover might lead to negotiations of the widest import.

It will be recalled that in the struggles of the first half of the eighteenth century England had been directed by the first two Hanoverian sovereigns into the road which led to an alliance with Austria, and to the granting of subsidies to the smaller powers of north Germany in return for soldiers with which to fight France or defend Hanover. A divergence of purposes had gradually weakened the Anglo-Austrian alliance. Maria Theresa was absorbed in projects for the recovery of Silesia, a matter in which England, with a commercial and colonial empire at stake, manifested such small interest as to rouse the liveliest dissatisfaction on the part of the Empress-Queen. This was the diplomatic situation when in 1754 the opening gun of a great world struggle was fired in the woods of western Pennsylvania. England and France in America had begun what proved to be the decisive war in their century of conflict. George II., alarmed for his Electorate, again sought by subsidies and by a renewal of the Austrian alliance to make England, as Pitt's brother-in-law, Temple, expressed it, an insurance office to Hanover. The negotiations with Austria were, however, balked by Maria Theresa's insistence that Prussia be named as one

of the objects of the allies' hostile intentions. The failure of these negotiations left England at the opening of the decisive struggle without an ally. The one hopeful phase of the situation was that in the solicitude of King George for Hanover's safety, his English and Hanoverian advisers had an interest strong enough to lead their testy, narrow-minded master to an *approchement* with his hated nephew, Frederick II. of Prussia. A hint from the Duchess of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, a sister of Frederick, who was then seeking to marry one of her daughters to the future George III., apprised Münchhausen of George's mellow mood. This able Hanoverian minister ventured to ask on behalf of his Electorate and its sovereign the good offices of the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel with Frederick in behalf of the neutrality of Hanover.¹ The Prussian monarch was quick to follow the lead thus opened, and negotiations were begun which led ultimately to an English-Prussian alliance. Austria had already taken up the plan of a French alliance so long urged by Kaunitz, and the news of England's move served to hasten that "Diplomatic Revolution" which made France and Austria allies after two centuries of conflict. The complexity and world-extent of the interests involved in the French-English duel for empire is nowhere better illustrated than in these two years (1754-1756), when a volley from the muskets of Washington's Virginians gave the signal to renew the struggle, while the negotiations begun by the King of England on behalf of Hanover's neutrality were "the germ of an alliance which was to shake the world."²

¹ Münchhausen's letter is in *Politische Correspondenz Friedrich II.*, vol. xi, pp. 246, 247.

² Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover: Some Aspects of the Personal Union*, Oxford, 1899, pp. 171-181. See also R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans: Les Débuts*, chs. iv and v.

The unity of Hanoverian-Prussian interests, which was realized whenever the Electorate was threatened by some European enemy of England, came to the surface again in 1778. To Frederick's alarm at the Austrian aggression in Bavaria were added the fears produced by the news that France had concluded an alliance with England's rebellious American colonies. The Prussian king was naturally apprehensive that France might seek to fight America's battles in the woods of Germany. To protect the region thus threatened Frederick proposed the formation of a corps of defense composed of Prussian, Hanoverian and Brunswick troops partially supported by English subsidies. The fate of the plan, like that of a later Demarcation Army, hung on the decision of the Hanoverian government, and its discussion introduces us to the name of Hardenberg,—the father, Hanover's field marshal, the son, of whom we shall hear more in connection with the later Demarcation Army, already high in the councils of his native state.¹ In 1784 Frederick was again obliged to arouse north Germany against the efforts of Austria to increase her power at the expense of Bavaria. The government of Hanover was among the first to which he broached his plan of a Fürstenbund. It was the influence of Hardenberg exerted through the Duke of York which brought his native state to view with favor the necessary military measures,² and in the final negotiations it was a Hanoverian minister who framed the articles which leagued north Germany against Hapsburg aggression. These scattered instances of Hanoverian-Prussian relations in the years since 1714 show, that when we take up their

¹ Ranke, *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenbergs*, i, 48 ff.

² *Ibid.*, i, p. 76.

history at the close of the eighteenth century, we are simply selecting a few years in which the general course of events in Europe made particularly interesting a situation which in its entirety still awaits adequate historical treatment.

The eight years between 1795 and 1803 possess a certain unity. They are the essential years in the history of Prussia's attempt to maintain neutrality amid the Titanic struggles of the rest of Europe against revolutionary France. In each stage of the development and decline of this Prussian neutrality system, Hanover played an important role, and at each stage its relations with Prussia became a center for the conflict of interests other than those of the two states primarily concerned; at no time are the Prussian diplomats left undisturbed to adjust with the ministry in Hanover their common interests and antagonisms. Thus it is that the history of their relations runs its course through eight years of French, Austrian, English and Russian moves and counter-moves.

Before entering upon the complexities of the period, let us try to see what was that phase of Prussian policy which involved Hanover and made the attitude of Kings Frederick William II. and Frederick William III. and their ministers, Haugwitz and Hardenberg, toward the Electorate the key to much of their activity in these years. The first efforts of Prussia toward neutrality were the result of the embarrassing position in which she found herself in 1794 as a consequence, in part, of her having joined the First Coalition in the war against France. Prussia's internal weakness and inability to realize on her resources, her endangered interests in Poland and the withdrawal of the English subsidies brought her to the special peace of Basel. In this peace

Hardenberg, a Hanoverian in the service of Prussia, served his native and his adopted state by getting the French government to include the German lands of the king of England behind a demarcation line which neutralized that part of Germany east of the Rhine and north of the Main. The persistence of his Hanoverian ministers secured from George III. an acquiescence in this neutrality. By that act Hanover renounced the policy of England, Austria and the Empire, and took her place in a nascent north Germany hegemony under Prussian leadership. But the neutrality arranged at Basel proved to be insufficient to protect the area included behind the first demarcation line, and the policy of Haugwitz passed to the second stage. In 1796 a new demarcation line was negotiated, an army of Prussian, Hanoverian and Brunswick troops was organized to defend it, and a congress of the states protected was called to provide for the support of the Army of Observation. In each phase of the second stage Hanover was a most important factor. The success of the positive side of the system of neutrality, that side which was turned toward the minor north German powers and involved their co-operation with Prussia for mutual defense, was conditioned by the attitude of George III. and his Hanoverian ministry. In this period the relations between the two states become consequently a broader but not a less troubled stream.

During the years from 1796 to 1800 there was a change of rulers in Prussia but no change in policy. Frederick William III., peace-loving to the point of weakness, clung to the system of neutrality under circumstances which, it is safe to say, would have moved as vigorous and able a sovereign as Frederick William II. to active measures. Even Count Haugwitz, the founder

of the system, urged his young master to consider the alliances against France which were being urged upon him. But the King's unconquerable aversion to war, rather than any statesman-like conception of a neutrality policy with its hand on the hilt of the sheathed sword, kept Prussia from joining the Second Coalition. The limits of our theme and the lack of important events in which Hanover was a considerable factor, justify the brief space given to the years 1796 to 1800.

In 1800 Prussia for the first time in five years appeared upon the stage of European politics. Paul I. of Russia in his newly conceived hatred for England sought to cripple her and to testify his friendship for Napoleon by reviving the maritime principles which his mother, Empress Catherine, had formulated in 1780. To enforce them he organized a league which he either coaxed or compelled Sweden, Denmark and Prussia to join. This resulted in the most embarrassing complications for all participants. Prussia was forced to yield to Paul's demands that England be punished by a Prussian occupation of Hanover. By that act Prussia endorsed a contention she had long denied, namely, the French view that the German states of George III. were an English continental possession through whose seizure and exploitation the insular power might be affected. Thus Prussia abandoned the fundamental tenet of any neutrality system for north Germany, that is, the view that the policies and interests of Hanover and England were so widely separated that the former might be drawn into the Prussian hegemony and its neutrality defended regardless of England's continuance of the struggle against France. If the fundamental tenet of a north German neutral zone was denied by Prussia's military occupation of Hanover, the continuance of that occupa-

tion destroyed the fundamental condition of the policy Count Haugwitz had conceived, the confidence of the Hanoverians in Prussia's good intentions. The discussions of this period over the matter of indemnities for the territory ceded to France on the west bank of the Rhine and not the dangers that a French invasion of the Electorate would follow Prussian withdrawal, furnished the medium through which the Hanoverian ministry read Prussia's purposes in continuing the occupation. Should the future produce a crisis calling for prompt action and full co-operation on the part of Frederick William III. and the Hanoverian ministry it would find the vision of both befogged by the events of 1801.

Once away from the safe moorings of the six years just passed in review, the weak craft of Prussian statesmanship was rapidly swept into troubled waters. The crisis forecast above was at hand when in 1803 France and England grappled in the final struggle, and the undefended Electorate was again made the victim of its connection with the crown of England. Last scene of all, Prussia, in the face of a threatened French invasion of Hanover, abandons her position as the defender of the neutrality of north Germany and retires within her own boundaries. The unaided Electorate with its cumbrous and divided government, its antiquated means of defense and its shuffling, undecided leadership, was obliged to surrender at discretion to Napoleon's lieutenant, General Mortier. As 1801 was a prelude to 1803, so the humiliation of Prussia in permitting a French army to occupy Hanover in the heart of Prussian territory brings in its train the disasters of 1806. But the limits of the theme outlined in the preceding paragraphs forbid any ventures into this later and equally interesting field. The following chapters attempt the more modest task of

studying from the view-point of Prussia's relations to Hanover, the inception, development and renunciation of the Prussian neutrality system.

Having thus outlined the work in hand, it seems necessary to preface this study by a sketch of the Electorate of Hanover, presenting chiefly those events which illustrate its political conditions.

Braunschweig-Lüneburg, to designate more exactly what we shall hereafter call Hanover, was an electoral province of the German Empire. In 1795 its area was about equal to that of Massachusetts and Connecticut and it had a population of almost a million.¹ Roughly speaking, it included the region between the Weser and the Elbe to about one hundred and twenty-five miles from their outlets. Irrespective of size or population, Hanover's location made it the key to North Germany. A strong power once in possession of Hanover could easily threaten the commerce of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, through whose ports went part of the food supplies of the northern nations and of England and France. The great commercial routes to Leipzig and southeastern Europe as well as those to Frankfurt and the Rhine region were either within or near Hanover's borders. No nation could safely occupy Holland as long as its enemy had an army on Hanoverian soil. Thus in 1795 France had a double reason for agreeing to the

¹ Ernst V. Meier, *Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte*, i, p. 100, gives 750,000; Thimme, *Innere Zustände Hannovers, etc.*, vol. i, p. 1, gives 900,000.

An article in *The Porcupine* (London daily), Feb. 14, 1801, puts the population at 1,062,500 (but counts Bremen as one of chief cities with 28,000 inhabitants). The annual revenue is placed at £820,000, military charges £230,000, general expenses £552,000. The debt is given as about £5,500,000. The article then briefly summarizes the resources and industries of the Electorate.

Prussian neutrality for Hanover. France could thus keep open its trade with the Hanseatic cities and be able to prevent the gathering of the Emigrant and Dutch corps behind the Weser. Then perhaps deeper than these two motives was the desire to hamper England's movements by neutralizing and later seizing Hanover, which, as has been indicated, the French chose to treat as an English continental possession.

To understand this peculiar relation between England and Hanover, we need to go back a little in English history.¹ In 1714 George William the Second, Elector of Hanover, had left his little German state to become King George the First of England. Both he and his son, George the Second, who was twenty-seven years old when he became Prince of Wales, returned frequently to visit their loyal Hanoverian subjects, but George III. had never set foot in his Electoral possessions. His interest in Hanover, however, had prevented any noticeable break in the policy pursued by his predecessors in governing Hanover. This Personal Union, which lasted from 1715 till 1837,² and the relation of the English king to his electoral possessions will become clearer if we review briefly the instruments by which they were established.

From the English side the Personal Union was shaped

¹The history of the accession of the Hanoverian dynasty to the English throne has never received full and special treatment. The best material is in Michael, *Gesch. Englands im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, and Salomon, *Gesch. des letzten Ministeriums Königin Annas v. England* (Gotha, 1894). The fourth volume of Koecher's *Gesch. Hannover u. Braunschweig* in the *Pub. aus den preuss. Archiven* will deal with the question.

²The Personal Union lasted until the accession of Victoria, who, according to the Salic law prevailing in Hanover, could not succeed to the German possessions of her uncle, William IV. They passed to her uncle Ernst Augustus, fourth son of George III.

by the Act of Settlement, 1701, which was framed with specific reference to such a contingency as arose when the Guelph dynasty came to the throne with George the First. On the Hanoverian side the relations between the absent ruler and his hereditary estates were regulated by an ordinance issued by George I. on his leaving Hanover in 1714.

The provisions of the Act of Settlement¹ which interest us are those limiting the succession to the Electress Sophia and her descendants, if Protestants; and providing that, in the event of the succession of a foreign-born sovereign, the nation should not be engaged without the consent of Parliament in war for the defence of any dominions or territories not belonging to the crown of England; and that all persons born of foreign parents out of the United Kingdom or Ireland, whether or not such persons had been naturalized, were excluded from the Privy Council, from Parliament, from any civil or military office of trust, and from the benefit of any grant of lands. The first provision was satisfied by George I. following the Lutheran confession as had his forefathers. The second was intended as a club in the hands of Parliament to enable it to direct all treaty-making to the interest of England. The clause was, however, non-operative during the reign of the first two Georges. The third clause cited above was most strictly enforced, as Hanoverians were carefully kept from obtaining English appointments, while on the other hand it is interesting to note there is but one instance on record where an Englishman was appointed to Hanoverian service. A fourth clause in the Act of Settlement was repealed

¹ 12 Wm. III, 2. Cf. Pickering's *Statutes-at-large*, vol. i. Discussed clearly by Hallam.

almost on the accession of the Hanoverians, that is, the provision that no future sovereign should go out of the dominions of England, Scotland and Ireland without the consent of Parliament.¹ Both the first two Georges visited Hanover whenever they chose despite the outcry against it in England.

Before leaving Hanover in 1714, George the First issued an ordinance regulating the government of the Electorate in his absence. By this "*réglement*," military matters in general were reserved by him for his own decision. In foreign affairs the ministry² in Hanover or the Regency as it was called, was to conduct matters of ordinary interest in the name of the Elector. Hanoverian envoys at foreign courts were to send two reports—one to London and one to Hanover. The foreign relations of the two powers were kept technically separate, though we shall later find English and Hanoverian ministers working hand and glove for objects of mutual advantage. Further, the knowledge of England's king concerning affairs at European courts—particularly at Berlin and Vienna and later at St. Petersburg—must have been clearer and surer with the reports of such men as the Hanoverian envoys, Ompteda, Hardenberg and Münster to supplement the observations of the English ambassadors.

If in foreign affairs the emergency was pressing, the ministry at Hanover was to decide without waiting for the king's approval even in matters of peace and war. The ministry could call the provincial states and propose

¹ On this whole paragraph see A. W. Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, chap. ii.

² The ministry, some five or six in number, were chosen from the ruling aristocracy in Hanover.

legislation to them. It could also confirm sentences, transmitting the facts only when it seemed possible the king might mitigate the sentence. The ministry's appointive powers were strictly limited as was its power to appropriate money without the king's consent. Meier, the able constitutional historian of Hanover, has well pointed out that in the indefiniteness of the clause as to the ministry's acting alone in matters of importance, lay the possibility for the king and his advising minister in London and the ministry in Hanover to shirk responsibility for the disasters of the period before us. Telegraphs and cables, mail-ship lines and railroads had not then become the tools of statesmen. Sail-boats and postmen could bring the *rescripts* of George the Third to Hanover in about the time they might now reach Hanover from New York.

Much more has been written about a feature of the government which was not mentioned in this almost forgotten *ordinance* of 1714, than about the ordinance itself: I refer to the residence at London of one member of the Hanoverian ministry. Through this member, who was practically a prime minister directing his colleagues from London, the king learned of Hanoverian affairs. The royal instructions, or *rescripts* as they were called, bear the countersignature of the minister "next to the royal person." Englishmen, always jealous of foreign influences, were at that day particularly ready to see in the foreign policies of the first two Georges nothing but Hanoverian policy transferred to a wider sphere. Much ink and more words have been wasted about the supposed influence over English kings of the members of the German Chancery,¹ popularly known as "the Hanoverian

¹ "Deutsche Kanzlei."

Junta.”¹ The union, however, was a purely personal one which in outward forms at least, did not go further than the subordination to a common sovereign and the use of the same coat of arms. Despite the looseness of the bond which bound them, the existence of the Personal Union was a fact which could not be without its effect on both members. The very nominal character of this connection and the disadvantages that accrued to Hanover as the result of its elector’s absence, should not blind the investigator to such interesting topics as the cultural interaction of the two states which found its visible expression in the newly founded university at Göttingen whose establishment was, in its turn, but a manifestation of the increased prestige which the connection with England had brought to Hanover.

The great central fact remains after even the most painstaking efforts to compass the less tangible lines of connection just suggested, that in matters of national interest England went its way almost unmoved by considerations as to the German possessions of its sovereign while, on the other hand, the Hanoverian ministry was not controlled by Walpole and Pitt.² Instances might

¹ Adolphus W. Ward in the Ford Lectures at Oxford in 1899, gave the matter its first special investigation in anything like a scientific way. The lectures published as *Great Britain and Hanover: Some Aspects of the Personal Union*, Oxford, 1899, if not completely convincing, are at least very suggestive and worthy of careful reading.

² In Appendix B at the end of this chapter will be found the opinion of the Russian ambassador, Simon Woronzow, on the completeness of this separation during the period covered by the following chapters. The chapters on the Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1801 show English statesmen interceding for the Electorate. The charge that Pitt controlled the electoral vote of Hanover at Regensburg was a favorite one with the pamphleteers of this period. See for example, *Niedersachsen nebst den Hansestädten, Hamburg, Bremen und Lübeck nach ihren neuern politischen Verhältnissen* (Hamburg, 1801).

be multiplied to show how desirous the English were to keep the separation as complete as that provided in the Act of Settlement.¹ The member of the Hanoverian ministry resident in London was regarded as the ambassador of Hanover at St. James. It was indeed proposed at first that the English prime minister should be present when he interviewed the King, even about matters concerning Hanover's internal affairs, but this was so utterly impracticable, particularly as the business was conducted in German, an unknown tongue to British statesmen, that the plan was soon abandoned. It is not at all uncommon to find Hanoverian ambassadors filling their reports with surmises as to the significance of certain actions of the British representatives, of whose plans and purposes they knew as little as they did of those of the ambassadors of Russia or France. I remember but one, possibly two, instances in all the ministerial correspondence of eight years when the cabinet at Hanover ventured to suggest to their colleague in London that he should seek to learn from the king something about the English plans. Even then their timidity was touching. Poor von Lenthe² in his turn was complaining in the very crisis when Hanover's fate hung on the turn given to matters at St. James, that it was useless for him to seek information of the English Cabinet as to their

¹ See Ompteda, *Die Ueberwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen*, pp. 4-11. The two armies though under the nominal command of the same sovereign were entirely separate, and England made subsidy treaties with Hanover as it did with other German states. Sometimes it sought the aid of the other German states first. Thus it happened that in the American war for independence, Hessians and not Hanoverians opposed the patriots. Hassell (*Das Kurfürstenthum Hannover, etc.*, p. 67) says that Hanover refused to allow Hessians intended for America to march through the Electorate, and that the Americans bought arms and cavalry equipment of Hanoverian factors.

² Hanoverian minister in London in 1803.

plans. The cold, hard egoism with which England yielded up Hanover to the disaster which its connection with England brought upon it in 1801, and again in 1803, would have aroused indignation in any but a people as loyal to their reigning house as were the Hanoverians throughout this long period.¹

In the eighty years since the Elector had given over the direct government into ministerial hands, Hanover had come to be ruled by a close corporation of the old nobility. While Prussia went forward under the enlightened despotism of Frederick the Great, Hanover decayed in economic and political vigor under the aristocratic rule of the privileged class. The leading governmental places were regarded almost as matters of inheritance in the old families of Hanover. Corruption and nepotism were rife. Reforms were demanded, but the demands were hushed up. True, the government was mild, but that was because it feared opposition and shunned publicity more than all else. Thus it was that by 1795 the government had lost all real vigor and power of initiative. It needed but the shock of really aggressive action on the part of some hostile neighbor and the whole structure would come tumbling down around the ears of its dozing occupants.²

¹The French occupation of 1803 called forth a flood of pamphlets, many on the connection with the English and its effect upon Hanover. The pamphlet of Doctor Jur. Seumnich and the replies thereto are devoted to the effects of the Personal Union. Most of them are a weariness to the flesh. All of them are well reviewed in *Jenäische Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb.-May., 1806, Nos. 27-34 inc., and Nos. 57 and 58.

²The best summary of conditions in Hanover in 1795 is to be found in Max Lehmann's *Scharnhorst*, vol. i, 81-87. The particularism of the provinces into which Hanover was divided is well brought out by Spittler in the Introduction to his *Geschichte des Fürstenthums Hannover*. After describing the simple method by which the grant of a tax was obtained in George III.'s English domains he continues, "aber

Following the tendency in every government, the aristocratic government of the Hanoverian nobility put the actual work of governing more and more into the hands of a bureaucracy of secretaries and subordinates, who were generally men with legal training. These subordinates were not mere transcribers of minutes and keepers of books, but exercised a positive influence on the course of affairs. Those holding the higher secretarial positions, for instance, prepared and presented to the easy-going and negligent ministry elaborate reports and recommendations as to the departments with which they were connected. If the secretaries were men of force and industry and learning, the higher officials found it easier to follow their opinion than to work over the field and obtain an independent view. Thus the real governors were hidden from view, and, most fatal of all, did not bear the responsibility for measures and conditions they really created. In the period about 1795 the results of the absence of the Elector were most apparent. There was no one guiding, responsible, never-resting force keeping all parts up to their best efficiency and lopping off the useless members. The ministry of the day, the Regency as it was generally called, was a comfortable, easy-going group of elderly aristocrats whose conception of the good of

wenn eben derselbe von seinen sämtlichen teutschen Unterthanen, welche ungefähr höchstens den zehnten Theil seiner Insulaner ausmachen, eine allgemeine neue Steuer verlangt, so muss mit sechs verschiedenen Parlementern vorher gehandelt werden und jedes verschiedene Parlamenter besteht aus mehreren Classen von Landständen gleichwichtiger Rechte und gleichversicherten Privilegien, welche alle, so sehr sonst ihre Vorzüge verschieden sind, um ihre freie Einwilligung hierüber befragt werden müssen; auch will am Ende das Volk im Lande Hadeln noch besonders gebeten sein." Quoted in the brochure, *Müssen Wir Nicht von England Getrennt werden* (Germanien, 1803).

the state was interchangeable with their view of the interests of the class they represented.¹ Their bureaucratic, bourgeois under-secretaries were men to whom public opinion attributed an even more rigid insistence on privilege and place. Naturally enough such conditions, while they made the rule of the aristocracy tolerable, did not make it popular, and the doctrines of the French Revolution found fertile soil among the radicals who were already conscious of the political lethargy that had crept over Hanover in the last fifty years.

The personal character of the Hanoverian statesman of this period does not need to hold our attention long. Count von Münster, the Hanoverian minister to the court at St. Petersburg, and Ludwig von Ompteda, the representative at Berlin, deserve especial mention as men of clear vision and undoubted ability as diplomats.² The names of Baron von Lenthe, the head of the London Chancery in the later years of our period, of Count von Wallmoden-Gimborn, natural son of George II. and commander of the Hanoverian army, and of Geheimersecretär Rudloff, will be of interest to any one who works over the pamphlet literature called out

¹ "Es (Regency) besteht ganz aus adelichen Mitgliedern, und macht in der Abwesenheit des Churfürsten den eigentlichen Souverain des Landes aus . . . Als Mitglieder der privilegierten Kaste, suchen sie deren Bestes hauptsächlich zu befördern und nehmen darnach den Maasstab des öffentlichen Wohls ab." Dr. Jur. Seumnich, *Ueber die Verbindung des Churfürstenthums Hannover mit England, etc.* (Hamburg, 1803), 26-27. It would seem as one looks through the pamphlets called forth by Dr. Seumnich's brochure that it was this sentence rather than the disaster of the French invasion which precipitated the lusty "Federkrieg" of 1803.

² On Münster's later career (1809, 1815), see the article by Prof. Ulmann in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1868, 338. . . Ompteda's career is sketched by his son in the introduction to *Politischer Nachlass des hannoverschen Staats- und Cabinettministers, Ludwig von Ompteda, aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1833*. (Jena, 1869, 3 vols.)

by the disasters of 1803. The actions of these men in connection with the events between 1795 and 1803 will sufficiently bespeak their character and ability. One of them, however, may well be described here as the type of the bureaucrat who under the old régime might attain to power in a government so lacking in virility. The dominance in Hanoverian councils which public opinion attributed to such a man as Wilhelm Augustus Rudloff, for it is to him I refer, tells one much of the government of the Electorate at the close of the eighteenth century.

This man who passed in the public opinion of the day as the real power in the government, "le roi d'Hanovre," "der kleine Kaunitz," as he was popularly called, was officially only a *Geheimersecretär*. Through real ability, of a pedantic sort perhaps, and immense capacity for work even of the most detailed kind, he had assumed the directing influence in the government. From the drafting of the most important state papers and the execution of the weightiest commissions, to the copying and storing of the documents in the governmental archives, Rudloff was the power that got things done, and a man who did things was the crying necessity in the government of the *ancien régime*.

Rudloff obtained his doctorate at Göttingen in 1767, when twenty years of age. After a brief experience as a lecturer at the University of Bützow, he was called to Hanover as legal adviser to the government. Five years later he left the legal department for the state department (*Geheime Kanzlei*). From 1786 on he was practically secretary for foreign and imperial affairs, as well as acting-secretary of the ministry, keeping its minutes and drafting all its reports to the minister in London and the instructions to the ministers at foreign courts. On

many occasions his reports were called for, and on all occasions he was present to see that the ministry transacted the necessary business in the prescribed way. Such an active, able and forceful person no doubt put the stamp of his personality on much of the ministerial policy during his term. Rudloff then must take his fair share of the blame that always attaches to persons trying to work an unworkable system. Trained like his colleagues and his superiors in the formal, technical law of the cumbrous Imperial system, he saw nothing beyond it. They were all absorbed in routine work and had no eyes for the new conditions in the Germany of their day. Rudloff's limitations were those of the class he typified—the legally trained, somewhat pedantic bureaucrat, into whose hands had fallen most of the governmental business of the German states of the eighteenth century.¹

Really able and progressive men were hard to hold in the Hanoverian service. The absence of the sovereign narrowed the field of activity; the main object was simply to keep the government going.² There was no such thing as a definite, self-conscious Hanoverian policy. The absent elector's best energies and real interests were given to the English people. Capable Hanoverian officials working without the direct supervision of the sovereign found advancement too slow for a progressive and ambitious man. Promotion must come through the favor of an aristocratic ministry drawn from the old

¹ E. Brandes, *Betrachtungen über den Zeitgeist, etc.*, 14, 15 (Hanover, 1808). Also Meier, *Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte*. (Leipzig, 1899.) As to the powers of the secretaries in Hanover, see the pamphlet. "*Ueber d. hannoverischen Adel u. die Secretärien.*"

² The evils of the Elector's absence were frankly pointed out to King George by Hardenberg in his resignation from the Hanoverian service in 1781. Ranke, *Hardenberg* i, p. 56.

nobility, and it could not be expected that they would push into power a class who were not "hoffähig."

By the side of this moribund state was the more aggressive Prussia of Frederick the Great to which the interests of the Germans of the larger patriotism and deeper ambition were turning.¹ Baron vom Stein, well and favorably known in Hanover through his service in the Westphalian states of Prussia, was offered a position in the Hanoverian ministry (1802), but he preferred the service of Frederick the Great,² and this despite the fact that his family ties bound him closely to the ruling aristocracy of Hanover.³ He saw no future in this "German China" as he called Hanover. Scharnhorst, whose military reforms make him share with Stein the title of founder of modern Prussia, discouraged at the failure of his efforts to reform the Hanoverian army, resigned his commission in January, 1801, and entered the Prussian service. Hardenberg, the successor of Stein and the executor of his reforms, was born and raised a Hanoverian and devoted the earlier years of his life to his country's service. But convinced after long waiting, even at the court of George III. in London, that the road to higher places was too long and uncertain, he left the Hanover-

¹ For a masterly review of conditions in Prussia in 1800 (ca.), see the essay by Max Lehmann, *Das alte Preussen*, in the *Hist. Zeit.*, vol. xc, 385 ff.

² Lehmann, *Stein*, vol. i, 246. Pertz, ii, 194-195. Pertz points out that several native Hanoverians of real ability were kept in second rate offices, e. g., Rehberg, Brandes, Rumann, Hoppenstedt, Rose. The commander of the Russian forces at Eylau and Friedland, and the leader of the party that murdered Czar Paul, was a Hanoverian—General Bennigsen. Cf. *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski*, i, 239, 240, 248. London, 1888.

³ Two members of the Hanoverian ministry, Steinberg and Kielmansegg were brothers-in-law of Stein, and his father-in-law was Count Wallmoden-Gimborn.

ian state to pass by way of Brunswick into the service of Prussia. Scharnhorst, Hardenburg, Stein¹—to have lost such a galaxy of genius is the greatest reproach utterable against the ancient régime in Hanover. To have drawn them into the Prussian service is the greatest tribute that can be paid to the state of Frederick the Great.²

A poor boat and indifferent seamanship may navigate peaceful waters. So, had peace been granted it, "the paternal government" of Hanover might have gone on many years in safety. But troublous days were ahead of it, for the waves of the French Revolution were dashing against and dashing down the old order in the old Europe.

The South German states were not the only members of the empire affected by the doctrines and events of the French Revolution. Hanover, with its mild government and more than English tolerance of free speech and free press, was touched by a wave of sympathy for the movement which seemed to promise so much.³ The students of Göttingen were up to the mark of student enthusiasm for new doctrines and stirring reforms, and still more stable writers and thinkers rejoiced at the advance of republicanism in France.⁴

¹ Beyme, one of Frederick William III.'s closest advisers, was also a Hanoverian. Bailleu, in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, xx, 271. The writer in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* disagrees.

² For a most interesting list of the foreigners who were influential in Prussia during the neutrality period, see Seeley's *Life of Stein*, part iii, chap. ii. It is interesting to note how many of the public men mentioned in this study were students in Göttingen during the period when Pütter and Schlözer were lecturing.

³ On the effect of the French Revolution in Hanover see Weiland, *Festrede im Namen d. Georg. Augustus Universität, etc.*, (Göttingen, 1889.) E. Brandes, *Ueber einige bisherige Folgen d. franzos. Revolution vorzüglich in Deutschland*, second ed. (1792), also Brandes, *Ueber den Zeitgeist, etc.*, pp. 180 et seq. (Hanover, 1808).

⁴ On lack of real patriotism in Germany at this time see Pertz, *Stein*, i, p. 87, and E. Brandes, *op. cit.*

But all this new thought, from the ebullitions of the students to the stimulating and reasonable articles of Prof. Schlözer, led to no overt action until the summer of 1792. It was then that, influenced perhaps by Custine's victories in South Germany, the opposition to certain oppressive taxes in the neighboring bishopric of Hildesheim seized the occasion to organize itself. The uprising spread to the adjoining Hanoverian principalities. The agitation against the unpopular tax in Calenberg, one of the six divisions of Hanover, was led by a certain von Berlepsch,¹ a school friend of Hardenberg,² who had himself led the local opposition to this tax. Von Berlepsch seems to have lacked good judgment. He sought to make out of the Diet of Calenberg a National Assembly, but only succeeded in getting himself called the "Calenberg Mirabeau." Only the mildness of the government³ prevented von Berlepsch from proving himself more than a rather able demagogue. His attempts to get the Calenberg Nation "to declare its neutrality in the struggle of its elector against France found no encouragement in the local diet. His appeal to the people resulted in his being ousted by George III. from the offices he held.⁴

Nevertheless, the period of unrest and disorder does not seem to have ended with the exit of von Berlepsch.

¹Herr A. Wunsch, Göttingen, will shortly publish a study of von Berlepsch.

²See below for further evidence of their relations. Berlepsch's mother was a von Hardenberg.

³"No government could be more mild, and an air of general content is spread over all the inhabitants." *The Porcupine* [a London daily], Feb. 14, 1801.

⁴It is interesting to note that von Berlepsch appealed his case to the Reichs Kammergericht at Wetzlar and got a decision in his favor to which the Hanoverian Regency paid no attention.

Hanover in 1795 was regarded as a sort of revolutionary tinder-box.¹ It needed but a spark from an invading French army to start a conflagration dangerous to the peace and safety of its neighbors.² The real imminence of such a danger may well be doubted. We can safely go no farther than to say, like the *ancien régime* in France itself, the paternal and easy-going government had encouraged the circulation of political doctrines which, had there been real grievances and a less phlegmatic people than the lower Saxons,³ might have led to serious results under a demagogic leader like von Berlepsch.

The electorate of Hanover as such had not been a participant in the campaigns against the French. At Regensburg the ministry had been of the party of moderation. They deprecated any rash action of the empire in reply to the decisions of the National Assembly, and it was not until March, 1793, that a Hanoverian contingent joined the allied army. The loss of the Netherlands as the result of the campaign of 1792 threatened English and Hanoverian interests, and the cabinet and the elector bargained with the English to furnish some thirteen thousand mercenaries. This was about half of the Hanoverian army.

The difficulty the authorities found in filling out the

¹ Malmesburg writing in 1795 speaks of a "Great Jacobin party in Germany, particularly about Hamburg in Westphalia," *Diaries, etc.*, iii, 44. Reinhard, the French agent to the Hansa cities, sends some interesting reports to Paris on conditions in Hanover. See Wohlwill's summary in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 410-411. Revolutionary tendencies are distinctly emphasized in these reports.

² These are the words put into the mouth of Hardenberg at Basel by Frederick William II.

³ On the "*Schwerfälligkeit*" of the Hanoverians of that day see Stein's letter in Pertz, i, 108 and note 29 to vol. i.

ranks of the regiments illustrates how little enthusiasm there was for military matters among the Lower Saxons. Volunteers were loath to enter the regular service, and attempts to recruit in Hanover were unsuccessful. Men, if they had the money, paid large sums for substitutes. If they were poor, they fled the country to escape the night raids of the recruiting officer. The ministry was obliged to transfer its efforts to the neighboring Imperial cities and ecclesiastical estates. Even after resorting to such subterfuges the promised contingent went forth two thousand men short. These difficulties make it plain why Hanover, when called on for its *Reichs-contingent*, preferred to pay a money subsidy.

The Hanoverians under the aged Field-Marshal Freytag were attached to the allied army under the young Duke of York. They took a most honorable part in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, and the escape of the gallant General Hammerstein from the beleaguered Menin is one of the most brilliant and daring things in all military history. Scharnhorst, then a Hanoverian captain of artillery, received his baptism of fire in these campaigns and gained himself a place on the staff of Count Wallmoden-Gimborn who took command after the departure of the Duke of York.

March, 1795, saw the English and their mercenaries ensconced behind the line of the Ems—depleted in numbers and depressed in spirits. Before them was the victorious army of the French under Pichegru. The situation was critical. Would the Prussian troops hastening from Clerfait's army on the Upper Rhine be in time to support Wallmoden? Fortunately the matter was not brought to a pitched battle, for the French, receiving word as to the negotiations at Basel, withdrew into Holland. To these negotiations at Basel we must next turn our attention.

CHAPTER I—APPENDIX A.

THE following list of Hanoverian ministers is taken from the table given in Meier's *Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte*, 1680–1866, Vol. II, p. 638. The list in Meier covers the period 1680–1848, and the recurrence of family names until we have Alvensleben III, Busche V, Lenthe III, Hardenberg III, and Grote IV shows how the great families kept in power, generation after generation.

In the period covered by this monograph, we have as members of the cabinet in Hanover:

Graf Kielmansegg, Karl Rudolph August, 1779–1806. (Kammerpräsident from 1792–1806.)

Gotthelf Dieterich Ende, 1782–1798.

Ludwig Friederich Beulwitz, 1782–1796.

Christian Ludwig August Arnswaldt I, 1783–1806.

Georg August Steinberg II, 1792–1801.

Ernst Ludwig Julius Lenthe III, 1795–1805 (minister resident in London for his whole term).

Claus v. d. Decken, 1796–1823.

Georg Friedrich August v. d. Wense, 1801–1811.

Christian Ludwig Hake II, 1801–1818.

Otto Ulrich Grote IV, 1801–1808.

As has been mentioned, Dr. Rudloff was Wirklicher Geheimer Secretär and Archivarius. Dr. George H. Nieper was his assistant, and George August Best was secretary to the minister in London, von Lenthe.¹

From the *Staatskalendar* we learn that for the period

¹See *Koeniglich. Grossbritannischen u. Kurfuerstlichen Braunschweig-Lueneberg. Staatskalendar* for 1795–1803.

1795-1803 Hanover's representatives at other courts were distributed as follows:

Vienna: Graf von Hardenberg and Herr v. Mühl.

Berlin: Julius v. Lenthe, with Carl Adolph v. Ompteda as Canzlei Auditor. Lenthe was succeeded in 1796 by Ludwig C. G. v. Ompteda, who acted until 1800 as von Reden, appointed in 1797, was otherwise employed, principally at the Congress of Rastatt.

Regensburg: Hanover's *Comitial Gesandter* was Dietrich Heinrich Ludwig von Ompteda.

Dresden: Von Bremer, with Ludwig C. G. v. Ompteda,¹ later at Berlin, as Canzlei Auditor. No reports of von Bremer's for the years 1795-1803 were to be found in the archives at Hanover. This is deeply to be regretted, as the relations between the two electorates of Saxony and Hanover appear to have been intimate.

Frankfort (for Mainz, Köln and Oberrhein): Von Reden, 1794-1797, with Schwarzkopf as Canzlei-Secretär. On von Reden's appointment to the Congress of Rastatt and then to Berlin, Schwarzkopf became his successor.

Munich (for Kurpfalz): Geheimer Legationsrat von Ompteda.

Netherlands: Geo. von Hinüber.

Anspach (for Franconia): Herr Schegk—his name disappears in 1802.

Swabia, Würtemberg, Baden and Pfalz-Zweibrücken: Herr von Küchel.

Lower Saxon Circle: Von Reden from 1798 on.

APPENDIX B

Simon Woronzow, Russian ambassador in London, on the Separation of Hanover and Great Britain (in Wassilshikof, *Les Razoumowsky*, II, pt. IV, pp. 242-245 of Brueckner's French edition).

SEPARATION OF HANOVER AND GREAT BRITAIN.

COUNT WORONZOW, LONDRES, }
le 17/28 juillet 1795.

“ . . . Je ne manquerai pas sans doute d'après la réquisition de m—r le baron de Thugut de parler à Mylord Grenville sur l' inconcevable conduite du ministre de l'électeur d'Hanovre à la diète de Ratisbonne et

¹ Cf. *Irrfahrten u. Abenteuer eines Mittelstaatlichen Diplomaten: Ein Lebens- und Kulturbild aus den Zeiten um 1800* (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1894, pp. 435), by Ludwig v. Ompteda.

sur les fatales conséquences que cette étrange conduite a produites dans les affaires de l' Empire.¹ Mais je ne puis vous cacher, que mylord Grenville ne peut rien dans cette affaire. Il y a une ligne de démarcation inviolable, qui coupe toute interférence du ministre britannique dans toute affaire qui regarde l'électorat d'Hanovre. Le ministère hanovrien est si jaloux de son indépendance qu'il s'efforce en toute occasion de représenter à l'électeur-roi, que son pays en Allemagne ne doit jamais être influencé par le ministère britannique, comme si celui-ci pouvait en quelques affaires que ce soit, surtout en politique étrangère, faire quelque-chose contre le gré ou à l'insu de son souverain. Cette appréhension de la régence de Hanovre est affectée et mise toujours en avant pour la ridicule gloriole de m—rs les ministres de la régence et pour satisfaire leurs vues et leurs intérêts privés. Ils sont pour le plupart attachés au système prussien. Ils ne voient ou ne veulent pas voir les perfides de la Prusse. Ils ne veulent pas comprendre, que l'agrandissement de la maison d'Autriche, de laquelle l'électorat étant séparé de toute la largeur d'Allemagne, n'a rien de dommageable pour lui et ne fait que raffermir son indépendance, mais qu'au contraire si l'Autriche est affaiblie, rien en Allemagne ne pourra résister à la rapacité prussienne, et l'électorat de Hanovre comme voisin et intermédiaire entre le duché de Magdeburg et les états prussiens en Westphalia ne manquera pas de tomber un jour entre les mains rapaces de la cour de Berlin et finira par devenir province de l'ambitieuse monarchie prussienne.

“Ce qu'il y a plus malheureux dans la conduite actuelle de la régence de Hanovre et de son ministre à Ratisbonne, c'est qu'outre le mal qu'ils ont fait ils calomnient implicitement un des plus vertueux souverains, qui ait jamais honoré un trône: ils le calomnient, dis-je, parce que chez nous, en Espagne et partout ailleurs on croit, que jamais cette régence, qui n'a d'autre autorité que celle que lui veut bien confier l'électeur-roi son maître, n'aurait pu prendre sur elle d'agir de cette manière dans une affaire de telle importance si elle n'était autorisée pour cela par ce souverain, qui est le vrai maître et dont elle doit suivre toutes les volontés à l'égard de l'administration de l'état et de ses rapports politiques.

“S. M. le roi de la grande Bretagne est un prince ferme et vertueux. Vous pouvez être sûr, m—r le comte, qu'il est incapable d'agir autrement qu'avec la plus grande franchise. Le malheur est qu'il est indulgent à l'excès, que vertueux lui même, il croit au vertu d'une plus grande masse d'hommes qu'il n'y en a malheureusement et qu'il ne soupçonne pas, que ses ministres sont pour la plupart moins Hanovriens que Prussiens et illuminés. Un autre malheur est que mylord Grenville

¹ The conduct of Ompteda in voting for Prussian mediation, *cf.* Vivenot's *Sachsen-Teschen*, pp. 199, 397-99,

ne peut guère se mêler des affaires de l'électorat et qu'il n'y a pas ici de ministre hanovrien, auquel on pourrait s'adresser et faire parvenir a S. M. tout ce qu'il est important qu'elle sache. Je vois d'ici votre étonnement et je crois entendre, que vous me dites: Mais si on se plaignait à mylord Grenville au sujet de quelque conduite de la Saxe ou de la Bavière, est ce qu' il ne ferait pas un rapport au roi sur ces plaintes? Pourquoi donc refuserait-il de présenter a S. M. celles qu' on fait contre la régence de Hanovre et son ministre à Ratisbonne? Votre observation est très juste, m—r le comte, mais souvenez vous, que l'électeur palatin et celui de Saxe etc. ne sont pas jaloux de faire leurs affaires avec le ministre britannique et que la régence de Hanovre l'est très fort et qu'elle a eu ses bonnes raisons d'établir un système dont elle abuse si cruellement, et qu'enfin mylord Grenville se mêle d'autant moins de ces affaires qu'il craint de passer pour un ministre que veut empiéter sur un département dont lui et tous ses prédécesseurs ont été toujours écartés. A peine osera-t-il présenter les papiers contenant les plaintes, et certainement il pourra se permettre très peu d'observations verbales sur leur contenu. Malgré tout cela on doit être persuadé que S. M. le roi, qui est la probité même et qui est un allié constant et zélé, ne manquera pas, dès qu'il en sera informé de désavouer son coupable ministre à Ratisbonne. Je vois que ce monsieur est gouverné par le comte de Goertz. Il est en bonnes mains. J'ai connu ce comte de Goertz pendant cinq ans que je l'ai vu ministre de Prusse en Russie: c'est l'intrigant le plus fieffé et le plus impudent que la diplomatie prussienne ait employé dans les affaires. Il est tel que les Lucchesini et leur pareils sont des Catons et des Aristides en comparaison de lui . . . C'était lui l'instigateur de la neutralité armée.¹ Il était tout dévoué à la France et c'est le plus dangereux des intrigants."

¹ Cf. Bergbohm, *Die bewaffnete Neutralität 1780-83* (Berlin, 1884), pp. 6-7.

CHAPTER II

THE TREATY OF BASEL AND THE BEGINNINGS OF PRUSSIAN NEUTRALITY

WHEN any power is without the force that would justify its taking the initiative and developing an independent policy, it must submit to the humble role of following that line of action which its neighbors or its allies indicate to it. It was such a position of subordination that the electorate of Hanover was obliged to occupy throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century. The transfer of its ruling house to the English throne had given the Electorate a certain prestige in Germany, particularly during the first half of the century, when the first two Georges were using their influence to determine English policy according to Hanoverian interests. But the countervailing disadvantages, some of which have been mentioned, had left Hanover in the equivocal position of a middle power in the hierarchy of German states. On the one side its advice was sought and its views considered by minor states like Brunswick, Hildesheim and Münster. On the other and above it in power and influence, stood Prussia, whose territory enclaved the leaderless Hanover on three sides. It was by virtue of the situation thus created that any attempt to treat Hanoverian policy leads ultimately to a study of Prussian policy. As a result of this fact the fate of the Electorate when threatened by the tide of French invasion in the spring of 1795 was determined by the course of its most

powerful neighbor, Prussia, rather than by any action, diplomatic or military, taken by the Hanoverian Regency. It is then towards Berlin that we must turn for an answer to the question, how Hanover is to be saved from a French invasion.

After some two years of crusading against the forces of revolutionary France, Frederick William II. of Prussia found himself in the fall of 1794 with a depleted treasury¹ and an army whose military fame had not been materially enhanced by the indecisive campaigns on the Rhine.² His allies, Russia, England and Austria, had developed interests foreign to the original purposes of the alliance.³ Particularly disquieting to the Prussian statesmen was the evident desire of Austria and Russia to push Prussia into the western complications in order that they might have a free hand in the matter of partitioning Poland.⁴ England, dissatisfied with the tactics of the Prussian general, Möllendorf, and unable to arrange for the control of the army he commanded, had refused in October, 1794, to continue the payment of subsidies,⁵ a serious matter when

¹ Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence*, iii, 21, 31, 43.

² Cf. Häusser, *Deutsche Geschichte*, ii, 3, for the unsatisfactory results of a campaign in which Prussia had met with no striking reverses.

³ Ranke, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fürsten von Hardenberg*, etc. [Berlin, 1877], vol. i, 253.

⁴ Smitt's *Suworow*, ii, 359. Quoted by Häusser, i, 321. See also Herrmann, *Gesch. d. russischen Staates, Ergänzungsband*, 509, 510.

⁵ The subsidy treaty with the English had been signed at the Hague, April 19, 1794. Gen. Moellendorf had been opposed to the treaty, and interpreted some its equivocal phrases to suit himself. This so disgusted Pitt that he authorized Lord Malmesbury to discontinue the payment of subsidies, Oct. 11, 1794. Moellendorf's part in the preliminaries of the treaty of Basel illustrates a remark of the day that Prussia was not so much a country with an army as an army with a country. For a copy of the subsidy treaty with the English, see Martens, *Recueil*, etc., v, 283. For an account of the negotiations, quarrels and abrogation, see

the exhausted condition of Prussia's treasury is considered. I say the exhaustion of the treasury, for it seems, when viewed in the light of the tribute money which Prussia was able to pay after Jena, that it was not so much a bankruptcy of resources¹ as it was a bankruptcy of the statesmanship necessary to make the resources available² which caused contemporary writers to explain the treaty of Basel by Prussia's financial weakness.³ The importance of Prussia's financial condition in 1794-1795 is a derived importance. Its significance lies in its conjunction with the difficulties created for Prussia by Catherine of Russia's designs on Poland. So tremendous is the significance which the wars against revolutionary France attained later that it is difficult for us to comprehend how, in the years between 1792 and 1795, European statesmen could have been concerned with any other in-

Malmesbury's despatches in the *Eng. Rec. Office, Prussia F. O.*, Nos. 31-33. The material in Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence*, iii, 1-148, is drawn from these archives. For the attitude of the Prussian army, see Kaulek, *Papiers de Barthélemy*, v, 114, and Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 258.

¹ Lord Malmesbury writes Oct. 19, 1794, "Germany (is) vastly rich—equal in men and money to France," *Diaries and Correspondence*, iii, 141.

² See article on the Prussian minister of finance, Struensee, in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Also Sybel, *Gesch. der Revolutionszeit* (fourth edition), and Bailleu in his introduction to volume viii of the *Publicationen aus den K. Preussischen Staatsarchiven: Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807*, p. xxii. The article by Dr. Bailleu in the *Hist. Zeit.*, vol. 75, p. 237, aims to lay stress on the financial causes of Prussia's peace policy, but leaves the reader with the clear impression that the fundamental thing was the weakness of the ministry.

³ Cf. for example, Alvensleben's memorial of Feb. 21, 1796, in Bailleu, i, 49-51; report of Caillard, French envoy in Berlin, May 31, 1796, Bailleu, i, 443, and Lucchesini in his *History of the Causes and Effects of the Confederation of the Rhine*, translated by J. D. Dwyer (London, 1821), p. 10.

ternational interest; yet it is true of Frederick William and his advisers that their eyes were directed toward Poland and the security of Prussia's territorial interests there, until the treaty of Basel and the events following it determined that Prussia was to be a power in west Germany. Rose diagnoses the case correctly when he says, "Poland was now, as ever, the ulcer that ate into the vitals of the First Coalition."¹ The situation and interests of the King of Prussia were such that he could ill afford to divide his military strength, nor could he support two imposing armies—one on the Rhine, where the First Coalition was facing France, and one on the Vistula, where Austria and Russia were threatening Prussian interests in Poland.

The change of policy through which Prussia broke away from the First Coalition and resumed friendly relations with the French Republic, has too often been treated by historians without due regard to the peculiar conjunction of domestic and foreign difficulties which Prussia faced in the fall of 1794. The tendency has been to present the treaty of Basel as a diplomatic revolution, and a base betrayal of its allies by Prussia. The general view of the treaty of Basel is vigorously expressed by Treitschke, "It was, despite all reasons of necessity which explain or excuse it, the greatest political mistake of our modern history—a betrayal of itself for which the Prussian state atoned bitterly through two decades of deprivation and dishonor, and by unexampled struggles and sacrifices." It is the service of Bailleu,² a

¹ *The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era*, p. 90.

² Bailleu, *Preussen u. Frankreich, 1795-1807* (*Pub. aus den preuss. Archiven*) and *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895. *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft*, vol. ii, for summary of these contributions.

Prussian, and Sorel,¹ a Frenchman, developing the view of Ranke,² to have emphasized in contradistinction to Schlosser, Sybel, Hüffer and Häusser, the view that the participation of Prussia in the war of the First Coalition against France did not correspond to the interests of the national Prussian policy, and that the treaty of Basel indicates a return to that policy. Consequently in becoming reconciled, Prussia and France obeyed their old traditions. Prussia, viewing things as they were at the time of the treaty of Basel, was justified in thinking the moderate policy would triumph in France and be satisfied with Belgium, Luxemburg and Savoy, and that Prussia needed her strength to face the powers beyond the Danube and the Vistula rather than those of the Seine.

The peace movement resulting in the treaty of Basel is too often made local to Prussia.³ It is represented that the other members of the empire heard with surprise and dismay of the withdrawal of Prussia and its additional perfidy in establishing a Demarcation Line which hemmed in the military activity of many of them. A sifting out of the great amount of chaff in the reports from the Imperial Diet at Regensburg leaves enough evidence to show that the desire for peace was strong throughout the Empire.⁴ The interests of the Empire

¹ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, vol. iv, and *Rev. Hist.*, vols. v-vii.

² Ranke, *Hardenberg und die Gesch. des preuss. Staates v. 1793-1813*, vol. i, 217, for instances.

³ See *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch* for 1897, containing a most illuminative article by Bailleu, "Vor Hundert Jahren," in which the period is more correctly interpreted.

⁴ Bourgoing, *Hist. diplomatique de la Révolution*, vol. iv, 42 et. seq. Sybel, *Gesch. d. Revolutionszeit*, vol. iii, 356. Vivenot, ii, ch. 2. *Papiers du Barthélemy*, v. 114. *Pol. Korrespondenz Karl Friederichs von Baden*, ii, 317.

were clearly not bound up in a crusade on behalf of the rights of a few members on the left bank of the Rhine. The participation of the Empire—this the Diet argued in extenso later—was a matter of self-defense made necessary by the disposition of the armies of the allies.¹

The pacific disposition, as well as administrative inefficiency, of the smaller members of the Empire is shown by the reluctance with which the war policy of Austria was supported by the Diet at Regensburg.² The demand for a levy en masse made in Germany in 1794, though it became a law of the Empire in May of the same year, had produced no effect. The Emperor had asked for a hundred Roman months (*Römermonate*), the Diet had voted but fifty. The reports of Hanover's delegate, Baron Ompteda, show that this tax brought but little into the Imperial treasury. Ompteda's reports from 1794-1801 are generally arranged under the rubrics "Reichs Krieg gegen Frankreich" or "Reichsfrieden mit Frankreich." The burden of the reports touching the subject of the war against France is the failure of the members of the Empire to furnish their troops or pay their financial obligations.

The alliance of Prussia and Austria against revolutionary France had not diminished the rivalry of these two powers in the Empire. For while Austria was urging on the Imperial Diet at Regensburg the need of better armament, Frederick William II, of Prussia, was receiving appeals from smaller principalities who were clamor-

¹ Häusser, i, 542. Reports of Baron Reden, the Hanoverian delegate at the Congress of Rastatt, 1797-99, in *Cal. Br. Des. ii, E. I. No. 67* (*Hanover Archives*).

² See the complaints of Thugut (Aug., 1794) in Vivenot, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Politik Oesterreichs*, vol. ii, and same the editor's: *Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiherrn von Thugut*.

ing for the mediation of Prussia.¹ Many of these appeals were the work of agents of the Prussian cabinet present at the smaller courts—the king indeed had not gone so far² and he was yielding but gradually to the peace idea.

The peace movement dates back as early as 1793,³ but nothing definite came of the earlier efforts. Later, in June of 1794, Moellendorf, the Prussian commander on the Rhine, had made secret and unauthorized overtures looking toward peace. Some time after this, at the instance of Frederick William II, Moellendorf had sought to interest the elector of Mainz in the creation of a peace movement at Regensburg.⁴ The selection was a good one, for the elector of Mainz had been one of the chief sufferers from the disastrous war, and this, together with the fact that his was a leading position in the electoral college, made him a most excellent mouthpiece of the peace party.⁵

¹ Dispatch of Ompteda, Sept. 16, 1794, *Cal. Br. Arch. Des.* 24 *Brandenburg-Preussen* No. 546. Ompteda (who signs this report instead of the regular minister, Baron Lenthe) said that for some time memorials had been coming in to the King of Prussia, the main object of these memorials being to put the matter of concluding a peace in a favorable light, but, he added, they could not well be considered by the King.

² Ompteda as above has learned that the king had refused to receive any more memorials because the proposed separate negotiations were against his conviction with the sea powers. The general desire for peace in Berlin itself is seen by the credence gained by the report of special Prussian-French treaty signed at Basel in Oct., 1794. Despatch of Lenthe from Berlin, Nov. 4, 1794.

³ D'Èsebeck, Minister of Zweibrücken, was negotiating as early as June, 1793. *Sec. A, III, 76 Archives Nationales*, Paris. This reference is a note made by Dr. Sidney B. Fay, of Dartmouth, during his researches in Paris.

⁴ Sorel in *Rev. Hist.*, v, pp. 299, 303, and Sybel in vol. iii of his *Gesch. d. Revolutionszeit.*, is authority for the same view.

⁵ The influence of Denmark and Sweden exerted through Baron Die-

On October 24,¹ 1794, the delegate for Mainz, Freiherr von Strauss,² proposed a peace of the Empire with France to be effected through the mediation of either Sweden or Denmark, whose position as members of the Empire and as neutrals seemed to fit them especially for the task.³

The peace proposal was no surprise, for the intention of Freiherr von Strauss had been well known for some time. Ompteda, in assuring his superiors of what was coming, had told them that under the circumstances the peace proposal would be favorably received in Regensburg, especially by the ecclesiastical members of the Empire. The Hanoverian ministry wrote King George that the Pfalz and Saxony were going to support the peace. Wasted territory and depleted finances would justify other temporal states in joining the movement.⁴ In the absence of a measurable public opinion in the Germany

den may be suspected. (*F. O., Prussia, No. 34, Malmesbury, Oct. 20, 1794, Eng. Record Office.*) Report of an interview with co-adjutor Archbishop, Baron d'Albert, who has been told by Barthélemy that in any peace, the Rhine must remain the French frontier. This the co-adjutor does not tell the Archbishop-Elector as it would delay peace.

¹ Häusser i, 582, gives Oct. 20. For mention of Mainz as leader of the Prussian party at Regensburg, see Barthélemy, v, 250, 261-262.

² Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 110.

³ Report of Regency to King on Oct. 24, 1794, *Cal.-Br. Bes. 11, E. I.*, No. 1121.

⁴ Report of Regency to King George, Oct. 24, 1794. The ministers add that the thing which is gaining currency for the proposition of Kurmainz is the idea that the Vienna court is back of it. This rather looks as though the smaller powers were glad to seek the cover of any excuse offered, for the report might have been the work of Prussian emissaries. This report of the Regency summarizes what Ompteda had reported to them. Dec. 16, 1794, Hardenberg reports from Vienna that Prussian agents are busy spreading the report that Thugut has sent an agent to Basel (his secretary, Bellain) to conclude a separate peace for Austria. *Cal. Br. Arch. Des 24, Brand.-Preuss., No. 546.*

of that time¹ we must take the utterances of the putting diet at Regensburg as one main gauge of the political thinking of the Empire, and certainly at Regensburg a peace policy—whether Prussian or Imperial—found much support.

The negotiations of Prussia at Basel had been opened under the guise of an exchange of prisoners.² Moellendorf and the peace party had gained the consent of Frederick William II to that form of action, and Basel had been selected because of the presence there of Barthélemy, a skillful French diplomat of the old school. But the earlier Prussian agents, Schmerz, a wine-dealer of Kreuznach, and Meyerinck, an adjutant of Moellendorf's, had materially injured Prussia's cause by making plain to the French the division in the camp of the allies.³

Despite such blunders in the early negotiations the peace party remained in the ascendant, and in December, Count Goltz, the former Prussian ambassador at

¹ On the creation of a nascent public opinion in North Germany by the French Revolution and the publications of Schlözer see Weiland, *Festrede an d. Georg. Augustus Universität* (Göttingen) den 4. Juni, 1889.

² v. Lenthe's despatches of Nov. 18 and Dec. 6, 1794, report the sending of Major Meyerinck to Basel to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, but as, according to v. Lenthe, that was already well settled, the real object of the mission, he concluded, was to find out on what condition France would make peace. *Cal. Br. Arch. Des. 24, Brandenburg-Preuss., 546. (Hanover.)*

Moellendorff had secretly opened communications with Barthélemy in opposition to King Frederick William II's wish. Cf. Sorel in the *Rev. Hist.*, v, 284, and Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 223. Bailleu in the *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895, p. 245 *et seq.* One is reminded of von Berenhorst's remark made ten years later: "Preussen ist nicht ein Land, das eine Armee hat, sondern eine Armee, die ein Land hat." Quoted by Havemann, *Gesch. Hannover*, p. 38.

³ For an account of the influences leading Frederick William to open negotiations, see Bailleu, *sup. cit.*

Paris, was sent to Basel. His instructions, dated Dec. 7, 1794, had been prepared from a draft made by the uncle of the king, Prince Henry.¹ They directed Count Goltz to secure a cessation of hostilities, and promise a recognition of the Republic, but not an active alliance. Prussia desired the evacuation of its provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, and the granting of neutrality and an armistice to the German princes who should come under the aegis of Prussia. Further the king wished to play the role of mediator of an Imperial peace if the French were favorably inclined—indeed, he was willing to put his services as mediator at the disposal of Austria, England, Spain and Sardinia. Prussia would acquiesce in yielding Belgium to France and assigning Salzburg to Austria as a recompense. On the suggestion of Haugwitz, as mediator, it was decided to await the action of France before they determined to cede the left bank of the Rhine.²

Goltz arrived in Basel December 28th,³ and from then until his death, February 6, 1795, carried on the negotiations with Barthélemy.⁴ Encouraged by the success of their arms in Holland, the French were able to meet with firmness the Prussian demands outlined above. They would not hear of a cessation of hostilities, and demanded the active alliance of Prussia with the French Republic. Matters moved but slowly, and so new instruc-

¹ The political activity of this prince, a brother of Frederick the Great, has just been made the basis of a work to which I have not had access, *i. e.*, R. Krauel, *Prinz Heinrich von Preussen als Politiker* (Berlin, 1902).

² Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 112, 113.

³ *Papiers de Barthélemy*, iv, 515.

⁴ Harnier, a Prussian agent, had been sent to Paris to negotiate there in order to hasten matters. Cf. Ranke, *Complete Works*, vol. xlvi, p. 232.

tions were sent Count Goltz on January 28, 1795.¹ The chief point in the new instructions was the embodiment of Haugwitz's suggestion that the cession of the left bank of the Rhine on which France insisted be postponed to a general convention between France and the Empire.² This, in view of the news just brought by Harnier direct from Paris as to the firmness of the Committee of Public Safety, was approved by Haugwitz's colleagues, Finckenstein and Alvensleben.³ Haugwitz's plan was in the nature of a compromise, for Alvensleben desired the continuation of the war.⁴ Haugwitz's compromise covered the ideas of the king in the matter and so was embodied in the new instructions.

Barthélemy did not arrive in Basel until January 12, 1795. Full powers were exchanged on January 26, but negotiations were delayed by the illness of Goltz and their conclusion postponed by the death of the Prussian negotiator on the night of February 5 and 6. Count Hardenberg, who succeeded Count Goltz, arrived on March 18th.⁵

Many and various are the motives which have influenced the negotiators thus far, and this complication of

¹ Sybel, *Gesch. d. Rev.*, iii, 367 (4th edition).

² Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, iv, 253, 254.

³ One needs to bear in mind the peculiar organization of the Prussian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. There were three men, all dealing with foreign affairs, and each directly responsible to the king. Cf. Tuttle's *Hist. of Prussia*, ii, 113, or Hüffer, *Die Kabinettsregierung in Preussen und J. W. Lombard* (Leipzig, 1891).

⁴ Hüffer: *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 114. Bailleu, *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895, 238, says he agreed essentially with Alvensleben.

⁵ Despatch from Hinüber dated March 20. The despatch puts the first meeting of the diplomats on the 19th at a social function given by a third party. Hinüber was present and anxious to obtain a private interview with Hardenberg, but was unable to do it in the presence of the company owing to Hardenberg's deafness.

interests will continue to control their policies throughout the period of treaty-making at Basel. The desire in the Empire for peace, the division between the allies, Austria and Prussia, the ambition of Frederick William II to figure as the mediator of an Imperial peace, the empty Prussian treasury, the desire of the French to break the coalition against them, to gain the Rhine boundary and establish peace, to restore commerce with the Hansa cities and strike England through Hanover, the need of devising something as a salve to Prussia for the humiliation of yielding her own possessions beyond the Rhine, something that would present her to the Empire as its pacifier and not its destroyer, the practical necessity of definiteness in the terms by which the German states were to be neutralized, the remnants of the feeling expressed in the *Fürstenbund*—all these circumstances and motives go to explain the acts and policies with which this chapter deals.¹

With the appearance of Hardenberg as Prussia's negotiator we are able to take up the genesis of the idea of neutralization of north Germany and the establishment of a demarcation line. This is the important phase of the treaty of Basel from the Hanoverian point of view.

The first instructions of Goltz² of December 8, 1794,

¹Von Cölln, *Vertraute Briefe über die inneren Verhältnisse am preussischen Hofe seit dem Tode Friederichs des Grossen*, (Amsterdam and Cologne, 1807), vol. i, p. 110, gives the following explanation: "Das unglückliche Neutralitätssystem ist die Frucht der Eifersucht zwischen dem Adel und dem dritten Stand. Jener wünschte theils aus Persönlichkeit, theils weil er seine rohen Producte an die Engländer verkauft, einen Krieg gegen Frankreich, dieser aus der industriösen und literarischen Classe bestehend, wünschte eine Alliance mit Frankreich, die Regierung stets von beiden Parteyen angegangen, schlägt den Mittelweg ein, und bleibt neutral."

²See Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 228 ff. and Häusser, i, 586-587. The summary given by Sorel in the *Rev. Hist.*, vi, 228, follows the above

had included as one of the principal objects of his negotiations securing the consent of France to the mediation of the king of Prussia for such other members of the Empire as should desire to make peace with France in this way. To these principalities, such as Franconia, the Upper Rhine Circle, Hesse, Trier, Zweibrücken, etc., amnesty and neutrality were to be granted until the conclusion of the peace. The assumption was that the French would not be opposed to any movement by which the states of the Empire came to look to Prussia as their protector. It gave expression to Frederick William II's favorite idea of effecting through his mediation a peace for the Empire.¹ But the hopes of the king were shattered by the firmness with which the French opposed mediation; the Committee of Public Safety preferred to deal directly with the individual members of the Empire and refused to consider an armistice.² Moreover, the Committee, supported by the victories in Holland, and secure in the feeling that the pressure for peace was strong enough in the Empire to secure their demands,³ sent Harnier back with that answer, and they insisted further

works. Haugwitz's deception of the English regarding the object of Count Goltz's mission is revealed in his declaration to Lord Spencer that "the business had been undertaken with the Emperor in consequence of the requisition of the Germanic body. . . . He assured me . . . that Goltz's instructions were confined to the inquiry how far it might be practicable to obtain an armistice for the Empire which might eventually bring about a general pacification." Lord Spencer (from Berlin), Jan. 10, 1795. *Auckland Papers*, vol. lx. (*British Museum, Additional Mss.*).

¹See Art. 2 of the instructions to Goltz in Kaulek, *Papiers de Barthélemy*, iv, 582.

²This was the reply both to Harnier (*Cf.* Ranke as below) and to Goltz, *Papiers de Barthélemy*, iv, 578, 580.

³Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 234.

that the Rhine must be France's boundary. Barthélemy, on January 24th, gave Goltz essentially the same reply. Goltz was told that France would be glad to treat for peace with the several states of the Empire alone, or in conjunction with Prussia.¹ Mediation by Prussia seemed to have received its quietus.

The second set of instructions for Goltz, dated January 26, are not to my knowledge in print.² We are assured that they yielded on the point of the armistice, and, as stated, postponed the question of ceding the left bank of the Rhine until a general pacification of France and the Empire should decide the matter. Mediation and neutralization seem also to have remained in abeyance until Hardenberg's appearance as Prussia's envoy.

Goltz on his way south had stopped to talk with Hardenberg, and the latter soon after sent to Frederick William a memorial containing his views on the peace. This interesting paper from the ex-Hanoverian is printed in the memoirs of that officious disciple of "the divine Machiavelli," Colonel von Massenbach.³

The paper is dated January 13, 1795, from Frankfort on the Main. After a sweeping review of the European situation as a necessary preliminary to determining the best policy for Prussia, Hardenberg concludes that the country needs a peace which does not involve the danger of a still more disadvantageous war in the immediate future. After considering the possible lines of action

¹ "M. de Goltz a paru charmé de cette déclaration puis qu'elle laisse à sa Cour quelque moyens de jouer un rôle auprès de ses Co-états." Barthélemy to the Com. of Pub. Safety, January 24, 1795. Barthélemy, iv, 580.

² They are summarized in Sybel, iii, p. 353. Dated Jan. 28.

³ See Massenbach, *Memoiren zur Geschichte des preuss. Staates unter den Regierungen Frederick Wilhelm II., and Friedrich Wilhelm III.*, vol. ii, appendix ii. (Amsterdam, 1809.)

with peace in view, he discards the idea of an alliance with France as "faithless, dishonorable and unpolitic." A second possible policy, and the one preferred by Hardenberg, would be for Prussia to secure neutrality for itself and the members of the Empire who have appealed to it, and to do this without alienating the allies, especially Russia, in Polish matters. This means that France must be willing to give up the idea of the Rhine as a boundary, and that Prussia could explain to its allies its reasons for seeking peace. If, says Hardenberg, Prussia withdraws without an understanding with Russia or the Empire, she is making a most daring move.

Suppose, however, that neutrality is established in the way mentioned above, how is it to be maintained? If Austria continues the war, Prussia cannot permit violations of its neutrality by the passage through the neutralized territory of the troops of either belligerent. The best means of maintaining the established neutrality would be by Armies of Observation, each to be supported by France and Prussia on their respective boundaries. The Prussian corps ought to consist of from 18,000 to 20,000 men, including the quotas of the other states declared neutral, in which category Hardenberg names Saxony, Mainz, Trier, Hessen, Baden and Würtemberg. Prussia ought further to put a corps in Westphalia and in Frankenland, and then withdraw the rest of its army within its own boundaries.

As the third case to be considered, Hardenberg names the continuation of the war. If this contingency arises the war must be defensive.¹

These ideas evidently met the general approval of

¹This brief summary is based on the text of the memoirs given by Massenbach, vol. ii, appendix xi.

King Frederick William II., for their propounder was commissioned as Goltz's successor. With the appearance of Hardenberg as negotiator, the subject of the neutrality of North Germany, defined and defended by a demarcation line, becomes one of the leading subjects for discussion.¹

At the very first meeting with Barthélemy on March 19,² Hardenberg proposes "as an object of mutual benefit to neutralize *de ce côté là* the north of Germany,"³ its tranquillity to be maintained by a cordon concerted with France. This, he urged, would be an advantage for France, for it would allow her to turn her arms against Austria. Barthélemy's cautious reply was that the system of neutrality would not, in general, be accepted by France, and could not be a point in the pacification. It might, however, be a subject of arrangement between the respective generals.⁴ On March 22, Barthélemy transmits

¹ It was one of the three main points in his instructions. Cf. Bourgoing, *sup. cit.*, 161, 162. Häusser says the Demarcation Line was the only point Haugwitz was willing to make a stand for. *Deutsch. Gesch.*, i⁴, 594. Hardenberg was verbally instructed to promise that Prussia would take Hanover *en dépôt* if France desired it. See letter of king to Hardenberg. Barthélemy, v, 149.

² Barthélemy, v, 116 *et seq.* Bourgoing misreads the despatch and gives March 20. Vivenot in his *Herzog Albrecht v. Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, 140, prints Hardenberg's arrival March 8, 1795, ten days too early.

³ *Papiers de Barthélemy*, v, 117. Hardenberg's instructions were to present this matter which had already been suggested by Moellendorf, and was an idea which Harnier and Barthélemy had discussed. *Rev. Hist.*, vii, 319. (Summary of H.'s instructions.)

⁴ Concerning the nature of Moellendorf's proposition see Barthélemy, v, 108. On March 18, Moellendorf wrote the French General Jordan that he (M.) would have his troops scrupulously observe the terms of the negotiation at Basel and expected the same from the French "En conséquence je vous avertis, Monsieur le général, que le but de la marche de l'armée prussienne dans ces contrées est d'éloigner les troupes étrangères des États du roi et de tirer ensuite la ligne de démarcation

to the Committee of Public Safety the outline of Hardenberg's plan of neutralization.¹ The English troops in the Lower Rhine region were to be embarked for home, the Hanoverian forces to be confined within their own boundaries. The encampment of Moellendorff's soldiers and those of the French were fixed, and the following territory was to be neutralized: The Rhine from the Wesel to mouth of the Lahn opposite Coblenz; a diagonal to be drawn from there to Frankfort; the line to run from that city to the principalities of Darmstadt and Franconia, which were to be included in neutral territory. All the German states in this line, particularly the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, were to withdraw their troops from the imperial army. Every facility would be given the French army for prosecuting its siege of Mainz. Barthélemy's reply was that he could not conclude the matter without instructions from Paris or information from the French generals; that such a proposition was new matter introduced with a view to delaying the negotiations.² His objection was that Prussia had proposed

désignée et convenue déjà en général à Bâle, mais dont il nous reste encore à convenir ensemble des détails." (See Barthélemy, v, 123.) This, it will be noticed, was on the day before Hardenberg's first conference with Barthélemy. France had already shown a willingness to confer with Moellendorf, Barthélemy, v, 127, *et seq.*

¹ When Hardenberg outlined his proposals for neutralization, he was told by Bacher that Moellendorf had proposed a project of neutralization much like Hardenberg's, and that it was considered by the French as a matter to be arranged by the generals. Hardenberg spoke cavalierly of the general and his project. The proposals his government had ordered him (Hardenberg) to make had nothing in common with M.'s plan he said. Barthélemy, v, 128.

² Sybel says that Barthélemy proposed a demarcation line as a good way for avoiding friction between the troops. With this idea Haugwitz agreed. This action of Barthélemy's, Sybel places in the period between the death of Goltz and the arrival of Hardenberg. See Sybel,

it as an indispensable article just as they were about to sign, and it appeared to him that such an arrangement would be more acceptable after the treaty had been concluded. Hardenberg replied that he must insist upon such an article as part of the treaty, and that it had been an essential part of the instructions of his predecessor, Goltz, to insist upon this point.¹

Barthélemy was surprised, vexed, suspicious. In view of Goltz's failure to insist upon any demarcation line, he was inclined to consider it a move made by Hardenberg on his own responsibility, and arising out of his desire to save his native land, Hanover. From the first Barthélemy laid emphasis on Hardenberg's birth and training as an explanation of his interest in securing the neutrality of the Electorate and its neighbors.² There was much to justify such a view of the Prussian envoy's conduct, but the situation was too serious, the import of the policy of neutralized North Germany too far-reaching, to justify referring it to the particularistic spirit of an agent. Certainly Hardenberg, whatever may have been his motives, was almost suspiciously frank in avowing himself a Hanoverian. In an interview with Bacher,

Gesch. d. Revolutionszeit, iii, 370 (4th ed.). The evidence of the Barthélemy papers is all against this statement. Barthélemy's project of a treaty in the first part of March has no such plan. Barthélemy, v, 102; see also Barthélemy, v, 117. Thugut, in a letter to Starhemberg, the Austrian ambassador in London, July 11, 1795, says: "Depuis est survenue la ligne de démarcation prussienne que la cour de Berlin affirme d'avoir été provoqué par une note de la Régence d'Hanover en date du 2 de mars." Vivenot-Zeissberg, *Quellen zur Gesch. d. Politik.*, iii. 290, 291. The idea of an armistice, as has been suggested, has in it the germ of a demarcation line. See Meyerinck to Bacher, Dec. 7, 1794, in Barthélemy, v, 30, 31.

¹ Barthélemy, v, 128.

² *Ibid.*, v, 113 (compare pp. 125, 126), 117, 118, 130, 131, 206.

the French attaché, he declared that "although he is serving the Prussian * * * * government, he is by no means Prussian, nor is he in any degree English; but that he is a good German, and above all a good Hanoverian; that in interesting himself earnestly for the tranquillity of Germany, he is more particularly interested in that of Hanover, and that he sincerely hopes the present situation of affairs will give the Electorate an almost absolute independence from England."¹

Such open avowals, sincere as they may well have been, could not long have served to explain a national policy to such an able diplomat as Barthélemy. The French ambassador was not long without evidence that the Prussian king was decidedly in earnest in his desire to cover his own withdrawal by securing the neutrality of the North of Germany. Through the kindness of Hardenberg, Barthélemy was able to transmit to the Committee of Public Safety a copy of an important letter of Frederick William's dated March 24, and addressed to Hardenberg. The most notable passage stated the king's views on the subjects of neutrality and a demarcation line, which, said the king, "I still regard as the most important point of all. I am resolved not to abate from it, and, though feeling quite sure it will meet with more opposition, I am far from losing faith in your ability to achieve success."² From this letter and from the attitude and arguments of Hardenberg, the Committee could easily convince itself that Prussia stood firmly for two things, the secrecy of the cession of the

¹ Barthélemy, v, 148. See Hardenberg's comments on his instructions in Ranke, *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenbergs*, i, 289.

² *Ibid.*, v, 149. Barthélemy had already given the Committee his view, that a demarcation line was an irrevocable part of Hardenberg's instructions. *Ibid.*, v, 133.

Prussian provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, and the establishment of a demarcation line whose maintenance would create a sort of Prussian hegemony.

The picture we get of the situation at the time of Prussia's negotiations at Basel, is that of King Frederick William II. still leaning towards the alliance against France, but drawn into negotiations with that power by his ministry and by a certain clique in the army reinforced by the king's uncle, Prince Henry of Prussia.¹ The king is forced by domestic conditions and by the complications in Poland,² now aggravated by the treaty of January 3, 1795, between Russia and Austria, to secure free hands to protect the interests nearest his heart, the acquisition of territory in Poland. To do this, he must pacify the French who want peace but who demand with it the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, hitherto an integral part of the Empire and a region in which Prussia had dependencies. In other words, Frederick William II. met the claim of the French for the Rhine as

¹ "Il (Harnier) rejette bien loin l'idée qu'elle puisse accepter de nouveau un subside anglais. Il dit que dans le temps de la conclusion du traité de subside, il occasiona une indignation universelle à Berlin et à l'armée, qu' il se forma une petite coalition contre cet arrangement, que le Prince Henri avec le maréchal Moellendorf et quelques vieux généraux du feu roi, firent tout ce qu'il falloit pour empêcher que les conditions n'en fussent remplis; qu'ils parvinrent même à faire intriguer à Londres et à y inspirer une telle défiance contre le roi de Prusse, que le gouvernement anglais lui-même rompit le traité en ne payant les subsides jusqu'au 1^{er} novembre (v. s.) tandis qu'il étoit stipulé qu'ils servent jusqu'au 1^{er} decembre. Il ajoute que ce procédé anglais a été un moyen puissant dont s'est servi le parti sage de sa cour pour animer le roi de Prusse contre le cabinet britannique et qu'il n'a pas peu contribué à lui faire prendre la ferme résolution de faire la paix avec la France." Barthélemy to Committee of Public Safety, March 16, 1795, v, 114. Wöllner's appeal to the King to abandon the allies is in *Hist. Zeit.*, 62, 285.

² Barthélemy, v, 18.

a boundary with the counter-claim of a protectorate over those states desiring to leave the leadership of Austria and conclude peace with France. If he were reproached for betraying the Empire by a separate peace,¹ and for violating its constitution by acquiescing in the cession of part of its territory, he could hush complaint by the gratitude of the states of the Empire already safely walled behind a Prussian demarcation line,² and by beginning negotiations looking to an Imperial peace under the leadership of Prussia.³ If this were accomplished, Frederick William could view with satisfaction his own part in the matter. Moreover, now that the magic word secularization had been spoken at Paris,⁴ it looked as though Prussia would obtain a considerable advantage from the cession of her provinces beyond the Rhine for which an abundant recompense might be given her in territorial gains nearer home.⁵

What arguments and conditions could Prussia present which would bring the Committee of Public Safety, in spite of their *ultimatum* of March 10,⁶ to accept the

¹ King Frederick William's reluctance to be a despoiler of the Empire finds frequent expression in Hardenberg's representations, see *e. g.*, Barthélemy, v, 170.

² Barthélemy v, 130, 261, Vivenot-Zeissberg, *Quellen zur Gesch. d. Politik Oesterreichs*, iii, 326.

³ Moellendorf writing in November of 1794 says most of the states of the Empire, even whole circles, have claimed the mediation of Prussia without waiting the action of the Diet. Barthélemy, v, 17.

⁴ French reply to Harnier in January, 1795, Bourgoing, *sup. cit.* 133.

⁵ This view of the inseparability in the Prussian plan of balancing their blow at the Empire, with which Austria could indict them, by a demarcation line that gave Prussia a better place in the Empire and a claim on the gratitude of the states benefited, is presented quite clearly in Hardenberg's interview with Barthélemy March 25, see Barthélemy, v, 130-133. It is essential to an understanding of King Frederick William's position.

⁶ Barthélemy, v, 106, III.

policy proposed by Hardenberg, that is, the policy of a neutral North Germany?

A glance at the military situation in the early spring of 1795 shows a French army so disposed as to invade Westphalia at any moment. On the other hand the Hanoverians were making energetic efforts to put themselves in a state of defence,¹ and in this they had the assistance of English soldiers and mercenaries in an attempt to run a cordon from Emden to Münster.² This meant that France must maintain a large force here to watch the allies which it might otherwise employ against Austria. Suppose the French troops should advance? Hardenberg pictured Hanover as on the verge of a revolution that would surely break out at their first approach. Such an outbreak could not but prove detrimental to the Republic's cause. It would be equally injurious to the neighboring Prussian states, to which it would surely spread. The king of Prussia could see but one thing to prevent this catastrophe, that was the neutralization of north Germany.

From the political point of view, so ran Hardenberg's argument, France was to think what a superb rôle she would attribute to the king of Prussia and share with him in creating such a neutrality. It would instantly determine all the princes of the Empire who longed so much for peace "to throw themselves into the arms of Prussia in order to find their way to the arms of France, and the final result of such action, isolating the Court of Vienna, would put it in a most embarrassing position and deal it a mortal blow,"³ It

¹ Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, i, 168 *et seq.*

² Barthélemy, v, 122.

³ *Ibid.*, v, 132. Sorel, in the *Rev. Hist.*, vii, 333, sums up the arguments for the demarcation line as Hardenberg viewed it.

would sever all connections between England and Hanover and free France from all embarrassment from that side. Hardenberg solemnly assured Barthélemy that this separation of the Electorate from Great Britain would be done in a way that France could approve. What more could France desire on this point; for King Frederick William could not suppose the French wished to devastate Hanover and incite a revolution there; furthermore he could not permit it.¹ On the demarcation line Hardenberg was instructed to stand firm—the alternative was war—an alternative the king would regret, but which he would push with all necessary energy.²

To put Hanover behind a neutralizing demarcation line would allow France to kill four birds with one stone. It would be a blow at the reigning family of her arch-enemy, England,³ then active in Hanover, and at its coadjutors, the Emigrants;⁴ it would placate Prussia; it would weaken Austria; it made possible the disposal of the Stadtholder, to whom Hanover, when once taken *en dépôt* by Prussia, might finally be given as an indemnification.⁵ Another element was the untrammeling of

¹ King Frederick William to Hardenberg, March 24. Barthélemy, v, 149.

² Same to Reden, Hanoverian minister. Malmesbury, *Diaries*, etc., iii, 206. Barthélemy, v, 150, also 137. The general view has always been that if Hardenberg had been backed by the war alternative, he could have made better terms.

³ Barthélemy, v, 252.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, 153, 154. Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, i, 195.

⁵ That such a plan is in the minds of the French at this time is shown clearly, Barthélemy, v, 205, 206, 227. Prussia was suspected of having a similar plan now and later; *Ibid.*, v, 153-4. The French agent in Bremen says: "On croit cet arrangement d'autant plus aisé que la nation anglaise ne demanderait pas mieux que de se débarrasser de cet électorat qui lui coûte tant de sang et de trésors et qui donne toujours une grande importance au roi." The writer of this despatch sadly lacked history and humor.

the commerce of the Hanseatic cities—a decisive motive now, as well as later, in determining French, Prussian, English and Russian policies toward north Germany.¹

Barthélemy was quick to see what Prussia was aiming at in the policy of neutrality, and paid Berlin statesmanship the compliment of calling their plan a most skillful move.² From a diplomatic neutrality on the matter, Barthélemy passed to the advocacy of the Prussian idea.

The Committee of Public Safety was at first strongly hostile to the scheme. It would trammel all their military operations, and then they said, "Where is there a Frenchman who would forgive them for neutralizing a state (Hanover) dependent upon England?" But their haste to close the negotiations,³ the advantages presented by Hardenberg,⁴ the firmness of King Frederick William in making this an ultimatum, as well as the course of events in France itself, where the struggle of factions was making the tenure of the Committee more and more uncertain, led them to yield, and on March 31 they instructed Barthélemy to agree to the Demarcation Line.⁵ Thus the treaty was signed April 5, 1795.⁶

The conclusion of the treaty met with a general favor

¹ Suggestive on this point are the references in Barthélemy, v, 132, 195, 196, 289. Hanoverian troops had just seized Bremen and Ritzebüttel, Hamburg's seaport. For the proclamation of Frederick William II. severing the relations between Hamburg and France, see *A Collection of State Papers Relative to the War against France*. London, 1794.

² Barthélemy, v, 134.

³ *Ibid.*, v, III, 135, 182.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, 136.

⁵ *Ibid.*. Reasons for assenting to such an extension of the Demarcation Line, v, 169. Prussian point of view, same vol., 134, 147.

⁶ For map of Demarcation Line *cf.* Vivenot, vol. ii. The area included in the neutral zone is, in general, that covered by the North German Confederation of 1866.

in Germany—the most notable exception being the head of the Prussian state, who seems to have wished more or less openly that the negotiations would fail.¹ The interest of Frederick William was not and never had been in the negotiations at Basel. It was the vision which the ministry had so skillfully placed before him, namely, that of playing the role of prince of the peace, which had induced him to send Goltz on his mission. Often, very often, the vision grew dim, seemed like an air-castle to the king.² The clink of English gold might have dispelled the vision forever and restored the king to the First Coalition, but the English ministry delayed, and when their offer of subsidies came, it was too late.³

¹ *Paget Papers*, i, pp. 71–105 *passim*.

Journals and Correspondence of Lord Auckland, iii, 299–300, London, 1860–1862.

² His own phrase. See *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895, p. 268.

³ Never in all the weeks of the negotiations at Basel did Lord Henry Spencer, the English ambassador at Berlin, despair of winning the Prussian king again to the allies' cause. He believed that a subsidy sufficient to relieve Prussia's needs would accomplish this end by allowing Frederick William to gratify his desire to win glory at the head of his army on the Rhine. Of Bischoffswerder's influence Lord Spencer felt sure. It was Schulenburg and "his tribe" that he feared. On February 27, 1795, Spencer writes: "So great is His Prussian Majesty's personal eagerness to make another campaign that I believe it would be still possible to carry that point in opposition to Prince Henry and all the ministry, if I were to receive immediate instructions for that purpose." (*Auckland Papers*, vol. lx.) Hope was renewed when Hardenberg was appointed. "M. de Hardenberg is, I believe, the only one of the King of Prussia's ministers who concurs in His Majesty's wish to continue the war. He, however, agrees in the perfectly evident necessity of an immediate peace if no offers of subsidy are made by England . . ." (March 10.) On March 24, Spencer writes: "M. de Hardenberg, who still continues to entertain hopes of relief from England, has lengthened out his journey (so) as not to arrive at Basel before the 19th of this month. He will continue to observe a similar conduct during the first few days of the conferences, but if at the end of

The rather hastily-concluded treaty of April 5¹ made

that time he perceives that no offers will be made to Prussia, he will be obliged, both by his duty and by a sense of the distress situation of his country, to think of nothing but making the best terms he can with the French."—*Auckland Papers, Additional Mss., Brit. Museum*, vol. lx.

This hope of delay on Hardenberg's part probably came from the Duke of Brunswick, who was disgruntled with the prevailing views at Berlin. Malmesbury, then in Hanover, writes Grenville the news of Hardenberg's instructions, direct from Hardenberg, "who is an open, communicative man." Hardenberg had stopped at Brunswick, and Malmesbury's words, "direct from Hardenberg," suggest the Duke as the medium of communication. It is, however, Gervinus, "much more artful and able" than Hardenberg, who says directly that Hardenberg will delay negotiations with France in the hope of an agreement being reached between England and Prussia. Malmesbury, March 18, and April 6, 1795, *English Record Office, F. O. Prussia* 36. The manoeuvres of the anti-war cabal to induce the King to conclude peace, and the intentions of Hardenberg to delay negotiations, show how weak and unsteady was the guiding hand in the Prussian state. For other references to Hardenberg's intentions to delay the treaty see *Rev. Hist.*, vii, 321-336.

The English ministry was finally induced to propose anew a subsidy treaty. On April 10, the very day when Lord Spencer is writing from Berlin, that on the advice of the Duke of Brunswick he is going to approach Frederick William, even if peace is already concluded, the British ministry sent him a draft of a treaty that he is "without loss of time (to) communicate in the most secret and confidential manner . . . to the court of Berlin." (*Auckland Papers*, lx, (*Spencer's Letter Book*) *Brit. Museum, Additional Mss.*) The step was taken too late. On April 12, Meyerinck arrived in Berlin with the treaty of Basel and its general purport was known to Spencer two days later. On July 8, 1795 (*F. O.—Prussia*, vol. xxxviii), Mr. Gray, Spencer's successor, wrote that the king of Prussia "would certainly have acceded to the proposals brought by Col. Calvert if they had come a month sooner."

¹ See Barthélemy's reply to the criticisms of the Committee of Public Safety, *Papiers de Barthélemy*, v, 182. Lord Spencer writing from Berlin, June 9, 1795, says: "M. de Hardenberg has assured a person at this place that if he had been allowed more time, he could have obtained infinitely more favorable terms for Prussia, even a stipulation in favor of Holland, but that his orders to sign the treaty without delay were so pressing and so constantly repeated that he could not

mention of future arrangements as to the removal of the theatre of war from north Germany.¹ The necessities of the re-established freedom of commerce, and of providing for exigencies arising under the Demarcation Line, made a more definite arrangement advisable.²

At Berlin the feeling was that Hardenberg had made Prussia assume too large a load of responsibility, when he gave the Demarcation Line such an extent and made Prussia responsible for the neutrality of all the states behind it.³ The elector of Saxony had not as yet expressed approval of the Prussian policy, or sought Prussian mediation.⁴ If it came to a question of forcing him to acquiesce, in addition to taking Hanover *en dépôt*,⁵ and facing possible complications arising from this, the treaty would furnish Prussia with anything but the benefits of undisturbed peace. The Berlin statesmen wanted such a modification of the Demarcation Line as would make Prussia responsible for the acquiescence to the treaty of Basel of a much smaller area.⁶

take it on himself to disobey them. He attributes the excessive precipitation entirely to the haughty and menacing language of the two Imperial courts." *Auckland Papers*, vol. xl (*Brit. Museum*).

¹ See article vii of the open treaty. De Clerq, i, 243.

² Sorel in an article on "*La Neutralité du Nord de l'Allemagne* (*Revue Hist.*, xvii), gives an account of the negotiations after April 5, 1795.

³ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 298.

⁴ Barthélemy tells the Committee of Public Safety on May 13, that Hardenberg has assured him that the Elector of Saxony acquiesced in article III, and had written to Vienna favoring peace. Barthélemy, v, 252.

⁵ Hardenberg had been assuring Barthélemy that Hanover would accede to the neutrality stipulations (see Barthélemy, v, 204, 213), and that there was nothing to be feared from Hanover despite the disturbances at Bremen. Barthélemy, v, 184.

⁶ *Ibid.*, v, 197, 203.

The French dissatisfaction was with the fact that King Frederick William's promise to take Hanover *en dépôt*, if the French demanded it, was not made an integral part of the treaty. If Hardenberg was willing to give promises to that effect after the treaty negotiations were closed, why, inquired the Committee, had the clause not been incorporated in the instrument of peace?¹

Hanover was the key to the commerce of north Germany. Its location commanded the mouth of the Weser and Elbe, and it lay within striking distance of the course of the Ems. At the mouth of Weser was the Hanseatic city of Bremen; at the mouth of the Elbe was Hamburg; Lübeck, the third great Hanseatic city, lay just beyond Hanoverian borders. The great commercial routes from these cities to Cologne, to Frankfort, to Leipzig and southeastern Europe, passed through the electoral possessions of George the Third.² No wonder, then, that the desire to secure such commercial advantages played a large part in leading the French to approve King Frederick William's policy of neutralization.³ The seizure of Bremen and Hamburg by the Hanoverian troops, and their general activity which threatens the tranquillity of the north, led the Committee to appeal to Prussia to interfere in the purpose of keeping their ports open. To quote their language, "This last point is of the greatest importance to the republic and nothing in the world is more urgent."⁴

¹ Barthélemy, v, 174. King Frederick William had promised it in his letter of March 24, 1795. *Ibid.*, v, 148.

² The diplomatic notes prepared by v. der Decken in 1803 in the effort to induce Russia to interfere in Hanover's behalf against the French occupation, present these points elaborately and forcefully.

³ Barthélemy, v, 179.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, 237. Committee to Barthélemy, May 10, 1795.

Both were anxious to conclude the negotiations so that the treaty might be published.¹ France would thus be assured of its commercial advantages, and Prussia would be able to take open measures to secure the acquiescence of states within the Demarcation Line, and thus check the agents of Austria who were busy arousing these states against Prussia and urging on them an Austrian alliance as the only means of safety.²

Despite the real desire of both parties to conclude the *convention additionnelle*, it was not signed until May 17th,³ the delay being due to the fact that the Committee of Public Safety did not desire to agree to the modification of the Demarcation Line until it had the assurance of its generals that the French military operations would not be hampered by the new line.⁴

¹Barthélemy, v, 175, 179, 189, 209, 223, 226. The excessive haste of Prussia in wishing to circulate some sort of treaty is illustrated in their giving out a *convention additionnelle* which had not been agreed to by Barthélemy. See Barthélemy, v, 241-243. A copy of the false *convention additionnelle* was forwarded by von Lenthe from Berlin on May 5, 1795. The actual contents of the treaty of May 17th do not seem to have been known in Hanover until 1797. In June, of 1795, Haugwitz solemnly denied that there were any provisions other than those made public.

²Barthélemy, v, 255. For Austrian anger at Prussia's action *cf.* p. 215 of vol. v. Lehrbach was the Austrian agent and was not as successful as the allies had hoped he would be. The excuse of the states who turned to Prussia was that in their weakened state they could be no help to the Emperor and only expose themselves to further danger. *Cf.* despatch of R. Heathcote, English agent to Cologne and Cassel. *Eng. Record Office*, July 21, 1795. On Hardenberg's efforts to further Prussia's cause see Vivenot, *Albrecht v. Sachsen-Teschen*, etc., ii, pt. 2, VIII Abschnitt.

³Barthélemy, v, 269.

⁴The Committee's explanation of their delay is given in Barthélemy, v, 228, 237. The advice of Pichegru—favorable to the Demarcation Line (see Barthélemy, v, 239-243)—arrived too late (Barthélemy, v, 263), for the Committee sent their assent (Barthélemy, v, 269) without waiting

The *convention additionnelle* of May 17th¹ consisted of a group of open articles and two secret articles. The two new points in the open articles are the fact that the King of Prussia only binds himself to force neutrality on the states behind the demarcation line and on the right bank of the Main, and that four military routes from Frankfort to Coblenz and Cologne are specified² along which the French and the imperial troops could move through the neutral territory. The two secret articles relate to the electorate of Hanover and the city of Frankfort.³ By the first⁴ the King of Prussia promised to occupy Hanover if it did not accede to the neutrality arranged for it. France was thus to be more effectively protected from all contemplated hostile enterprises of the Hanoverian government.

On April 14, 1795, Hinüber, the Hanoverian agent on watch in Basel, arrived in Hanover with a copy of the treaty and secret articles of the peace signed April 5. Hardenberg had made the treaty known to him on the 8th, and in a burst of pleased confidence had told Hinüber that "he considered it the most fortunate

longer (Barthélemy, v, 255). The treaty was signed as soon as the approval of the Committee reached Barthélemy, May 17.

¹ See Barthélemy, v, 270-272 (inc.), or De Clerq, i, 242 *et seq.*, for copy of this treaty, Historians often refer to this and the treaty of April 5th as one and the same instrument.

² See Barthélemy, v, 204, 263.

³ As to the object of the article on Frankfort see Barthélemy, v, 204. The secret provision as to taking Hanover *en dépôt* was first communicated to the Regency by Ompteda in his despatch of May 12, 1799. [*Hanover Archives.*]

⁴ The article reads. "Dans le cas que le gouvernement de Hanovre se refusât à la neutralité, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse s'engage à prendre l'Électorat de Hanovre en dépôt, afin de garantir d'autant plus efficacement la République française de toute entreprise hostile de la part de ce gouvernement."

moment of his life in that, while performing the service due the king he now served, he was able to follow the desire he always had of aiding his native land (Hanover) and the government he had once served." The plan of the treaty was his alone, as he had outlined it at his last visit to Berlin, and as it had been approved by the king and Haugwitz despite the efforts of the opposition party, which did not wish to give the demarcation line such an extent. The turn of affairs in Paris had helped him secure such favorable terms.¹

Hardenberg then allowed Hinüber to copy the treaty in his (Hardenberg's) room on promise that it would be shown only to the Hanoverian ministry. The latter immediately sent a copy to King George, calling his especial attention to the secret articles.² This information of the contents of the treaty given Hinüber by Hardenberg was the first notification to the outside world of its contents.³

¹ Hinüber's report in *Cal. Br. Des. 11, E. II, no. 395*.

² Ministry to King George, April 16, 1795. *Cal. Br. Des. 11, E. I, no. 1130*.

³ The effect of the news of the treaty on the Imperial Diet in Regensburg is given in a letter of April 21, 1795, from Goertz, the Prussian delegate, to Hardenberg. Cf. Kaulek, *Papiers de Barthélemy*, v, 215. Meyerinck, the Prussian messenger, reached Berlin with a copy on April 12th, but the contents were not known for some time. See despatch of v. Lenthe's to ministry, April 14, in *Cal. Br. Arch. Des. 24, Brandenburg-Preussen, no. 546*.

CHAPTER III

HANOVER ACCEPTS PRUSSIAN NEUTRALITY

THROUGH the story of Prussia's negotiations at Basel, we are brought to a consideration of Hanover's attitude toward the peace negotiated for her. This account of Hanover's attitude toward peace requires a consideration of her anomalous position, and a retrospective glance at affairs in Regensburg since the peace proposition of the elector of Mainz, in October, 1794.

Hanover occupied a peculiar position. She was one of the leading members of the Empire. To her ruling house had been given the electoral hat in 1692, and during the century since, no state had excelled Hanover in loyalty to the house of Hapsburg.¹ But in the French war beginning in 1792, she had not sent her troops to join the Imperial army, preferring to pay a contribution instead.² She had, however, accepted subsidies from England, and Hanoverians in English pay had taken a most honorable part in the campaigns in Flanders,³ but

¹ See Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, p. 10. "Which of these (members of the Quadruple Alliance) could compare with the devotion of the House of Brunswick-Lueneburg to the House of Austria? This sentiment was as an article of faith with the Hanoverian advisers of Geo. I." One could hardly say as much for the sentiments of the Hanoverian ministry of George III.

² Von Sichert, *Gesch. d. hannov. Armee*, pt. iv, pp. 22-30.

³ Havemann, *Geschichte von Braunschweig und Hannover*, vol. iii, pt. iv.

this giving of both men and money was a strain on the lukewarm German patriotism of those times.¹

The success of the French in Holland² in the fall and winter of 1794-95 had laid open the western border of the Electorate, and threatened to bring war to the very firesides of the Hanoverians. Having had no interest at stake in the war of the Empire with France, Hanover manifested the usual indifference of communities called upon to defend distant fellow states.³ The loyalty of Hanover to George III. did not furnish a sufficient ground on which to appeal for greater sacrifices, for the Hanoverians saw that it was King George of Great Britain, and not Kurfürst Georg of Braunschweig-Lüneburg, who was engaged in the war.⁴ Despite this, however, the English king and his Hanoverian ministry had hitherto agreed on the maintenance of the Empire and friendship with Austria as the best course for a middle

¹ While recruiting for the defence of the Electorate in 1796 and again in 1803, the Regency had to take measures to prevent the young men from leaving the country.

² Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 113.

³ See the complaints of the Imperial commander as to the indifference of the Northern members. Vivenot, *Herzog von Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, 411. It reads quite like the complaints of a New York colonial governor as to the impossibility of making Virginia see the need of protecting a northern colony in case of a French-Indian war.

⁴ E. von Meier, *Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte*, vol. i. Hanover had been called on for its quota for the Imperial army in the fall of 1792. Of the levy *in triplo*, 120,000 men (See Vivenot, *Herzog Albrecht, etc.*, ii, 398, for an explanation of the formation of an Imperial army), Hanover should furnish as member of the Circle of Lower Saxony, 1131 cavalry and 2742 infantry. The outbreak of war between England and France had caused the former to take some 12-13,000 Hanoverians in its pay, and these with Hanover's Imperial quota, and other English soldiers and mercenaries, marched to the defense of the Netherlands. Von Sichart, *Gesch. d. hannov. Armee*, pt. iv, pp. 22-30.

power in north Germany, particularly a power so much at the mercy of a strong neighbor like Prussia.¹

Hanover's attitude on the matter of a general peace was complicated, moreover, by the peculiar dual position of its sovereign, who was at once king of England and prince of the German Empire. As king of England he was the ally of Austria, which was earnestly opposing the peace movement in the Diet at Regensburg. By what sort of metaphysics, then, was Kurfürst Georg to appear in the Imperial Diet as an advocate of the peace so heartily condemned by King George and his allies? On the other hand, what right had the king of England to sacrifice the electorate of Hanover to the demands of an English alliance, especially since Austria, as we have seen, was working to prevent the success of what it chose to call the "unexpected" ² move of the elector of Mainz? Did Pitt, as was so often claimed, control a vote in the German Imperial Diet which he could cast for England's interests? ³ Such were the puzzling questions involved in the determination of Hanover's policy on this single issue.

¹ The loyalty to Austria was always tempered by fear of Austria's plans to sacrifice the Empire to the greater interests of the Hapsburgs. At least this applies to the attitude of the Hanoverian ministry. Ministry to King, Oct. 11, 1795 and March 12, 1797. *Cal. Br. Des.*, 11, E, I, no. 1121. (*Hanover Archives.*)

² Report of Ministry to King, Nov. 7, 1794. The Hanoverian ministry could not call the Mainz proposition "unexpected," but they did express surprised disapproval of the urgency of Mainz in the matter. "Insonderheit ist es uns etwas Unerwartetes gewesen gleich hernach zu vernehmen, auf welche öffentliche Weise von dem churmainzischen Hof bereits zu Regensburg mit der Sache, hervor- und vorausgegangen ist." Report of Regency, Nov. 11, 1794. [*Hanover Archives.*]

³ The pamphlet literature of the period of the French occupation (1803) contains this assertion of Pitt's interference in affairs of the Empire through Hanover. See below, as to Pitt's knowledge of Hanover's actions in the matter of the Demarcation Line.

The course of the Hanoverian ministry during the war had been the wavering, middle-of-the-road policy so often pursued by small states.¹ It had rented soldiers to England and paid money to the Empire instead of sending its quota. Its real safety lay in arranging directly with the French for its neutrality or in making itself count for enough to have its alliance sought by some larger power, to whom its respectable military strength and excellent situation would have been inducements sufficient to secure for Hanover protection on favorable terms. Instead of doing something like this, the Regency had pursued a policy which did not secure for the Electorate the protection and loyalty of either Austria or Prussia, and yet exposed it to the vengeance of the French, who chose to see in it a continental basis from whence the English could threaten the French borders. The realization of what this might bring on the peace-loving Hanoverians was keener in the minds of the Regency than it was in that of the absent ruler of the Electorate. He was bound to Austria in an offensive alliance; the ministry, on the other hand, were beginning to show clearly that their support of Austria was limited by narrow self-interest.

The proposition of the bishop-elect of Mainz for an Imperial peace at once found favor in the eyes of the Hanoverian ministry. It offered them an excellent opportunity of to extricate themselves from a war in which they had no real interest. An *Imperial* peace—that is what they wished, and their letters to the king became urgent. For once they were anxious for decided action. Hanover must become an advocate of the peace.

¹ See Fritz Friedrich, *Politik Sachsens; 1801 bis 1803* (Leipzig, 1898). This study shows Saxony pursuing the same policy.

It must act, and not let the matter drift or fall into the hands of unfriendly powers like Denmark or Sweden, both of whom had been suggested at Regensburg as mediators.¹

King George was clearly reluctant to move toward peace. In his letters to the Regency he deprecated hasty action, and would have Hanover agree to the Mainz proposition only when it was clear that all the other states favored it.² It was his advice that they wait till they found out what the elector of Saxony was going to do. A month later he spoke more as became the ally of Austria. "Wait for peace through the unified action of the Empire under the leadership of the Emperor."³ He issued a note to the Hanoverian representatives at foreign courts condemning the action of Mainz for the indiscreet and unprepared manner in which it had proposed peace. It was, he said, due to the Emperor or to the powers from whom the German Empire had received help and support [England] that they should be consulted rather than thus embarrassed. He was "of no other mind than that it would be most advisable to let the matter drop entirely for the present." The sacrifices of the Emperor should have earned the confidence of all, and when the proper time came the Emperor, as *Reichsoberhaupt*, with the co-operation of the Diet, was the one who should negotiate a peace.

The ministry, however, were of a wholly different view, simply because they did not want to see peace

¹ Regency to King, Oct. 24, 1794. For some light on the previous relations between Hanover and Denmark, see Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, chap. iii.

² Rescript of October 30, 1794.

³ Rescript of November 30, 1794.

longer delayed. Waiting for an Imperial peace on the motion of Austria was not to their mind, at least not when French armies were overrunning Holland. Consequently, much to the disappointment of the Austrian ministers, the Hanoverian cabinet took, through its representative at Regensburg, an attitude most favorable to peace.¹ They held that it was all in vain that the Empire was expending its strength when peace was the thing most to be sought.² So earnest was its desire that we have now to trace how, even despite its suspicions concerning Prussia's desire to gain preponderance in the Empire,³ it was willing to seek the protection of the peace Prussia had negotiated.

Some of the other German states had hardly waited the conclusion of the treaty before appealing to Prussia for her mediation in a peace with France.⁴ And it is equally true that Prussian agents were sounding the various states as to their attitude towards a neutrality policy before the Demarcation Line had been incorporated in the treaty. Austria was just as busy at Regensburg and at the various courts presenting the perfidy of Prussia's conduct and the danger of reliance on a power that had already sacrificed the Imperial interests beyond the Rhine. This rivalry, as has been noticed, pushed Prussia to the unseemly length of publishing, as a finished fact, a treaty to which Barthélemy had given but a general assent.

Beyond a doubt the efficacy of the essential principles of the Prussian-French treaty of Basel lay in the attitude

¹ See Häusser, i, 582, for exactly opposite statement.

² Vivenot, *Herzog Albrecht von Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, 135 *et passim*.

³ Regency to King, Dec. 5, 1794.

⁴ *Hist. Zeit.* (Bailieu), 1895, 211-212.

assumed toward them by Hanover.¹ Among the aims of the French in agreeing to the Demarcation Line was their desire to secure themselves from attack on the side of the recently conquered Holland and to make sure of the commercial advantages accruing to them through untrammelled trade with Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. Neither of these objects was secure as long as Hanover followed the policy of the English crown. It is clear then why the French insisted that the treaty must contain Prussia's promise to seize Hanover if the latter did not accept neutrality. As Hanover went, so went the fortunes of the neutral policy.²

The Hanoverians were thoroughly dissatisfied with the war policy which made them a cat's-paw for Great Britain, and exposed them, as a result, to the danger of a French invasion. The safety and interests of Hanover itself made it clear to the ministry that the establishment of a demarcation line would be to the advantage of the electorate. Their task lay in bringing their elector, King George III. of England, to agree to the separation of Hanover from the support of the English-Austrian opposition to France, and in allowing it to seek the protection of its hereditary rival in North Germany.

Influence direct and indirect had been brought to bear to make sure of Hanover's friendly attitude towards a separate peace. The Duke of Brunswick, who possessed the confidence of both courts, was moved by the Berlin cabinet to write to Hanover urging the Regency to ap-

¹ The influence of Hanover in determining the success of this Prussian scheme of defence for North Germany recalls the situation in 1778, when Frederick the Great proposed military measures against a possible French invasion. See Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 48-49.

² *Cal. Br. Des.* 11, No. 545, *Hanover Archives* (Von Lenthe's despatch of April 4, 1795).

peal to Berlin for Prussian mediation, and citing to them his own example.¹ However, the Hanoverian Regency did not seem in any haste to throw itself into Prussia's arms. True, it gave the Berlin cabinet most friendly assurances, but it went no further, except to urge that a clause be inserted in the impending treaty by which German princes who might desire the benefit of the Prussian neutrality would be allowed three months in which to decide. Meanwhile Hardenberg, in Basel, was assuring Barthélemy again and again that Hanover would certainly accede to the neutrality if it could once be arranged. What official basis there was for such an interpretation of Hanover's opinions does not appear from an examination of the archives at Hanover, except that such an examination reveals the fact already commented on, namely, that Hanover was a member of the peace party at Regensburg, and that their delegate, von Ompteda, was extremely hostile to Austria, and correspondingly disliked by the court of Vienna.² When the news of the treaty of Basel came to Regensburg, von Ompteda did not hesitate to proclaim Prussia the savior of Hanover.³

¹ The original of the Duke's letter is to be found in *Cal. Br. Des.* II, E, I, No. 1130 (*Hanover Archives*). It is most alarming in its tone. According to the Duke, Pichegru has orders from the Convention to seize Hanover and urges that King George cannot disapprove if, in view of lack of time, they capitulate at once or seek neutrality. Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence*, iii, 209, mentions this letter.

² Goertz, the Prussian delegate at Regensburg, writes to Hardenberg April 21, 1795. " . . . Mais ce que surprenoit et confondoit encore le plus la cour de Vienne, étoit d'être informée qu'il y avoit eu à Bâle un homme avoué, M. de Hinuber, qui avoit eu le premier connoissance du traité et que les notes du ministre de Hanovre données à Berlin, de même que les correspondances entre les ministres de Hanovre et de Cassel se trouvoient entièrement en contradiction avec les assurances venues de Londres." Barthélemy, v, 215.

³ Barthélemy, v, 215. The utterances of this "Comitial Gesandter"

English policy under Pitt's leadership leaned, in 1795, more and more toward the Austrian alliance. In the months succeeding the treaty of Basel new subsidies were granted Austria, and a Triple Alliance, including Russia, was arranged, less, however, for use than for show.¹ The king, George III., was firm for a prosecution of the war, so insistent that at the close of the year the English ministry's message to the House of Commons expressing sentiments favorable to a peace with France, though in the king's name, did not, we are told, represent his real opinion.² From the moment of the introduction of the peace proposal by the representative of Mainz at Regensburg, George had been restraining the peace inclinations of his Hanoverian ministry. His communications had urged the ministry time after time to delay action on some pretext or other.

The ministry were, as has been shown, in favor of taking a definite stand for peace. On their own initiative they sent Hinüber³ to Basel to watch proceedings there. In the same independent spirit they had given Prussia assurances of a kind that made the Berlin statesmen sure Hanover would not oppose their scheme of neutralizing North Germany.⁴

seem to have been rather more strongly Prussian than his royal master or even the Hanoverian ministry approved.

¹ Stanhope, *Life of Pitt*, ii, 331.

² *Ibid.*, ii, 366.

³ These are among the important instances in which the ministry acted first and secured the king's consent afterwards.

⁴ Ranke (*Complete Works*, vol. xlvii, 284-285) in his "*Notiz über die Memoiren des Grafen von Haugwitz*" has the following paragraph:

"Von grosser Merkwürdigkeit sind die Verhandlungen mit England und Hannover, welche noch vor dem Abschluss des Baseler Friedens eröffnet wurden. Nach Haugwitz liess Georg III. den König von Preussen bitten, Hannover in seine Protection zu nehmen. Der han-

Hanover's representative at Berlin had secured, according to the statement of the Berlin cabinet, the introduction into the treaty of the clause which allowed other states within a period of three months to avail themselves of the benefits of peace.¹ The readi-

noverische Gesandte Lenthe bemerkte, dass Georg III. als Kurfürst von Hannover seine Politik von der trennen werde, die er als König von England beobachte. Friedrich Wilhelm II. gerieth in eine gewisse Aufwallung hierüber: denn die englische Politik sei ja die einzige Veranlassung seiner Friedensverhandlungen mit Frankreich. England habe ihn gezwungen, ganz gegen seine Gesinnung, mit der revolutionären Macht, die er an sich perhorrescire, in Verbindung zu treten. N'est-ce pas cet abandon que j'ai éprouvé de la part de l'Angleterre qui m'a enfin obligé à vaincre la répugnance que vous avez connue et que vous avez si bien jugée de m'approcher d'un gouvernement auquel je suis loin encore d'accorder ma confiance?, Zugleich aber erinnert sich der König, dass er immer die Sache des deutschen Reiches geführt habe, und da der Herzog von Braunschweig, der Vertraute seiner Gedanken, der ihn hauptsächlich mit zum Kriege veranlasst hat, sich für Hannover verwendet, so lässt er durch den Herzog dem Könige von England versichern, dass derselbe allezeit auf den Schutz von Preussen rechnen könne. Mais il s'agit maintenant de répondre à l'ouverture confidentielle du gouvernement d'Hanovre. Nous dirons, qu'après tout ce que j'ai fait pour l'empire germanique il n'est pas permis d'élever le moindre doute sur mes dispositions en faveur de cette partie de l'Allemagne, qui doit compter préférablement à tout-autre sur ma protection."

All the evidence in the archives at Hanover emphasizes the sharp divergence between the views of King George and those of his ministry on the subject of Basel. Ranke's inclusion of England, and even of George III., as parties to negotiations on behalf of Hanover, is the result of following Haugwitz's defence of his conduct. It was clearly to Haugwitz's interest to interpret, as in strict right he might, all action of the Hanoverian ministry as directed by the king of England. He was well aware of the separation between England and Hanover, but it was one of those things which Haugwitz's elastic conscience allowed him to recognize or deny as best suited the moment.

¹ Gronau, *Christian Wilhelm von Dohm* [Lemgo, 1824], p. 285, note 1, and Regency's report to King George of the instructions they had sent v. Lenthe at Berlin, Feb. 26, 1795, *Cal. Br. Arch. Des.* 24, No. 546. *Pol. Korrespondenz von Karl Friederick v. Baden*, vol. ii, p. 311. Also

ness with which they would accept the proffered peace may be inferred from this. Indeed, in January,¹ when the danger of a French invasion was imminent, they had gone farther, and authorized the Hanoverian minister at Berlin, von Lenthe, to accept *ad referendum* any arrangement negotiated by Prussia for Lower Saxony.² When the treaty of Basel came to them the Regency were ready to begin the campaign against their sovereign's inclinations.

The diverging interests of Hanover and England, as represented in the conflict of opinions between the Regency and King George, were evident in the matter of the Imperial peace; they again found clear expression in the king's disapproval of the ministry's policy as outlined to him in their letter of February 26, 1795. On that date they wrote him of the imminent

instructions to von Dohm, Sept. 11, 1795, *R* 67, *B* 18, vol. ii, pp. 69-75. (*Berlin Archives*.)

¹ V. Lenthe handed in the memoir Jan. 27. The king of Prussia had responded to the appeal for protection by a plan of defense which joined Clerfayt's force and Möllendorff's army and the Hanoverian-English contingent. Haugwitz was particularly anxious to know what the London cabinet thought of Prussia's project. See despatch of Haugwitz to Jacobi-Klöst, Prussian minister in London. Feb. 9, 1795. April 7, Jacobi reports that after an audience with Pitt, he sees that Pitt is poorly informed as to the Hanoverian-Prussian peace negotiations. Pitt says that what von Lenthe has done must have been on his own authority. Jacobi assured him that it was done with king George's authority. Pitt was embarrassed and said it was always necessary to separate King and Elector. *R. XI, 73 England Conv., 167.* (*Berlin Archives*.)

² Regency to von Lenthe, Jan. 25, 1795. *Cal. Br. Des. II, E, 1, 1130.* (*Hanover Archives*.) The inclusion of Hanover in a neutrality line was no surprise. Late in February, von Lenthe had reported that Prussia was insisting on the inclusion of Hanover in the desired neutrality (letter of Ministry to King George, Feb. 26, 1795.) April 4, von Lenthe wrote that Prussia's insistence on Hanover's neutrality was delaying the treaty.

danger of a French invasion. Hanover being unable alone to resist France, they considered Prussia the only refuge. Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick had been promised by Prussia inclusion in the peace then being negotiated, and von Lenthe had been instructed to ask at Berlin for the three-months clause which had been part of the treaty of Ryswick.¹ Could not the king be moved to agree to the Prussian treaty under such circumstances, the ministry asked?² The king's answer was clear. He joined the issue by disapproving the steps taken at Berlin as unnecessary, and by telling the ministry that, as far as he knew anything about the treaty negotiations, they were opposed to his fundamental principles, to which he would be true.³ The king seemed unmoved by the situation of his Electorate, which, unsupported by the Empire, or by its neighbors, who were themselves seeking Prussian protection, stood under the shadow of a French invasion.⁴

The ministry at Hanover were not pro-Prussian from principle. Had there been a hope of an Imperial peace under the leadership of Austria they would have been glad to seek safety that way. They could not view with favor a special Prussian treaty with France which would give Prussia an opportunity to dictate terms in a later Imperial peace. Such a peace would give Prussia an unwelcome preponderance when other states followed its

¹ See a preceding page for explanation.

² It is in this same letter they tell the king of Hinüber's mission to Basel. *Calenberg-Briefe, Designation 11, E, I, No. 1130.*

³ King's reply is dated March 17, 1795, and only approves the sending of von Hinüber. George III. considered the action of Prussia unconstitutional. The rescript of April 17, 1795, is in a similar strain.

⁴ The danger and measures taken to ward it off were reported to the king March 17. V. Lenthe at Berlin had been told to give Haugwitz the impression that King George would follow the action of the other states.

lead in the matter of special peace.¹ This statement of their attitude gave them common ground with their sovereign, and a certain amount of confidence thus established, they proceeded in their letters of April 16 and 18 to argue the question of ratifying Prussia's special treaty with France at Basel, April 5, 1795.

Their argument ran something as follows: If the treaty of Basel be viewed from the Prussian standpoint alone it simply restores good relations between France and Prussia. As Article V. does not yield any territory of the Empire or of its members, but refers such matters to a future convention, the treaty cannot be regarded as unconstitutional. As to the other members of the Empire, there were two stipulations—Article XI., which provided for securing peace for them, and Article I. of the secret articles which established the Demarcation Line. True, this peace is not consonant with the previous agreement of Prussia with King George and the Empire, nor is it well supported by historical precedents.² But the peace of Basel was not inimical to the king's interests (as elector), for it assured the safety of his lands, except the county (Grafschaft) of Bentheim; furthermore, they thought that could be saved when a general peace was arranged, as Hanover will in the meantime have Bremen and Ritzebüttel in its hands. The Regency argues that the acquiescence in the treaty was not inconsonant with the elector's duties as a prince of the Empire, for

¹ See their letters to the king, April 5 and April 12.

² They are able to cite the action of Prussia in the war of the Spanish Succession where she concluded a peace in 1713 at Utrecht, while the Imperial peace was concluded in 1714 at Rastatt and Baden. In 1679 at the Congress of Nymwegen the house Braunschweig-Lüneburg (Hanover) had concluded a separate peace at Celle before the Imperial peace was arranged.

they reasoned that Article II. of the treaty, which provided for the cessation of all hostilities including the furnishing of men and supplies against each other, related simply to France and Prussia, and therefore Hanover would be free to continue its support to the Imperial army. As to the arrangements in the secret articles concerning the states behind the Demarcation Line, the Regency did not think such provisions would affect Hanover. In truth, of course, they did not know the real contents of those secret articles. They had no contingent to withdraw from the Imperial army, and as the article provided that no state was to make any *new* arrangement, Hanover would be allowed to continue its *old* arrangements, namely, to pay its share toward supporting a military contingent, and to contribute the Imperial taxes (Römermonate). Thirdly, Hanover had in no way been a leader in the war, and was therefore not especially antagonistic to a special peace. The continuation of the war by England would not be affected by Hanover's acquiescence. All that was needed to secure to the Electorate the advantages of peace was a simple declaration from Hanover that the article as to the Demarcation Line was "absorbiert." If Prussia required it, a more specific statement could be given, and they outlined a communication whose wording is much like the letter in which King George finally expressed to Prussia his acquiescence.¹

Despite the pressure of the Regency and the urgency of Prussia expressed both at Hanover and in London, King George hesitated to give a definite answer. "He

¹ Later letters which take a still more favorable view of the Demarcation Line, may be based on the prematurely printed *convention additionnelle* mentioned in the *Papiers de Barthélemy*, vol. v.

was pleased to see his German states in safety, but he could not clearly see how he was to act without finding himself in collision with his principles as king of England. The king awaited with great impatience the reports from Hanover and Regensburg relative to the negotiations for peace with France.¹

The news of the additional treaty of May 17 aroused the English people still more, and increased their king's embarrassment. Haugwitz recognized that the action asked of Hanover did not square with the war policy of the cabinet of St. James and England's recently established relations with Austria. He watched with keen interest their attitude toward the treaty of Basel.²

The English ministry had sought to avoid all responsibility for the part of Hanover in the treaty of Basel.³ They advanced as their defense the distinction between George as king and as elector. This, however, did not satisfy several members of the House of Commons, and Putney interrogated Pitt concerning the matter, calling Pitt's attention "to the extreme astonishment of the public in the matter." Pitt answered that he had just come

¹ Dispatch of Jacobi-Klöst from London to Haugwitz, May 26, 1795. (*Berlin Archives*.) This was not, as Jacobi knew, consistent with the instructions of Ompteda at Regensburg where Hanover had given it to be understood that she would accept Prussian protection.

² King Fred'k Wm. III. (Haugwitz) to Jacobi, June 21, 1795. (*Berlin Archives*.)

³ Reports of Parliamentary debates are fragmentary. The best material was found in the files of the London dailies in the British Museum. The ministerial policy of subsidies to Prussia had been attacked as paying Prussia to defeat Kosciusko. Then when Prussia and Hanover conclude peace with a government considered by Pitt as too unstable to treat with, the opposition (Fox and Sheridan) refused to see the difference between the King of England and the Elector of Hanover and proposed to import Hanoverian ministers to advise the king rather than Hanoverian soldiers to defend him.

from an interview with the king and "the king could give the explicit assurance that the Elector of Hanover will never separate himself from the King of England." Direct as was the answer given by Pitt, continues the Prussian ambassador, Jacobi, it did not satisfy all the members of Parliament. The matter, however, could not be pushed farther without accusing the king of duplicity. To Prussian overtures, through Jacobi, the king presented the same opposition to all measures necessitated by the treaty of Basel. Best, the Hanoverian attaché, assured Jacobi that this was the king's final position in the matter.¹

If the action of Hanover interested Prussia, France and England, it interested no less the cabinet of England's ally, Austria. The activity of the Hofburg statesmen against the success of Prussia in securing the acquiescence of the states within the newly established Demarcation Line has been noticed. April 20, 1795, Morton Eden, the English minister at Vienna, wrote Grenville that Thugut still hoped to bring about a complete concert between the courts of Vienna, Hanover and Dresden. He would thus defeat the machinations of Prussia to effect a formal division in the Empire forcing Austria to a disadvantageous peace.²

Austria sought by every means possible to make its opposition to the treaty of Basel effective. Representations against it were made in London, Hanover and St. Petersburg and in the court of every South German prince. Even Thugut, who generally underrated the force of public opinion, resorted to the aid of periodicals

¹Jacobi to Haugwitz, July 19, 1795,—*Berlin Archives, R XI, 73, England, 167, Bd. I.* The Prussians were trying to secure the evacuation by Hanover of Ritzbüttel and Cuxhaven.

²*F. O. Austria, No. 40 (Eng. Rec. Office).*

and pamphlets to meet the propaganda of the Prussians.¹ Promises were made to the Hanoverians of greater activity on the part of the Imperial army.² But the Hanoverian ministry, despite its often-expressed distrust of Prussia and her leadership in the negotiation of peace,³ was readier to take its place under the Prussian ægis than it was to trust the House of Austria. Von Ompteda, the ministerial agent of Hanover to the Diet of the Empire, showed himself at all times the active ally of Goerz, the Prussian representative, and Austria could only hope to secure the support of Hanover through pressure brought to bear on its ally, King George of England. At St. James they were assured of the support of the anti-Prussian wing of the cabinet.⁴

As has already been noted, both Prussia⁵ and the German ministry of King George were active in creating at St. James a sentiment favorable to the accession of Hanover to the neutrality of the "*convention additionelle*."

But the Hanoverian appeal to King George to accept the Demarcation Line was inspired by fear of the French armies then in Holland near the Westphalian boundaries, and by distrust in the English government, for which they would be suffering if war continued, rather than by any settled policy of adhesion to Prussia. The king,

¹ Vivenot, *Sachsen-Teschen*, vol. ii, pt. 2.

² Hardenberg (in Vienna) to the Hanoverian ministry, April 15, 1795. *Hannover Des.* 92, XXXVII, A, No. 1, 30, also A, 2, June 15. '95.

³ Cf. e. g. Ministry to King Geo., Dec. 5, 1794.—*Cal. Br. Des.* II, E, I, No. 1123. Reverse of this to Ompteda at Regensburg, June 17, 1795.—*Cal. Br. Des.* II, E, III, No. 66.

⁴ Grenville, Loughborough, Stormont, Cornwallis, Windham, Spencer, Duke of York, and Lords Howe and Hawkesbury. Jacobi to Haugwitz, April 24, 1795. (*Berlin Archives*.)

⁵ As to Prussia's use of English newspapers see Haugwitz to Jacobi, May 6, 1795.—*R*, XI, 73, *England Conv.*, 167. (*Berlin Archives*.)

against his own personal feeling, against the opposition of his ally Austria, and seemingly without reference to the opinions of his English ministry, yielded finally to the arguments of his German cabinet, and on the *last day*¹ of the three months of grace, the Hanoverian ministry were rejoiced by receiving their sovereign's consent. It was not a very hearty approval nor very generously granted, but it enabled them to satisfy the sharp demands of the Prussian cabinet, itself acting under pressure from the French government.²

It may well be doubted whether his Hanoverian subjects ever fully appreciated the struggle it cost George III. to comply with French demands, and at the same time put Prussia beyond danger of complications which might drive her back to the alliance she had abandoned. Several years later, when he was talking with the Hanoverian minister in London about subsidies from the Hanoverian army defending the Electorate, the king re-

¹ Haugwitz told von Lenthe that July 25 was last day of grace. See v. L. to Han. ministry, June 25, 1795. *Des.* 24, No. 547.

² The King's rescript is dated Aug. 4, 1795, and was received at Hanover August 14. "Wir halten mit euch dafür, dass es bei der Wendung zu Regensburg dazu nicht kommen werde, dass der Berliner Hof von den in der Demarcations Linie begriffenen Reichsständen einer Erklärung begehren sollte. In einem solchen nicht zu verhoffenden Fall würde in dessen nach eurem Vorschlage die unverfängliche Aeusserung, dass man mit Vorbehalt aller Reichsständischen Zuständigkeiten bei dem preussischen Frieden acquiescire allen Umständen nach wolgeschehen können." The Ministry under date of August 20 say concerning this wording of the consent: "Insonderheit ist darin auch der Punkt der preussischen Verwendung auch eine so vorsichtige und angemessene Weise (?), dass damit weder zu viel eingeräumt noch angestossen wird, nur gerade herüber die diesseits dabei gehegte Meinung erfüllet und adoptirt ist." *Cal. Br. Des.* 11, E, I, No. 1121. Vivenot, *Herzog Albrecht v. Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, 2, p. 210 (Wien, 1866), makes the unpardonable blunder of speaking of England's accepting the Demarcation Line on behalf of Hanover.

plied to the Hanoverian appeal that each land must bear its own burdens. He added that he could but reproach his German subjects for not having risen in arms in 1795, to resist to the last all possible invasion. England, with the whole nation then (March, 1799) under arms ready to repulse the enemy, was showing the spirit King George had hoped his German subjects would exhibit.¹

In consenting to accept the neutrality arranged by Prussia, King George attempted to maintain a semblance of legality and loyalty to the tottering Empire, by reference to an Imperial peace to be negotiated under the Austrian leadership. The Hanoverian Ministry, recognizing the necessities of their situation as their supreme law of conduct, had raised no serious question as to what their fellow-states at Regensburg or the Emperor in Vienna would think.² Austrian leadership for North German states behind a Prussian Demarcation Line, was hardly within the realm of the practicable. Hanover, even more definitely than in the days of the Fürstenbund, was turning from Austria to Prussia. The situation created by Hanover's acquiescence in the treaty of Basel and by her vote at Regensburg, in July, 1795, that the King of Prussia should be associated with the Emperor in the negotiation of an Imperial peace, had created a political unity, in which there were possibilities—great possibilities—of Prussian-Hanoverian coöperation for the control of North Germany in opposition to the Austrian policy which the rest of the Empire was following.

¹ See the interesting promemoria of von Lenthe on the English attitude in 1799. (*Han. Arch.*) *Cal. Br. Des.* 11, E. I, no. 1126, Mar. 12, 1799.

² On the way the action of the Elector of Hanover was regarded, see letter of Lucchesini to Hardenberg, Oct. 17, 1795, in *Mitt. a. d. nachgelassenen Papieren eines preuss. Diplomaten* [Schladen]. Herausgegeben von L. v. L[edebur]. (Berlin, 1868.)

The treaty of Basel was the death-blow to the moribund German Empire. Vivenot has well said, "It was not until August 6, 1806, that the last German Emperor resigned the Imperial crown. He might just as well have done it April 5, 1795, for since the day of the treaty of Basel the crown had lost all its significance."¹ There was revealed an insight keener than that of his day and generation in the words of Malet du Pan when told that the treaty of Basel was concluded: "L' Europe s'en va."²

¹ *Albrecht, Herzog von Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, 2, p. 542, also pp. 140, 212 and 537, for similar statements. Similarly Bourgoing, 171-72. Treitschke (*Deutsche Gesch.*, i, 142) says Häusser's opinion to the same effect is suppressed in the third edition of his *Deutsche Geschichte* appearing posthumously at the time of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866.

Goerz, the Prussian agent at Regensburg, wrote Hardenberg April 21, 1795 (trans.): "By your Article XI the King has become the arbiter of the fate of Germany, and if we and France take advantage of it, as it is the permanent interest of both to do, the court of Vienna will not longer have a shadow of influence in all Germany. France will draw all the princes to her and reunite them to the system of Prussia who will not delay to become (d'être) her ally." Barthélemy, v, 213.

² Sayous, ii, 136 (Quoted by Sorel, *Revue hist.*, vii, 357).

CHAPTER IV

FAILURE OF THE CONVENTION ADDITIONELLE OF MAY 17, 1795

THE Regency¹ and the influential classes in Hanover had welcomed the establishment of neutrality. The danger of a French invasion in January and February, 1795, together with the well-known French view of Hanover as an English dependency, had almost created a panic in the defenceless province, for the disorganized and disheartened English and Hanoverian army was in no condition to meet the advance of the conquering French. Naturally, then, the cordon that Prussia promised to draw around the Electorate seemed a veritable boon.

It was, however, the misfortune of Hanover that peace arrangements with the French Republic were effective only in proportion to the military precautions taken to insure their observance. Nor had the Demarcation Line arranged at Basel proved to be the finality that the small states expected to find it. When they were urging Hanover to save herself by acquiescing in the Line, Haugwitz and his colleagues were pleased to speak of it as a safe refuge from being "sansculottized."² Now their own memorials to their master, the king, recognized the

¹The ministers in Hanover will hereafter be designated as the *Regency*. This is in conformity with French and English usage of the times and will make clearer discussions in which Prussian, English and Russian ministries are involved.

²Haugwitz's expression. Cf. Bailleu, i, 113.

negotiations at Basel as being arranged for a line much longer than Prussia could hope to maintain.

That the inviolability of the line was not earlier tested is to be explained by the delay in opening the campaign of 1795. All summer long the French troops, under Jourdan and Pichegru, lay along the Rhine, hindered in their plans by lack of supplies and by the dissensions at home which kept the government fighting for its very existence. With the fall of Luxembourg and the failure of the invasion in Bretagne, the forces of the Republic on the Rhine found themselves in a position to open the long-delayed campaign. Their first offensive movement, the crossing of the Rhine, led to a violation of the Demarcation Line in the most ruthless manner. Eichelkamp, on the east bank of the Rhine and within the line, was seized, despite the protest of the Prussian officers that such action violated the neutrality of the place. The French had reckoned well on the weakness of the Prussians and their unwise confidence in French protestations of loyalty to their obligations respecting the Demarcation Line. With Eichelkamp in their hands, they were able to threaten the Austrian communications and force the Imperial troops into a retreat.¹

The Prussian troops had practically all been withdrawn from the frontier into Prussian territory on the lower Rhine. The exception was the Prussian force under Hohenlohe, which had drawn a cordon around Frankfort. Here it was that the French and Austrians both violated the neutrality line, and General Hohenlohe, feeling himself too weak to resist, contented himself with dignified notes of protest until ordered by his government to withdraw into Franconia.² Everywhere the

¹ On the details of the above paragraphs see Häusser, ii, pp. 30 ff.

² Gray, English agent in Berlin, writes Nov. 3, 1795: "The French

French pushed forward, plundering right and left. The smaller powers of the region were in a panic,¹ and all who could, fled into neutral territory. How long that would offer protection seemed to depend only on the necessity in which the French might find themselves of violating it in order to forward their military operations.

The French had calculated rightly upon being able to violate with impunity their treaty obligations to Prussia. One might have expected at least a vigorous protest against these high-handed measures. Instead, the Prussian ministry informed the French representative in Berlin that they abandoned the Demarcation Line in the region of Frankfort.² General Hohenlohe, the Prussian commander, was ordered to withdraw his troops into Franconia. Such a revelation of weakness could but impress unfavorably the states who had trusted their safety to the much-vaunted Demarcation Line. The Demarcation Line which was to bring the benefits of peace to so large an area, and be the introduction to an Imperial pacification, had crumbled at the first shock of contending armies.

General Jourdan having announced the 10th of last month, while he was in the neighborhood of Frankfort, that he had received orders not to respect any longer the line of Demarcation except with regard to such Princes as had recalled their contingents, the situation of Prince Hohenlohe at Frankfort, with the corps of Prussian troops under his command became of course extremely delicate. The passage of the Main by the Austrians which had since taken place, has contributed still more to the embarrassment of that position. To avoid, therefore, being committed either with the Austrians or French this court has sent orders to Prince Hohenlohe to retire with his troops into the King of Prussia's dominions in Franconia." [*English Record Office.*]

¹ Häusser, ii, 35.

² Prussian note to Caillard, Nov. 25, 1795, quoted by v. Alvensleben. Cf. Bailleu i, 149 ff.

Even before this proof that the mere negotiation of neutrality was not synonymous with securing it, Hanover had recognized her especial danger. The Electorate's peculiar relation to England, and the presence within or near her borders, of English, Dutch, French emigré, and native troops, made her position far less secure than that of the neighboring provinces. It seemed necessary to the Ministry to ask in return for Hanover's accession a special acknowledgment from France, of the Electorate's neutrality. To secure this was the task the Hanoverian Ministry set Haugwitz after their acquiescence in August, 1795, and again and again they pressed on him the necessity—the plain duty—of the French to come out into the open with their intentions.

But a new light had dawned on the French government, and the very slowness with which Hanover had been brought to accede to the treaty, and its dilatoriness in enforcing neutrality, had aroused suspicions.¹ Instead of the "Gegen Erklärung," for which Hanover clamored, the Republic transmitted vigorous protests through Barthélemy at Basel and Caillard at Berlin, against the assembling of emigrants and Dutch around Osnabrück.

When these protests resulted in Prussia's causing the assembled forces to move, only to re-assemble in Oldenberg and Hanover, French complaints became threats. If the Dutch and French emigrants were not entirely removed from Hanoverian soil, the French troops would advance into the Electorate and undertake their dispersal.² Reports of the French agents exaggerated the

¹ Barthélemy, v, *passim*.

² Haugwitz to von Lenthe, Hanoverian minister in Berlin. Cf. latter's dispatch of Sept. 12, 1795, no. 546. (*Hanover Archives*.) French complaints during the summer of 1795 are to be found in Barthélemy, v, 338, 348, 372, 379, 380, 388, 399, 411, 414, 421 and 496. Especially vigorous protests are given on pp. 364 and 376.

strength of the troops behind the Demarcation Line.¹ The protests to Hardenberg, vigorous as they were, seemed, as far as the French could see, to be ineffective, and it was surmised that Hardenberg was not passing these protests on to Berlin. The necessity of having an agent in Berlin to speak directly to the Prussian Ministry on these matters was one of the reasons for appointing Caillard as French ambassador to Berlin.² It is evident that the conservative and moderate Barthélemy was restraining the more radical elements in the government at Paris. He was not willing to see the whole work of his negotiations swept away by an invasion of Hanover, however well justified the move might seem.³ In the opinion of the progressive party in Paris, the time had come for threatening summary action. Having found their protests to Hanover by the way of Berlin ineffectual, the French urged that there now existed the situation contemplated by the secret articles of the *convention additionnelle* of May 17, 1795, namely, that Hanover, not having observed the stipulated neutrality, should be taken *en dépôt* by Prussia. Prussian occupation, the French government thought, was the only way to compel the Electorate to conform strictly to the terms of the neutrality arranged for it. These threats (except those referring to secret articles of the treaty of Basel) were transmitted to Hanover through the Prussian Minister.⁴

¹One agent estimates their strength at 40,000. Barthélemy, v, 376, 377.

²*Cf.* note 1, and Barthélemy, v, 412, 413.

³Barthélemy, July 18, vol. v, 377.

⁴Haugwitz not only kept Hanover alarmed by communicating French threats, but he used the courts of Hesse-Cassel and Osnabrueck to convey to Hanover rumors of impending danger from French invasion. Ministry to King George, Oct. 4, '95, no. 1130. The danger was undoubtedly real. *Cf.* Ompteda's dispatch and Ministry's reports to king in no. 1126a, I, *passim*. (*Hanover Archives*.)

There was no reason to doubt that the French government maintained its hostile attitude toward the German lands of the King of England. To the delay in giving the *Gegen-Erklärung* was now added the further source of uneasiness mentioned above—the violations of the Demarcation Line.

Here it may be well to call up what some may deem a “neglected factor” in the history of the period—the attitude of the Elector himself. It is in the way he treats this real danger to the Electorate that George III. shows how much his view of things continental is that of an English king rather than that of a minor German prince. He will not be hurried in the removal of the objectionable Dutch, English and emigré troops. He seems to consider the danger from France more imaginary than real, and he distrusts Prussia thoroughly.¹ One royal rescript of this period still further illustrates this insular English attitude assumed by King George. The Regency in Hanover was thoroughly alarmed by the reports² from their envoy in Berlin, von Lenthe, and so, at the suggestion of the magistrates of Bremen,³ they timidly proposed to their sovereign that their Electorate negotiate directly in Paris for its own neutrality.⁴ To this appeal the King-Elector answered with a largeness of spirit justified by his own location, that he would not approve a special treaty with the French until all other measures had failed.⁵

¹ Rescript of Sept. 25, 1795. (*Hanover Archives*, no. 1130.)

² Despatch of Sept. 12, 1795, no. 546. (*Hanover Archives*.)

³ Sept. 29, 1795, no. 1130. Bremen was at this time occupied by English and Hanoverians. Subject of complaint by both French and Prussians.

⁴ October 1, 1795, no. 1130. (*Hanover Archives*.)

⁵ Rescript of October 20, 1795, no. 1130.

What the measures might be, what the ultimate decision would be, rested less with the King-Elector, less with his ministry in Hanover, than it did with the power which had pledged itself to take Hanover in possession, if it did not so act as to relieve France from all fear of attack from that side. The mere acquiescence in the terms of the treaty of Basel did not fulfill the terms of agreement between Prussia and France. Hardenberg did not fail to point out this distinction between acknowledging the peace and promising to observe its terms.¹ Much as Prussia's freedom from complications with France depended on its ability to control Hanover, its claim to the confidence of all the smaller states and of its former allies depended equally on its controlling it without resorting to the extreme measure of occupation.

The source of the French discontent, as has been mentioned, was the remnant of English and Hanoverian troops in and around the town of Stade, the collection of a Dutch and French emigrant corps at Osnabrück and the occupation of Hamburg and Bremen. The reluctance with which the Elector-King moved in the matter of dispersing these camps might well justify French fears that these hostile troops were only waiting for some marked success of the allies on the Upper Rhine to make a forward movement against Holland. The total strength of the disturbing forces is estimated at about 11,000 men, of which 4,500 were English and 3,000 French emigrants.² The French government, though not over particular about seeing that its generals observed the Demarcation Line, insisted on the strict neutrality of the

¹ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 329, 330.

² R. 67, B. 18a, vol. I, p. 56. (*Berlin Archives.*)

states behind it. The Committee of Public Safety held that their interests in Holland were so much endangered by the contumacy of the Electorate that they must take it on themselves to bring Hanover by force of arms to a less belligerent attitude.¹ With the forward movement of their troops the subject became of still greater import to the French, and Prussian occupation was again urged as the only measure consonant with Prussian honor and at the same time satisfactory to the French.²

All this pressure, but without any mention of the secret articles of the treaty of Basel,³ was passed on by Haugwitz and the Prussian ministry to Hanover by way of Ompteda, the Elector's representative at Berlin. Knowing the close relations between the electoral courts of Hanover and Saxony, the latter power was moved by Prussia to make a most pressing appeal to Hanover to observe the neutrality in full.⁴ King Frederick William II. and his ministry were bending every energy to extricate themselves gracefully from the predicament in which they were put by their obligation to force Hanover into neutrality when the relations between the two powers did not justify such action. For, as Ranke points out, the relations between Prussia and France were dependent on the Prussian ability to protect the French in Holland from an attack on the side of Hanover.⁵

¹ Committee to Barthélemy, Aug. 22, 1795. Bart., vol. 5.

² Committee to Bart., Sept. 10. vol. v, p. 450.

³ The secret articles of Basel were not known in Hanover until May, 1799. Wohlwill in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 402.

⁴ Report of the Han. Ministry to King, Sept. 27, 1795, *No. 1130*. (*Hanover Archives*.) On Saxony's policy in this period the reader is referred to Paul Hassell's article "Kursachsen und der Baseler Frieden, 1794-95," in *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, Vol. XII (1891), and to Friederich's study, *Politik Sachsens, 1801 bis 1803* in the *Leipziger Studien aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte*, vol. iv, pt. iii.

⁵ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 330.

By the first of September the matter had become of prime importance to Prussia. The French had begun late in August the long-delayed forward movement. The vigor and success of their movements, the well-known independence in action of the French generals and their annoyance at the presence of English and Dutch troops on what they considered English territory that should not have been neutralized, the ruthless disregard the armies manifested for the Demarcation Line, the threats of the Committee of Public Safety, all these considerations might well have roused King Frederick William II. His personal interest¹ in having the danger to the Electorate presented once more to the Regency at Hanover led to a proposal, signed by both Haugwitz and von Alvensleben, to send Wilhelm Christian von Dohm, the Prussian agent in Halberstadt, post haste to Hanover.²

The proposition was at once approved by the king.

The instructions given the man who was chosen as capable of stirring the Hanoverian ministry to action are significant. Rightly read, they again emphasize the fact that Prussian policy was determined, in the first decade after Frederick the Great, not so much by a Hertzberg, a Haugwitz or a Hardenberg as by the geography of its scattered domains, especially those lying west of the Elbe.³

¹Note in king's own hand to Lecoq, dated Sep. 8. Cf. *Berlin Archives, sup. cit.*

²Note is endorsed by the king, Sept. 10, 1795. It embodies a draft of the instructions. The king again urges haste. V. Dohm had been sent to Hanover by Frederick the Great (May, 1785) to urge Hanover to send a delegate to Berlin to arrange the basis of the Fürstenbund. Cf. von Dohm's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, iii, 73 ff.

³See a forceful paragraph in Max Duncker's review of Ranke's *Hardenberg, Preuss. Jahrbücher*, vol. xlii, 570.

Perhaps more to the point are the following significant words in the

At the opening of the instructions the Hanoverian ministry are in all justice reminded that the very neutrality they were violating had been arranged at their request. The introduction of Article XI. into the treaty of Basel is asserted to have been the direct result of the Hanoverian note of March 2, 1795.¹ Nor was this the limit of Prussia's exertions. She had stopped the forward movement of the triumphant armies of the Republic, before which the English and Hanoverian generals despaired of making a defense in the spring of 1795. The return for all this is Hanover's continued occupation of Ritzbuettel, Cuxhaven and Bremen, and allowing the English to gather Dutch troops on Hanoverian soil—and this despite Hanover's "remarkable answer" acquiescing in the peace. Now Prussia, continued von Dohm's instructions, could not longer tolerate a condition which threatened the safety of her own states. If Hanover does not act, Prussian troops will be sent in to make an end to this assembling of foreign soldiers, or the Demarcation Line will be re-arranged to protect Prussian territory alone. Prussia has no intentions hos-

Prussian reply of May 10 to Caillard's note of April 26, 1795 (see Häusser, ii, 71): "il est presque superflu d'observer que ce n'est qu'en faveur de ses propres États que le Roi est entré dans les susdites stipulations (concerning neutrality and the Demarcation Line); que c'est uniquement leur repos, leur sûreté parfaite pendant la durée de la guerre actuelle, qu'il avait en vue à cet égard. . . . Si d'autres pays de l'Allemagne en profitent, c'est leur situation topographique qui en est la seule cause, puis qu'ils se trouvent comme enclavés dans ces mêmes États." Bailleu, i, 68, footnote 1.

¹In this article France promises to accept the good offices of Prussia for those states of the Empire which desire to negotiate with France. France for a period of three months from ratification of the treaty will not treat as enemies the states on the right bank of the Rhine for whom the king intercedes. It is this last part which, as has been before mentioned, was the subject of the Hanoverian note of March 2.

tile to Hanover's august ruler, but they must insist that the French should be given no occasion "for the least shadow of suspicion."¹

A week later von Dohm was in Hanover, busy with ministerial conferences. The ministry there had already been urging on the king of England the necessity of his German lands complying with the Prussian-French demands. They were duly impressed with the seriousness of the alternatives offered by von Dohm, but they were not so humble as might have seemed desirable to the Berlin ministry. One man, at least, put up an energetic protest against French interference in affairs behind the Demarcation Line. Rudloff, the Regency's secretary and adviser, expounded, in opposition to von Dohm's representations, the view that all the treaty of Basel promised on behalf of the neutral states was that no offensive measures should proceed from behind the Demarcation Line. That is to say, if Hanover wished to gather troops as a defensive measure, it was no affair of the French Committee of Public Safety.² Rudloff even assumed a belligerent tone, and spoke about not fearing the French troops that might attempt an invasion. This view, that the Electorate was at liberty to take any measures it might deem defensive, coincides with the stand the Hanoverian ministry took in the opening conferences. And there was a show of justice in the view that his own troops within his own Electorate should be at the disposal of the King-Elector. But, as the course of this monograph shows, this was but an-

¹ The instructions are dated Sept. 11, and von Dohm is told not to qualify them in any way, and he is to demand a categorical answer.

² For the French view of their right to interfere behind the line established by their consent *cf.* Napoleon's instructions to Beurnonville in Dec., 1799, Bailleu, i, p. 518.

other instance when neither the King-Elector nor the Regency in Hanover were determining factors. Prussia had most at stake.

George III. on September 25 sent the necessary orders for the expulsion of the emigrant and other corps, and the Regency hastened to execute them.¹ This news and the Regency's assurance that Hanover would never allow any hostile demonstration to proceed from behind the Demarcation Line, and would evacuate the Hansa towns,² was considered satisfactory at Berlin, and von Dohm left Hanover. Not until at the command of the Berlin ministry he had stated clearly that Prussia did not, now that Hanover's army was dismissed, assume to guarantee the neutrality of the Electorate.³ Despite the explicitness of von Dohm—and he could be explicit when it was necessary—Rudloff insisted to the end that Prussia's guarantee of Hanover's neutrality should come as a substitute for the military measures now abandoned. And Rudloff evidently came to believe that Prussia had done what he demanded,⁴ for in the following spring it is his obstinate insistence, at least it is the insistence of the Hanoverian Regency on this view, that delays the organization and provisioning of the Observation Army.⁵

The King-Elector's proclamation as to the expulsion

¹ King's rescript in no. 1130 (*Han. Archs.*).

² Note verbale handed in by von Ompteda at Berlin, Oct. 2, 1795. This was despatched from Berlin to Hardenberg in Basel that he might answer Barthélemy and the French government satisfactorily. *Berlin Archives* vol. cited above.

³ See instructions to v. Dohm, October 9, and his report of Oct. 18.

⁴ See von Dohm's report of Oct. 3. (*Berlin Archives*, as above).

⁵ It ends in a rupture of the personal relations between von Dohm and Rudloff, two men too nearly alike in mind and training ever permanently to agree.

of his English troops and the auxiliary corps of French and Dutch had been obtained in haste. It was executed at leisure. The unwillingness with which the king of England saw himself forced to do as France, speaking through Prussia, desired, is partially shown in this dilatoriness in doing what he had promised. As late as December a majority of the English troops were still in Hanover. The French were still suspicious and watchful.¹ Prussia was urgent. As the pressure was increased, as the terror was more or less vividly conjured up by von Dohm, the embarkation of troops would be hastened. Then it would grow slack, and the English transports would fail to be on hand. As late as February, 1796, there were still English officers in Bremen.²

The seriousness of the situation in the fall of 1795 gave occasion, in connection with von Dohm's mission, for an exhibition of the strong particularism still prevailing in the principalities and counties composing the Electorate. The slowness of the Regency in conforming to the stipulated neutrality can be traced to but one definite source—the reluctance of the king to remove troops that might later be useful to the allied cause. The Hanoverians, loyal as they were to their distant sovereign, were alive to the dangers they ran by allowing the Stadtholder to recruit within their borders, and by Hanover's general neglect of neutrality in the face of such a ready and suspicious enemy as France.³ Von

¹ Delacroix to Barthélemy, Dec. 10, 1795. Barthélemy, v, 517.

² Reports of Prussian envoy in Bremen (v. Rump) at the end of volume cited above in *Berlin Archives*.

³ The Hanoverian troops were put on a half mobile footing and so disposed, partly toward Hessen and partly toward Westphalia, that they could be readily (within 48 hrs.) concentrated on either frontier. The staff officers were simply furloughed. Reports Dec. 15 and 17, 1795 in 1126a I (*Han. Archives*).

Dohm felt encouraged at the expressions of the leading officials of Calenberg and Lueneberg. They seemed to feel grateful for Prussia's efforts to ward off danger, and in evidence of this were urging prompt action on the Regency. The estates of Bremen-Hoye-Diepholz took occasion to offer the Regency similar advice. More noteworthy is the action of the estates of Calenberg, the principality which includes the cities of Hanover and Göttingen. The estates had already given proof of their independent view of things touching Hanoverian policy. In 1794 they had set forth the position of the "Calenberg Nation" and the "Göttingen Nation" on the subject of the attitude to be assumed toward the French Revolution. They were still under the dominance of von Berlepsch, the agitator who had fathered the resolutions of 1794. The danger of a French invasion was von Berlepsch's opportunity. In a special session (Oct. 31) they met in the city of Hanover and passed resolutions urging the ministry to ensure the Electorate's safety by doing all that strict neutrality required. Not content with an urgent presentation of the ministry's duty to secure the country's peace and quiet, they ended their resolutions with a threat to appeal to the king of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick to call the diet of the Circle of Lower Saxony. This body might be expected to overrule the ministry, to the end that Hanover might no longer be exposed to danger by being drawn into England's struggle with France.¹

But other measures brought forward on a larger stage were destined to secure the safety of Hanover and the

¹ A copy of their resolutions of Oct. 31, is enclosed by von Dohm Dec. 4, 1795. It was given him by a member of the estates under promise of secrecy. *Cf. Berlin Archives. R. 67, B. 18 a. vol. i.*

neutrality policy of Prussia. Several years later (1799) Haugwitz, in a resumé of Prussian policy since 1794, said that the treaty of Basel only definitely established peace between France and Prussia—"all the rest was conditional (*hypothétique*).". We need not stop here to consider whether Haugwitz thought in May, 1795, that the treaty of Basel and the "*convention additionelle*" were wholly conditional or was brought to that view by French and Austrian disregard for his cherished Demarcation Line. In either case the conviction that the work of Hardenberg and Barthélemy was not a finality must have come early. The interested German states had no sooner accepted the proffered neutrality than the cabinet at Berlin, began hinting at Paris that it would be well to negotiate a new line. Shortly afterwards the project of a composite army to defend the line was suggested at the different courts of North Germany.

To the negotiations leading up to the French-Prussian treaty of August 5, 1796, and to the Prussian-Hanoverian agreement resulting in the formation of an Observation Army the following chapter will be devoted. With the establishment of a new demarcation line and an army to make it respected, we may begin to speak of neutrality as "*a system*."

CHAPTER V

FOUNDING NEUTRALITY AS A SYSTEM

THE hopes of an Imperial peace, for which Prussia's treaty with France at Basel was to have been the introduction, had gradually faded during the summer and fall of 1795;¹ the worthy ambition of Frederick William II. to figure as a prince of the peace had come to naught. As was pointed out in a preceding chapter, the king had expected to profit from the general demand for peace, and to prove by the success of his own negotiations with France that he was the proper person to mediate between the Republic and the rest of Europe. Thus, on the unsteady foundation of his neighbors' patronage, the king had hoped to restore the influence of Prussia, not only in German, but also in the wider field of European politics. Instead of the expected plaudits, he had heard himself denounced by his former allies as a base betrayer of the common cause and the disrupter of the old Empire. While Europe thus looked askance at the statesmanship which was guiding the Prussian policy, the emissaries of Austria were busy within the Empire, arousing suspicion everywhere by dwelling on Prussia's alleged session of the left bank of the Rhine. Thus, despite all the letters and conferences of Hardenberg,² a large number of

¹ Häusser, ii, 45. Hardenberg acknowledges the failure in his farewell note to Barthélemy, Dec. 9, 1795. Barthélemy, v, 518.

² The Austrian view of Hardenberg's activity in Vivenot, *Herzog Albrecht von Sachsen-Teschen*, ch. on "*Baseler Friede*."

the minor German States were made so distrustful of Prussia's motives that they declined to ask her mediation with France in their own or the Empire's behalf. It was evident that Francis II. at the head of the moribund Empire still occupied the place of vantage in Germany over the head of the Fürstenbund.¹

When we turn from the situation in Europe and the German Empire to the still narrower field bounded by the first Demarcation Line, we find matters no more encouraging; for the territory within the cordon of neutrality had proved more than Prussia could protect. The early violation of the line by both French and Austrian forces had led Prussia to abandon that part of the neutralized territory around Frankfort on the Main²; to her inability to bring about a peace on behalf of the states not neutralized she had now added the failure to protect those which had manifested their faith in her by seeking the protection of her neutrality. The situation of affairs was such that the Prussian cabinet could not with safety or propriety long delay in finding either a way to continue the neutrality arranged at Basel or some proper substitute for the policy there inaugurated.

The consideration of any new policy on the part of Prussia, directs our eyes at once to the situation in Paris after the treaty of Basel. Since the spring of 1795, the party of aggression had gained the ascendancy in France³

¹ On this struggle between Austria and Prussia to control public opinion, cf. Vivenot, *sup. cit.*, chapter on "*Die öffentliche Meinung zur Zeit des Baseler Friedens.*"

² October 26, 1795, Bailleu, i, 29. For Lucchesini's version of this violation see [Schladen], *Mitt. a. d. nachgelassenen Papieren eines Preuss. Diplomaten*, 341, 342. (Berlin, 1868.) "Je n'ai jamais rien espéré de la ligne de démarcation."

³ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 337 ff.

and sweeping on in the full tide of aroused national feeling, had passed, as the last great act of the convention, a resolution to make the Rhine a French boundary. This meant war—a great struggle, not the hoped-for peace. It meant to Prussia the definite loss of her provinces on the west bank of the Rhine, whose final disposition had been postponed at Basel until the general pacification. The party of the moderates in France had been silenced by the cannon of Napoleon in the streets of Paris, and with the disappearance of that party disappeared the hope of a general peace. The triumph of the aggressive party in France endangered the neutrality which Prussia had so confidently asked, and even forced, her neighbors to accept.¹

Nor was the outlook any more cheerful viewed from the standpoint of Prussia's internal condition. King Frederick William II., never the real master of the situation, had in the last year or so abrogated more and more of his nominal control. His dissipations were beginning to tell on an originally powerful frame, and his health was on the decline that led to the grave. Madame Lichtenau, long content with holding the King's fancy,

¹ Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 195 (Feb., 1796): "An einem seidenen Faden hängt das Schicksal d. nördlichen Deutschlands. Wahrscheinlich erwarten die Franzosen nur eine Gelegenheit um auf dieser Seite loszubrechen, und den Zuvorkommenkrieg zu spielen wie ihn Friedrich II. vor vierzig Jahren spielte—und glaubt man etwa, dass die französische Regierung von den erneuerten Vorschlägen des Lord Elgin, wovon viele Privatpersonen unterrichtet sein wollen, nicht unterrichtet sei? Wird die in Hannover negocierte Anleihe von zwei Millionen Thaler der französischen Regierung nicht als ein Beweis dargestellt werden, dass wir von England aufs Neue Subsidien ziehen?—Hofft man etwa, dass dieselbe die Schmähungen desjenigen Staatsministers der den Baseler Frieden geschlossen, und der ihn nun selbst verwirft, nicht in Erfahrung bringen sollte?—Glaubt man etwa, dass der Citoyen Caillard die Rolle eines Taub- und Blindgeborenen in Berlin spiele?"

now aspired to be the Pompadour of Prussia.¹ The Prussian cabinet was not a unit in regard to the policy to be pursued, and the strife of its factions weakened confidence in its policies and utterances; the great class interest in privileges of freedom from taxation stood solidly in the way of any vigorous policy that must necessarily endanger their exemptions; the army itself was more interested in peace than in war—the soldiers preferred furloughs to fighting, and the officers were under the temptation of the extra money which the furlough system put in their purses.²

To the question as to what should be done there were three evident answers. First, a statesmanship which considered the probable result of the situation might well have held that the true policy for Prussia was to take her place in the states-system of Europe, which was now threatened by the revolutionary Republic. Towards such a policy of joint action with Prussia's former allies the English ambassador pressed King Frederick William II. almost constantly, by offers of subsidy, while that monarch had himself come to feel that the patriotism which led his advisers and generals to urge on him a peace policy was mistaken.³ A second plan was to abandon the mainte-

¹ In a despatch of Nov. 19, 1797, Lord Elgin, writing from Berlin, gives an interesting account of conditions at the court of King Frederick William II., during his last days. He dates Madame Lichtenau's new ambition back to a trip to Italy in the summer of the preceding year, when she had learned about Louis XIV. and Louis XV. (*Eng. Rec. Office.*)

² Cf. Bailleu in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895.

³ Lord Elgin says of a conversation he had just had, "One of the many pieces of information which Prince Hohenlohe gave me in the course of the visit was that the king personally had long been in the belief that England had really been desirous of counteracting him in the war against France and attributed to this cause even the bad success of

nance of neutrality for all North Germany, and simply extend a protecting cordon around Prussia's own states. But this way meant danger and disgrace; for Prussia's Westphalian lands were so enclaved that the surrounding territory must be neutralized and guarded. Otherwise she would have denied, not the responsibilities of any fore-ordained mission, but the veriest duty arising from the position of her own provinces. Lastly, the policy begun at Basel still offered possibilities.¹ The opportunism which had governed Prussia's policies pointed towards the negotiation of a new demarcation line and the organization of a force to defend it. This successfully accomplished, Haugwitz might consider himself as the founder of neutrality as a "system." The peace of Basel would then fall into an honorable place as the first step toward withdrawing North Germany from the ravages of war. Neutrality assured, Prussia could husband her resources and secure indemnification for her territorial losses in the struggle just closed. This course of diplomatic speculation it was into which Hertzberg, Haugwitz and Hardenberg in turn steered the Prussian state.²

the operations in 1794, and that it was only within these few days that he had been undeceived in this important point. That the king was now convinced of the nature of the proceedings under Marechal Möllendorff and that disregard was paid to his orders not from motives of treachery, but from impressions of false patriotism on the part of those who directed the campaign." Elgin's despatch of Feb. 23, 1796. [*Eng. Rec. Office.*]

¹The three possibilities, as Haugwitz viewed them from the standpoint of 1796, are given in a conversation with Caillard. Cf. latter's report of March 26, 1796, Bailleu, i, 437, 438.

²Cf. Max Duncker in *Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 39, 571. The Austrian chargé, Hudelist, writing in Sept., 1799, says that no answer from the Prussian government would give any measure of its intentions, "car comment sera-t-il possible tant que sa première maxime sera d'agir selon les circonstances?" Bailleu, i, 557.

Hardenberg, who had remained in Basel awaiting the opportunity to negotiate with Barthélemy in behalf of the minor states seeking Prussia's mediation, had expected the triumph of the moderate party in Paris.¹ By August, 1795, however, it was clear to him that the work of the *convention additionnelle* of May 17th was far from final. Thus the necessity of either determining a new line, or abandoning, by agreement with France the attempt to maintain neutrality, was signally evident² to him and to the king, and the latter was only awaiting the settlement of affairs in Poland before determining what action he would take.³

Hardenberg's views on the policy to be followed were decidedly in favor of vigorous action.⁴ His birth and training as a North German of the Circle of Lower Saxony, and his clear vision from the standpoint of a Prussian statesman, kept his eyes ever on the Lower Rhine as the danger point. It was in this region, then, Hardenberg thought, that Frederick William must face the French. It was the king's duty to oppose them with vigor. Make them feel, wrote Hardenberg, that reckless action on their part would drive Prussia into open opposition. Close action with the circles of Upper and Lower Saxony, and a part of Westphalia would, in Hardenberg's opinion, make a formidable confederation, on whose behalf Prus-

¹ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 314-320.

² Bailleu, i, 18.

³ *Ibid.*, i, 20.

⁴ Hardenberg to king, Dec. 5, 1795. Bailleu, i, 34 ff. In the inaccurate and garbled account of the neutrality policy given in the *Memoires d'un homme d'etat*, iii, 374 ff, and 222-225, Hardenberg is credited with the idea of a new demarcation line. Haugwitz, it is said, took up the idea and tried to get rid of the originator by sending him on a mission to Lower Saxony. As will be seen later, it was on this mission (?) that Hardenberg did some very effective work for the neutrality system.

sia could easily secure from France a recognition of neutrality. Such an arrangement would rescue Hanover from its endangered position and Prussia, disregarding the rest of the Empire, could then unite around itself the North of Germany,¹ and make itself a power to be respected.² This was the doctrine of an egoistic Prussian policy.³ With such a view the hopes of the preceding April and May have little in common. Prussia was to go forward under the assumption that the Empire was dissolved, and that there remained nothing for each state except to look after its own interests and safety with "egoistic selfishness" ("egoistischer Eigennutz").⁴

The current of events in the fall of 1795 gave force to Hardenberg's suggestions. The relief felt in Berlin at the success of von Dohm's mission to Hanover in September, 1795, could have been but short. The French complaints about the troops, emigrant, Dutch and English, on Hanoverian soil, were as vigorous as those which had been made before Hardenberg told Barthélemy of Hanover's acquiescence.⁵ Furthermore, French promises to observe the Demarcation Line on the side towards Westphalia were of uncertain value with

¹ "Et la maison Palatine."

² In the *Memoires d'un Homme d'Etat*, vol. iii, Hardenberg is represented as the instigator of von Dohm's mission to Hanover in the fall of 1795, and as the Prussian statesman who suggested the second demarcation line and was in general the sponsor for the neutrality of Prussia. Cf. e. g., vol. iii, 278-279.

³ See Bailleu's essay in *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch* for 1897. He gives some suggestions for the interpretation of this period of Prussian history.

⁴ Transliteration of Haugwitz's words to von Ompteda. See latter's despatch, August 20, 1796, no. 1126a I. [*Han. Archives*].

⁵ Oct. 12, 1795. Suspicion is very evident in Delacroix's letter to Barthélemy, Dec. 10, 1795. Barthélemy, v, 517.

the Jacobin party in the ascendant;¹ and with the promise was coupled a disagreeable condition, to the effect that the king of Prussia must assume full responsibility for the dispersion of hostile forces in either Hanover or Westphalia.

Though not ready to go to the extreme measure mentioned in the secret articles of the *convention additionnelle*,² the ministry at Berlin felt the necessity of some sort of assurance that France meant to observe the neutrality of Hanover.³ The Electorate itself had long clamored for a "Gegen-Erklärung" from France, after the Hanoverian proclamation accepting the Demarcation Line, and even if the war fever in Paris should abate,⁴ the generals of the French armies were still thought insubordinate enough to be dangerous.

Prussia would have been willing to continue its negotiations through Hardenberg at Basel. The French government, however, had brought it about that Caillard was to represent them more directly at the court of Berlin.

¹ Hardenberg to the king, Dec. 5, 1795 (*sup. cit.*).

² That is, to take Hanover *en depot*. This is the time when, according to Vivenot, the periodicals under Prussian control were preparing public opinion for Prussian annexation of Hanover. See his evidence in *Herzog Albrecht von Sachsen-Teschen*, ii, pt. 2, 328 ff. He goes on to assert that a greater share of the Hanoverian statesmen were in Prussian pay, and that the University of Göttingen was an efficient Prussian instrument in moulding Hanoverian opinion. The main value of Vivenot's work is that it shows how men of that time, as well as of a later, might put a hostile construction upon the Prussian actions and thus stir up such distrust in otherwise friendly courts as to control their actions and thus react on what was done and said at Berlin.

³ Cf. instructions to Sandoz-Rollin, Dec. 25, 1795. Bailleu, i, 40. Hardenberg's distrust of the Jacobin regime finds free expression in his letter to the king on Dec. 5, 1795. Cf. Bailleu, i, 36.

⁴ Sandoz-Rollin, the Prussian minister in Paris, reports Dec. 28, 1795, that there is in Paris a strong demand for peace. Bailleu, i, 41.

Among other reasons suggested for their insistence on having a representative near the person of the king, was the suspicion that Hardenberg was not transmitting their protests against Hanoverian violations of neutrality.¹ Under obligations to send a representative to Paris, Frederick William selected Freiherr von Sandoz-Rollin, formerly ambassador to Spain. As in the sending of Caillard, so in the instructions of Sandoz, the position of Hanover was made a matter of special mention. As far as material at hand allows one to judge,² Sandoz's most positive duty was to secure a direct acknowledgment of the oft-violated Demarcation Line, and thus insure Hanover and North Germany against French incursions; the importance which Prussia attached to such an acknowledgment is attested by the insistence with which Sandoz is directed to press the matter.³

The French Directory itself was not of one mind on the attitude to be assumed toward the Prussian insistence on the recognition of the neutrality of North Germany. The general feeling plainly stated was that the French had been more hampered than helped by a line which limited their operations in the South and sheltered their enemies in the North. If it were an advantage to Prussia to secure the neutrality of Westphalia and Hanover, it was a neutrality the French proposed to sell at the highest price. The condition *sine qua non* of a new agreement was the Prussian recognition of the French right to the territory on the west bank of the Rhine. Even with that condition complied with, the situation of

¹ The archives at Berlin show this suspicion baseless.

² Summary of instructions in Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 229.

³ Dec. 25, 1795, and January 29, 1796. See documents in Bailieu, i, 40-45.

Hanover was one that Rewbell and Delacroix, though favorable to the Demarcation Line as far as Westphalia was concerned, viewed as on a different footing. The military members of the Directory (Carnot and Aubert-Dubayet), backed up by the reports of General Jourdan, did not wish to grant anything till the plans of the campaign were settled.¹ To the French the Electorate was ever a means of striking England. Its possession might work an exchange that would restore to them some of their colonial possessions;² or, better yet, it might be used as a bait with which they could draw Prussia into difficulties with the Empire³ and with the crown of England.⁴

As it became more and more certain that the Republic was entering on a great struggle, the Directory, influenced by the military party, hesitated to agree to a line that might conflict with Jourdan's plans.⁵ Hanover was again the particular stumbling-block. While that Electorate was delaying Prussian plans for its defense, the

¹ Sandoz, Jan. 12, 1796, in Bailleu, i, 45. Hüffer, i, 300, is evidently using the same material.

² Delacroix suggests the Windward Islands. Bailleu, i, 45.

³ They demanded that Austria acknowledge the line. Bailleu, i, 59. Frederick William writes, Feb. 6, to his ministry: "Die Gründe und die Anerbietungen des Herrn Caillard sind wenig stichhaltig; es scheint man will nur Zeit gewinnen und uns mit ganz Europa veruneinigen." Hüffer, i, 300. See also Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 219, 220.

⁴ Sandoz, Jan. 18, 1796: "... chaque jour le ministre Delacroix me tient un nouveau langage sur cette neutralité; avant hier il soutenait par ex. que l'électorat de Hanovre ne devait pas inspirer autant d'intérêt à V. M. qu'elle le manifestait; que c'était du démembrement même de celui-ci qu'elle trouverait un jour des arrondissements convenables à ses États; enfin que V. M. ne pouvait pas vouloir affaiblir les moyens de pacification de la République française en comprimant ses avantages..." Bailleu, i, 46.

⁵ Bailleu, i, 59.

French were muttering threats against its independent existence.¹

The state of the negotiations in Paris made it imperative that the Prussian government should take into consideration the possibility of a rejection of the line proposed as a substitute for that negotiated at Basel. Haugwitz was the royal adviser who saw clearly the calamitous consequences of the failure of the negotiations. He had staked his whole policy on a successful effort to escape the importunities of the allies and the overtures of alliance made by the French. With a clearness of insight and a firmness of purpose which does not always distinguish his policies or their execution,² Haugwitz turned

¹ Bailleu, i, 58.

² Krüdener, after stating the views of King Frederick William III., in 1801, gave the following sketch of Haugwitz: "Quant à son ministère, personne n'y a assez de caractère pour avoir un système à soi, ni assez d'ascendant pour faire prévaloir son système, s'il en avait. Le comte Haugwitz, ni pacifique, ni guerroyant, ni Anglais, ni Français, ni Autrichien, n'est que ce qui convient à un ministre qui craint les embarras. Si son Maître aimait la guerre il serait le plus intrigant et le plus ambitieux des ministres. Il n'a que des demi-volontés." F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vi, 297, 298, also pp. 258 and 266 for views of Repnin and Panin, both former Russian ministers in Berlin. Sieyès refers to him as "le ministre des ajournements." Cf. Bailleu, i, 483. Of all the diplomats, English, Austrian, Saxon, Hanoverian, French and Russian, whose utterances, printed or unprinted, have come under my eye, I think Caillard, the French ambassador in Berlin from Oct., 1795, to June, 1798, is the only one who consistently speaks of Haugwitz with favor. [Cf., e. g., Bailleu, i, 439 and 469.] One ought possibly to add the Bavarian, Bray. While himself regretting Haugwitz's retirement in 1804, Bray speaks of the general satisfaction among the diplomats at Haugwitz's disappearance. His slackness and neglect had brought Haugwitz into bad repute. Cf. Bray's account of Haugwitz's retirement in Bailleu, ii, 624, 625, and in Bray's memoirs, published under the title, *Aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten der alten Schule* (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1902). This monograph has in no sense attempted a rehabilitation of Haugwitz or a defense of his policy. The aim is simply to show the policy in the light in which it appears when approached from a point of view of a minor North German state.

energetically to the consideration of the means which were to save Prussian neutrality if the line was rejected, and which in any case would make the line respected by the not-too-scrupulous generals and statesmen of the Republic. The frequent violations of the neutrality arranged in May, 1795, had taught that something more than sign-posts decorated with the Prussian eagles must be put to mark the border line.¹ Haugwitz now turned to the idea of the organization of an Observation Army, formed and supported by the North German states who shared the benefits of Prussia's neutrality. It is only by giving due consideration to the policy of neutrality from its military side, and with special reference to Prussia's relations during the period to the minor German states, that one can obtain a fair estimate of Count Haugwitz as the responsible royal adviser in the years 1795-1803. Regarded from that point of view, neutrality seems a vigorous policy,² bearing within itself great possibilities for the future of North Germany and Prussia, if that state but justified the confidence she had asked of her neighbors. When to the neutrality arranged by treaty Prussia had added a respectable military force that promised a blow for every infringement, then we may speak of a policy worthy a historian's consideration. When the Duke of Brunswick, with such men as Blücher, Wallmoden and Scharnhorst as his lieutenants, had assumed command of an army of 40,000 soldiers, drawn from the greater states of North Germany and supported by the joint action of all the neutralized states legislating in a special congress called for that purpose, then we have

¹ "Of what good is a neutrality that is not armed?" inquired Häberlin in his *Staatsarchiv*. Cf. vol. iii, 48 (footnote).

² See Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 218-220. He expected that it would need to be defended against the Austrians.

something different from the arrangement in the *convention additionnelle*—we have a “Neutralitäts-System.” These things Haugwitz saw, and strove to make his sovereign see. It is the failure of King William III. and his kitchen cabinet, in the years 1798 to 1803, to appreciate that in those days of stress and strain, neutrality was not a self-enforcing system, that the army must cast its lengthened shadow over diplomatic negotiations, that the sign of the sword alone made treaties binding—it is the failure of the king to stand firm in dealing with the blustering Czar Paul or the ruthless Napoleon that has relegated the Haugwitzian policy and its author to the limbo of great failures.

Whatever may have been the weaknesses of neutrality as a policy, its chief exponent cannot be accused of a failure to realize the necessity of making it effective. The idea of an army to defend the neutrality of states who wanted to keep free from the great contest had early received attention.¹ The uncertain attitude of the French statesmen and generals towards a strict observance of neutrality gave it new life.² Haugwitz became its exponent,³ and without the knowledge of his colleagues,⁴

¹ Cf. chapter II.

² One should also notice the firmer tone in the directions to Sandoz about this time, e. g., Jan. 29th, in Bailleu, i, 45, and similar expressions to the diplomatic corps in Berlin. *Ibid.*, 529. But Prussia did not mean to carry matters to a point of war. Cf. Caillard's report, Feb. 27, of conversation with Haugwitz, *ibid.*, i, 437.

³ *Ibid.*, i, 49.

⁴ Von Alvensleben in a memoir dated Oct. 1, 1797, reviews the events after the treaty of Basel. In speaking of the king's action of Feb. 15, 1796, he says: “—(je suppose par les conseils de S. Exc. M. le Comte Haugwitz, le département n'en ayant eu aucune connaissance avant)—.” Bailleu, i, 150-151. Haugwitz was further hampered by the great pressure then being exerted by England and Russia

and against the sharp opposition of the French party in Berlin, whose head and front was the King's uncle, Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Frederick the Great,¹ King Frederick William II. was induced by Haugwitz to send a circular note to the North German states sheltered by the neutrality arrangement.² These notes, of February 15 and 16, 1796, give no open hint in their account of negotiations at Paris that there is overshadowing danger of failure. The minor states are urged to relieve the situation by the strict enforcement of neutrality. Mention is made of the new line which is being negotiated, and, in a conclusion especially adapted to each state addressed, it was inquired what they could do to make certain the execution of the stipulations concerning the new line.³

The note to the Duke of Brunswick is the one which most clearly reveals the seriousness of the situation.

through their respective representatives, Lord Elgin and Kalistchev. Cf. Lord Elgin's despatches in the *Eng. Rec. Office. Prussia F. O. nos. 39, 40, 41*. These despatches show Hardenberg and Hohenlohe as the most earnest advocates of an Austrian-English-Prussian rapprochement. Haugwitz is not deaf to offers of subsidies. If this account pretended to be a full treatment of the Prussian policy during the period of neutrality I should be obliged to take into account the herculean efforts made by England during these years to arouse the Berlin cabinet from its retirement. The English archival material for such an account is abundant. A glimpse of the diplomatic struggle and cabinet dissensions in Berlin in Feb., 1796, may be obtained from the despatches of the Austrian ambassador, Count Reuss. Cf. Bailleu, i, 527-528, 532.

¹ His attitude during the negotiations at Basel has already been referred to. On this period see Caillard's report of Jan. 30, 1796, in Bailleu, i, 435.

² On the same day Struensee, minister of finance, was set the task of devising means to raise four or five million (reichsthalers?). Cf. Struensee's report of March 1st. *R. 67, B. 19 a, vol. i. (Berlin Archives.)*

³ Copies of the notes in above cited volume in the *Berlin Archives*.

The letter does not follow the form of the circular note closely. Its main consideration is given to the question of measures to be adopted—what is to be done if France rejects the proposed line? In all frankness the king reveals to Charles William Ferdinand “the incalculable danger” in which he thinks all North Germany stands if the tide of war flows toward the Lower Rhine. To the Duke’s foresight and patriotism is commended the necessity of the Prussian plan of gathering an imposing army that shall make neutrality respected. Nor does the king wish to see matters delayed till the storm breaks. Quietly and without *éclat* the plans should be concerted. Over the whole plan the king of Prussia invokes the shadow of legality and Imperial sanction. “It only remains to add, that in order to put the neutrality we are considering more surely beyond the possibility of violation, I am in constant communication with the Court of Vienna in order to secure its co-operation.”

The only unwisdom in this appeal was that it seemed to make the execution of a plan, whose failure or success meant much to the Prussia of that day, dependent on the attitude of a group of minor and dependent states. To be obliged to abandon a military measure that should efficiently defend her own possessions and give force to her negotiations in Paris,² merely because the states of Lower Saxony and Westphalia would not aid her, was to confess the failure of her own power to initiate vigorous measures.

¹The note to the Duke is dated Feb. 16. On the communication of the plan to Austria, *cf.* Bailleu, i, 529, 530.

²Von Ompteda’s report of Jan. 26, 1796, “es scheint hin und wieder gewünscht zu werden, dass der hiesige Hof durch die Zusammenziehung einer Armee in dem nördlichen Teutschland unter dem sehr natürlichen Vorwand der Deckung der Neutralitätslinie seinen Negotiationen mehr Nachdruck und sich selbst mehr Respect verschaffen mögte.”

The replies to the circular note of February 15, seemed to indicate that Haugwitz had put Prussia to the shame of such a confession. Some accepted the plan directly. Of this group Brunswick is the best example. Of those who rejected it incontinently none did it in language so biting and scourging as the Bishop-Elector of Cologne.¹

The important question was what attitude the Elector and Regency of Hanover would assume. Their state was not only the one naturally most interested after Prussia in keeping the French out of the Westphalian region, but its geographical position and financial ability to contribute made its action definitive. The Regency had known since early in December, 1795, that Prussia considered it advisable to keep the Hanoverian troops as the Prussian had been kept, in complete readiness to act. The safety of North Germany lay then as ever in the association of such controlling states as Hanover, Saxony, Hesse and Prussia.² The Hanoverian Regency had never lost sight of the uncertain position in which they remained as long as the French neither observed the neutrality line nor pledged themselves not to molest the English king's German lands. So it is not surprising that despite their tendency to consider most measures as "bedenklich," the Regency most heartily concurred in the plan suggested by Haugwitz.³ Their

¹ His reply is eloquent in its passionate bitterness and almost convicts Prussia of treason to the Empire by the pointed enquiries it directs at the Berlin statesmen. The Elector of Cologne had been as bitter in the preceding year when the Elector of Hanover had sought peace. Cf. Vivenot, *Briefe des Freiherrn von Thugut*, i, 398, 399.

² Reports of von Ompteda, Dec. 5, 1795, in *Cal. Br. Des. 24, Brandenburg-Preussen No. 551*. (*Hanover Archives*.) Haugwitz had broached these topics to the Hanoverian envoy.

³ Jan. 2 they write Ompteda that the proposition of Haugwitz deserves

troops had been kept on a half mobile footing in complete readiness to take the field, so that when Haugwitz through Ompteda¹ sounded them as to their attitude towards the formation of a demarcation army, the idea did not come to them as something new, but rather as a plan in complete agreement with the measures they had taken.² It was then, with Hanover's co-operation practically assured, that Haugwitz issued his note of February 15. The Hanoverian reply, which has been so severely condemned, is far from being the hearty expression of support that might have been expected. It seems to have been framed with the view of driving a good bargain with Prussia when the question of financial support should arise. Most vigorously the Regency presented all the efforts Hanover had made to conform to the treaty of Basel, and that, in view of the Prussian failure to obtain a "*Gegen Erklärung*" from the French, Prussia herself is the state which should assume the support of further protective measures. The tone is what might have been expected if we knew that Secretary Rudloff had been commissioned to write the reply in accordance with his views as expressed to von Dohm in the preceding fall.³ But this little display of narrowness

"alle Aufnahme und eine vollkommene Erheblichkeit. Ihr werdet demnach zu erkennen geben dass diesem sehr erleuchteten Gedanken der grösste Beifall von uns ertheilet wird." In 1126a, I. (*Hanover Archives*.)

¹ Ompteda's report of Jan. 26, 1796.

² That is, keeping their troops in readiness. It is in their rescript of Feb. 3 that they write: "Die in eurem Bericht von 26. v. M. erwähnte Idee von Formirung einer Neutralitäts Armee ist uns nicht fremd und unbekannt. Es stehet solche mit unserm obigen Auftrag in Verbindung und daher werdet Ihr bestens zu beobachten suchen inwiefern solche oder etwas Ähnliches oder Mehreres dorten vielleicht nach und nach Ingress finden möchte." *Hanover Archives*, 1126a, I.

³ The reply is in the same volume with Haugwitz's note in the Berlin

did not prevent the Regency from acting in a way more consonant with their previous utterances. February 20, Haugwitz was assured by them that fifteen or sixteen thousand Hanoverian troops¹ could be mobilized in fourteen days to defend the Weser, and communication was opened with Saxony to induce her to dispose an equal number along the Werre. So convinced were the Regency by Haugwitz's assurances of the French hostile intentions, that they asked only to know what was intended in the way of common action that they might be prepared to act, should the French utterances seem ambiguous.² That these utterances were not simply for the effect which they might have in Berlin, is proved by the Regency's suggestion to King George that Hanover propose to Prussia a convention arranging their joint defence of the Demarcation Line.³ On February 29, two weeks after Haugwitz's inquiry, they agreed to the Prussian plan for a defensive army of

Archives. The tone of the Hanoverian reply may justify the adjectives used by Bailieu, but the policy of Hanover early in 1796 toward the Demarcation Army cannot be called "widerwillig und ablehnend." Bailieu, i, xxiv, *et seq.* Their reply to the note of Feb. 15 is dated Feb. 26 and is signed by Kielsmanegg, Steinberg and Arnswaldt. The Regency, in a letter to King George, dated Feb. 25, 1796 [*no. 1126a, I, Hanover Archives*], explains that though firmly in favor of the neutrality of north Germany, they have thought it better to reply in generalities and depend on the Prussian negotiations.

¹ Probably an over-estimate. Cf. Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 407, for an estimate in the preceding year.

² Regency to von Ompteda in 1126a, I. (*Han. Archives.*) In a note to the king they indicated that Haugwitz was extremely cautious in revealing his plans for fear France would be "*brusquirt*." Regency to king, Feb. 4, 1796.

³ Regency to king, Feb. 25, 1796, in *no. 1126a, I*. They think such an agreement will prevent a Franco-Prussian understanding and draw Prussia toward the English system.

30,000 Prussians and 15,000 Hanoverians under the Duke of Brunswick.¹ In view of the fact that French invasion only awaited French interest, the Hanoverian Regency held it absolutely necessary to trust themselves wholly to the Prussian court and to arrange matters in conjunction with them as they alone were in a position to ward off the danger and to give assistance to which their previous assurances bound them.²

The attitude of King George was slightly less cordial towards the idea of a Demarcation Army than was that of his ministry in Hanover.³ He approved in the main, throughout these months, the Regency's oft-expressed intention of acting with Prussia in case danger from France was pressing, but from his broader outlook he felt less sure that the French would dare to flout Prussia by invading Hanover, and deemed it wise not to let the leadership in the matter slip too completely into Prussia's hands. General Wallmoden-Gimborn was appointed commander of the Hanoverian contingent, with Major Scharnhorst as his quartermaster-general.⁴ All further details the king left to the ministry, with oft-repeated injunctions to purchase the necessary supplies and to keep their promises to Prussia.⁵

¹ Regency to von Ompteda in 1126a, I. The king of Prussia had written a personal letter to Brunswick about his co-operation and the Duke, with a view, possibly, of sounding the Regency, wrote to Hanover for advice. Regency to king, Feb. 25, 1126a, I. (*Hanover.*)

² I have followed closely the wording of their despatch to the king, dated March 3, 1796.

³ He (von Lenthe drafts the rescripts) was advising the discussion of united action before he received Haugwitz's note of Feb. 15. Cf. rescript of Feb. 19, 1796, in Cal. Br. Des. 11, E. I, no. 1126a, I.

⁴ Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, i, 283.

⁵ The King's views are expressed in such rescripts to the ministry as those of March 4 and 11, April 15 and May 3rd. Jacobi-Kloest, the

This cordial attitude of King George and his advisers toward the main idea of the Prussian plan is a pleasing oasis in all the aridity of these years, during which Hanover is so often the passive object of policies initiated by other states. There is a positiveness in the Regency's reports about mobilizing troops, appointing commanders and establishing headquarters that refreshes because it is so un-Hanoverian.¹ But "*Bedenklichkeiten*" could not long be wanting. In the early stages of the correspondence the question of expense and its distribution had occurred to the Hanoverian ministry. They were not sure but that Prussia was exaggerating the French danger,² while having in mind other objects,³ and with persistence the idea recurred that Hanover had a right to appeal to Prussia's guarantee of neutrality so long as the Regency had promised von Dohm the expulsion of the Dutch, English and emigré troops.⁴ But it is in the unwillingness to undertake the expense of supporting the Demarcation Army until it could otherwise be pro-

Prussian ambassador in London, considered the King as most favorably disposed toward the Prussian plan. Cf, e. g., report of March 24. (*Berlin Archives*.) He is equally pleased with von Lenthe's conduct. Cf. Jacobi's report of April 26, 1796. (*Berlin Archives*.)

¹ March 30, the ministry sent Haugwitz a detailed statement of the composition of their corps of 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry with headquarters at Minden (In *II26a*, I). Stein was then in Minden as President of the Westphalian Chamber of War and Domain. Lehmann, *Stein*, i, 176 (Leipzig, 1902).

² Reports to the King. March 3 and 31.

³ Regency to Ompteda, March 9, 1796. By this it is likely they meant that Prussia had primarily in view the protection of its Western provinces or the expression of its discontent at the French treatment of the Prince of Orange. The Regency's report to the king, April 14, shows the greatest distrust of Prussia's plan.

⁴ E. g., Feb. 29, 1796, in a rescript to Ompteda. On this matter see chapter iii.

vided for, that they prepared the greatest difficulty for Haugwitz, who, despite the discouraging replies to his note of February 15, the failure of Struensee to raise a loan and the opposition of his colleagues, had held the Prussian king to the plan he had proposed.¹

The question of expense had raised such difficulties that, as long as Hanover refused to assume the burden, the Prussian troops were unable to move. The man who was to command them did not at first seem inclined to lessen the uneasiness which the Regency showed. Between the death of Frederick the Great and the rise of Stein the most influential personality in North Germany was Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick.² His advice was sought and followed by Frederick William III. On the other hand, the position and interests of his own lands, together with the moderation of his views, gained him the confidence of the smaller states, so that at each new move of their more powerful neighbor they were prone to ask, "What does the Duke of Brunswick think?" When the idea of an Observation Corps promised to become a reality there was but one choice for its commander.³ All agreed that the Duke of Brunswick was the man.

¹ On Feb. 21, Alvensleben submitted a memorial arguing against the Demarcation Army on the ground of expense. Cf. Bailleu, i, 49 ff. Struensee's failure is shown in his report of March 1, where he says that he has been able to raise but 1,000,000 (thalers?). *Berlin Archives*, R. 67 B, 19 a, 1. Haugwitz's views are set forth in a memorial (unsigned) dated March 3, and bound in this same volume in the *Berlin Archives*. The memorial shows a clear appreciation of the crisis that faces not only the system of neutrality but the Prussian state itself.

² There is no adequate biography of the duke. See Fitzmaurice, *Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick: an Historical Study* (1735-1806). (London, 1901.)

³ The king of England, among others, requested that the Duke be

The Duke had not been in sympathy with the Prussian policy of neutrality, and when Clerfaut's successes in the fall of 1795 had given the Imperial cause a brighter prospect he urged the allies to offer Prussia increased subsidies. What he would have done was to move the Hanoverian corps up to the Ems and then have negotiated with arms in his hands.¹ But nothing was done, and the Duke was left strong in his dissatisfaction with the controlling party in Berlin.² This distrust of the Berlin cabinet the Duke felt free to express to the Hanoverian commander, General Freytag.³ The king (Frederick William II.), he said, means well, but no trust can be put in the persons around him. The ministry is weak and untrustworthy. Count Haugwitz conducts affairs very well at times, but he swings from one side to the other. The Duke doubted the reality of the danger from the French, and feared the intrigues at court and the ministry's constant plans for territorial increase. He would take the command if offered him, but that he might not be the tool of nations, houses, or men who were not bound by treaties, he would, when he knew what the army was expected to defend, make his arrangements directly with the king; for otherwise no dependence could be put in an arrangement at Berlin.⁴ Such

appointed commander of the Demarcation Army. Cf. copy of Prussian reply to Russian protest against the Demarcation Army, dated May 25, 1796, and enclosed in Lord Elgin's dispatch of that date. (*English Record Office, For. Office, Prussia, No. 40.*)

¹ Cf. Duke's letter to King George, Oct. 29, 1795, conveyed through Wallmoden and the Duke of York. (*In 1126a, I, Han. Archives.*)

² Duke's letter undated in above package. King George sought to have the Duke use his influence in Berlin. King George to General Wallmoden, January 19, 1796.

³ Reported by Rudloff, March 5, 1796. (*no. 1126a, I.*)

⁴ Letter of the Duke, March 5, 1796. (*In 1126a, I.*)

words from the Duke of Brunswick to the Regency in Hanover could not but have been seed sown on ground well prepared.

The consent of the French government to the general idea of a Demarcation Line given on March 24¹ had advanced the negotiations but little. The Directory's constant recurrence to the definite session of the left bank of the Rhine, indemnification for the House of Orange by Prussia's seizing Mecklenberg, the adoption of the policy of secularization and a Franco-Prussian alliance, had opened a long and troubled vista of propositions and counter-propositions.² Prussian diplomacy, then, had not been successful enough in Paris to justify any relaxation in the Prussian efforts to secure the neutrality of North Germany by the organization of an army for its defense. Haugwitz was embarked in a policy to which his every interest bound him,³ and he pushed it with a vigor scarcely characteristic. At a conference held in Magdeburg April 15, he met and discussed the situation with the distrustful Duke of Brunswick and with Prussia's efficient agent, Christian Wilhelm von Dohm. There, presumably, the whole situation was canvassed.⁴ Certain it is that the Duke was brought to

¹ Sandoz-Rollin to Prussian Ministry. Bailleu, i, 60.

² Hüffer, i, 301, 302.

³ "La neutralité fut l'ouvrage de Haugwitz, sa gloire, son enfant chéri." Haugwitz, *Fragment des Memoires*, 17. "Je parle de cet enfant chéri qui m'a valu ou qui a dû me valoir la bénédiction de ma patrie. Si elle balance à me l'accorder, je la trouve au fond de ma conscience." Haugwitz, as quoted in Ranke, *Works*, 47, 305. See also Caillard's despatch in Bailleu, i, 439, 440, and Reuss to Thugut, *ibid.*, 539.

⁴ The Duke, in view of this conference, had been furnished by the Regency with the necessary data as to Hanover's military strength, etc. Cf. Regency's reply to Duke's request, April 13, 1796. No. 1126a, I.

see that there was a real basis for fearing the French.¹ The Duke now explained to the Regency that what had seemed to him suspicious in the actions of the Berlin ministry had been the result of viewing externally the contending factions. The Duke, too, determined to take command of the Demarcation Army if assured of the co-operation of Hanover. At a conference in Peine, April 21, Minister-President Kielsmanegg, of Hanover, and the Duke went over the whole ground, differing only when it came to the question of supporting the corps that the Prussians wished to form.² Hanover's refusal to undertake it even temporarily seemed to the Duke all the more to be regretted when one considered the poverty and slowness of the Circle of Lower Saxony. Convinced that the king of Prussia was in earnest about the proposed measures, the Duke was mildly optimistic about

¹ See protocol of Regency's meeting of April 18th to consider a letter from the duke. (In *no. 1126a, I.*) According to Lord Elgin's despatch of Jan. 16-17, 1796, the duke had already consented to assume charge of defensive measures. [*English Record Office.*] Haugwitz, in his *Fragment des Memoires*, pp. 53, 54, says of this interview with the Duke: "Le Duc de Bronsvic qui avait tort peut-être d'accepter le commandement en 1792 (mais s'en étant chargé il n'aurait pas dû le quitter en 1793) en 1796 se trouvait à sa place. Rappelé alors par Frédéric Guillaume II. il fut dû aux soins de Haugwitz qu'il s'y trouvait, Après sa retraite en 1793 il y eut des froideurs entre le maître et son ancien maréchal. Le-dernier sans quitter le service avait cependant l'air d'y avoir renoncé pour toujours. Les relations qui devaient avoir lieu maintenant et naître du système de la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne, semblaient de nature à appeler de nouveau le Duc de Bronsvic au commandement de l'armée. C'était la pensée du ministre, qui pour cet effet, en se menageant une entrevue avec le Duc à Magdebourg y parvint à raffermir la confiance ébranlée. . . . A la tête [de] cette armée il fit respecter le droit de la neutralité dans toute son étendue."

² The Duke's report is enclosed in von Dohm's letter of April 23. [*Berlin Archives.*]

the possibilities of getting England and Prussia together,¹ if only Hanover would see its duty.

Evidently the Haugwitz-Brunswick-von Dohm conference at Magdeburg on the 15th had considered an expedient for securing the steady support of the troops when once in the field—that is, the revival of the Diet of the Circle of Lower Saxony, which had not met since 1682.² It would be on such a subject that von Dohm's unrivaled knowledge of Imperial laws and forms would furnish a safe guide. But a still more pressing question considered in Magdeburg³ obscured for the time the interesting experiment just mentioned. It was determined to send von Dohm on another mission to Hanover with the object of convincing the Regency that it was necessary for them to do temporarily what the Circle of Lower Saxony was to be asked to do for a longer period, that is, furnish supplies not only for their own, but for the Prussian corps under General Blücher.

Von Dohm started for Hanover about the middle of April. His previous experience had given him an insight into the way of thinking in Hanover, and optimistic though he was, he could scarcely have felt unwarranted hope in this attempt to get the threatened Electorate to support a Prussian corps for three months; for there still prevailed in Hanover the view that Prussia was responsible for the defence of Hanover against the French. The mythical guarantee given by Prussia when Hanover

¹ The minutes of this three-hour conference are in *no. 1126a 1*, (*Han. Arch.*).

² Bailleu's Introduction to volume viii, *Publicationen aus d. Kgl. Preuss. Archiven*, Cf., p. xxv.

³ The opening words of the instructions sent v. Dohm refer to the fact that the main points in them were discussed in Magdeburg. There exist to my knowledge no minutes of this conference of April 15.

ceased its measures of defence in the preceding fall, was something Hanover might be expected to revive and insist upon as long as Rudloff had a hand in shaping the Regency's councils.

The instructions given von Dohm, as already mentioned, were determined on in Magdeburg.¹ When compared with the Prussian circular note of February 15, they show that Prussia is now apparently determined on but one thing, that is, the defence of the neutrality of her own Westphalian provinces. To the other interested provinces she offers the protection of her troops if they will co-operate in supporting a corps composed of regiments from Prussia, Brunswick and Hanover. So definite are von Dohm's instructions in proclaiming that Prussia could and would sit in peace and see the other provinces invaded, so sure is she of the ability of her own troops to protect her scattered Westphalian states, so oft repeated is the direction to von Dohm to make it clear to Hanover that this is but an *offer* of the king of Prussia, and that if Hanover does not provide temporarily the necessary supplies, von Dohm's mission ends²—so definitely is all this put, that it is only by reënforced attention to the real situation that one can distinguish the statesmanship in the general plan from the diplomacy adopted for its execution. Haugwitz's own utterances show that he saw in this crisis how inextricably Prussia's national honor and very existence were imperilled if the French should invade Westphalia and Lower Saxony.³ The geography of Prussia's provinces made it impossible that she should

¹ R. 67 B. 19 a, vol. I, (*Berlin Archives*).

² His instructions are to retire to Brunswick and await results.

³ Cf. the *memoire* of March 3, in *Berlin Archives* (*sup. cit.*).

be indifferent to French movements against Hanover.¹ What would become of Minden and the Mark if Hanover should be overrun by the French? Or who could foretell the fate of Hildesheim and Osnabrück, bishoprics that Prussia had not left out of sight in arranging her indemnity? Thus it was that geography had shaped policy before von Dohm's instructions were ever drafted. It is from this point of view that one can understand why Hanover and the interested states dared to delay so long and to expect so much from Prussia; they felt certain she could abandon the Electorate only when she abandoned her own states, and her hopes of increase in the Westphalian region.²

Specifically, von Dohm was directed to secure from the Regency in Hanover the support for three months of the troops of the Demarcation Army, and also the Regency's co-operation in getting the Imperial approval of the system of neutrality and the measures taken to support it.³ The idea that the Emperor was not to call on the neutralized states for troops or contributions (Roman months) was indeed asking positive sacrifice of the Emperor in behalf of an association that put itself in opposition to the Imperial policy.

A new demarcation line acknowledged by France,

¹ Lord Elgin, January 30, 1796, reports a conversation with Haugwitz after the receipt of Sandoz's first despatch, in which Haugwitz said that the King "further felt himself bound in honor to insure the safety of Hanover as he had exerted all the weight of his influence to obtain its adherence to the stipulations of Basle." (*Eng. Rec. Office*).

² One is impressed with the feeling that the Hanoverians did not realize fully the financial and military weakness of Prussia, and counted too much on her ability to do alone what she asked their necessary aid in doing.

³ See copy of von Dohm's instructions in *Berlin Archives*. Also Gronau, *Von Dohm*, 300-302.

then at war with the Empire, the formation of an army to defend it by drawing contingents that would otherwise go to the Imperial army fighting France on the Rhine, the approval of this neutrality association by the very Emperor whose forces it depleted, whose leadership it denied, the support of the Demarcation Army by subsidies from England, who regarded herself as deserted by Prussia at Basel, and by contributions from Hanover, whose ruler was then directing the English forces against France—it was this sheaf of possibilities that the government of Frederick William II. would bind together in a neutrality system which would restore Prussian prestige and establish the Prussian hegemony in North Germany. Was the statesmanship of Haugwitz and his colleagues robust enough to realize what it dreamed? The unsatisfactory course of the French negotiations has been noted. England refused subsidies to support an army that was to remain on the defensive.¹ The Emperor not only

¹ Lord Elgin's despatch of Feb. 13, 1796, says he has combated an idea broached by von Ompteda, *i. e.*, "that an army brought together for the purpose of preventing the infringement of the treaty of Basle would be so beneficial to the allies as to induce England to aid Prussia in forming it." He did it because "an idea has been surmised of forming a species of armed neutrality for the Circles of Upper and Lower Saxony, and in that view, no doubt, some troops destined for co-operation with the Austrian army might be withheld for the purpose of joining the Prussians." February 23, Elgin reported how Haugwitz and Hohenlohe had urged the benefit to England of the well-defined neutrality of Hanover and North Germany. Elgin again tells them, "— how impossible it was that England should stand forward for the defense of a treaty made in contradiction to engagements contracted with her and interests she was using every effort to support. That on these grounds it was quite out of the question that England should take any share in the protection of the North of the Empire or advance money for an arrangement for that purpose." Later, Lord Elgin went further than his instructions permitted, and urged on Count Kalitschev and Prince Reuss, the Russian and Austrian envoys, that though they

stamped the neutrality system as unconstitutional, but brought the Empress Catherine of Russia from approving to protesting against the Demarcation Army.¹ One

might disapprove Prussia's means of defending the north of Germany by a Demarcation Army, yet they must agree in holding her responsible for its protection, and that, in view of the serious danger from the French, too many obstacles should not be put in the way of the Berlin Cabinet. Cf. Elgin's despatch no. 46, May 25, 1796. (*Eng. Rec. Off.*) Haugwitz in his reply to Russia's protest against the Demarcation Army, said that it was concerted with and approved by the English government. The English ministry hastened to disavow this (cf. instructions to Lord Elgin dated June 24, 1796). Further, on the attitude of Russia towards the Observation Corps, cf. Regency to King George, June 30, 1796. (In no. 1126a, I, *Hanover Archives.*)

¹The Prussian government allowed the English and Austrian representatives to think the Imperial consent was a *sine qua non* in the plan of forming a Demarcation Army. Lord Elgin, April 16, quotes an Imperial declaration recently received that "neither as Emperor, State of the Empire or one of the combined powers can he give his sanction to the line of Demarcation for the neutrality of the north of Germany." April 24, Elgin reports that Haugwitz has abandoned the plan of getting the Imperial consent. April 26, he tells how Kalitschev has called on Haugwitz with assurances of Empress Catherine's hearty approval of the Corps of Observation if "it would not be attended with circumstances of a nature to cause jealousy to the allies or to throw impediments in the way of their operations." His despatch dated May 17, discovers Kalitschev, as the result of an Austrian representation in St. Petersburg, urging Prussia to desist from the measure as insufficient in itself and unconstitutional in the eyes of the allies. Austria sought to arouse Hanover's suspicions by dwelling on the untrustworthiness of Prussian declarations and the ulterior aims she might be concealing behind the Demarcation Line and the Hildesheim Congress. (Cf., e. g., report of Embassy at Vienna to King George, July 13, 1796, no. 1126a, I, *Han. Archives.*) Hanover stood up most stoutly for its right to protect itself. (Cf. Regency to its Embassy at Vienna, March 17 and 29 and June 8, no. 1126a, I, *Han. Archives.*) Hardenberg and v. Mühl, Hanoverian envoys, acted steadily with Lucchesini in Vienna. (See despatches of Schoenfeld, Saxon Envoy, during these months, e. g., June 29, 1796, *Dresden Archives.*) After the Prussian and Hanoverian envoys had jointly explained what was being done for the neutrality of North Germany, the following *note verbale* was given Han-

other support remained untried, and the success or failure of von Dohm's negotiations with Hanover and the Circles of Lower Saxony and Westphalia would test that.

The political situation in Hanover at this critical juncture shows two conflicting tendencies. The first is represented by the ministerial aristocracy which had set itself against Hanover's paying the cost of the Demarcation Army, and was maintaining that Prussia, having guaranteed Hanover's security, should itself support the army. If Prussia did not bear the expense, the Regency

over: "Der Kaiser hätte zwar wünschen mögen, dass das Corps welches zusammen gezogen würde nicht blos zu einer Deckung des nördlichen Deutschlands, sondern zur Mitwirkung für die gemeine Sache bestimmt wäre, erkannte aber auch dass in so weit der Endzweck *blos* auf die Sicherstellung des nördlichen Deutschlandsgrenze und die Reichständischen *Obliegenheiten* nicht minder genau erfüllt würden, jene Ausstellung eines Observation Corps den Gesetzen und der Verfassung des Reichs nicht entgegen stände und *in dieser Masse* versagten S. Kaiserl. Majst. Ihren Beifall nicht." (Extract enclosed in Schoenfeld's despatch of July 6(?), 1796. *Dresden Archives*.) The nearest the Emperor ever came to publicly recognizing the neutrality system was in a note of Count Colloredo's in reply to a Prussian protest against a supposed breach of the Demarcation Line. It is dated October 30, 1800. It refers to the occasion of the Prussian protest as unknown and immaterial "indem Allerhöchstdieselben weit entfernt sind die von dem preussischen Hofe angenommenen Neutralitäts-Grundsätze des nördlichen Deutschlands zu beeinträchtigen sondern vielmehr jede Gelegenheit eifrigst ergreifen werden Se. Majestät dem Könige Ihre freundschaftlichen Gesinnungen zu bezeugen." Cf. Häberlins, *Staatsarchiv*, v, pp. 357-359. The English and Austrian view of Prussia's plan may be inferred from Morton Eden's letter to Auckland, from Vienna, May 15, 1796: "Prussia, supported by Hanover, is doing everything that is possible to distress us in the Empire. Its views evidently are to set on foot an army at the expense of the Circles of Westphalia and Lower Saxony in order to avail itself of events. . . . The conduct of Hanover gives great discontent here (Vienna) and it seems impossible for me to convince any one that His Majesty's English ministers have no influence over the counsels of his Hanoverian government." Cf. *Journal . . . of Lord Auckland*, iii, 334.

was willing to roll the burden upon the outlying Westphalian states on the plea that they were the real cause of the danger from the French.¹ The second political group, the provincial estates and the people in general, turned toward Prussia as a natural protector, and received with favor the offer of King Frederick William II. to place a corps on guard duty if its support were guaranteed.²

If one stops to consider for a moment the policies here in conflict, it will be evident, I think, that the position of the Regency was not without a certain amount of justification, viewing the situation as they did. As representatives of their Elector's interest, they may well have hesitated at first to assume the expense involved in supporting an army of forty or fifty thousand for three months. They were not convinced of the reality of the danger from the French, considering, on the one hand, the ill-provisioned and disorganized condition of the French army, and, on the other, their own resisting power and the certainty that Prussia would rush to their aid if serious danger arose.³ Having agreed to join their own troops to the Prussians under Blücher, and to support their troops, they felt they had more than met all the promises they had made Prussia. The added demand that Hanover should, if everything else failed, support the Prussian corps too, may have been regarded by them as a financial matter in which delay and bargaining might relieve them of at least part of the expense. Less justifiable but quite as potent may have

¹ Von Dohm's report of April 28, from Hanover, *sup. cit.*

² Hanover correspondent of *St. James Chronicle*, writing April 23. Cf. issues of May 7-10 (British Museum).

³ See von Dohm's letter of April 28, 1796 (*R. 67, B. 19a, I, Berlin Archives*).

been the fear which they, as members of the old aristocracy, shared with their class, that the assumption by the Electorate of such a burden would endanger their privileged exemptions from taxation.¹ All classes would be asked to contribute to the common defense, and a privileged class once yoked into drawing the burdens of state is not willingly restored by its team mates to a seat on the coach.

Von Dohm on his way to Hanover stopped at Brunswick and learned there the discouraging result of the Duke's conference with President Kielsmanegg at Peine on April 21.² When he arrived in Hanover, April 25,³ his undampened ardor and unabated zeal were but coldly regarded by the Regency. His proposition that Hanover support the Observation Corps until the Diet of Hildesheim had acted was promptly rejected.⁴ His trump cards, the urgency of the danger from the French

¹ I am led to this suggestion by the character of the Regency, by the existence of such a struggle in Prussia (*Cf. Hist. Zeit.*, 1895, 256-260), and by the following passage in von Dohm's instructions: "Als Hauptprincip muss hiebey angenommen werden, dass alle Unterthanen der associirten Lande und vorzügl. auch die privilegirten Classen deren Existenz und Eigenthum so vorzügl. geschützt wird, der Gerechtigkeit auch Vorschrift der Reichsverfassung gemäss zu Tragung dieser Last mit beytragen und dieses überall auf gleichem Fuss behauptet werden muss und niemand irgend Privilegia und Immunitäten hiegegen anführen darf." (*Berlin Archives*, R. 67, B. 19a, I.) A resolution to this effect was one of the first acts of the Hildesheim Congress. *Cf. Häberlin's Staatsarchiv*, iv, 383-387.

² Material on von Dohm's mission is in *Cal. Br. Des.*, 24, no. 550, and no. 1126a (*Hanover Archives*).

³ *St. James Chronicle* (London), May 19-21, 1796. The correspondent reports that Hardenberg is expected soon, and is to go to other towns to arrange measures of defense.

⁴ The ministry were not in the least conciliated by von Dohm. They hardly admitted him to a direct conference and passed him over soon after by communicating directly to Berlin.

and the firm determination of the king of Prussia not to move a single man until supplies were on hand in convenient magazines,¹ were played in vain. The Regency replied² that they knew no danger pressing enough to make them assume a burden that should really rest on the states other than Prussia, Hanover and Brunswick, which were doing their share by furnishing troops. Their real view, however, was that Prussia should live up to the agreement they claimed it had made the previous fall.³ Hanover would not admit that she herself was the cause of the danger to the tranquillity of the North of Germany.⁴ Her Regency complained that they knew nothing of the French-Prussian negotiations or the status of the Demarcation Line which they were asked to defend.⁵ This much the Regency said directly to the Berlin statesmen and their further actions and utterances showed that they did not realize the weak and unstable condition of Prussia.⁶ They thought the

¹ Von Dohm's letter to Haugwitz, from Halberstadt, April 19, 1796. He outlines these as the convincing points to present in Hanover.

² Dated April 30, 1796, in *R. 67, B. 19a, I (Berlin Archives)*. They further plead ignorance of the French and Imperial views on the formation of an Observation Corps.

³ This allusion to Prussia's responsibility for Hanover's defenseless condition brought forth a vigorous reply from Berlin, May 7. (*Cf. Ministry to von Dohm, Berlin Archives.*) The Regency were not so blind to the danger from France as this reply indicates. See their letter of February 20 to Ompteda and to the King March 3. By March 31 (Regency to the King) their courage is restored. (*No. 1126a, I, Han. Archives.*)

⁴ This point was urged in von Dohm's instructions.

⁵ See Hanoverian reply of April 30, *sup. cit.* In the meanwhile the Prussian king had been awaiting news of von Dohm's success in order to know how to answer the treaty proposition made by the French, April 20. See Hüffer, i, 304.

⁶ *Cf. Lord Elgin's despatch of May 2 (?), 1796. (English Record Office.)*

Prussian minister Stein was already providing magazines at Minden for the support of the Prussian corps,¹ and when early in May, Hardenberg arrived in Hanover, the Regency hoped he might be the bearer of more favorable terms,² and refused to accede to the demands made by von Dohm. Baffled but not beaten, that indefatigable minister, obeying his instructions, left Hanover for Brunswick, after having issued the Prussian ultimatum that Hanover must grant the supplies asked for by May 12, or the offer of protection would be withdrawn.³ Here he only awaited a favorable reply from Hanover before moving to the second of his duties, the calling of the Congress at Hildesheim.

Meanwhile influences were at work in the Electorate which did not propose to see the land left open to a French incursion by the delays and bickerings of Rudloffs and Kielmanseggs.⁴ Hardenberg, the Hanoverian whose diplomacy at Basel had made Prussia responsible for the acquiescence of Hanover in the neutrality, was now visiting in Hanover, ostensibly for business reasons,⁵ but really, one may feel sure, seeking to accomplish as a

¹ Von Dohm's report of April 28, 1796. (*Berlin Archives.*)

² Von Dohm to Haugwitz, May 2, 1796.

³ Von Dohm, May 6, reports his presence in Brunswick ". . . wo ich in 24 Stunden weiter kommen als in Hannover in 6 Tagen." What I have termed the Prussian ultimatum is dated Berlin, May 2, and as it was despatched *par estafette* could have been delivered by von Dohm before leaving Hanover. The time limit is the chief thing not in his original instructions. Hardenberg favored his leaving. Cf. von Dohm's report from Hanover May 2.

⁴ April 25, Haugwitz wrote von Dohm that the Demarcation Line could only be made acceptable to the French by making it far less inclusive and even then no definite guarantees were obtainable. (*Berlin Archives.*)

⁵ See Appendix A. at the end of this chapter.

Prussian what he had planned as a Hanoverian years before, namely, the bringing of Hanover into closer connection with the other German States.¹ Count Hardenberg as a private citizen was more influential than if he had come as Prussia's envoy.² The public could regard him as a disinterested son of Hanover. The Regency alarmed by the activity of French revolutionary agents³ and the urgent statements of von Ompteda, their ambassador in Berlin, were readier to listen to Hardenberg's representations of the critical nature of the situation, for he spoke not alone as one who knew Prussian conditions, but as the mouthpiece of the Estates of Calenberg who had not neglected this opportunity of making their voice heard.⁴

In an earlier chapter a passing reference was made to some of the signs of Revolutionary influence in Hanover, and the name of von Berlepsch was mentioned as the agitator who had formulated the surprising declaration made by the Estates of the neutrality of "the Calenberg Nation." In the account of the first mission of von Dohm to secure the dispersion of English troops and mercenaries in the neutralized region, it was shown that the activity of these Estates and the co-operation of von Berlepsch in von Dohm's plans had brought forth a stirring protest against the remissness of the Regency

¹ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, I, 56-57.

² Cf. von Dohm's report from Brunswick May 6.

³ Lord Elgin's report of June [], 1796 (*Eng. Record Office*).

⁴ In his article on Reinhard in the *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, Lang refers to a long memoir of Reinhard on conditions in Hanover at this time. This memoir I have not seen at this writing. A new source for the career of Reinhard after this period is the recently published letters of his wife. Cf. de Wimpffen, *Une Femme de Diplomate. Lettres de Madame Reinhard à sa Mere 1798-1815*. (Paris, 1901.)

in observing their treaty obligations. The crisis of 1796 was such another occasion as von Berlepsch sought. On May 6, the Estates of Calenberg met in Hanover in special session. There were as of old the three houses—the nobility, clergy, and commonalty. Their form was that of the ancien régime; their utterances, so often the outcome of local prejudices, showed on this occasion the breadth of a truer view than the Regency had yet grasped.

Through the confidence of one of their members in von Dohm, we are given the substance of their deliberations.¹ With unanimity the three Estates appealed for action to the Regency, whom the public held responsible for the delay of the Prussians in marching to the Electorate's defence. Their sense of their duty and the province's danger led the Estates to memorialize the ministry to adopt any and all measures that will place the safety of their Fatherland beyond doubt. The groundlessness of the Regency's plea of poverty is proved when the Estates offer to bear, in company with the other provinces of Hanover and the endangered neighboring states, the cost of the Prussian troops for the first three months. The action of the Estates was judiciously and respectfully taken. The language of this memorial is considerate, firm, vigorous. The energy of the Estates lay in the activity of von Berlepsch, whose promemoria was the basis of their discussion. The form of the declaration, its very tone, is given by the vote of

¹ Von Dohm in Brunswick transmits the action von Berlepsch had taken on May 6. He refers to von Berlepsch as an able man decidedly out of favor in Hanover. Von Berlepsch embittered by his removal from his offices went so far in 1798 as to enter into a treasonable correspondence with the French urging them to invade Hanover. (Cf. Wohlwill in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 422.)

Herr Landrath, Graf von Hardenberg of the Curia Dominorum Nobilium. It was Hardenberg's statement which was unanimously approved by all three Estates.¹ Nor is it to be supposed that the activity of these former school fellows is comprehended in these resolutions.² Public opinion needed to be aroused and directed, and when the Regency still delayed, the Estates demanded action on their memorial. The Regency may have omitted to answer the appeals of the Estates,³ but it had taken action much more to the point.⁴

The transfer of von Dohm from Hanover to Brunswick did not mean a cessation of his activity. He took up the scheme of a conference of delegates from the different provinces interested in the system of defence, and, with von Münchhausen, the chief minister of Brunswick, busied himself in sending out calls for such a conference. Though snubbed by the Hanoverian Regency⁵ and dis-

¹ Von Dohm's letter of May 14 (*R. 67, B. 19a, vol. I, Berlin Archives*), encloses (1) a copy of the act of the Estates, (2) a minute of the resolutions of the committee in charge of the matter, (3) an address to the Regency dated May 7.

² Hardenberg proceeded to Altona (Hamburg) where he held a conference with Reinhard concerning Hanover. Cf. article by A. Wohlwill in *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, 1875, 94-95.

³ In their report to the king May 12, the Regency mention that "Unterdessen sind schon die Lüneburgische und die Calenbergische Landschaft bei uns von selbst eingekommen und haben angeboten dass zu der Vertheidigung des Landes und zu der Verpflegung der Truppen die erforderlichen Lieferungen an Korn und Fourage nach einer dessfalls zu treffenden Regulirung vom Lande übernommen werden sollen." (*Hanover Archives*).

⁴ On the whole situation during these weeks see Appendix A.

⁵ Von Dohm's aggressive methods seem to have displeased the Regency very much so that they communicated directly to Berlin although von Dohm had full powers for all negotiations.

gusted with their slack methods,¹ he hoped still that they would not overrun the date set by the Prussian ultimatum—namely, May 12. Nor was he disappointed. The Regency sent Rudloff to Brunswick May 11, but did not arm him with the full powers asked. In view of the relations between the two men, it was an unhappy choice to send Rudloff to deal with von Dohm “ministerially,” while directing him to negotiate with the ministry of Brunswick. Finding that the latter body would not deal with him, Rudloff was finally driven to call on von Dohm, who, making the best of a bad business, treated him as the fully accredited envoy he had awaited. It was thus ungraciously that the Hanoverian Regency yielded to the necessities of the situation by adopting measures requested by Prussia and approved by their sovereign and by public opinion in Hanover.²

The following days were spent in a conference between von Dohm, Rudloff, von Münchhausen and Mahner for Brunswick, and Lockhausen for Hildesheim, discussing the provisional support of the troops.³ Rudloff had come with a plan which he practically carried through.⁴ It amounted to Hanover’s assuming about one-half the

¹ In order to show them the Prussian way of doing business he answers communications received on Sunday night before seven o’clock on Monday. The steps they then take involve a different question than that proposed by Haugwitz between Dec. 5, 1795 and Feb. 15, 1796.

² Cf. von Dohm’s reports in *R. 67, B. 19a, I. Berlin Archives*.

³ Rudloff’s memoranda of the meetings are in *nos. 1126a, I, and No. 550 (Han. Archives)* and von Dohm’s are in *R. 67, B. 19a, vols. I and II. (Berlin.)*

⁴ Von Dohm was warned by General Wallmoden in a letter to the Duke of Brunswick not to trust too implicitly in Rudloff’s assurances as to the “*Marschfertigkeit*” of the Hanoverian Corps. Wallmoden hoped to have 10,000 men on the Weser by the end of the month but they could not be fully prepared before June 15 or 20. Cf. von Dohm’s letter of May 14 (*Berlin Archives*).

expenses of the united corps of 45,000 Prussians, Hanoverians and Brunswickers. Not all the arguments and persuasion of von Dohm were able to move Rudloff to assume a greater burden.¹ Having settled the Electorate's share, Rudloff withdrew, promising to return, but he did not, and most of the deliberations conducted after May 18, as to the shares to be borne by the Hanseatic cities and smaller states, were without Hanover's participation. When measured by their willingness to pay for the defense to which they contributed no troops, it cannot be said that the Hanseatic cities and lesser states of Lower Saxony and Westphalia showed so great self-sacrifice as Hanover, which had at all times been willing to contribute and support its corps of 15,000 men. Hamburg and Bremen had been asked to assume part of the provisional outlay. They pleaded various excuses, but were evidently in terror of French displeasure.² To Hamburg, further French irritation would have been particularly embarrassing, as the city was already more than troubled by the problem of what to do with the representative sent them by the Republic.³ Wherever he turned von Dohm was balked by timidity and niggardliness.

Over all the countless and wearying details of these preliminary conferences we can pass without loss of time. Their management is a tribute to the activity, patience

¹ The tension at the conference was unpleasant. At one time Rudloff withdrew and only an invitation from the Duchess of Brunswick kept him in town till a compromise was effected.

² Von Dohm finally got a cash payment from Hamburg. Bremen refused at first to participate openly but would send money secretly. Prussia refused to excuse her from sending a delegate to the Congress in Hildesheim.

³ Reinhard. See A. Wohlwill's article in *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* for 1875.

and hopefulness of von Dohm amid the most exasperating delays and discouragements. Delegates to these Brunswick conferences frequently appeared without the necessary full powers and then all apportionments must await the approval of their petty governments. The refusal of some small contributor to do its assigned share necessitated a complete re-apportionment, which, when arranged by the same process of bickering, wheedling, and threatening, had to run the gauntlet of ratifications down to the little power whose share was a few miserable bales of straw or bushels of oats. Meanwhile the advance guard of a Prussian army—a Prussia but ten years away from the days of Frederick the Great—was waiting under Blücher—the same Blücher who was not to be delayed at Waterloo—waiting till these little principalities enclosed within the lines of Prussia's western possessions, should appropriate a few thalers to defend their own existence. Was it any wonder that the Republican armies could break at will into a land where exemption from three months' support of a few thousand men was insisted on as though it were a principle of state policy? Is it remarkable that Prussians thought aloud about territorial consolidation and extension, and that the lessons learned in the weakness of 1795 to 1803 bore fruit years later? Is it surprising that men like von Dohm, Massenbach, the Duke of Brunswick, Haugwitz and Hardenberg, looked forward to a definite hegemony of Prussia in North Germany, either through the grouping of states in a revived Fürstenbund, or by a division of the Empire between Austria and Prussia?¹

¹Von Dohm was selected by Frederick the Great as one of his agents in the organization of the Fürstenbund and had since been active in the Westphalian region as a Prussian official stationed at Halberstadt. His experience in these fifteen years culminating in his labors in con-

The consideration of such policies must be left to the historians of the later periods; but the conditions which would give rise to such views and justify their realization are revealed in the period we are studying,

nection with the Congress of Hildesheim, gave him certain well-grounded views of the needs of Prussia and North Germany. The revolutionary wars directed his thoughts as they had those of Haugwitz, the Duke of Brunswick and Massenbach, toward some form of a North German Confederacy. Like them, also, he had drafted his plan of union. Gronau, in his *Christian Wilhelm von Dohm nach seinem Willen und Handeln*, Appendix XII. (Lemgo, 1824), publishes in French, a memorial of von Dohm's, prepared in 1800, which embodies his idea of a plan for federating North Germany under Prussian leadership. Colonel Massenbach in his *Memoiren zur Geschichte des Preussischen Staates*, iii, 201-229, publishes a German translation with some alterations of his own and adds notes (see Gronau, *sup. cit.*, p. 374, note 1). After a sweeping review of conditions in 1800 in which he dwells on the advantages Austria is likely to obtain from her recent treaties with the French, and the constant danger in which Germany stands now that foreign war has become practically the condition of internal peace in France, von Dohm in his memoir goes on to consider the means by which Prussia may secure herself and strengthen her power. He repudiates the idea of partitioning or annexing minor powers which are found unable to defend themselves. Such a proceeding might be necessary in South Germany, but in the North the states felt no pressing danger from France and were too independent and too strongly attached to the existing state of affairs to be treated in any such summary fashion. Aggression would drive them to union in defence of their common interests. As the old Empire is practically dissolved, it is better to lead these states into a new league with Prussia at its head. Not the least of the advantages of such a plan would be its return to the ancient German federative principle which had been unwisely abandoned during the past two centuries of state sovereignty.

The primary problem in forming such a confederation would be essentially that to which the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention addressed itself—the comparison is mine—namely, the determination of the spheres of central and state government and their definition so that conflict might be avoided.

The area to be included in the new confederation should be that protected by the Demarcation Line which might well be extended to the Main and ought, in any case, to include Hesse-Cassel. In order to give due recognition to the more powerful states included, von Dohm is

and such a mission as von Dohm's is enlightening in its failures. Five weeks to arrange with a dozen petty powers the support of 45,000 soldiers for three months, and the almost complete shipwreck of a policy by the

willing to divide his confederation into four sections, in each of which Prussia, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel shall have certain military and political prerogatives.

Despite all the difficulties of whose existence no one had a keener appreciation than von Dohm, that optimistic Prussian hoped the union might be formed. Success is assured, he said, to those who labor for what all see is a necessity. Let Prussia be judicious in securing the definition of its rights, and firm in claiming them once they were agreed to. Thus the small states would be prevented from exceeding their powers while, on the other hand, they might rest secure in the rights reserved to them. A federal treasury and army should be formed to provide for the common defense. He then outlines a detailed plan for the military defense of the confederation. To treasury and army all states and all classes within the states should contribute without distinction or privilege.

For each section there was to be a council of deputies to direct the expenditures of the section's treasury and attend to other matters. The affairs of the whole confederation were to be directed by a Prussian minister acting in conjunction with the princely heads of the other sections. A new judiciary was to replace the old Imperial courts and differences between the states were to be arbitrated by a court whose members were named by the states.

When its details are worked out, von Dohm feels sure his plan will prove feasible because "*Notre Système actuel de la neutralité du Nord d' Allemagne en a déjà fourni l' exemple sous des conditions beaucoup moins favorables. Il a frayé le chemin pour un Système plus étendu et permanent.*" The italics are mine.

Von Dohm concludes with some statesmanlike suggestions as to the selection and arrangement of secularized indemnities with a view to conducting that matter so that the federative idea might be furthered. Let Prussia in this, and in the conduct of the whole matter, show the purity and disinterestedness of her intentions and all Germany will declare for the plan. He then points out how the foreign powers may be brought to see their advantage in favoring a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership.

[I am indebted to my friend, Prof. T. W. Todd, of Washburn College, Topeka, Kansas, for his kindness in making me a copy of this plan from Gronau's work in the Royal Library in Berlin.]

short-sightedness of the state most interested next to Prussia in its execution, show what conditions existed in the Germany of the eighteenth century. When the circumstances are clear, we must feel that it was a triumph for von Dohm to have arranged, by June 1, the

The words which I have italicized recall a passage in Massenbach's *Memoiren*, ii, 217 (*cf.* also p. 103), written supposedly in Feb., 1796. After stating that Prussia has only to observe the strictest neutrality in order to assure herself of similar self-restraint on the part of the French, he concludes: "Dann aber blühet die Wohlfahrt unserer westphälischen Provinzen unter den Stürmen des Krieges und das westliche Deutschland, das uns Schutz und Sicherheit zu danken hat, gewöhnt sich nach und nach an die Bande, mit welchem wir es sanft umschliessen. Eine Föderation Preussens und der Staaten des westlichen Deutschlands wird Bedürfniss für Preussen."

According to Treitschke (*Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, i, 181) this plan of von Dohm's was first presented by him at the Congress of Rastatt in 1797. Gronau (*sup. cit.*, pp. 373, 374) in discussing the origin of the plan says that shortly before von Dohm left Halberstadt he had a conference with the Duke of Brunswick and another distinguished German prince (possibly the Duke of Weimar, *cf.* Häusser, *Deutsche Geschichte*, ii, 490 ff, fourth edition) concerning the critical situation. They encouraged him to frame his ideas and lay them before those in authority. The result was the above plan written in the first weeks of his stay at Harburg. (The copy in the Berlin archives is dated Halberstadt, Nov. 7, 1800. See Häusser, *sup. cit.*, ii, 490, footnote). It seems to have been sent to the smaller provinces without effect. That it was not forgotten in Hanover nor very favorably received, is evidenced by the fact that in December, 1801, Münster, the Hanoverian envoy to St. Petersburg, presented it to the Russian government as a proof of the wide-reaching plans, inimical to the interests of Russia and of North Germany, which were cherished in Berlin.

The plan of the Duke of Brunswick for dividing the Empire between Prussia and Austria is mentioned in the despatches of Lord Carysfort for October 21 and November 1, 1800. (*English Record Office.*) The English ambassador states that the plan had the approval of Haugwitz. It should not escape the reader that the date of Carysfort's despatch is about the time of the appearance of von Dohm's plan. Hudelist, the Austrian agent in Berlin, contended, in 1799, that the neutrality system was founded and maintained with a view to the dissolution of the Empire. See his despatch in Bailleu, i, 557, 558. To any one interested in

question of temporary supplies for the Demarcation Army. He was then able to turn to the Congress of Hildesheim and the host of questions it crowded upon him.¹

considering further the possibilities of the neutrality system, the words of King Frederick William III., possibly only royal flattery, may be of interest. They were spoken to Capt. von der Decken, the Hanoverian special envoy, in the crisis of 1801. The king said: "Er wünsche, dass das durch die Demarkations-Linie angefangene System auch nach dem Kriege fort dauern möge, und eine bleibende Verbindung zwischen den protestantischen Staaten fort dauern könne. Es wäre ihm darüber verschiedene Pläne überreicht, und er wünsche auch meine Meinung zu hören." See von der Decken's report of March 24, 1801, in *Cal. Br. Des. 24 Brandenburg-Preussen*, no. 585, *Hanover Archives*.

Treitschke (*sup. cit.*, i, 144) closes his paragraph on the treaty of August 5, 1796, with these words: "Die Gedankenarmuth der Berliner Politik versuchte kaum ernstlich, die thatsächliche Herrschaft, welche der Staat im Norden besass, zu einer staatsrechtlichen Hegemonie auszubilden; und doch liess sich der Friedensschluss nur dann entschuldigen, wenn man ihn benutzte um in Norddeutschland die Politik des Fürstebundes wieder aufzunehmen." This comprehensive but cautiously stated judgment should be examined and interpreted, it seems to me, in the light of the material given in this note and in the account of the formation of the Demarcation Army and the Congress of Hildesheim. See also note 1, p. 173 and p. 174, note 3.

¹ Since the completion of this monograph there has appeared the fifth volume of Sorel's *L'Europe et la Révolution Française* with the subtitle *Bonaparte et le Directoire, 1795-99*. Though appreciating fully the importance of the Franco-Prussian relations in this period, (cf. for example p. 28) the author of the excellent articles on the treaty of Basel and the neutrality policy already cited has given rather less space than might have been expected to the Prussian neutrality system and adds nothing new to the work already done by himself and Dr. Bailleu in this field.

CHAPTER V—APPENDIX A

The following letter of the Regency to King George in London throws so much light on the general situation that I have considered it worth making public. I am indebted to my friend, Dr. Victor Loewe, of Hanover, for the copy given below. The letter is dated May 8, 1796:

“..... Auf diese anderweite Note ist bald darauf mit einer Staffette eine Depeche des Hofraths von Ompteda gefolget, welche er, um einer gleichfalls abgehenden Preuss. Staffette zuvor zu kommen, nur in simplio hieher abgelassen hat, und wovon wir demnach die Abschrift E. K. M. hiedurch in Unterthänigkeit vorlegen. Nach solcher hat der Minister Graf von Haugwitz, (der übrigens von der hier dem von Dohm ertheilten Antwort noch keine Kenntniss gehabt), ihm in einer eigens dazu verlangten Conferenz die Eröffnung gemacht, dass nach den dringenden Umständen das rassemblement der Truppen entweder unverzüglich geschehen, oder diese mesure völlig aufgegeben werden müsse, dass daher man Preuss. Seits genöthiget sey, sich binnen einer bestimmten Termin von zehn Tagen die diesseitige Erklärung wegen der provisorischen Verpflegung zu erbitten, und dass dazu der von Dohm den schleunigsten Auftrag erhalten werde. Dabei ist selbiger dann ausführlich in die Betrachtungen hineingegangen, nach welchen, wie er vermeint hat, die gegründete grösste und nach Besorgnis von Frankreich jetzt vorhanden sey, wie E. K. M. aus der Depeche selbst in mehrerem zu ersehen, geruhen werden.

Indem wir damit uns in der Lage befunden, eine Entschliessung fassen zu müssen, die in Ansehung der mit dem Preusse.

Hof zu nehmenden mesures vielleicht entscheidend seyn dürfte: so wird unterdessen von E. K. M. aus dem Berichts Psto. des Hofraths von Ompteda vom 30. April wahrgenommen seyn, wie der Minister Graf von Haugwitz sich gegen ihn über die Lage der Umstände mit Frankreich und über die Gesinnungen des Preuss. Hofes viel vollständiger und viel zusammenhängender geäußert gehabt hat, als es vorhin noch nie geschehen gewesen ist. Daraus ergiebt sich erstlich, dass Frankreich geflissentlich die Negociation wegen der Neutralität zu trainiren, und in einer Ungewisheit zu lassen sucht, um darunter freie Hände zu behalten. Es lässt zweitens keinen Zweifel übrig, dass es insonderheit feindseelige Absichten gegen E. K. M. teutsche Lande heget, und den Preuss. Hof dahin zu disponiren trachtet, wo nicht in die Absichten mit hinein zu gehen, doch in einer gewissen Gleichgültigkeit dabei zu bleiben, Und drittens scheint es jetzt der ernstliche Wille des Preuss. Hofes zu seyn, der von Frankreich gegen das nordliche Teutschland überhaupt gerichteten Intention sich mit Nachdruck zu widersetzen, und dabei aller Anstoss gegen den römisch. kaiserl. Hof möglichst zu vermeiden.

Der in diesen Tagen in seinen privat Angelegenheiten hier gewesene Preuss. Minister von Hardenberg hat in mündlichen Unterredungen alles dieses mit Anführung von noch viel mehrern speciellen Umständen bestätigt, wobei er zugleich im Vertrauen erläutert, dass das bisherige schwankende in dem System und den Maasregeln zu Berlin, welches er nicht *entkennt*, theils aus den differenten Opinionen in Ministerio und theils daher rühren, dass, gegen seine jederzeit gehegte Meinung, man Anfangs immer geglaubt und gewünscht habe, auf die französischen Aeusserungen bauen zu können, die dann in der Folge bald verändert, bald verdrehet, bald wiederum erneuert, und bald im Grunde völlig zurückgenommen wären. Insonderheit hat er von der Lage der Dinge zu Berlin folgendes im engsten vertrauen zu erkennen gegeben. Es wären daselbst, ausser der Partei des Printzen Heinrich, deren anstössige politische Grundsätze der König mit einer Art von Indigna-

tion ansehe, zweierlei Parteien vorhanden. Die eine Partei halte dafür, dass Preussen sein Interesse von dem nördlichen Teutschland und von dem Interesse E. K. M., als Churfürsten, durchaus nicht trennen, gegen Frankreich eine starke Sprache führen, und imposante Maasregeln nehmen, und solchergestalt das gemeinschaftliche Armement aufstellen lassen müsse; und von dieser Partei sey der Minister Graf von Haugwitz, der General-lieutenant von Bischofswerder und auch der Prinz von Preussen.¹ Die andre Partei hingegen, an deren Spitze der Minister von Struensee² sich befinde, und wohin ebenfalls der Cabinets-Minister von Alvensleben inclinire, hege die Meinung, dass man Preusse. Seits die ganze convention additionelle des Baseler Friedens fahren zu lassen, nur die eigenen Preuss. Lande zu salviren, wegen des übrigen nördlichen Teutschlands aber sich nicht gegen Frankreich zu stellen habe, und damit die schweren Kosten des Armements erspart werden könnten und würden. Gegenwärtig habe die erstere Partei und Meinung das Uebergewicht nach der persönlichen Denkungsart des Königs; fänden sich aber in der Ausführung davon zu viele und zu mannichfaltige Schwierigkeiten, so könne man nicht gewiss seyn, dass selbige sinken und die andre Meinung oben kommen mögte.

Wenn man dieses nun auch dahin gestellt seyn lasset, so bleibt es allemahl jedoch unter den vorhandenen Umständen das wesentliche Interesse E. K. M. Sich für Ihro teutsche Lande des Preussischen Hofes zu versichern, und selbigen hieher fest zu halten. Es wird dadurch die Sicherheit und

¹ Later King Frederick William III., not to be confused with Prince Henry of Prussia, who favored the French.

² On Struensee's views, see report of the French Agent Otto, August, 1799. Bailieu, i, 505. Before accepting the views there presented, one should read the report of the Austrian envoy, in Bailieu, i, 535, 536. Time must have softened Haugwitz's feeling toward Struensee if any such opposition ever existed, for Haugwitz, in his *Memoires*, refers to Struensee in the kindest and most loyal terms as his mentor and the supporter of Haugwitz's system of neutrality. See Ranke, *Works*, 47, 304, "Notiz über die Memoiren des Grafen von Haugwitz."

die Abwendung der Gefahr der hiesigen Lande auf eine gedoppelte Weise erreicht, und so zu sagen entschieden. Einmahl nemlich, weil mit der Assistenz des Preusse. Hofes, zu deren Leistung derselbe seine Verbindlichkeit dermalen nicht *entkennt* und bereit ist, man zuverlässig stark genug seyn wird, um eine intendirende feindliche Invasion abzuhalten. Und zweitens vornemlich, weil nach der höchsten Wahrscheinlichkeit, so bald die hiesigen Truppen mit Preussischen Truppen zusammen stehen, französischer Seits schwerlich einst ein Angriff und eine Zurückwerfung der letztern gewagt werden wird, um sich nicht eine offenbare Rupture mit Preussen zuzuziehen. Dahingegen wenn möglicher Weise Preussen hier zurück bliebe, es eines Theils mit der hiesigen Sicherheit ganz auf die Zulänglichkeit der eigenen Vertheidigung allein beruhen, und andern Theils es dann doch wenigstens immer von Seiten Frankreich zu einem Angriff und zu wirklichen Hostilitäten kommen, und von deren ungewissen Ausgang die Sicherheit E. K. M. Lande gänzlich abhängen würde.....”

CHAPTER VI

FOUNDING NEUTRALITY AS A SYSTEM (*Continued*)

HAVING in earlier chapters outlined the withdrawal of Prussia and her neighbors from the continental struggle, and the failure of their attempts to have a definite neutral zone established with a self-enforcing boundary line, it was found necessary in the preceding chapter to sketch the inception of a plan for securing what the *convention additionelle* of May 17, 1795, had promised but not attained. That plan, as we have seen, had two sides. The one was outward toward France, and negative, involving the negotiating of a treaty by which France bound herself not to violate the neutrality of the area for whose non-participation in the war Prussia made herself in a sense responsible. The other side was that turned toward North Germany, and necessitating certain positive measures, that is, the organization of an Observation Corps or Demarcation Army to make the negotiated line respected, and also the finding, in co-operation with the States protected, of some means of supporting that army. It will be the object of this chapter to follow the consummation of the efforts initiated by Prussia for the founding of a system of neutrality, and, if space permits, to follow briefly the history of that system till the year, 1801, when, with its right to exist called into question by the treaty of Lunéville, it met an inglorious end at the hands of the power which had called it into being.

The central and most positive thing in the task Prussia

undertook was the formation and support of an army that should guard the line of the Ems and Weser. The idea of creating such a defensive force was not a new one when Haugwitz broached it to Ompteda early in December, 1795.¹ As early as October, 1795, the Duke of Brunswick had been urging such a force as worthy England's encouragement by subsidies,² and the Saxon ambassador, Zinsendorf, had opened the subject to von Ompteda in the same month.³ Tracing the idea back to its source we come to see, as did some of the statesmen of the day, that an army of defense was a necessary complement to the projected neutrality.⁴ The Hanoverian who, as Prussia's agent at Basel, had negotiated the first neutrality, secured the introduction of the Demarcation Line, and had made himself an effective force in arousing his native state to the responsibilities she must assume in the grave crisis of these months in 1796, is certainly among the first to couple the idea of neutrality by force of arms to the idea of neutrality by treaty. In his memoir, dated at Frankfort January 13, 1795,⁵ Hardenberg clearly exposed the danger of violation that an extended neutral zone sustained. His remedy was the formation of two Armies of Observation—one French, the other to be composed of contingents from the neu-

¹ See von Ompteda's despatch of December 5, 1795.

² See letter of Wallmoden's to Duke of York, Nov. 4, 1795, transmitting the Duke of Brunswick's letter (*English Record Office, Brunswick, Foreign and Domestic, vol. I, 1785-1800*).

³ On October 11. See von Ompteda's despatch of Oct. 25, 1795.

⁴ See Haugwitz's memorial in Bailleu, i, 267.

⁵ Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 315-324. Almost twenty years before, Hardenberg, as a Hanoverian official, had discussed with the representative of Frederick the Great this monarch's plan of forming just such an army to protect Hanover against the danger of a French invasion in 1778-79. See Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 48-49.

tralized German states.¹ But the idea came to naught. The withdrawal of Hohenlohe's corps from around Frankfort showed how ready Prussia was to avoid any clash with either France or Austria. To have maintained unaided the original line by a Demarcation Army would have involved Prussia in expenses almost as great as those which had exhausted her treasury during the war. Even with a less extensive area to defend, we have seen how incapable of utilizing Prussian resources by an adequate system of taxation,² the Prussian minister of finance, Struensee, had shown himself. But the army was an essential element in the neutrality system, Haugwitz's "enfant chéri"; and the army depended, under existing circumstances, on what Hanover and the minor states of northwestern Germany would do to support it. How was their co-operation to be secured?

Haugwitz, writing of this period several years later, called it one of the most embarrassing situations in which Prussia had ever been placed.³ "The fate of Prussia hung by a thread," said Massenbach. It was in this situation that Haugwitz fell upon the idea of reviving the Diet of the Circle of Lower Saxony, which had not met since 1682. The subject was discussed with von Dohm⁴ as the man best qualified by his knowledge of the German constitution to undertake its calling and direction.⁵ After having arranged for the temporary

¹ This idea Hardenberg continued to favor. See his letter of November 22, 1795. Bailleu, i, 33, 34.

² Cf. also article on Struensee in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*.

³ Haugwitz's memorial of Jan. 5, 1799, in Bailleu, i, 265 ff. (Cf. p. 267.)

⁴ Von Dohm's instructions refer to it as discussed at Magdeburg. See also von Alvensleben's *Denkschrift* in Bailleu, i, 153.

⁵ "Von Dohm ist lediglich ein Publicist der genau die deutsche Con-

support of the Demarcation Army, von Dohm was directed to issue a call for a congress at Hildesheim of the states of the two Circles, Lower Saxony and Westphalia, which were interested in maintaining the Demarcation Line. The contumacy of the Hanoverian Regency and the petty spirit of other states at the Brunswick conference had delayed von Dohm's issuing the call for a meeting of the Circle of Lower Saxony.¹ By May 21, however, the situation allowed him to issue a call for a meeting at Hildesheim, June 20, of accredited delegates from "the states within the new Demarcation Line."² On June 22,³ the Congress of Hildesheim held its first session.

"The Congress of Hildesheim deserves unquestionably to be ranked among the most remarkable events of the times," says Häberlin in 1796, and adds—how characteristic of men in the shadow of that venerable legal leaning tower, the Holy Roman Empire—it "offers a rich field for the discussion of legal questions."⁴ And the discussions came. Could one doubt but that men who debated endlessly on questions of precedence and the importance of distinguishing it by red plush chairs and green plush chairs, would seize the occasion to utter ponderous, "reichsrechtliche" opinions on all conceivable

stitution kennt u. den Inhalt aller Reichs-Fundamental Gesetze sich zu eigen gemacht hatte. Ein genialischer Kopf ist er nicht, jedoch sehr brauchbar als Instrument." (V. Cölln.) *Vertraute Briefe*, vol. i, 12 (Amsterdam, 1807).

¹The call is published in Häberlin, *Staatsarchiv*, i, 393-395. A copy of this call dated April 22 is in the Hanoverian Archives.

²Häberlin, *Staatsarchiv*, i, 395-396.

³Bailieu, i, 153. Just a month after the date suggested in von Dohm's instructions.

⁴Häberlin, *Staatsarchiv*, iii, 45. This magazine put itself on record as an exponent of the Congress and the ideas it represented.

phases of the Congress's formation and activity? Such an innocent phrase as that quoted from the call for the Congress—"to the States of the Empire included in the new Demarcation Line"—represents as much discussion and diplomacy as a case before the Hague Tribunal. Nobody knew of a precedent for a joint session of the Diets of the two Circles, and as all the states of Westphalia were not comprehended in the Line, how could the representatives of those who were, be allowed to sit at the same table with the Diet of Lower Saxony? Hanover objected to such an irregular way of increasing the membership of the Diet of Lower Saxony, as it would have made it less possible for Hanover, Prussia and Brunswick to control its deliberations. The voting power of small states would have been increased, and these states were anxious to roll the main burden upon the Electorate whose connection with the crown of England, they held, brought them all in danger.¹ But the form finally decided on² was that of a joint conference of the Diet of Lower Saxony and of the representatives of the *interested states* of the Diet of Westphalia. These two groups of delegates held separate sessions with von Dohm as representative of Magdeburg to the Diet of Lower Saxony and extraordinary plenipotentiary of the king of Prussia to the conference of Westphalian states.

¹ See Gronau, *Christian Wm. von Dohm*, 306, foot note (Lemgo, 1824).

² Von Dohm's reports and instructions up to June 29, 1796 in *R. 67, B. 19, vol. II. (Berlin Archives.)* The instructions dated June 18, approve the *Kreistag* form as long as Hanover prefers it. They insist, however, that von Reden only represents the elector of Hanover, in which case von Dohm who represents Frederick William II., as king, elector and member of the Empire, must take precedence over Hanover's delegate.

Thus as a delegate to both sections of the conference, he passed from one table to the other to lead the discussions.¹

A dozen petty questions had to be settled, not the least annoying of which was the question of precedence raised by the Hanoverian delegate, von Reden, whether he, as representative of the king of England, ought not to outrank other delegates.² How were the contributions to be apportioned, according to the ability of the states to pay, or according to the degree of danger they were in from a French invasion?³ Should class privileges exempt any individual within the lines of the participating states?⁴ In view of certain cessions of Charles XII. of Sweden in 1712, did the representative of Magdeburg, von Dohm, or the representative of Bremen, von Reden, have the best claim to exercise the right of *Directorium agens*?⁵ To von Dohm and his government, all matters of form and ceremony were indifferent.⁶ What they wanted was action. There was but one question before the Congress: Would it agree to support the army Prussia offered for its protection? To this one thing, said Haugwitz, let them confine their

¹ Gronau, *von Dohm* (*sup. cit.*), pp. 308, 309.

² Possibly a more annoying action was that of the delegate from the city of Bremen at the conferences in Brunswick in making himself the mouth-piece of Reinhard, the French envoy to the Hanseatic cities. Reinhard even proposed to attend the Congress. See the reports of von Dohm cited in the preceding chapter. On the French attitude towards the Demarcation Army see *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 415-416, also Sandoz despatch in Bailleu, i, 66-67.

³ Häberlin, *Staatsarchiv*, iii, 45.

⁴ See note below.

⁵ Cf. Gronau, *von Dohm*, 306.

⁶ Cf. Instructions to von Dohm dated Berlin, June 29 (*Berlin Archives*).

deliberations,¹ understanding always that it was a Prussian offer, not a Prussian guarantee, they were accepting.²

The history of the deliberations at Hildesheim is a better exhibition of the energy and fidelity of the Prussian envoy than it is of the business-like methods which his government commended, or of the patriotic spirit which men of wider vision strove to instill.³ Its first session lasted from June 22 to September 1, 1796. It met a second time February 25, and adjourned never to meet again, June 21, 1797.⁴ It arranged for the support of the troops of the Demarcation Army, fixing the share of each contributing state and arranging for the delivery of supplies and funds every three months. It audited accounts, and when provinces failed to pay it relieved the delinquent, if the excuse was accepted, and redistributed shares to make good the deficit. Practically von Dohm *was* the Congress, and with its disappearance in June, 1797, he did without it what he had attempted to do with it, namely, arrange the *Verpflegung* of the Demarcation Army.⁵

¹ Whatever possibilities the Congress of Hildesheim may have offered of founding a North German Confederation, it is well here to remind ourselves just what Prussia had in mind in convening it. The following passage from von Dohm's instructions of June 18 is unequivocal: "Hiebey ist unsere festen Willensmeinung, dass der vorsehende Convent, welche Form er auch erhalten möge, sich lediglich nur mit dem einzigen in den Convocationen angedruckten Verpflegungsobject beschäftige und werdet Ihr alle mit diessem nicht in nothwendiger unumgänglicher Beziehung stehende Gegenstände die etwa angeregt werden wollten ganz unbedingt von der Hand weisen."

² Instructions to von Dohm, June 29 (*Berlin Archives*).

³ *E. g.*, Häberlin's *Staatsarchiv*, iii, 46-48.

⁴ Von Dohm's reports and Gronau's *von Dohm*, 314, 316.

⁵ The archival material on the Congress after June, 1796, is surprisingly scarce. Häberlin's *Staatsarchiv*, vols. iii, iv and v, contains some account of the proceedings of both sessions. Vol. iii is the most valuable

The importance of the Congress lies not in its deliberations, but in its connection with the general plan of putting neutrality on a solid basis, and in the possibility, not unperceived at that time, of developing it into a permanent legislative body for a North German hegemony under Prussian leadership. Haugwitz was directing Prussian policy at this time on the supposition that the Empire was dissolved, and that each state was free to seek its own selfish interest.¹ But though the exigencies of a financial difficulty had revived and modified an old legislative expedient, there were no men like Henry II. of England in the Prussia of those days to develop from it a political confederation or a *Zollverein*.² Many men of the time saw possibilities of new combinations of German states, and naturally enough thought along the lines in which Frederick the Great and his Fürstenbund had trained them.³ But the dominance of non-German ele-

on the subject. The subject of the Congress of Hildesheim will be treated in a dissertation by Herr cand. phil. Ad. Schulze of the University of Göttingen.

¹ Conversation with Haugwitz reported by von Ompteda in his despatch of August 20, 1796. (*Hanover Archives*.)

² In von Dohm's instructions of April, 1796, is a paragraph on the desirability of the free exportation of grain among the associated states, particularly if accompanied by measures against grain exportation to non-associated lands. It is insisted that all states be bound by majority rule and if any state does not contribute, it is to be proceeded against militarily. Obstreperous subjects in any state are to be put down at once by Prussian troops at von Dohm's call.

³ See, e. g., Massenbach, *Memoiren*, ii, 103. Haugwitz often defined his object as that of making the king of Prussia "the Emperor of North Germany," cf. *Denkwürdigkeiten* . . . *Hardenbergs*, ii, 13. This is doubly interesting when brought into connection with the plan of dividing the Empire, which, according to Lord Carysfort, Haugwitz and the Duke of Brunswick had drafted and discussed. Grenville, then in Berlin, on a special mission to secure Prussia's participation in the Second Coalition, writes, June 11, 1799 (*English Record Office*), "Whatever

ments such as Russian influence and Polish interests,¹ hindered the development of a solid structure upon the Hildesheim Congress, which Haugwitz himself once designated as a corner-stone upon which to erect Prussian dominance in North Germany.²

Meanwhile there had been arranged at Paris and in Berlin the treaty by which the French acknowledged the Demarcation Line which the Prussians were so anxious to establish, and the Prussians accepted the French condi-

may be the decision of this Court upon the question of War with France, I cannot believe that they will ever be sincerely willing to abandon their favorite System of Neutrality for the North of Germany: I am indeed persuaded that they look to that system not only as offering to them security against a French War, but that they consider the Power or Influence of Prussia in Europe, as well as in the Empire, to be considerably increased by this German Confederacy in which Prussia [has] the Weight and Influence of all who accede to this their favourite System and I have thought that I have observed that in every Plan of general Concert and of final Arrangement which Count Haugwitz has ever discussed with me, this Prussian Confederacy in the Empire has always shown itself to be the most prominent feature in his political Conversations." Haugwitz, in his *Memoires* (Ranke, *Works*, 47, 305), written after his retirement, says: "Les liens qui réunissaient la Saxe, le Hanovre, la Hesse et les autres princes dont les états se trouvaient à l'abri de la ligne de démarcation se basaient sur la sûreté et l'intérêt commun. Revenu de ces fausses idées dont autrefois on avait farci les têtes, de ces idées extravagantes, de prétendue dignité et de gloire, l'aigle prussien couvrait de ses ailes ses états voisins sans charger le sien du poids de ses efforts. Ce fut alors qu'il remplissait sa haute destinée."

¹ The chapter on the Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1801, indicates how Russian interference put a bar to the development of a Prussian hegemony. Dr. Bailleu suggests Polish interests, which from the time of the treaty of Basel had diverted Prussian energies from the German field.

² Cf. his memorials of Jan. 5, 1799, and Oct. 28, 1799, in Bailleu, i, 268 and 343, 344. Also Dr. Bailleu's essay in *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch*, 1897. Wohlwill, in the essay already referred to in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 415, considers the Hildesheim Congress one of the efforts at Prussian-German unification which has not been sufficiently studied.

tion, that is, the unconditional surrender of the west bank of the Rhine, with indemnification of the German powers, by giving them secularized lands on the right bank.¹ The surrender of their plans on Hanover and the Hanseatic cities, through whose seizure and exploitation they might hope to replenish their treasury while dealing the crown and commerce of England a telling blow, was the great sacrifice the French made.² They did it hesitatingly and unwillingly. They would have much preferred, if they could not occupy it themselves, to have divided the Electorate³ or to have turned it over to Prussia for herself⁴ or for the indemnification of the Prince of Orange.⁵ The acceptance of the Demarcation Line meant not only a lessened area for French military operations, but the approval of Prussia's plan to station a considerable force in the lower Rhine region threatening Holland.⁶ It meant also that Hamburg could not be punished for its refusal to receive a French envoy.⁷ All long-cherished plans for attacking the Electorate must be laid aside,⁸ and such a concession, in view of

¹ Copy of the treaty in DeClerq, *Recueil des Traités de la France*, i, 275 ff. Hüffer notes that in the fall of 1795 a German offered a prize of 4,000 fr. for the best essay on the reasons why France should have the Rhine as a border and the prize was won by a former Prussian official. Hüffer, i, 197.

² Rewbell to Sandoz. Bailleu, i, 45, 66.

³ Reinhard to Hardenberg, *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, pp. 412, 413.

⁴ Hüffer, i, 308.

⁵ Barthélemy, v, 205, 206.

⁶ *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 416.

⁷ Bailleu, i, 67.

⁸ Documents summarized by Wohlwill in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 408 ff, supplement the reports in Bailleu, i, in showing the danger in which Hanover stood. The Directory rejected the suggestion of Caillard that they make a separate treaty with Hanover. See also Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 307 and Haugwitz memorial of Jan. 30, 1797 in Bailleu, i, 112 ff.

public opinion and military considerations, was no easier now than the preceding year at the treaty of Basel. But Prussia was insistent; oral promises would not suffice; and thus, aided by their great successes in the summer campaign of 1796,¹ they sold their favors at the highest price possible, namely, the Prussian approval of the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia, whose losses on that side were not heavy, received in return for its abandonment of an area that was distinctly Imperial the promise of territorial increase,² and, as a salve to the injury suffered by its pride when the treaty of Basel had failed to become an Imperial peace under Prussian leadership, it received the French acknowledgment of the neutrality of North Germany protected by a Prussian Demarcation Line and Army.³

The conclusion of the peace was a personal triumph for Haugwitz.⁴ To all the difficulties created by the French unwillingness to forego their plans against Hanover and the Hanseatic cities, had been added the reluct-

¹ See Hüffer, i, 208 ff. for a sketch of the military operations. It is to be noticed that they delayed ratification until Jourdan's reverses lost them what the summer campaign had gained. Haugwitz himself saw that the French victories threatened to put all Europe at their mercy. Cf. Bailleu, i, 269.

² Upon which they began to plan immediately. Cf. summary of von Alvensleben's *Denkschrift* in Hüffer, i, 309. The treaty promised them but a modest amount of secularized territory.

³ This, it seems to me, is the light in which one may best understand the policy and its defence by Haugwitz in his *Denkschrift* of January 30, 1797, in Bailleu, i, 112 ff.

⁴ That it was his work, see his own claim in Ranke, *Works*, 47, 284. See also Alvensleben's testimony in Bailleu, i, 152. He says that Haugwitz had received verbal orders from the king and that the other members of the department were in ignorance of the king's views and of the negotiations.

ance of his sovereign,¹ encouraged by more aggressive advisers like Hardenberg and Hohenlohe, and the activity of England and Russia seeking to draw Prussia into a coalition against France. That he had avoided these²

¹See king to Haugwitz on July 9, 1796 in Hüffer, i, 309. On the 13th the king left for Pymont where the English agent, Hammond, planned to lay siege to him (Bailleu, i, 532). Hammond was encouraged by a conversation he had had on August 11 with the Duke of Brunswick at Minden. The Duke assured Hammond, " that from the different conversations which he had had with the King of Prussia, at Minden and Pymont, he perceived his Majesty's mind to be in a state of the greatest agitation, that his personal Hatred of the French had increased to an height almost incredible in consequence of the violation of their Engagements with Him as to the light in which the territory of Cleves was to be considered and of the separate Pacification which they had concluded with the Princes of the Empire without his intervention and on conditions so unjustifiably rigid that by the conduct of the French in this last point the Principal Object of the King in concluding the Treaty of Basle—the expectation of becoming the Mediator if not for Europe at least for the Empire—was entirely defeated. For these reasons the Duke considered the present as one of the most favorable periods that could have been chosen for the negotiations in which I was employed." Hammond's despatch of August 17, 1796 (*English Record Office*). The treaty with the French had been agreed on July 16, three days after the king left for Pymont, and its formal conclusion was delayed till August 5, awaiting Caillard's full powers. (Hüffer, i, 310.)

²His actions must have completely mystified the English. Lord Elgin's letters of May 9 and later, show Haugwitz listening encouragingly to offers of subsidies. The Duke of Brunswick told Hammond (*sup. cit.*) that Haugwitz and the king could be counted on for action if the opposition party did not start too many difficulties respecting the finances, and the danger from Russia and Austria in Poland. On Aug. 23, Haugwitz solemnly declared to Austria and England that Prussia neither had any other relations with France than Basel nor was she negotiating any. The secret provisions of the treaty of August 5, 1796 were first revealed to Russia in February, 1797. See F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par le Russie*, vi, 252-253. By the St. Petersburg-London-Berlin route they reached Hanover where the Regency had been seeking most anxiously to learn them, fearing that they concerned Hanover's fate by making it part of Prussia's indemnity.

without for a moment countenancing the pro-French views of Prince Henry and his party,¹ or being discouraged by the petty spirit displayed by the states whom he had drawn together at the Congress of Hildesheim, thus making possible the realization of his plans of a neutrality system, constitutes, in Haugwitz's own words, his claim to the gratitude of his countrymen.² He had, he thought, founded a "system which is to survive the present and live on to times most distant."³

An adequate account of that period of Prussian history covered by the neutrality system, to establish which Hardenberg and Haugwitz did so much, remains as yet unwritten. The limits of this brief study will allow only a sketch of one or two features of it in the years between 1796 and 1801. A paragraph or two on the Demarcation Army, and a mention of some of the occasions when the adherence of Frederick William III., if not that of his ministry, to the neutrality system, kept Hanover and North Germany free from the exactions of the French invader, is the extent of the outline which can be given in this chapter.

The army which finally gathered under the command of the Duke of Brunswick—the "Demarcation heroes," as the sarcastic ones called them—consisted nominally

¹ The Prince was as active as ever in the French cause. He had been writing the Duke of Brunswick on the subject of a Franco-Prussian alliance. Cf. Hammond's despatch of Aug. 17, 1796 (*sup. cit.*).

² See below.

³ Haugwitz's words. Cf. Ranke, *Works*, 47, 292; also p. 290. In his *Fragment des Memoires*, written as a reply to Walter Scott's *History of Napoleon*, and published in 1837, Haugwitz gives a glowing description of the neutrality system to which he adhered for twelve years. See p. 37 of the *Fragment*, etc.

of 25,000 Prussians under Blücher, 15,000 Hanoverians¹ under Wallmoden and Freytag, and several thousand Brunswick troops. It is likely that its actual enrollment fell below its nominal strength,² and that the system of furloughing still further reduced the strength as well as the expense of the force.³ The army was stationed along the line of the Weser with the commander's headquarters at Minden, where Stein was for part of the time charged with the duty of looking after Prussia's share in the provisioning. After the two sessions of the Congress of Hildesheim, von Dohm seems to have been the sole directing force in making the necessary arrangements. Hanover continued its efforts to lessen its expenditures on behalf of the Army, by urging its considerable reduction in strength.⁴ But certain dangers, real or exaggerated, enabled Haugwitz to keep the reluctant Regency up to its task;⁵ such were the constantly recurring

¹ The composition of the Hanoverian Corps is detailed in the Regency's communication to Ompteda, March 30, 1796. See also on the subject, von Sichart, *Gesch. d. Königl. Hannoverschen Armee*, vol. 4.

² Cf. von Alvensleben's *Denkschrift* of Oct. 1, 1797, Bailleu, i, 153.

³ Cf. Ompteda's report of June 27, 1797, in no. 549 (*Hanover Archives*).

⁴ Cf., e. g., Regency to king, Nov. 13, 1796, in no. 1126a, I.

⁵ The burden of the army was considerable. The notes kept by von Dohm and used by his biographer show that from June, 1796, to the end of 1800, the expenditures for the Prussian troops were 9,264,384 thalers, of which the Prussian provinces paid 2,360,841 thalers. Including expenses of mobilizing, etc., the Prussian treasury, up to the end of March, 1801, had paid out, according to official report, 5,074,597 thalers, 23 gr., 4 pf. From the end of June, 1796, to the end of June, 1800, the other provinces, including Hanover, which, as we saw, paid at least one-half of the total cost, expended in provisions or cash, 5,246,555 thalers. Cf. Gronau, *von Dohm* (Lemgo, 1824), p. 376. In January, 1799, Haugwitz estimated the army at 50,000 men, including the troops of Saxony, and the cost to Prussia for its support since July 1, 1796, at 2,138,206

rumors of French plans, the example of Napoleon's dealings with Venice, the treaty of Campo Formio, which was thought to enable the French to pursue plans dangerous to the tranquillity of Hanover and the Hanseatic cities.

That the Army was never called from its scattered cantonments to play an active part in history-making, cannot be explained by the wholly tranquil course of affairs between 1796 and 1801. The very foundation of the neutrality system was racked and strained in the vortex of diplomatic intrigue which found its center in Berlin.¹ With contending armies hurrying forward to battle on every frontier of the neutralized area, and hostile diplomats exerting every pressure to draw Prussia as an ally back into the camps of war, the maintenance of neutrality did not signify the supineness so often pic-

crowns (ecus). Councilor Rose, speaking in 1832, estimated the cost of the Demarcation Army at 5,000,000 thalers. Quoted by Fr. Thimme, *Innere Zustände des Kurfürstenthums Hannover*, i, 38, note 2.

¹ Siéyès arrived in the summer of 1798 as ambassador from France with the special object of securing Prussia's co-operation with France. Bailleu gives the necessary documents for following his efforts. See also Ranke's account in his *Hardenberg*, i, pp. 401 ff. Early in the same year General Stamford, who, though representative of the Prince of Orange, was in English pay, and M. Deluc, the French teacher of Queen Caroline of England, arrived in Berlin with a plan of an English-Prussian alliance, which the Berlin cabinet rejected. Then, in 1799, came Th. Grenville, as special envoy with the avowed object of rousing Prussia to action with the allies. The story of these unsuccessful missions is to be found in the despatches of Elgin and Grenville, in the *English Record Office, Foreign Office, Prussia*, nos. 47-55. The mission in 1798 is the beginning of Deluc's diplomatic activity which continued in Berlin for several years (*vide* following chapter). Deluc, who as a Swiss scholar had shown Rousseau the Castle of Chillon, and who at ninety listened approvingly to the reading of Byron's description of the castle (Byron to Murray, April 9, 1817, Th. Moore, *Life of Lord Byron*, p. 350 [London, 1844]), is an interesting figure to whom the writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography* does scant justice.

tured. Effective neutrality meant readiness for aggressive war. The leading statesmen of Prussia in the period had shown their appreciation of that fact in the early discussion of a Demarcation Army, and the sponsor for the system, Count Haugwitz, testified, as we shall see, still more clearly in the summer of 1799, that he had grasped the idea that a neutral Prussia could remain such only so long as it could be made to appear like a giant who had chosen to rest with arms in hand.

The period which ensued after Prussia had definitely established neutrality for North Germany granted the States behind the Demarcation Line the boon of a long-desired peace. For the next ten years, while the rest of Europe was the battlefield of contending armies, Prussia and the coterie of states her new German policy had gathered around her, enjoyed an intellectual and commercial renaissance. The fertile fields of North Germany from Silesia to Hamburg became the granary from which the warring powers drew their supplies. The commerce on the great rivers and in the ports at their mouths, the neutral and contraband carrying trade on the high seas, added to the wealth that poured into this peaceful isle amid the swirl of revolutionary wars. "Prussia . . . became the center where immense fortunes from France, the Netherlands, Holland, a part of Germany, from Switzerland, and even from Italy, were successively deposited as in a place of safety, so that the overflowing banks and treasuries of Berlin offered but three per cent. on the funds which elsewhere yielded the depositors four, five, and even six per cent."¹ In matters of culture the period of neutrality must be reckoned the most productive

¹ Report of Hudelist, Austrian attaché, Sept. 9, 1799. *Cf.* Bailleu, i, 558.

in the history of German literature. History, poetry, the drama, art, philology, philosophy and political science found havens in the peace-encircled courts and universities of North Germany. Names which posterity might never have known in their full grandeur had the land been a prey to the rapine and exhaustion of war, fixed themselves forever in the galaxy of Germany's great. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Voss, Wolf, Goethe, Schiller—these names testify to the fact that Germany in the period of neutrality was laying the foundations for at least intellectual unity.¹

As one looks back over the period from the political point of view, Prussia seems to be slowly finding herself. Though dragged down by the alien Polish provinces, cramped by inherited institutions and social forms, and handicapped by the lack of incisive leadership, she appears, for the time being, to have set her feet in the paths that led to the political eminence which her previous history and her geographical position decreed to her. Weak and tortuous as the diplomacy of the Prussian statesmen seems at times, it must not be forgotten that there was more hope for the unity of North Germany under Prussian leadership in the declaration of the debauchee king, Frederick William II., that a French invasion of Hanover meant war, than there was in the whole reign of his great predecessor, who had callously invited the French to occupy Hanover in the very heart of his domains. If to this it be replied that Frederick the Great was the founder of a Fürstenbund, it may be well to remind ourselves that the aged monarch only sought union with his hitherto despised German neighbors as a last covert for Prussia in her European isola-

¹ Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 331-333.

tion,¹ and that the Fürstenbund, unlike the Neutrality System, never raised an army nor called together a legislative body.² It is only by directing our attention for a moment to the great transformations going on beyond the limits of Prussia's political influence that we shall be able to see why any internal weakness or wavering leadership would be disastrous in the prevailing condition of Europe.

It cannot be too often repeated that the events of the period we are considering, and especially of the years compassed by this study, must always be read by the light of the flames that rose and fell in the land beyond the Rhine and the Vosges. The conflict of parties in revolutionary France can be understood only after a study of the foreign problems over which they struggled, and conversely, the result of the domestic conflicts is the determining factor in shaping the issues of peace or war through which France so vitally affected the tranquillity of the rest of Europe. Despite the triumph of the radical faction in Paris in the fall of 1795, the party of the Moderates, whose watchword was the constitutional boundaries of France, had been able to maintain a considerable influence in the government. The preliminaries of Leoben (April 18, 1797), which contained a recognition by the French of the integrity of the Empire, though they were coupled with doubtful references to France's legal boundaries, seemed to warrant a hope that the Directory, to

¹ *Hist. Zeit.*, vol. xli (n. s. 5), p. 410 ff. *Der Ursprung des deutschen Fürstenbundes*, by Paul Bailleu. Students of Prussian history will be pleased to learn that Prof. Sidney B. Fay, of Dartmouth College, expects to publish soon his study on *Frederick the Great and the Fürstenbund*.

² Cf. the suggestive essay by Dr. Bailleu in the *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch*, 1897.

whose membership had been added Barthélemy the negotiator of the treaty of Basel, would leave Germany to readjust itself undisturbed by anything more than French interest in the matter of secularization and indemnification.¹ But there were many yet unsatisfied, ambitious spirits who were ill content to see France sinking back into the ways of peace. Most powerful of these was the young Corsican whose fortune-given sword was pushing hard at the door of Opportunity. The triumph of the peace party meant the closing of that door and the end of his dreams of power and empire. The treaty of Campo Formio (October, 1797,) and the coup d'état of the 18th Fructidor tell the story of his decision. The war spirit embodied in Napoleon Bonaparte had extended France's boundaries to the Rhine. Savoy and Nice were hers; Italy owned her power; the Ionian Isles, non-French territory, were the stepping-stones to Egypt; India and colonial empire rose above the horizon. At home the party of reaction was crushed. Barthélemy was in prison, Pichegru banished, Carnot in flight. The press was throttled, and priest and noble again felt the persecution of the old laws. The revolutionary government henceforth cowered under the shadow of the military genius it had placed at the head of its armies in Italy. The diplomats of Europe had now to reckon with an incommensurable factor. Systems that might once have prevailed against a Republic torn by internal factions would go down before the indomitable will of the one man who knew no law but his own boundless ambition. The outlook for the peaceful development of Prussia's attempt to find in a union of the states of North Germany the basis for a sound and steady political devel-

¹ Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i, 259 ff.

opment was darkened by the events of the epochal year 1797, which marks the union of the revolutionary movement with the genius of Napoleon.¹

The full significance of the events of 1797 was not at once apparent. The fact that Austria, whose leadership had hitherto kept the Empire involved in the war against France, had finally, like Prussia, concluded a separate peace with the Republic, gave new vigor to the long drawn-out movement for an Imperial peace. The first motion looking to such a peace had been made, as has already been mentioned, in October, 1794. Such was the Imperial Diet's method of treating subjects of importance, that not until July following was the matter put in its final stage. The result was that Prussia, much to the disgust of the Austrians, was associated with the Emperor in the work of opening the negotiations with France. This barren triumph of Prussia's was due, let it be remarked in passing, to the vote and influence of the Hanoverian delegate, von Ompteda, who here definitely abandoned the leadership of Austria for that of Prussia. As the matter really lay in the hands of the Emperor, nothing came of the appointment of a delegation of sixty-eight members, in which Hanover, as the Duchy of Bremen, was represented by Baron von Reden, then Hanoverian agent to the Upper Rhine Circle. At his side, as legal adviser, was placed the learned Professor Martens, of Göttingen, well known to modern scholars through his great *Collection of Treaties*. These appointments were made in October, 1795. In July, 1797, the Regency added to the delegation von Schwarzkopf, Hanoverian envoy in Frankfort. But the Electorate, which hoped, by an Imperial peace, to make still more certain its own neu-

¹ *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch*, 1897, p. 128.

trality in case England continued the war,¹ was obliged to wait until the victories of Napoleon over Austria and the treaty of Campo Formio prepared the way for the convening of the peace congress at Rastatt in November, 1797.

The disastrous end of the Congress of Rastatt in the murder of the French negotiators in April, 1799, has given it an immortality that not all its year and a half of fruitless negotiation could have secured it. Much has been published about its labors,² and great masses of unpublished material must lie in the archives of many a German principality. The reports of the pompous von Reden, the learned, legal arguments of his pedantic colleague, Professor von Martens, and the essays of that jovial young diplomat, von Schwarzkopf,³ reveal Hanoverian

¹In the years 1797 and 1798, particularly after the treaty of Campo Formio, Hanover was very apprehensive that the French would resume their plans for attacking Hanover as a means of bringing England to terms. See *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 420 ff. Though very desirous of closing the Elbe and the Weser to English commerce, the French were more interested in securing a Prussian alliance and would scarcely have found it good policy to violate the Neutrality System. The rumors of danger from the French generals in Holland were so persistent that King Frederick William III., uncertain what might be the effect on the Directory of his rejection of their offer of an alliance, was moved, in 1798, to give the Duke of Brunswick full power to repel any hostile French movement against Hanover or the Hansa cities. The letter dated May 17, 1798, is in Bailleu, i, 206-207. The subject of the danger from the French army and its ambitious generals occupies a goodly space in the despatches of the Regency during these years. It is interesting to note that this is the period when von Berlepsch was urging the French to invade his native state. About this same time there was submitted to the Directory a plan for erecting a republic in North Germany of which Hanover was to form the central part. Cf. *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 422 and 424.

²See Hüffer, *Der Rastatter Congress und die Zweite Coalition* (Bonn, 1878-79).

³See Ritter von Lang's *Memoiren*, pt. i, 318. Schwarzkopf's forty-six essays on the members of the Congress and on life in Rastatt are in *Cal. Br. Des.*, II, E. II., 404 b (*Hanover Archives*).

policy as it passed from the high righteousness of insistence on the integrity of the Empire,¹ to the low level of bribing rival negotiators² in order that Hanover might be assured of its share of the plunder distributed as indemnification. Given their first opportunity to come in direct communication with the government at Paris, the Regency of Hanover showed itself as anxious as the Prince of Thurn and Taxis to conciliate the Directory.

As the action of the Hanoverian delegation was hardly creditable, it had also no distinct effect on the course of negotiations. Hanover had at first some faint idea of forming a third party—other than the Austrian and Prussian factions—in the Imperial delegation. But the Hanoverian “System” met with no encouragement from Saxony, whose support it was expected to command.³ Consequently, von Reden and his colleagues fell back on a fairly steady policy of co-operation with Prussia and Saxony.⁴ Kept by the Austrian court in ignorance of the result of the negotiations at Campo Formio in October, 1797, it was to Prussia that Hanover turned, while it viewed with strong suspicion the plans and suggestions of the Austrian delegation.⁵ It was the co-operation of Prussia and Hanover in this

¹ George III., in his rescript to the Regency, is several degrees more emphatic on the subject of preserving the Empire in its integrity than the Regency is. See king to Regency April 21, 1797, in *no. 1144* (*Han. Archs.*). The first instructions to von Reden are in *Cal. Br. Des.*, II, *E. I.*, *nos. 1129 and 1149*.

² See reports from May to July, 1798, in *no. 1159* (*Han. Arch.*). Any biographer of von Dohm should examine the material in this fascicle.

³ Hanover and Saxony were in very general agreement throughout the Congress. For an instance, see Hüffer, *Rastatter Congress*, i, 216, 217.

⁴ Hüffer, *sup. cit.*, pt. ii, 189.

⁵ Hüffer, *Rastatter Congress*, i, 109, notes this hostility to the Emperor.

field that alone would demand at least this brief mention of the Congress of Rastatt.¹

Had the Congress of Rastatt accomplished its intended work, the conclusion of the treaty would have raised interesting questions as to the status of the Neutrality System and the continuance of the Demarcation Army. If Hanover had not succeeded in securing from the French a special acknowledgment of its inclusion in the peace arrangements,² the Electorate might have found itself exposed to French hatred of its sovereign and his English policies, with no other resource than to call on Prussia to occupy. But the outbreak of the Franco-Austrian war put an end to the deliberations at Rastatt, and to the hopes it had raised of a Franco-Imperial peace.

In the situation created by the renewal of hostilities and the formation of the Second Coalition, Count Haugwitz sought, on the one hand, to avoid all entanglements with France which had long been attempting to draw Prussia into bonds closer than those established by the treaties of Basel and of Aug. 5, 1796; on the other, while chary of offending Napoleon, he hoped to maintain friendly relations with his enemies, England, Russia and Austria.³ If a choice had to be made and isolation aban-

¹ It can hardly come within the purview of this monograph to exploit the pros and cons of the cession of Buderichsinsel, the dismantling of Ehrenbreitenstein and the abolition of the Elsfletherzoll. Prof. Marten's legal opinions and drafts of treaties would in themselves make a stout volume.

² This was one of the points in von Reden's instructions. All the essential material for an account of Hanover's part in the Congress at Rastatt is to be found in *Cal. Br. Des.*, II, E. III., no. 67. Nos. 1128, 1129, 1149, 1150^a and 1161 of the same category contain duplicates and some unimportant additional material.

³ Bailieu, i, 267. Haugwitz expressed himself in similar terms to Deluc in August, 1801.

doned, as seemed to him necessary in July, 1799,¹ it was to the English-Russian camp that Haugwitz would lead the armies of Prussia. But the vigorous policy of the minister did not meet the approval of the young king who in the first important decision of his reign chose the part of inaction, hoping thus to postpone the explosion until a more convenient time.² It was the king now, as it was the king in 1803, who shrank in weakness and indecision from a positive line of action. It was Haugwitz now, as it was Haugwitz always, whose weakness and false loyalty to his sovereign led him to abandon the ideas of public welfare to which he had set his name and made him remain to execute in silence that which he had condemned, but for which, as leading minister, he would be held responsible.³

¹ Bailieu, i, 311 ff. Haugwitz had favoured a connection with England and Russia before this. See his memorial of May 5, 1799, Bailieu, i, 283 ff. and Lombard's opinion of it, p. 289.

² See the king's letter of July 17, 1799, Bailieu, i, 316 ff. and Siéyès despatch written in May, 1799, in Bailieu, i, 500. Woronzow in London says, "Il est presque décidé que le roi de Prusse restera à la fenêtre pour voir ce qui passera dehors." *Das Archiv des Fürsten Woronzow*, viii, 214. (Moscow, 1870-1884.)

Grenville incloses in his despatch from Berlin, April 25, 1799, a copy of a *note verbale* which Baron Finckenstein had handed to Count Dietrichstein, the Austrian ambassador, on April 15. It is a reply to the arguments advanced at a conference of April 7 in which the Prussian representative had met Dietrichstein, Panin (for Russia) and Grenville. It announces the king's determination to adhere to the prevailing system which could on occasion be made offensive. "Le Roi n'hésite pas de placer au nombre de ces chances (1) l'invasion de l'électorat d'Hanovre." Other sufficient reasons for Prussia's taking the field, are the violation by the French of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and interrupting English communications with the continent, an attack on Hamburg, the Prussian provinces in Franconia or Saxony. (*English Record Office.*)

³ In the crisis of 1803, when the king failed to approve plans whose

It was the misfortune of Prussia to have, in Frederick William, its Louis XVI., a king who, to a mediocre ability that made counselors necessary, joined a narrowness of spirit and a high sense of his own authority, which did not allow him to tolerate among them men of force and ideas. Thus throughout these crucial years a king with limited views and no inceptive power was supported by men, who, while they had ideas, lacked the higher patriotism and the strength to support them by a refusal to lead where royal weakness pointed the way. It was to Stein and Hardenberg, and not to Haugwitz and Lombard, that the nation and, perforce, the monarch, turned in the times when a strong hand was required at the helm. We touch here, let it be remarked in passing, the great misfortune of Prussian policy in the years between 1795 and 1806. It is that the leading ministers, whether in the light of recent investigation they be thought weak or strong, wise or incapable, did not in their own day possess the confidence of their country or of the rest of Europe. Judged by the light they had, this is the heaviest indictment that can be brought against the advisers of Frederick William III.¹

execution Haugwitz felt to be vital to Prussia's existence, the minister talked some of resigning but concluded "Mon devoir est d'obéir et dès que le roi mon maître ne veut point entendre parler de cette occupation, je renonce à mon projet." F. Martens: *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vi, 310.

¹ On the lack of ministerial responsibility in this period see a recently published reform proposal of Gentz's in the *Hist. Zeit.*, 89, 239 ff. Ompteda, *Die Ueberwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen* (p. 70), points out the disastrous effects of this lack of confidence in 1803.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER IN 1801

INTENSIVE study of certain periods, certain institutions, certain men in the field of European history, leads also to an extension that brings within the student's purview the whole continent with its complex of national interests, or whole centuries with their genetic relations to one another. Luther, the Church, Louis XIV., representative government, the French Revolution, Napoleon, are great centres toward which all roads of study, no matter how remote their starting point, seem to lead. In no period is it more difficult to delimit one's field, while yet preserving true proportion, than in the revolutionary and Napoleonic era. The topic to which this chapter is to be confined is the diplomatic preliminaries ending in the occupation of Hanover by the Prussians in April, 1801. Simple and very local in its interest as this seems, we must follow the thread through the web and woof of all Europe's politics in the months preceding Prussia's unwilling abandonment of the neutrality system.

The inconstancy of the Czar of all the Russias, Paul the First, and the "masterly inactivity" of Prussian neutrality, the humiliation of Austria at Marengo and Hohenlinden, left France, left Napoleon at the close of 1800 with but one great foe—England and Pitt.

England still stood out against France. Others might be uncertain as to the reality of the danger to them from the new France and be led by this and by exhaustion to

peace. But England, true to her commercial and colonial instinct and interests, was conscious earlier in the struggle even than France itself, that the contest was one to the bitter end. With the dominance of Napoleon in the consular government, France began to develop those ideas which one finds occasionally in the policy of the Directory.¹ She saw through Napoleon's eyes who her real enemy was, and what the means were that would cripple her. It is after the failure of all efforts to subdue England by crushing her continental allies that suggestions are renewed, in which one sees the ideas of the Continental System clearly foreshadowed. With these plans comes a definite revival, in more aggressive form, of the idea of Hanover as a continental possession of England, which may be so handled as to bring England's monarch to terms.

The not too imposing military strength of Prussia and her North German allies was not sufficient to shut out from the French mind the possibility of violating the neutrality of North Germany. The occasion need only be urgent. In all the years after 1795, or after August, 1796, Prussia could never feel sure that there was not real purpose back of the numerous rumors of French intentions against Hanover and the Hanseatic cities. The region was without doubt of great importance to England for the sake of the grain and naval stores that were shipped from its ports. The Elbe and Weser tapped the great granary of North Germany, and a free highway to the sea along those rivers involved the prosperity of

¹As early as March 4, 1796, a dispatch from Reinhard, the French envoy in Hamburg, on the closing of the Elbe and the Weser, shows he has the germ idea for a continental system. *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 412. See also letter of Siéyès, July 14, 1798, Bailleu, i, 481.

German provinces as distant as Silesia.¹ France knew the importance to herself of the region and its commerce, and considered that it must be far more important to the trade of England.

Here then was the opportunity to live up to the Napoleonic motto of striking the enemy wherever found. The English fleets had shown themselves a wooden wall which the genius of Napoleon could not surmount. Her commerce with the continent and the German states of her reigning house seemed England's only vulnerable points. The most ready victim of its sovereign's English wars, the electorate of Hanover, was protected only by a treaty and the army of an exhausted land and a peace-at-any-price sovereign. It might also be argued that the conclusion of a French peace with the Empire ended the neutrality of Hanover; moreover the geographical location of Hanover, as has been indicated, made it possible for the French, through a hostile occupation, to accomplish the double aim of separating Hanover from England and England from the continent. The two ideas were, from the first, closely associated. To close the Elbe and Weser to English commerce was to hamper materially two lines of egress for supplies to Great Britain. The occupation of Hanover would give a vantage point from which not only these rivers and the Hansa cities, but the whole North of Germany might be shut to English trade. A master stroke of French policy it would be to accomplish all this through Prussia, and thus involve Frederick William III. in Hanoverian affairs in such a way as to range him on the side of England's enemies.²

¹ Silesian merchants appeared in Berlin in 1801 to protest against any action of Prussia's that would result in closing the outlets for their products.

² Häusser, ii, 344, 345, on basis of Lucchesini's despatches. Luc-

Two ways to this end lay open. The offer of Hanover as an indemnity for Prussia's losses beyond the Rhine seemed a bait at which the "landbegierige" Prussian ministry would readily snap, and possibly they could carry the king with them. The co-operation of Russia and the pressure of the Maritime League opened a second unexpected way of forcing the Prussian hand to strike a blow at England's crown. If these had failed, as they once seemed in a fair way to do, there remained an actual or threatened occupation of Hanover by France itself. And to France either alternative seemed equally advantageous. Action by either Prussia or her own generals would result in closing the rivers of North Germany, and Prussian occupation might be expected not only to estrange England, but to arouse the never dormant suspicion of Austria that Prussia would take Hanover for her indemnity.

The idea that Prussia should possess herself of the German dominions of the English throne was not a Napoleonic idea. As an effective idea in European politics it seems, however, to have been of French origin.¹ As soon as there was the hope of separating Prussia from the coalition in 1794-95, there came to the French the ideas of a Prussian alliance and of a Prussian seizure of Hanover, embroiling Prussia so that it would find itself favored by France alone should it retain Hanover. But strange as it may have seemed to the French government,

chesini fathomed Napoleon's plan. See also Napoleon's *Correspondance*, vi, 129. "A Talleyrand: *Demande d' un Rapport sur les Moyens d' engager la Prusse dans la Politique de la France.*"

¹The *Papiers de Barthélemy* (ed. Kaulek), so often cited in chapter two, show how hostile France was to Hanover. Gervinus in Paris in 1795 hears the "alberne Idee" of Hanover for Prussia. Cf. Bailleu, i, 397, 400.

the idea was not accepted by the king of Prussia or his advisers. They were not blind to its advantages, but they were true to higher obligations. There was not a single public utterance of the responsible ministers of the Prussian kings between 1795 and January 1, 1801, that could seriously disturb the repose of the neighboring Electorate.¹ Neither for himself nor for his landless relative, the Prince of Orange, would Frederick William II., or his successor, entertain the idea of seizing or dividing Hanover.² But in successive years the proposition re-appears, and Prussia in the period from the time it took Hanover under its protection by virtue of a treaty with the French, until it actually occupied the Electorate in April, 1801, was never free from the pressure of French intentions against the Electorate.³ Despite the pressure of the French party at Berlin, Haugwitz had maintained himself in power and with him, despite all his shifting and tortuous methods, the neutrality of North Germany seemed in safe hands. When France alone threatened to violate it, he had shown himself ready to take arms in defense of his cherished system. The change of attitude in 1801, when Napoleon made evident his plans against

¹ Nor have I ever found record of any private utterances except that of Hardenberg (see note, below), which could be cited as a basis of distrust. But one feels sure that there must have been talk of this kind in Berlin. Such a supposition alone explains in many instances the suspicious tone of Hanoverian dispatches from Berlin or from the Regency to King George.

² *Hist. Zeit.*, 1884, 412, 413. Conversation between Reinhard and Hardenberg.

³ Report of v. Reden, February 15, 1800, *no. 580 (Hanover)*, and of Sandoz-Rollin from Paris in April (Hüffer, i, 321) and May 6, 1796, in Bailleu, i, 67, and hints in Caillard's conversations as to Prussia's position on indemnity 1797-98. Bailleu, i, 470, 472. Also F. Martens, *Recueil par la Russie*, vi, 256.

the Electorate, is to be attributed to the fear aroused by the violent and uncertain Czar whose armies lay along Prussia's most vulnerable side. Thus it was that Napoleon, aroused anew in 1800 and 1801 by the English, found the mad Czar of Russia unexpectedly serviceable in carrying out his ideas.¹

From hatred of France, bitter and extreme, Paul I. had, in violent reaction, become an enthusiastic admirer of Napoleon and an uncompromising foe of his recent ally, England. Early in 1800, there recurred rumors of the revival of the Maritime League of 1783.² Documents published later³ have shown the course of events which enabled Paul to push his plans so that by December 18, he had brought reluctant Denmark and Sweden⁴ and neutral Prussia to sign an agreement at St. Petersburg by which they bound themselves to the maintenance of neutral commerce on the high seas. It was to all appearances a protective measure. England was not men-

¹ V. Reden in his reports for the summer of 1800, *e. g.*, July 1, *no. 582 (Hanover Archives)*, mentions how the French and Spanish ministers at Berlin are working for a league on the basis of the ideas of Catherine in 1781. Spain was further aroused by the affair in the harbor of Barcelona and secured Prussia's support in urging Sweden to a protest against the conduct of the English. *Cf. Martens, Recueil, Suppl.*, ii, 373 ff. July 22, 1800, v. Reden says the first move for the alliance was made in February, 1800, by Russia at Stockholm. That though this plan comes from St. Petersburg in its argumentation as to English commerce, it is what the French papers have been urging. Von Reden's despatch of January 6, 1801, gives a remarkably clear exposé of Napoleon's interest in the league as a means of striking England in the same way the continental policy did. *No. 582 (Hanover Archives)*.

² The reports of von Reden, Hanoverian minister in Berlin and Carysfort, the English ambassador, show that they did not think the league would be formed that year.

³ Martens, *Supplément au Recueil*, etc., vol. ii, 344 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 388. Denmark and Sweden signed on Dec. $\frac{4}{10}$, 1800.

tioned. The whole convention reads as though the cases to be considered were simply foreseen as possible results of some distant war. Yet to any one who knew the position which Englishmen had held on the questions involved, who knew the "*Ungestüm*" and capriciousness of the half insane Czar, who went back of Paul's views to those of the craftier Napoleon whose tool Paul was, it was clear that Prussia, by so readily joining the Maritime League,¹ had taken a decisive step towards entering the arena of European affairs from which it had withdrawn for six years.

There could be no reason to hope that England would abate one jot or tittle from the position she had held in 1781.² To her merchants and statesmen the views she held on the subject of neutral commerce were bound up with her very existence and could only be yielded with it. For any power or powers to make a demand on England to recognize a different definition of contraband, of a blockade, of the rights of enemies' goods in

¹ According to F. Martens, the Russian proposition to renew the Maritime League "was immediately accepted" by Prussia. Cf. *Recueil des Traités, conclus . . . par la Russie*, vi, 286. This readiness to join Russia is to be ascribed, not so much to the enthusiasm for the principles of the armed neutrality, as it is to a larger plan of playing a part between Russia and France and a desire to placate a powerful neighbor whose hostility would be most embarrassing.

² Carysfort reports August 23, 1800, that everybody in Berlin is sure Great Britain will maintain the position she has assumed (after the capture of a Danish vessel). V. Reden reports the king of Prussia as saying, "Wenn die Englischen Minister mit ihren mercantilen Projecten nicht die ganze Welt aufbrächten, so ginge noch alles gut." V. Reden adds: "Dieses Wort des Königs welches in der That manches Wahre in sich fasst, und die Halsstarrigkeit mit welcher das englische Ministerium alle seine Pläne von Handelsvergrößerungen mit Gewalt durchsetzen will ohne sich um die ganze übrige Welt zu bekümmern, setzen uns allerdings in die grösste Verlegenheit." No. 584 (*Hanover*), February 17, 1801.

neutral vessels than those she herself chose to grant, was to the Englishmen of that day equivalent to announcing an alliance with France.¹ The English despatches and instructions to their representatives in foreign courts at this time, produce in the reader a profound impression of the terrible and uncompromising earnestness with which England was fighting at every point the battle for supremacy on the seas and in the world's markets. But the grandeur of a world power's struggle interests us for the present only because it is a vortex drawing into itself the fate of lesser and dependent powers. The unfortunate ruler of England, himself the victim of a mental malady that from time to time eclipsed his mind, could be struck through a blow at his ancestral German possessions.

France had long persisted in viewing Hanover as England's continental possession. The mad Paul was possessed of the idea, and the weak and unwilling Frederick William III. of Prussia was to be made the instrument of revenge on a related house by oppressing a neighboring province whose capital city had cradled his queen. Never was there in these eight years, from 1795 to 1803, a more striking illustration of Hanover's unfortunate position as a *Zankapfel* between Russia, Prussia, England and France; never a better example of what their allegiance to the sovereign of England was likely to cost George III.'s faithful German subjects.

This is not the place to weigh the importance of the commercial interests whose protection might justify Prussia's entering the Maritime League. It is probable that the rather high-handed conduct of the English²

¹ See instructions to Carysfort, August 22, 1800. (*English Record Office*.)

² Favorable settlement of the case mentioned by Martens, *Recueil*

would not have brought Prussia, with her growing carrying trade and lack of a navy, to join a league of maritime powers,¹ if a stronger force had not been pushing her on to this virtual abandonment of her neutral position. The move was made with reluctance.

Throughout the summer of 1800 the Prussian cabinet had been essaying the rôle of mediator between France, Austria, Russia and England. To do this successfully meant to reap belated honors as the peace-maker of Europe, and to save the neutrality system from the rocks ahead. Above all it was necessary to bring England into the comity of nations. Peace between France and the powers, with England left out, would mean the revival by France of her former plans for seizing Hanover and closing the Elbe and Weser to English commerce. This failure to include England in the pacification would mean increased danger for Prussia;² for there was not one iota of conciliation in the actions of the English navy. Neutral vessels, Danish, Swedish³ and Russian, were

Suppl., ii, 381, should not obscure the numerous vexatious cases which Jacobi and Balan, Prussia's ambassador and attaché, were constantly bringing to the notice of the British government. The real reason for modifying the term "high-handed" as regards Prussia is the exemption of her vessels from the embargo laid by the English government on vessels of the members of the armed neutrality, January 14, 1801.

¹ The despatches between Carysfort in Berlin and Hawkesbury in London, if in any degree acceptable testimony on the question of Prussia's true interest, show that her hope of commercial success as a neutral carrier with no navy lay in not offending Great Britain. See the same view in v. Lenthe's *Darstellung in Zeit. des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, 150-151.

² V. Reden's despatches of this summer follow these efforts and point out the danger to Hanover from England's persistent hostility to France. No. 580 (*Hanover Archives*).

³ Mention is made of English seizures of Swedish and Danish vessels in 1799 by Hudelist, Austrian chargé, in Bailleu, i, 559.

seized or searched in a most irritating manner.¹ The cabinet at St. James, unmoved by the moderate councils of such men as Carysfort, who saw things from the standpoint of securing friendly assistance from minor continental powers, rigidly held to the strictest English insular view of neutral rights.² Denmark and Sweden were driven into the arms of Russia. Prussia, dominated by the fear of an enemy in the rear,³ felt itself obliged⁴ to yield to the Czar's plans.⁵

¹ Cf. Martens, *Recueil Suppl.*, ii, 443, 444.

² Cf. e. g., Carysfort's despatch of Aug. 26, 1800, when he is even hopeful from the utterances of Krüdener, Russia's minister in Berlin, that Russia may be brought into line against France. Also his despatch of Nov. 16, 1800, urging conciliatory action (*English Record Office*).

³ King Frederick William III. said, "Ich muss meinen Rücken frei haben." Fear of the French and rivalry with Austria have received due, even undue, attention from writers on this period of Prussian policy. It is well to keep in mind that the experience of Frederick the Great, the incidents of the partitions of Poland, if nothing else, had taught Prussia that she could do nothing in Europe with a free hand unless she were sure of Russia at her rear.

⁴ I say obliged, although there was a party who saw in union with Russia the possibility of a more independent attitude toward France and Austria. Möllendorff was a warm advocate of the league with Russia for this purpose. See von Ompteda's despatch from Berlin, June 17, 1800. No. 582 (*Hanover*). The utterances of another group led v. Reden, the Hanoverian minister to Berlin, to view the armed neutrality as a "Fussschemel" to Prussia's plans of territorial increase and the attainment of real dominance in North Germany. Cf. Despatch of November 29, 1800. No. 582 (*Hanover*).

⁵ V. Reden's despatch of June 17, 1800 (no. 582), shows that he then expected that Saxony, the Porte, and, under certain circumstances, Hanover, were to be asked to join the Maritime League. Nov. 22, 1800, v. Reden learns that Hanover is to be omitted. The ministry regards the League as "eine präcipitante Idee," Nov. 30, 1800, in no. 582. Sept. 3, 1800, Carysfort, the English minister in Berlin, writes that Haugwitz has again denied that Prussia was having anything to do with the Northern League, "and so far from wishing to reduce or to limit the naval power of Great Britain, rejoiced in its increase, consider-

Nothing could be stronger and seemingly more sincere than the numerous assurances Haugwitz had given of Prussia's real interest in seeing England maintain, undiminished, her naval supremacy. It seems, then, a step as inexplicable as it was sudden, to join a maritime league with the Czar of Russia at its head. It does not appear to have been done in a spirit of hostility towards Great Britain. Prussia hoped to avoid committing any overt acts in the enforcement of the convention, and to make England see the distinction between the now hostile league which had been formed because its members had common views on certain points of international law, and the active enmity of Russia on account of Malta. Prussia hoped, as has been suggested, to get between Russia and France, and as mediator to play a leading rôle in Paris. Finally, if worst came to worst, and a choice had to be made between two evils,¹ it seemed advisable for Prussia to favor Russia, at least nominally; for there seemed more hope of dealing reasonably with the sane ministers of George the Third, though Prussia was an ally of Russia, than there did of dealing with the unstable ruler of all the Russias, while disapproving his scheme of armed neutrality.²

ing it as the great bulwark of the common liberty of Europe. All accounts have concurred to convince me (Carysfort) that the idea of the Northern League has been always discountenanced by Prussia." May 31, 1800, Beurnonville reports to Talleyrand that in a three-hour interview, filled out by the "sterile fecundity" of Haugwitz, the latter had mentioned the possibility of a Northern League that would limit English commerce. Bailleu, i, 524-525.

¹ England knew this, and had no objection to Prussia's adhesion to the principles of the Maritime League if only no hostile action was taken. Instructions to Carysfort, Jan. 16, 1801. (*English Record Office*.)

² Sept. 14, 1800, Carysfort sent by special messenger the contents of

But once embarked on a course laid down by Russia and France, Prussia had before it, if it would at the same time retain a remnant of the position created for it by its neutrality system, the duty of doing unpleasant things because Napoleon or Paul wanted them done, and it would have been much more unpleasant for Prussia to let them be the executioners of their own plans.¹

important despatches just received by Baron Krüdener from the Czar. Paul had two armies of 80,000 each on the march, "destined to enforce the conclusion of peace (on Austria?) consistent with the general interests of Europe and the known principles of His Imperial Majesty, and (Krüdener was) to make the strongest instances to the Court of Berlin to put an army in readiness immediately for the same purposes." Krüdener did his errand with energy, even menacing, but to no effect. Prussia could not be moved (substance of Russia's reply to Prussia in Carysfort's despatch of Oct. 7); Haugwitz told Carysfort (Sept. 27, 1800) "that Prussia would not concern herself directly with anything outside the Demarcation Line." No appeals to her cupidity would move her, though it had been tried on a recent occasion (seizure of Danish ships). "She had been told if she would take part against England she might seize Hanover, and France would guarantee to her the possession." Up to Sept. 21, Carysfort had no definite knowledge as to the Maritime League, and was assuring Krüdener of England's desire to renew relations with Russia. (Despatch of Sept. 16.) In the first part of the despatch which tells that St. Petersburg had joined Denmark and Sweden, Carysfort talks of England's subsidizing the army Paul had called out. On Nov. 8 he felt sure there was no league forming against Great Britain, despite the efforts of France. (*Cf.* despatch of Nov. 11.) Haugwitz at this time (*cf.* Carysfort's despatch of Nov. 13) repeats his assurances of extreme friendliness to England, and broaches the subject of a union of Prussia, Austria and England, inviting Carysfort to bring about a reconciliation between Austria and Prussia. (*Eng. Rec. Off.*)

¹ A conversation with Mr. Lombard has just been "reported to me from a quarter upon which I can perfectly rely, and by which it clearly appears that the Prussian government is under the greatest distress and embarrassment at not seeing means of escaping the consequences of the measures in which it has been so rashly engaged. Its intention is to keep aloof till the solicitation of its confederates, which it cannot resist, and which will certainly be strongly urged, obliges it to participate." Despatch of Lord Carysfort, Berlin, Feb. 1, 1801. (*English Record Office.*)

The situation was critical, but it was of the kind that the statesmanship of Berlin in this period as represented in Count Haugwitz was peculiarly able to meet. A great crisis, a bold move, war—these were words that might figure in the vocabulary of a Stein, a Blücher, a Scharnhorst, but the sovereign of Prussia and the advisers next the royal person, Haugwitz, Lombard, Beyme, Köckeritz, Zastrow—how they have shrunk into oblivion behind the stalwarts of 1813—were a combination that shunned a policy of blood and iron, and suited themselves to the tortuous course dictated by circumstances. The best thought of the Haugwitzian diplomacy is embodied in neutrality conceived as a system; the best example of the Haugwitzian method in diplomacy is to be found in the period between December, 1800, and September, 1801. There was a softness in the tread of his diplomacy that enabled him to walk unscathed between the half slumbering war giants of that time. Russia was seemingly placated by Prussia's approval of Paul's revival of the principles of 1781. On the other hand, England was being made to feel that though Prussia approved the principles in abstract, no overt act of Prussia's would make them dangerous to England's practice. To such a position England had not the slightest objection. With its own isolation before it, the English government was willing to spare Prussia, that, when the storm was over, it might be more easily drawn to the support of England on the continent.¹

¹ In confirmation of this see instructions to Carysfort from London, January 16, 1801. Also Carysfort's despatch of January 22. "The general idea which I should think myself justified to form if perfect reliance was to be placed upon the most prominent parts of Count Haugwitz's conversation, would be not only that this court but Denmark and Sweden also really intended to draw themselves out of the scheme of armed neutrality. . . . He (Haugwitz) said that it is the treaty of 1780 which he

Indications were not long wanting that the Czar was not to be content with abstract approvals of his mother's views of international law. These would not bring England to terms on the question of Malta. Reprisals of some kind must be made, and as the ocean was England's, naval impotence directed the Czar's attention to other ways in which to punish his whilom ally. First came an inquiry as to the possibility of closing the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser to English commerce if it was deemed advisable by the Maritime League.¹

meant to act upon. Have patience and you will be convinced that nothing is intended against you." (*English Record Office*.) Another proof of this English consideration is that the English seizure of Heligoland, Prussia is assured, was not made until a map had been consulted and the English assured themselves it was outside the Demarcation Line. (Instructions to Carysfort, January 24, 1801.) This is noteworthy because English ambassadors at Berlin had had instructions never by any act or phrase to give countenance or recognition to the Demarcation Line. And again see English note explaining to Prussia reasons why she is omitted from the embargo laid on Swedish, Danish and Russian vessels. On January 5, Carysfort surmises Haugwitz's reply to England's inquiries about the League. In concluding the interview, Haugwitz, after friendly assurances, had added that he could speak only for Prussia but believed England "was misled in attributing hostile views to Sweden and Denmark."

¹Despatch of Lusi (Prussian ambassador at St. Petersburg), January 1830, 1801. "Le Comte de Rostopschin a reçu ordre de L'Empereur son Maître de me dire, que sa Majesté Impériale avoit lieu d'espérer que, en cas de mesures hostiles du côté de l'Angleterre par rapport à la neutralité armée Elle voudra bien lui fermer les ports de l'Elbe et du Weser." As early as February, 1800, Simon Woronzow, the Russian minister in London, had received instructions from the Czar to bring England to time on the question of maritime rights by threats (1) that Russia would make a commercial treaty with France and not with England, (2) that a persistent refusal would result in the invasion of the Electorate of Hanover and the closing of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. (Instructions are given in *Woronzow Archives*, vol. xi, p. 392, Harvard Library.) Woronzow, judging from his reply of February 25, seems to have ignored his instructions. He points out that the Czar must be in ignorance of commercial history between 1766 and 1793 to think to intimidate Eng-

Now, Russia, seated at Hamburg or Bremen, or with an army in Oldenburg, was a spectre as disquieting to Prussia as a force in the same region wearing the French uniform would have been. The inquiry was a clear warning that Prussia must prepare to act with apparent hostility against Great Britain. Never certain of what the Czar might choose to do, Prussia's anxiety to keep her own borders intact, was increased by her desire at this juncture to win over Paul to her indemnity project which had just been proposed for the Czar's approval.¹ It was only with Russia's coöperation at Paris that they could hope to put through their ambitious plans for territorial increase.

Procrastination in the face of Russia's urgency became more and more difficult. The embarrassment of the cabinet at Berlin was evident to all observers.² The pressure from France, Russia, Sweden and Denmark, was pushing the reluctant Frederick William III. on to measures that even his best assurances could hardly make explicable to England or his fellow states behind

land by threatening Hanover. He then expands on the absoluteness of separation between the two in words scarcely less vigorous than those quoted in *Appendix B. to Chapter I.*

¹ Russia's ministry to Krüdener, March 2, 1801. They ask for Bamberg, Wurzburg, the city of Nuremberg, etc. "Des raisons prépondérantes ont décidés le Roi à chercher la majeure partie de ses indemnités dans le cercle de Franconie." There they can best oppose Austria if thus strengthened—a suggestion cleverly supposed to appeal to the Czar, then in much disgust at Austria. The ministry thus ask for Hildesheim, Osnabrück and Eichsfeldt, which will allow Prussia to renew some day her plans of defending the neutrality of North Germany.

² Carysfort, February 7, 1801. "The object of this court at this moment is Procrastination, for what end cannot be easily ascertained. I fear they only wait the Determination of Russia whose Armies are in force on the Frontier and whose support is what they chiefly rely on to accomplish their ambitious Designs in Germany."

the Demarcation Line. The measure which it was understood Paul favored, was the occupation of Hanover, and Berlin was filled with rumors of the Electorate's partition or exchange.¹

The Maritime League and Paul's desire to make it an instrument to punish England for refusing to yield Malta, were working to the advantage of no one more than Napoleon. Aroused anew by the English embargo against the Northern powers,² and the English action in Egypt, Napoleon assumed the right of interpreting to Prussia the duties which her relations to Russia and France required of her.³ Her hostile attitude to England, said Napoleonic logic, involved Prussia, as a member of the Maritime League, in the closing of the ports of the Elbe and Weser, and occupying Hanover or letting the French do it. With Russia pushing Prussia the way France had long pulled, the Neutrality System must either be abandoned or defended with arms.⁴ The decision of Prussia could not longer be delayed. The reluctant King Frederick William III., realizing the danger to his position now that Russia had been drawn into the French system,⁵ did violence to all his principles and plans by preparing to occupy the Electorate.⁶

¹ Lord Carysfort, February 21, 1801. (*Eng. Rec. Off.*)

² Bailleu, ii, 21, 22.

³ In October of 1800, Napoleon had desired to use Prussian vessels to transport supplies from Antwerp to Bordeaux. He first inquired if the king of Prussia was prepared to make his flag respected, by seizing Hanover, as Prussia had no fleet. Bailleu, ii, 9-10.

⁴ In the fall of 1800, before she was entangled with Russia, Prussia was ready to meet France with arms in her hand if the French violated the Demarcation Line. Instructions to Lucchesini, October 14-16, 1800. Bailleu, ii, 7.

⁵ On February 27, 1801, Napoleon proposed to Paul a joint Franco-Russian occupation of Hanover. *Corr  spondance*, vii, 63.

⁶ First notice in letter to Lucchesini, February 3, 1801. (*Berlin*

The Prussian state has seldom, if ever, made a clearer confession of weakness than Haugwitz's letter to the Duke of Brunswick February 8, 1801,¹ announcing that fear of Russia and France called for the sacrifice of Hanover. The self-abasement of it all lay in Prussia's abandonment in the eyes of Europe, of a principle which she had long proclaimed and was even then admitting, and this before the shock of arms had robbed her of the glamour cast about her by the military fame of Frederick the Great. For at the very time that she submits to the claim of Russia and France that England must be punished through Hanover, she was reiterating the view she had long held, that they were separate in interests and policy.² The resolution communicated to Lucchesini in Paris and to the Duke of Brunswick was,³ as the delay in executing it showed, contingent upon the continuation of the pressure which Russia and France

Archives.) He is to keep it quiet, saying only that the king had joined the Maritime League, and will take measures that it necessitates. The cost was even greater. The realization of any plans Prussia may have entertained of drawing North Germany into a hegemony under her leadership, and such plans were in the minds of some of the Berlin cabinet, would be delayed or rendered impossible by the results of the seizure of a neighboring and friendly province. Among other evidences of far-reaching plans may be cited the instructions to Lucchesini, Oct. 14-16, 1800. Bailleu, ii, 8. Haugwitz's and the Duke of Brunswick's plans to divide Germany have already been mentioned.

¹ Bailleu, ii, 25.

² I do not mean here to cross the line between presenting Prussia's action from the proper point of view and weighing the advisability of Haugwitz yielding. With no allies, an untrustworthy army, and a foe at rear and front threatening to occupy if Prussia did not, one can understand why the unaggressive ministry would readily find in the sanctity of their obligation to the Maritime League an excuse for an act which they acknowledge to be the result of political necessity. Bailleu, ii, 25.

³ Special attention is called to the date of the communication to Lucchesini of Prussia's intention to occupy Hanover, *i. e.*, Feb. 3, 1801.

were exerting when the decision was made. Procrastination was still the refuge of the hard driven Prussian ministry. England meanwhile was giving them every reasonable excuse she could for delaying action.¹ This, it must be added, was not primarily on account of the Electorate in which her sovereign was interested, but rather that the English fleet under Parker and Nelson might gain the Sound and overpower the Danes before any of their allies in the Maritime League could come to their rescue.² A storm so suddenly aroused might scatter as suddenly; Paul was a man of moods, but Prussia in waiting for a shifting of the wind from this quarter was running close to the dangers of the French Scylla.

Reasonable excuse for delay could no longer be opposed to the interpretation Napoleon had put on Prussia's allegiance to maritime principles *before* she had entered a league for their maintenance.³ The ratification of peace with the Empire⁴ was going to furnish him an excuse for regarding the neutrality of North Germany as non-existent. The French-English struggle still continued, and Napoleon told Lucchesini "that it will be open to the king of Prussia or myself to occupy the electorate of Hanover."⁵ And when Prussia neither moved to support Denmark nor to occupy the Electorate, his utterances became more threatening.⁶

¹ See instructions to Carysfort, January 16, 1801. (*English Record Office*.)

² See note below.

³ His utterance of Oct., 1800, already referred to, is in Bailieu, ii, 9-10.

⁴ At Lunéville, Feb. 9, 1801.

⁵ March 10, 1801, to Lucchesini. *Cf.* Bailieu, ii, 31.

⁶ March 18, 1801, Lucchesini reports that Napoleon has said to Kalyshev (Russian representative), "Eh bien, les Prussiens disent toujours de marcher et ne bougent point; s'ils ne se décident pas promptement

The young sovereign in Berlin, peace-loving, high-minded, neutral by nature and fitted to rule in times of peace over some small state with paternalistic and reactionary tendencies, had, by the cruelty of fate, been thrown into Europe in the midst of a great revolution. A similar caprice of fortune had placed in his hands the sceptre of a state lying in the very heart of the old Europe now in its death throes. Everywhere the call was for action, decision, boldness, breadth of view, firmness of purpose. Between struggling giants there was no place to kneel and supplicate for peace. The power that would watch the struggle at its ease must rest on a drawn sword. Frederick William III. was unequal to the situation created for him by a complication such as that he now faced. Military and financial weakness¹ made resistance to both Russia and France impossible. Geographical reasons forbade Prussia passively allowing either power to march into the heart of her domains in order to occupy the German lands of the king of England. Honor, consistency in policy, and the history of the past six years called on Prussia to deny absolutely, by force of arms if necessary, the claim that the peaceful electorate of Hanover could be made to suffer vicariously for the contentions of Great Britain. Since the treaty of Basel, Prussia had been attempting to de-

et qu'ils abandonnent le Danemark à ses propres moyens rien ne saurait me détourner de m'emparer de l'électorat de Hanovre." Bailleu, ii, 31, footnote 2.

¹ Although the peace had brought many material advantages to Prussia (cf. Philippson, *Gesch. d. Preuss. Staatswesen*, etc., ii, 164, and Bailleu, ii, 558), the same lack of a resourceful and aggressive minister of finance had left the Prussian finances disorganized. See Haugwitz's expression of regret in Jan., 1799. Bailleu, i, 267. The article on Struensee in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, throws light on that minister's attitude towards financial reforms.

fend the neutrality of North Germany, and the faithful adhesion of Hanover to Prussia's leadership had alone made possible the success of that policy. Too weak to resist the pressure from east and west, it remained to be seen whether, to save the neutrality of North Germany for the time being, Prussia would consent to disavow the fundamental tenet of neutrality as a system¹ by occupying Hanover in order to punish England.

In the midst of all the difficulties of the position which the extraordinary combination of circumstances created, King Frederick William III. was willing to grasp at any means which, by reconciling Russia and England, would relieve him from danger on his most vulnerable side. Breaking over the boundaries of diplomatic usage, he used first Captain von der Decken, and then regularly Colonel Köckeritz as channels by which to convey to Lord Carysfort and the English government the difficulties of the position in which his attempt to oppose both Russia and France placed him. If only he might effect a reconciliation between England and the disgruntled head of the Order of St. John, he could see light breaking ahead.²

¹ Ranke, in speaking of Prussia's attitude in 1801 concerning Hanover's separation from England, says she "führte eine andere Sprache . . . und wagte es nicht, die vorige wirklich in der Natur der Sache und den älteren Vorgängen gegründete wieder anzustimmen." Ranke, *Hardenberg*, ii, 14, footnote.

² March 15, 1801, Carysfort, after announcing that the occupation of the Electorate is inevitable, adds, "the King (Frederick Wm. III.) thinks at present if he could be backed by Russia, he would yet dare to hold up his head against France and look for support to England. But if the Emperor was to turn about and be again our friend I much doubt whether Prussia would venture to oppose the will of France. The King's natural timidity is increased by that of all his generals without exception, by distrust (well grounded) of the affections of the army, and by suspicions, most just, of the abilities and intentions of his Counsellors." (*English Record Office*.)

Whatever relief the wavering Prussian monarch may have felt when he learned that secret negotiations were already on foot between London and St. Petersburg, his respite was short.¹ On March 10, a hurrying messenger arrived in Berlin, bearing despatches from his Prussian Majesty's minister in St. Petersburg. For once Haugwitz did not complain that the inefficient Lusi² had made his report valueless by omitting matters of importance.

Lusi's note is dated St. Petersburg, Feb. 12/26(24?), and runs as follows :³

"J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer cy-joint a Votre Majesté la copie de deux lettres⁴ qui m'ont été adressées par le Comte de Rostopsin dont la dernière roulant sur des ouvertures très importantes étoit écrite de sa propre main!

Copie :

Monsieur le Comte,

Au moment de notre Séparation j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir un billet autographe de l'Empéreur, dont je vous joins ici la copie.

'Proposez en mon nom par le Cte Lusÿ et Krüdener au Roi de Prusse l'occupation de l'Electorat d'Hannovre comme une mesure qui pourra faire finir plutôt les vilénies du Cabinet de Londres'.⁴

¹ Cf. a long and very important letter of Carysfort, telling his communication to the king of the semi-official utterances that the Mecklenburg counsellor, Lützow, has been authorized to make on Carysfort's (*i. e.*, England's) behalf at St. Petersburg. It is dated March 4, 1801, and encloses important documents. (*English Record Office.*)

² Lusi's despatches from St. Petersburg in this period are certainly barren enough to deserve Haugwitz's frequent reprimands. See condemnation of Lusi in Haugwitz's letter to King Frederick William III., August 7, 1801. *Rep. XI, Russland, 149 b.*, p. 193 (*Berlin Archives*).

³ *Rep. XI, Russland, 149 a, Vol. I (Berlin Archives).*

⁴ The second letter is a copy of the ukase of Feb. 11/23, forbidding exportation to Prussia.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une considération très distinguée, etc.

Comte de Rostopsin."¹

Having reached this point in the narrative of events as they are occurring on the larger stage, we may well turn for a moment to the interested victim of all this discussion.

Thus far this account of the occupation of Hanover seems a case of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. England, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Denmark—what was Hanover itself doing? Where could it hope to be effective? It had no representative in Paris nor in St. Petersburg. Denmark was its one well-hated, non-German rival. Its small German neighbors were awed into timorous silence by the very greatness of the powers involved and by the fear for their existence that the question of indemnity had raised. Hanover, thrown to the wolves, might let them save their own territorial entities.² London and Ber-

¹ Three days later Le Coq was despatched to St. Petersburg on a special mission to arrange Prussia's indemnity and the military measures which the Maritime League might necessitate.

² When the occupation of Hanover came, the minor states raised no open protest, though alarmed by it. Saxony was sailing in Prussia's wake during these years as closely as was Hanover (see despatches by Sir Hugh Eliot, English envoy to Dresden, in *Pub. Record Office*.) The despatch of May 11, 1801, is particularly good. Helbig denounced the occupation to Count Loss as "cette fâcheuse et terrible expédition," but no action was taken. In Brunswick, the head of the state, Duke Charles William Ferdinand, was convinced of the French danger and had been urging Prussia to occupy. The Dukes of Holstein and of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, then in St. Petersburg, took Hanover's part in the discussions there. Hesse-Cassel was planning to acquire an electoral hat and if it came as the result of Hanover's absorption by Prussia, the Landgrave, whom the ministry at Hanover had denounced as "landgierig," would hardly raise a strong protest. The Duke of Strelitz, father of Queen Louise, and uncle of Duke Adolphus of Cambridge, who looked on Hanover as his second home, came to Berlin (March 21) and

lin' seemed the only places where Hanover might speak for itself.

All through the summer of 1800, von Reden in Berlin watched anxiously the ebb and flow of the Prussian-Russian negotiations on the matter of neutral commerce.² The fear that Prussia would use measures necessitated by such a league to further her territorial aims,³ was more than counterbalanced by the faith that Prussia, whatever the cause of the complications, would return to its neutrality system when the storm was over. But even before Haugwitz had told the Duke of Brunswick (Feb. 8, 1801) that Prussia was preparing to occupy the Electorate, the ministry at Hanover saw the coming action, and saw in it only danger.⁴ Believing from Krüdener's

there strongly protested to both king and queen against the action Prussia contemplated. His words simply increased the perplexity of the hard driven Prussian monarch. (Helbig's despatch of March 23, 1801, *Dresden Archives*.)

¹ V. Lenthe, the Hanoverian minister next to the royal person in London, says in his defense, "Wir hätten keinen eigentlichen Feind (in the period after Basel) aber durchaus keinen Freund auf den wir rechnen konnten und unsere ganze Politik konnte nur die sein, uns an die eine Macht in deren Händen wir sowohl wegen ihrer überwiegenden Stärke als wegen unsrer Lage ohnedem waren so gut wie möglich anzuschliessen und es nun darauf ankommen zu lassen ob deren Politik für oder wider uns entscheiden würde." *Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, 149. This sentence represents fairly well the viewpoint of this dissertation.

² Cf. von Reden's reports in *Cal. Br. Arch. Des. 24, Brandenburg-Preussen*, no. 582 (*Han. Arch.*).

³ V. Reden's despatches, Nov. 22 and 29, 1800.

⁴ The Hanoverian government was conscious of the danger of a European pacification which left England out. A phrase in the Prussian note to England of February 12, could well be considered by the thoughtful Hanoverian as an indication of the fate to come. Haugwitz's note, after announcing that the king of Prussia is one of the members of the Maritime League, says, "et en cette qualité elle est obligée non seulement de prendre une part directe à tous les événements qui intéressent la

words and Russia's previous policy that there was no danger of the Czar confusing King and Kurfürst, and not aware that France had resumed its hostile position with more than usual vigor, they turned on Haugwitz in a note of vigorous protest—a note that was at the same time a strong appeal to the best instincts of the Prussian king and ministry. So seldom in this period did the Hanoverian Regency rise to take the initiative, that the note of February 12, 1801, made all the deeper impression on the Berlin leaders.¹ As the ally of Prussia, Hanover had deserted the policy followed by the kingdom of its reigning house, and had thus made possible the successful maintenance of the Prussian neutrality system to which Hanover had further contributed men and money. The Regency and King George, with such a record to point to, could earnestly appeal against an action that seemed only to result in Hanover's suffering vicariously for England's sins. Passing from things more positive, the Electorate of Hanover agreed in full with the king of Prussia as to the value of the neutrality system, and of the uninterrupted commerce of the Elbe and Weser. Its elector had not the slightest objection to entering with Prussia and other interested parties—even Denmark—into any arrangement for maintaining

cause des neutres, mais aussi de la soutenir en vertu de ses engagements, par telle mesures efficaces que l'urgence des cas pourra exiger. Il doit à des stipulations, qui n'eurent rien d'hostile, que la sûreté de ses sujets lui dicta, tous les moyens que la providence a mis en son pouvoir, . . . que le roi, en donnant ses regrets à des événemens qu'il n'eut jamais provoqués, remplira saintement les obligations que les traités lui prescrivent." Martens, *Recueil*, 2nd edition, vii, 218-219.

¹ According to v. Reden's account it had created a sensation in Berlin and greatly embarrassed the king. (Despatches of February, 1801, in *no. 584*.) This is rather borne out by the interest Saxony and England took in seeing what answer Haugwitz would make.

neutrality and keeping open these important rivers.¹ The note and the proposition it contains are by all odds the cleverest diplomatic move the Hanoverian government made in the period we are studying. The situation of the Prussian government was beyond peradventure made much more difficult. Much of the ground upon which it had based its talk about occupying the Electorate was removed by the offers Hanover made in order to show its good faith in observing and defending its neutrality. Officially no notice whatever was taken of the note,² Prussia assuming that Hanover was not a party to the negotiations, and that until England replied to the Prussian note of the same date, or yielded the contention of the Maritime League, serious notice could not be taken of the communications from the Regency. Privately, Haugwitz assured von Reden that the French would never consent to Hanover's joining the League. France would not consider that this was the sort of separation from England which Napoleon demanded. Russia, Haugwitz told von Reden, was not to be feared, but France had already shown itself Hanover's most dangerous enemy. Recently the French had three times proposed the occupation of Hanover, "puisqu'il falloit chercher son ennemi partout où on pourroit l'atteindre."³

¹ Cf. copy of note in *Hann. Dcs.*, 92, XLI, No. 67. (*Hanover Archives.*)

² Von Lenthe's defense in *Zeitschrift des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, 152. Von Lenthe there brings the Berlin note into connection with a plan he had of uniting the North for its own defense against the French. He broached the subject to Bernstorff, the Danish minister, who immediately disapproved it (for fear of Russia?). The royal rescript authorizing the note is dated January 27, 1801. V. Lenthe (as above).

³ Von Lenthe, *sup. cit.*, p. 153. Cf. Lord Carysfort's despatch of Feb. 13, 1801, for Haugwitz's conversation with von Reden, when the latter handed in the note of Feb. 12.

If England persisted in its rigid views of its maritime rights, not only Hanover, but Prussia itself, would be drawn helpless into the maelstrom. There was but one voice in Berlin when the subject of Hanover was discussed—if it came to a break with England, the Prussians must occupy the Electorate.¹ There was little comfort in the assurances of the English ambassador that the Prussian seizure of Hanover would only prolong the wars. The history of the last seventy-five years contradicted Carysfort's opinion that the English people would never consent to their sovereign being deprived in this way of his German states.² The Hanoverians were soon to know what they might hope from England. On February 19, the Regency, feeling that it had done all that it could in Berlin, wrote the minister in London, von Lenthe, that all now depended on the help he might obtain from Great Britain.³

¹ Von Reden, Feb. 10 and 17, *Des. 24, No. 584*. Cf. note (—) on king's despair over England's obstinacy.

² V. Reden, Feb. 24, in *no. 584*. (*Hanover*.)

³ V. Lenthe in *Zeitschrift, etc., sup. cit.*, p. 153. One should notice here two other subjects considered by the ministry in Hanover in March, 1801. First, the subject of indemnity, and the situation in which Hanover was placed by the conclusion of the treaty of Lunéville, which Hanover was foremost in approving for fear delay would give France a chance to misinterpret the Hanoverian attitude, led to the proposal that Hanover should have an agent in Paris, and the Regency transmitted to Napoleon through Beurnonville in Berlin and Bacher, French agent in Frankfort, the most friendly assurances of a desire for a good understanding with France. (Cf. *Cal. Br. Arch. Des. II, E. I, No. 1182 and 1183*.) Reports to King George, *Cal. Br. Des. 24. Brand.-Pr., No. 592*, March 12. The second is their renewal of more intimate relations with Austria. They quite agree with the Austrian view that some power in Lower Saxony should be raised to counterbalance the Prussian influence, and plainly indicate that they would like to try their hand as a "*Gegengewicht*," if only a generous indemnity is given them. (Cf. *no. 1182, sup. cit.*, ministry to king in March, 1801.)

The English attitude toward Hanover during the last few years gave little reason to hope that any concession would be made for the sake of the Electorate. Always jealous of the Hanoverian connection, the English cabinet and public, even King George himself, had never quite justified the readiness with which Hanover had sought the protection of the Demarcation Line. Von Lenthe was not a man with decision and ability enough to modify this generally hostile view or hold the king from approving the English measures against the allies.¹ Signing the embargo on Swedish and Danish vessels, as von Lenthe told him, was equal to signing a warrant for the invasion of the Electorate. But no English minister would hearken to a consideration of Hanover's interests in the matter.²

The royal family was much interested in the fate of the Electorate, but the king, who alone was in a position to influence its fate, could only adhere to the principles in

¹ Jacobi-Kloest in his despatches to Berlin seems to consider the Hanoverian attaché, Best, as an abler man than von Lenthe and more in favor with King George, *e. g.*, February 26, 1801. (*Berlin Archives.*)

² It was rumored that Pitt and the Duke of York were in sharp disagreement, Pitt having threatened to resign if any act against the allies was modified on account of Hanover. Count Loss to Helbig in Berlin, February 23 (?), 1801. (*Saxon Archives.*) V. Lenthe says: ". . . , so konnte ich auch hier nichts ausrichten weil ich kein andres Mittel (other than union proposed to Denmark, etc.,) vorzuschlagen hatte: denn das eben eingetretene Ministerium blieb ganz auf dem Wege den seine Vorgänger betreten hatten, die Rüstungen wurden mit gedoppeltem Eifer getrieben und es wurde mir bestimmt gesagt, dass derjenige englische Minister den Kopf verlieren würde der die in der Behandlung der neutralen Seemächte von Grossbritannien allezeit behaupteten Grundsätze aufgeben wollte. Auch hatte der König selbst von jeher eben so gegen mich gesprochen und würde mich also nicht unterstützt, wenn er auch wohl gewesen wäre. Er war aber krank und ich konnte keine Befehle von ihm einholen." V. Lenthe in *Zeitschrift des hist. Vereins*, etc., 1856, 154.

which he had been reared, and be true to the interests of his English kingdom, though it cost him his patrimony.¹ The Prince of Wales was emphatic in opinion, but chary in action, in view of the arrangements for a regency then under discussion;² the Duke of York had, it was thought, opposed Pitt in the matter;³ the Duke of Cumberland, the fourth son, spoke out the royal family's attachment to their ancestral home. It remained for Duke Adolphus of Cambridge, frank and engaging, to do for himself and his father on the Electorate's behalf a service that English policy could not disapprove.⁴

On February 25, the young Duke who had been with the Demarcation Army, accompanied by his adjutant, the able and active young Captain von der Decken, set out for Berlin to try what might be accomplished there

¹ See note below. It was at this crisis that the weakened and overburdened mind of the king gave way to one of his occasional spells of insanity.

² Cf. Jacobi-Kloest's despatches of March 13 and 17, 1801. (*Berlin Archives*.) The prince in the latter despatch has made it plain that England fears Napoleon will win Russia with his plans in the Orient and Prussia by the offer of Hanover.

³ See preceding page, Note 2. An editorial in the *London Times* for February 2 says: "We have reason to think the dissensions in His Majesty's Cabinet regard principally the part which this country and its sovereign who unites with that capacity the executive sovereignty of the Electorate of Hanover, is or ought to act, with respect to the king of Prussia, as guardian and chief of German neutrality on the one hand, and as party to the neutrality of the Baltic on the other." Pitt resigned Feb. 5, but did not hand over the seals till March 14 on account of the king's illness. King George had refused to approve his plan for the Catholic emancipation. See George III. in *Dict. of National Biography*, and the article by von Noorden, "*Rücktritt des Ministeriums Pitt 1801*," in the *Hist. Zeit.*, ix, 343.

⁴ Helbig, March 5 (*Dresden Archives*). "Le Prince Adolphe d'Angleterre . . . c'est le moins beau, mais le meilleur de ses frères et très aimable."

on Hanover's behalf. It was a personal mission, whose hope of success must lie in the influence his young relative could bring to bear on King Frederick William III., seconded as it would be by Captain Decken's unofficial conferences and representations to both king and ministry. The story of their mission is an interesting one, and not without importance in some of its bearings on the relations between the two powers whose connection we are following. But in its main aim of moving Prussia to abstain from invading the Electorate, it was foredoomed to failure. The ministry at Hanover must have felt the chances of success were slight. They were very likely thinking not of what was to be done to avoid Prussia's invasion, but what was to be done to save Hanover's further existence as a separate power. It would have needed firmer faith and greater courage than theirs to withstand the suspicion as to Haugwitz's ultimate designs which permeated all von Reden's reports from Berlin in the crucial months of February and March.¹ But these were mere surmises. As a fact, von Reden let it be seen that Prussia would surely have to

¹ V. Reden's statement of the opinion in Berlin on the matter of occupying Hanover (despatch of March 2) is that the great mass believe in temporary occupation and exploitation. This idea suits the military group and such financiers as von Schulenburg. Another party—Lombard, Beyme, Köckeritz and Haugwitz—favored uniting Hanover to Prussia. The impression von Reden had and so heard from all he talked with, was that Haugwitz was using the English-Russian-French affair as an excuse. "Die wahre Ursache ist die, dass Graf Haugwitz, Minister Hardenberg und Consorten auf die russische Unterstützung sich stützend und wohl wissend, dass die Franzosen ihre Projecten auf den Teutschen Norden (eprouviren?), weil sie diesen gegen England aufgebracht haben, ihren Favorit Plan durchsetzen wollen." They were trying to get the Duke of Cambridge out of the way. (Von Reden's despatch of March 15.)

invade if England maintained its ground.¹ Nobody could know better than King George's son how certainly England would face all Europe rather than yield her supremacy on the high seas.

Duke Adolphus was well fitted by nature and by interest to make an appeal for the country in which he had spent so much of his youth. His acquaintance with the king and queen of Prussia, and his winning ways prepared for him a friendly reception. Captain von der Decken, though a young man, is, it seems to me, to be named with Ludwig von Ompteda and von Münster as one of the three ablest Hanoverians whose talents were then at the service of the ministry for diplomatic missions.

They arrived in Berlin, February 28, and remained nearly all of the month of March—until the occupation of the Electorate created a situation that made the position of the Duke as the guest of the Prussian court too embarrassing. Both were active and both have left on record reports of their activity.² The Duke's object was

¹After von Reden had handed in the note of February 12, he met Haugwitz at a ball and was rather coolly received. "Zugleich liess er so viele Aeusserungen fallen das ich hätte müssen gar nicht sehen noch hören wollen, wenn ich nicht gemerkt hätte dass sich Preussen und die übrigen nordischen Mächte an Hannover halten werden, wenn England sich nicht bequemen will ihren Willen zu thun." Haugwitz points out that it has for six years been difficult to protect Hanover against the French and now that England had embroiled herself with the Northern powers and England's "acharnirter Feind," the Czar, was taking the same view as the French, the position of Prussia was almost untenable. In war it would be impossible to maintain the separation of the spheres of king and Kurfürst in the person of George the Third. The French termed it "une distinction metaphysique." V. Reden, February 14, 1801, no. 584, (*Han. Arch.*) Von Reden notes that he had grasped the Czar's intentions as early as his despatch of Nov. 22, 1800.

²The material for an account of this mission will be found principally at Hanover. *Cal. Br. Arch. Des.* 24, *Brandenburg-Preussen*, nos.

to try by direct appeal to Frederick William III. to prevent if possible the occupation of the Electorate; or, if the occupation was inevitable, to delay it as long as possible, and to arrange it on terms most favorable to the Electorate. They stopped in Brunswick to interview the Duke, and there learned how serious the situation of the Electorate was, that is, that France and Russia were pressing the king to occupy, and that, though he would delay as long as possible, it must be done, and the Duke of Brunswick was expected to take command of the invading army.¹

Immediately on their arrival in Berlin, the energetic von der Decken sought and obtained an interview with Frederick William III., much to the disgust of the royal advisers who were seeking to bring the king to decisive action.² The king only made it plain how helpless he was in the situation created for him by the English steadfastness on the one hand, and the reckless plans of the Czar Paul on the other. Von der Decken who had begun the interview in the conviction that the Prussian plan was to absorb Hanover, left the king convinced that the latter at least was not a party to any such scheme, whatever the ultimate designs of his minister might be.³

585, 586, 587, 589. Also Carysfort's despatches for the period and in *Eng. Pub. Record Office* and Helbig's despatches in the *Dresden Archives*.

¹ V. Decken's report of February 26. Reference has already been made to Haugwitz's letter to the Duke, Feb. 8. Bailleu, ii, 25.

² Köckeritz interrupted the interview several times and started an angry colloquy with Capt. Decken when he came out. Both Haugwitz and Hardenberg are credited with trying to hasten Duke Adolphus' departure. (Duke Adolphus' dispatch of March 15.)

³ Some things that passed in the interview seem worth repeating here. To Capt. Decken's expressions of Hanover's faith in the king's good intentions, Frederick William replies: "Sie können überzeugt sein, dass

The most hopeless phase of the whole situation was Prussia's confession of weakness and lack of independent policy in this critical situation. The interviews of the next few days with the English and Austrian ambassadors did not offer a ray of comfort. The air was full of rumors of how the Russian ambassador was urging again and again the occupation of the Electorate, how Augereau's army was ready to march when Napoleon gave the word, how Prussia was cherishing the most extensive hopes of having Hanover assigned to her as an indemnity.¹ The young envoys wavered for a moment

wenn ich nicht das Raub und Plunder-system verabscheute, meine Truppen das Hannoversche schon längst besetzt hätten. Es fehlt nicht an vielen Eingebungen die zu den gewaltesten Mittel rathen. Ich verabscheue sie. Allein wenn die Engländer mich zwingen so haben sie es mir nicht beizumessen. Ich will meiner Ehre nichts vergeben." I think this must be what Hassall (*Das Kurfürstentum Hannover vom Baseler Frieden bis zur Preuss. Occupation im Jahre 1806*, p. 35), puts in quotation marks.

The king fears a Russian occupation, but gives v. d. Decken the impression that the Czar has not threatened it. (This is March 1.) It will not be enough for England to raise the embargo on the Swedish and Danish vessels. The whole embargo must be raised and Russia conciliated. "Ich muss meinen Rücken frei haben," were the king's words. Captain Decken urged that Prussia would lose more than she would gain by taking Hanover for her indemnity—Westphalia was a better field, suggested the Hanoverian. The king said Prussia had not yet settled her indemnity plan. In summing up his impressions Decken says: "Möchte ich mit meinem Kopfe dafür haften dass der König in seinem Herzen die Besitznehmung der Hannoverschen Länder nicht wünscht, ich habe aber Gründe zu vermuthen, dass Herr von Haugwitz den Plan hat; vermuthlich erst seit einiger Zeit: und den König hauptsächlich durch Drohungen mit den Franzosen dazu zu bringen sucht. Herr von Haugwitz hat den Herrn von Cöckeritz auf seiner Seite."

¹ See v. d. Decken's reports of March 9 and 15. (*Hanover Archives*.) In latter report v. d. Decken tells how Haugwitz uses Deluc to convey the news that Lucchesini in Paris has just reported that Augereau is to occupy Hanover if Prussia does not. Haugwitz sends the most solemn assurances that "er keineswegs gewillet sei das Hannoversche zu behalten oder *en séquestre* zu nehmen sondern die Besetzung

and thought of leaving Berlin,¹ but the kindly invitation of the king and his gracious queen, Louise,² determined

lediglich geschehe um das Land gegen die Franzosen sicher zu stellen." This must be kept from the French. Hardenberg gives him the same assurances as to danger from the French. Carysfort was of the opinion that Prussia's step was caused more by Russia, and the threat about the French army was a "Kunstgriff" of Haugwitz. On the same day Duke Adolphus sends an account of an interview in which the king urges him to stay till the king indicated he was to leave. "Dass er (Fred'k Wm. III.) bis jetzt an die Besitznahme des Hannoverschen noch nicht gedacht hatte obwohl er von beiden Seiten dazu sei aufgemuntert worden." An important despatch of Lord Carysfort's of March 14, 1801, tells how he has received a person (Deluc) authorized by Count Haugwitz to say that his Prussian Majesty has found it necessary to determine on the occupation of Hanover in order to keep Augereau out. But the act must in no way be interpreted as hostile to Great Britain or as an obstacle to friendly and close connection in the future. On the 15th Carysfort reports the king's interview with Prince Adolphus. This incident seems to me the most direct evidence available of the cross purposes at which the responsible directors of Prussian policy were working.

¹ Capt. Decken to Regency, March 9.

² V. d. Decken's report of March 13, presents the queen as an intercessor for the land of her birth. V. d. Decken to Regency, Berlin, March 13, 1801.

"Die Königin war gestern so gnädig mir zu sagenich möchte ihre Bitte beim Prinz Adolph, noch eine Zeitlang hier zu bleiben unterstützen, weil sie es so sehr wünsche. Ich erwiderte: dass der Prinz besorge dem König lästig zu sein. Und da sie sich darauf verpflichtete mir als heute Morgen über die Gesinnung des Königs in diesem Punkte völlige Auskunft zu geben, bath ich sie bei dieser Gelegenheit dem Könige unser Land zu empfehlen, worauf sie sich nach der ganzen Lage erkundigte.

Diesen Mittag sagte mir die Königin sie habe mit dem Könige über alles gesprochen. Der König sähe es sehr gern dass der Prinz noch hier bliebe, weil seine Gesellschaft ihm sehr angenehm sei. In Rücksicht unsers Lands hege der König die besten Gesinnungen. Er verabscheue durchaus die Idee sich eines fremden Eigenthums zu bemächtigen, und wurde zu der Besitzung des Hannoverschen nur dann schreiten, wenn er von den Engländer durchaus dazu gezwungen würde." In no. 585 (*Hanover Archives*.) Cf. further on Queen Louise and her attitude toward the neutrality system, *Deutsche Revue*, Sept., 1901, and *Hist. Zeit.*, 88, 557

Duke Adolphus to remain until Prussia was forced out of its inactivity by a definite English refusal to meet any of the Russian-Prussian demands.

Of King Frederick William's good intentions there was little doubt, but his Majesty's hopes and ideas seemed to be in disagreement with views of the situation cherished by such men as Haugwitz, Köckeritz and Hardenberg.¹ The king's words were reassuring, but he himself seemed to feel that the case was hopeless unless Haugwitz accepted Captain Decken's views. At the king's request an interview was arranged by honest

¹ See v. d. Decken's report of the preliminaries of the interview with Haugwitz in his report of March 24. He saw the king and queen at a ball on the 21st. In this interview, as well as one on the 1st, von der Decken argues on the basis that Prussia has an idea of retaining Hanover permanently. It is the close of this line of argument that King Frederick William III. approves his ideas and expresses his desire that he convince Haugwitz of it. Later in the evening Queen Louise tells Capt. Decken, "Der König habe keine Neigung nicht einen Mann marschieren zu lassen, er werde aber so sehr gedrängt." The king, it is to be noted, knew what his ministry did not, that England was making an attempt to negotiate with Russia, and so he could oppose their desire for quick action in the hope that a successful outcome might relieve him of his embarrassing situation. Cf. Carysfort's report of March 4, 1801. It seems clear when one reads the English terms concerning Malta (enclosed in this despatch), that England hardly expected a successful outcome and hoped from the negotiations with Russia and their communication to the Prussian king to hold back those powers till the fleet of Parker and Nelson had gotten into the Sound and overpowered the unaided Danes. No wonder that Napoleon stormed at Prussia for leaving the Danes to their own resources.

Carysfort, in his despatch of March 22, in exulting over the unexpected procrastination that had been secured in the Prussian measures against Hanover and England until the English fleet has done its work, considered it "principally due to the presence of His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus, which in every point of view appears to my humble judgment to have been of great importance to his Majesty's service." The delay of hostile measures was highly beneficial to England in allowing her to get supplies from the continent. (*English Record Office.*)

Deluc, reader to the queen. On the evening of March 24, Capt. Decken repaired secretly to the study of Haugwitz and there talked over the whole situation. Haugwitz though friendly, was clearly determined to make the best argument possible for the situation into which he admitted Russia and France had put Prussia. With his usual readiness to make his arguments fit the occasion he laughed at the idea of trying to distinguish the policies of George III. as King and Kurfürst—a distinction which, as has been indicated, was as fundamental to his long cherished neutrality system as any clause in the treaty of August 5, 1796.¹ When v. der Decken conjured up the spirit of Frederick the Great in all the amazement which that great man would feel to see his state in such a humiliating position, doing the behest of its neighbors, Haugwitz frankly avowed the weakness of the state he represented and confessed the opportunism that guided its policies.² Captain Decken presented an exhaustive

¹ "Der Unterschied zwischen dem Könige von England and Churfürst von Hannover ist nie verkannt, selbst der Churfürst von Hannover unterscheidet ihn nicht immer. Die Franzosen haben im 7-jährigen Kriege auch darauf keine Rücksicht genommen. Und gesetzt sie hätten es jemals gethan, so ist es jetzt unser Vorthail es nicht zu thun. Er machte sich über die Idee den Churfürst vom Könige trennen zu wollen auf eine etwas unartige Art lustig."

² Haugwitz said, "Der preuss. Staat könne seinen Kräften zufolge nur eine leidende Rolle spielen, seine Politik erfordere, auf eine geschickte Art zu lauren. . . . seine Politik sei das von selbst zu thun was man ohnehin thun müsse, was sich nur dadurch ein Staat in Ansehen erhalten könne." I add here the estimate of Haugwitz's policy made by Helbig, the Saxon envoy in Berlin: "Le principe de ce Cabinet, sous la direction de Mr. le Cte de Haugwitz, est d'attendre toujours les événemens pour y régler après les dispositions à faire." May 10, 1801 (*Dresden Archives*.)

March 23, 1801, Helbig makes some wise comments on the Prussian occupation. After speaking of King Frederick Wm.'s reluctance, "Enfin la peur de s'exposer à la fureur de la France et de la Russie l'ai em-

memorial which stated and answered all the possible reasons that might be considered by the Prussian ministry as sufficient grounds for the step they were about to take.¹ Haugwitz went through it with him carefully, but remained unshaken in his determination—all the more so since it was, as we have seen, not *his* determination, but a step conceived in Paris² and decreed in St. Petersburg.

Out of the interview with Haugwitz, as in the conversation of Captain Decken with Frederick William III., stands clearly the one idea of keeping free from difficulties with Russia and France. Prussia's duty to her allies of the Maritime League, the alleged disappearance

porté sur la bonté de coeur de ce Souverain. Ce Prince et son Ministère auroient pu s'épargner cette situation critique si de tout tems on avoit tenu un langage ferme énergique et digne de la puissance Prussienne. Maintenant, tout bien considéré, il faut avouer, qu'il ne leur reste pas d'autre moyen que de céder aux impulsions des autres, qui forcent le Roi à faire ce qu'ils exigent ou à compromettre ses propres avantages." (*Dresden Archives*.)

¹ Copies of this able memoir are to be found in Berlin and Hanover. In the former archives it is unsigned and is bound in the volume, *R. XI, no. 140, C. I.*, just before King Frederick William's proclamation to the Hanoverian ministry.

² Direct evidence as to how Napoleon brought his ideas before Paul after their reconciliation is, as far as I know, rather scanty. Jan. 20, Napoleon wrote Talleyrand: "Il parait, Citoyen Ministre, que le Prusse n'a pas été comprise dans l'ordre du conseil privé du roi d'Angleterre. Il faut espérer que Paul la poussera. Ne pourrions-nous pas en attendant contribuer à pousser Hambourg?" *Correspondance*, vi, 736. Napoleon's letter to Paul, Feb. 27, 1801, is better evidence of how the First Consul wished the Czar's co-operation. He proposes that a joint corps of French and the Russian prisoners just freed under the Russian general, Sprengporten, occupy Hanover until peace is made. If Russia closes the North of Germany to England and Napoleon shuts the English trade out of Portugal, they will have the continent closed to England. *Cf. Correspondance*, vii, 63. The references given by Häusser, ii, 347, are not to the point.

of the neutrality of the North of Germany with the signing of the Imperial peace are evidently subordinate to the desire to remain on a friendly footing with Russia, to be free from the danger of attack on Prussia's vulnerable side, thus manifesting her utter inability to resist pressure from both Czar and First Consul.¹ If one seeks, then, to summarize the effective reasons for Prussia's action, they seem to range themselves in a certain relation and order. The long-cherished view of France that Hanover was an English possession, and the loss of Egypt, accompanied by a feeling of French helplessness before English maritime predominance, caused Napoleon to take advantage of the Czar's momentary anger over England's maritime exactions and refusal to yield Malta. By this sudden Russian-French unity in hostility to England, France might hope to force Prussia as a well-intended member of the Maritime League to the occupation of the electorate of Hanover. They could expect by this means to involve Prussia in the scheme of a continental system, and ultimately to embroil her in a war with England.

Lastly, the reader must throw the whole matter on the background formed by the subject of indemnification. Prussia's "Landbegier" was considered inordinate by its

¹ Haugwitz, "Preussen muss nur suchen mit Russland gut zu bleiben." And again, that Prussia could not protect Hanover according to its principle. "Dass Russland ihm auf den Hals gezogen habe." (Capt. Decken, March 24, to the Regency in Hanover.) Frederick William III., "Ich muss meinen Rücken frei haben." (Capt. Decken's interview of March 1.) The king assures Prince Adolphus of Bonaparte's definite declaration that he will occupy Hanover as soon as the peace of Lunéville is ratified if Prussia does not. Prince Adolphus is convinced by this interview that the occupation is brought about by the French danger. See his report to the Regency, March 21, 1801. (*Hanover Archives.*)

neighbors and the English public, the cabinet was credited with plans so far-reaching that the well-intentioned King Frederick William was kept from knowing their ultimate aim. There could be no doubt in times when every power was filing excessive claims for damages, of the interpretation Austria, Hanover, England and the smaller German states¹ would put on the occupation of the Electorate.² Men like Hardenberg dropped remarks about the occupation being permanent, if they had their way, and the responsible minister let it be known that he sought, by watching his opportunity, to turn everything to the advantage of Prussia.³ King Frederick William III. was good, but weak.⁴ Hanover could not defend

¹The opinion of the Saxon envoy (Helbig) and the Minister, Count Loss, is to be found in the despatches of February 23 and March 4, 1801. (*Dresden Archives.*)

March 20, when he has learned from Zastrow that orders have been given to close the mouths of the Weser, Elbe and Ems, he sends *par estafette* news "de cette fâcheuse et terrible expedition, dont les suites sont incalculables pour le Nord de l'Europe et principalement de l'Allemagne." (*Dresden Archives.*)

²*Cf.* Reden's despatch of March 14, 1801, where he says the opinion among the diplomats in Berlin is that Prussia, under cover of compulsion from France and Russia, is seeking to increase its territory. No. 584. (*Hanover Archives.*)

³Helbig, Saxon envoy, to Count Loss, March 31, 1801, ". . . mais je suis pour ainsi dire persuadé que le cour de Berlin ne voudra jamais rendre cette conquête. Si elle suite (sic) le Conseil du Ministre, Baron de Hardenberg, qui a parlé confidemment de cette affaire à un de ses amis, elle gardera ce pays. Si cependant elle peut et que des Cours mieux intentionnées ne s'en mêlent pas cet homme qui ne cherche pas (sic) qu'à dépouiller les autres trouveroit à la fin que toute l'Europe pourroit convenir à arrondir la monarchie prussienne." (*Dresden Archives.*)

⁴In his interview with von der Decken, Haugwitz thoroughly ridiculed the suspicion that Prussia had the remotest idea of keeping Hanover. He assured von der Decken that Prussia was seeking an altogether different indemnity. This we know to be true, but as these indemnity plans were not explained or certainly known, it leaves unmodified the statement in the text as to the way the European public would interpret the occupation.

itself. England was loyal to its sovereign, but indifferent to his German possessions. How dark and hopeless seemed the outlook for Hanover! Apparently the only ground for confidence in the future was the character and good intentions of Prussia's king.¹

But the good character of its monarch alone has never been sufficient to make Prussia a force in European politics. Whatever may have been the intentions of a clique in the ministry, the king's purposes might well have restrained them.² It was a different question when, weakened financially and militarily, the Prussian state, its protests in behalf of maritime rights having been passed over by England in disdainful silence,³ attempted to withstand the threats of France⁴ and the united representations of its allies—Denmark, Sweden and Russia.⁵ Sharp and decided pressure from either east or west would force the long deferred decision on King Frederick William.

¹ "The king's intentions I believe to be honorable, but his weakness extreme." Lord Carysfort, March 15, 1801. (*English Record Office*.)

² Carysfort had very little confidence in the Prussian king's effective influence. March 17, 1801 he writes, "There is evidently a difference of opinion in regard to the occupation of the Electorate of Hanover between the King and his Ministers from which, however, no results very favorable to Great Britain can be expected. The King may wait in the hope that England and Russia may be reconciled, but should that event take place the habit of irresolution and the want of sufficient military preparations would leave in all probability the Councils of Prussia too much under the influence of France."

³ The reference is to the Prussian note of February 12, 1801. Cf. Martens, *Recueil*, 2nd edition, vii, 215 ff.

⁴ Besides the material already cited on this point the reports of von Reden reproduce the rumors current in March that Augereau had been hastily summoned to Paris to concert a French occupation.

⁵ Reden reports such protests March 7 and 14, 1801, no. 584. Similarly in Lord Carysfort's despatch of March 7. March 10 and 14, Reden writes that Russia is urging Prussia to seize Hanover.

The Russian Czar had already given proof of the lengths to which his hatred of England might carry him against those who did not rise to his degree of anti-English fervor,¹ and all attempts to point out to him that Prussia's participation in the Maritime League ought not to involve her in the English-Russian difficulties over Malta, fell on deaf ears.² The proposal that Prussia receive Hanover as its indemnity³ left no excuse for misunderstanding the situation as Paul viewed it. He was willing to sacrifice the traditional Russian policy in North Germany by increasing Prussia's power immoderately if the step in any way injured England. All hopes that half-way measures⁴ would content, were removed when in the early morning of March 25, Krüdener aroused Haugwitz and presented Paul's indemnity plan, assigning Hanover in lieu of the Franconian bishoprics

¹February 23, he issued a most extraordinary ukase forbidding the exportation of Russian products to Prussia because they reached England through that channel (the ukase is given in Martens, *Recueil*, 2nd ed., vii, 220). This ukase was modified by a succeeding one so that exportation took place provided Prussia saw to it that the products did not reach England. *Deutsche Zeit. für Geschichtswissenschaft*, N. F., ii, 253-54. The way he had coerced Denmark and Sweden into the Maritime League exhibits his spirit and methods. Jan. 1, 1801, he had incontinently dismissed the Danish envoy, Rosenkranz, from St. Petersburg because neither Rosenkranz nor von Bernstorff, the Danish prime minister, had favored the League. See Helbig's despatch of January 29, 1801 (*Dresden Archives*). Lusi, the Prussian minister, was thankful to escape the same fate.

²See Prussian ministry to Lusi, Jan. 9, 1801 (*Berlin Archives*).

³See below. Throughout March, Russia was urging Hanover as an indemnity. Cf. Lusi's dispatches of March 10, 13 and 17 (*Berlin Archives*).

⁴Such as occupying the mouths of the rivers and later occupying Hanover *en sequestre*. Rostopsin, Russian vice chancellor, to Lusi, Feb. 14 (*Berlin Archives*).

which Prussia had desired.¹ Krüdener was commissioned to do more than proffer, he was to threaten Prussia with an army of 80,000 Russians then moving towards Lithuania.² If Prussia did not decide within twenty-four hours to send its troops into Hanover, the representative of Russia was to quit Berlin.³ Such a serious

¹ Bailieu, ii, 41-42. The original of Paul's plan is nowhere preserved. The best authenticated copy is in Alex. Wassiltchikow, *Les Razoumowski*, vol. ii, pt. i, p. 405. (*Ed. française*, by A. Brückner.) The extract there given was made by Count Andre Rasoumowski from a note found in Paul's desk after his death. The reference to Hanover is: "Que l'Empereur propose au Roi de Prusse de se dédommager sur le Hanover de ses cessions au delà du Rhin et réserve au Danemark la ville de Hambourg."

² (Bernhardi.) *Hist. Zeit.*, iii, 156. The date given there should be corrected in accordance with Prof. Ulmann's suggestion. (*Zeit. f. Geschichtswissenschaft*, N. F., ii, p. 258, note 2.) Sugenheim, *Russlands Einfluss auf Deutschland*, ii, 191, cites as proof of Paul's earnestness in his demand, the march of Russian troops toward the Prussian boundary. In Schiemann, *Die Ermordung Pauls*, etc. (Berlin, 1902), p. 74, Bennigsen and Subow in their statement mention among the vagaries of Paul the plan to conquer Altpreußen. In Weljaminow-Sernow's statement (p. 24 of Schiemann) it is mentioned that he declared war on several nations a few days before his death. Prof. Ulmann gives other references to works that accept this threat of Paul's, *Zeit f. Geschichtswissenschaft* (as above), p. 259, note 2. The best evidence that I have found that military movements against Prussia were part of Paul's plan is in a pro-memoria of the Mecklenburg court chamberlain, von Lützow, enclosed by von Reden in his despatch of August 3, 1801. (*Han. Arch.*, no. 589.) Lützow had been the bearer of secret overtures from England to Russia early in the year (see Carysfort's despatches of January 21 and Hawkesbury's instructions to him February 13, 1801, *Eng. Rec. Off.*), and had been in St. Petersburg at the time of the crisis. Lützow's memoir is dated "Month of June—Pawlowsk." He explains the harshness of the Prussian tone in the note of February 12 by its desire to satisfy Paul, "denn es ist gantz sicher dass eine starke Armee schon in Anmarsch war die Preussen zu zwingen die Hanoverschen Lande zu besetzen." The present Czar told him (Lützow) that the troops then in motion were stopped by a courier sent out two hours after Paul's death.

³ *Sbornik Ruskajo*, vol. 70, p. 672, for a minute of the order dispatched

situation¹ admitted of no delay, and at a conference held in Potsdam² on the 26th, and attended by the Duke of Brunswick, it was decided to hurry forward the Prussian troops already under orders to march.³ General Kleist,

on March 11. The dispatch in the *Sbornik* does not mention the Russian army. I have here simply verified a reference made in Prof. Ulmann's article already mentioned. On March 25, Haugwitz summoned Carysfort to discuss with him confidentially the relations between the two countries. "Instead, however, of pursuing this intention, he shortly and drily informed me by command of the King, his Master, that no answer having been returned to the note of February 13, and England having committed hostilities against Sweden and Denmark on the open sea and in the ports of Norway, and a large fleet having put to sea apparently designed to act in the Baltic (note: Parker and Nelson had sailed on the 12th), his Majesty had found himself obliged to use all the means in his power for the support of His Allies, And that his troops were now on their march to occupy the Sea Coast and the posts commanding the Elbe and Weser. I contented myself with observing in reply that the intentions of Prussia had long been beyond doubt, and the pretexts now alledged by his Excellency could only tend to confirm an opinion very generally entertained that the conduct of Prussia was dictated in reality by considerations wholly distinct from the differences existing between England and the powers of the North." In concluding his despatch Carysfort correctly summarizes the situation: ". . . I remain persuaded that Fear is still the predominant motive of this court, and that its measures depend almost exclusively at this moment upon the decisions of the Russian Emperor." (*English Record Office.*)

¹ March 29, 1801, Carysfort encloses in translation a note from the Duke of Brunswick to Capt. Decken: "Do not remain any longer here. I hope to have the honor of seeing you to-morrow. We have received very bad news from Petersburg, from which may be collected that Paul makes the fate of the Electorate depend on Malta. I wish the Prince would send information as fast as possible to England of this confounded situation of affairs."

² No record of this conference has been preserved as far as I have been able to determine.

³ According to a dispatch to Lusi of March 23, cited by Ulmann, the marching orders had been issued that day. There is similar evidence for a still earlier date. It was with tears in his eyes that Frederick William announced to his council his decision to occupy the Electorate, and the whole topic was one he could hardly be brought to discuss (Col.

and not the Duke of Brunswick¹ as had been expected, was put in command of the occupying army, and Minister of Finance, Schulenburg-Kehnert,² was dispatched to act

Zastrow to Helbig, the Saxon envoy, March 12). Besides the repeated assurances given by both the king and Haugwitz that he had no hidden purpose in the occupation (see the reports of the Duke of Cambridge, Adolphus, and Capt. Decken, already referred to), the king, on April 18, wrote Prince Adolphus as follows: "Monsieur Mon Cousin: Si je puis compter sur la justice des autres lors qu'il s'agira d'apprécier les mesures que j'ai de suivre, vous aussi devez compter sur la mienne, quand occupé d'un seul intérêt vous m'entretenez du país qui en est l'objet des sollicitudes qu'il vous inspire. Le sentiment qui vous fait parler est aussi naturel que le principe qui m'a fait agir était juste. Je crois avoir satisfait à l'un comme à l'autre, et m'être acquitté envers l'humanité autant au moins qu'envers d'autres considérations. Sans prévoir les bornes que celles-ci pourraient prescrire, je n'oublierai point celle-la et jamais des calamités superflues n'auront pesé par ma faute sur un peuple. Ces sentimens sont absolument indépendant de ceux que je vous porte, Monsieur mon cousin, quelque vrais que soient ces derniers. Il en résulte que si l'amitié ne peut rien sur les principes eux aussi n'ont rien fou sur elle et que je suis et serai toujours avec l'attachement le plus sincère. Monsieur mon Cousin, de Votre Altesse Royale le bon cousin.

Potsdam, 18 Avril, 1801. AU PRINCE ADOLPHE D'ANGLETRRE."
Rep. XI, 140 C. I., Vol. I (Berlin Archives).

¹It is likely the Duke, who had provisionally accepted charge of the military arrangements, finally felt it would be putting himself in an embarrassing position if he commanded Prussian troops invading the lands of the head of his house. Helbig, Saxon envoy, develops at length the idea that the Duke learned at the conference of ulterior aims in the Prussian policy, and did not desire in any way to figure as Hanover's despoiler. See Helbig to Count Loss, March 31 (*Dresden Archives*). He appends the substance of Paul's indemnity plan, despatched, he says, twelve hours after the receipt of Prussia's proposal by the hand of LeCoq. This last is quite impossible, as LeCoq did not leave Berlin before March 13, and would consume almost two weeks in reaching St. Petersburg.

²Helbig says of him, February 16, 1803: "Le crédit arrogant de ce Ministre indispose tous les esprits contre lui. Sa disgrâce seroit possible parce que le Roi le craint et le déteste et qu'autour de ce Prince, il n'y a absolument personne qui plaide sa cause mais comme il n'y a aucun sujet capable de le remplacer entièrement cette disgrâce ne devient pas très,

as civil governor of the Electorate. The connection of the Regency with the sovereign was cut off and the ministry relieved of all responsible part in the general government of the land. The local administration was left undisturbed, but as a political power Hanover could regard herself as non-existent.¹ I doubt not that many a Hanoverian expected to see in this, Prussia's centennial year as a kingdom, the end of Hanover's course as an independent Electorate. But the day of her political resurrection was nearer than anybody could dream. Its herald was to be a messenger from the capital on the Neva!

probable." (*Dresden Archives*.) For Schulenburg's activity under Frederick II. see his *Denkwürdigkeiten in Forschungen z. Brandenb. u. Preuss. Gesch.*, xv, 2.

¹ "Hannover müsse sich von der politischen Seite als nicht existierend ansehen." Haugwitz to von d. Decken per latter's report of March 24, 1801. (*Hanover Archives*.) V. Reden in Berlin was not officially recognized by Haugwitz until November. With the death of Paul, and the return of Schulenburg to Berlin, the Regency came back to control in order to arrange with von Dohm the support of the army. The connection with King George was nominally suspended throughout the occupation.

CHAPTER VIII

PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER (CONTINUED)— THE EVACUATION

WITH occupation before it for two months,¹ as something inevitable, the Regency in Hanover had had time to consider what it would do when the Prussian occupation really took place. Yet there was no serious thought of opposition.² The mission of Capt. Decken, the friendly attitude of the Duke of Brunswick, who had charge of the military details, and Frederick William's honorable purposes, had affected a modification of the harsh terms at first proposed. The threatening proclamation drafted by Haugwitz,³ and issued by von Schulenburg as civil governor of the Electorate, was framed to satisfy the foreign powers whose agent Prussia was.⁴

¹ Feb. 10, von Reden wrote: "Gott gebe, dass das englische Ministerium gelindere Maasregeln einschlagen möge, weil sonst nach den Versicherungen eben dieses Gesandten (Posch, envoy of Bavaria, whom twenty years' service in Berlin had made very Prussian-minded) die militairische Occupation von Hannover unvermeidlich sein würde." *No. 584 (Hanover)*.

² V. Lenthe in *Zeit. d. hist. Vereins f. Niedersachsen*, 1856, 156-57. Pages 149-164 deal with the Prussian occupation of 1801.

³ Capt. Decken's report of interview of March 24 contains Haugwitz's statement to Decken that he was then at work on the proclamation.

⁴ Köckeritz writes to Haugwitz concerning the instructions H. had drafted for Schulenburg: "Ich war über diese Instruction ganz entzückt, sie bedeckt unser Fehler wegen der langsamen Besetzung und lässt auf der andern Seite den König in dem schönsten Lichte der Gerechtigkeit und Billigkeit erscheinen." (*Berlin Archives.*)

The Regency and General von Wallmoden-Gimborn accommodated themselves to the new situation and signed a convention with Schulenberg April 3, 1801. By its terms the Hanoverians promised not to resist the movements of General Kleist's army, whose support they were to assume after the first of May. The Hanoverian troops then with the Demarcation Army were furloughed or distributed as garrisons in rather widely separated towns.¹ All other fortresses and garrison towns, including Hameln, were turned over to the Prussians. Lastly, a solemn promise was given that the Prussian laws and the ordinances of the government of occupation would be strictly obeyed.²

The submission was made in bitterness of spirit. The ministry to the very last, and indeed throughout the summer, remained outwardly unconvinced of a danger from France sufficient to justify the occupation. Despite the assurances of the Prussian king and his ministry to the contrary, the secret purposes which von Reden attributed to them in occupying Hanover were accepted by the Regency as proved truth.³

¹ Carysfort proposed that they be taken into the English service. Carysfort, to the English ministry, March 29, 1801. (*Eng. Record Office.*)

² The convention is printed in Martens, *Recueil*, 2nd. edition, vii, 351-52. Its opening paragraph sums up the points in Fredk. Wm.'s address to the Regency. The full text of the address and of the king's proclamation setting forth that his duty to his allies of the Maritime League requires the occupation, etc., both dated, March 30, 1801, are to be found in *Rep. XI, 140, C. I, Vol. I.* (*Berlin Archives.*)

³ Von Reden's reports of March 2 and 14 show the sort of rumors he heard. His opinion of Haugwitz and his intentions is to be found in his despatch of March 28, 1801. (*No. 584.*) After saying that he does not believe as many do that Haugwitz has given up his "reunion projects," von Reden adds: "Die Gleissnerei dieses Mannes ist von der Art, dass er noch manche betrogen wird, und so dürfte es gewiss Gelegenheit genug finden um seine ferneren Demarchen zu beschönigen."

Their spirit is partially revealed in the closing paragraph of the convention by which they make their submission. The paragraph is made to embody an allusion to Frederick William III.'s solemn promise to restore their government and keep their territory intact.¹

The appointment of Schulenburg proved but temporary,² and he was soon relieved of the most unpleasant situation in which his duties placed him.³ On the eleventh of April the ever serviceable von Dohm was ordered to go to Hanover to take charge of a subject with which the negotiations of 1796 had made him familiar—the “*Verpflegung*” of Prussian troops at Hanover's expense.⁴

It is hardly profitable to surmise what would have been

¹ Martens, *sup. cit.*, p. 352. The clause about the guarantee of territory may well have had some references to keeping the Danes from fixing themselves in Lauenburg. Cf. von Schulenburg to Prussian Ministry, April 3. Regency to Schulenburg, April 7. (*Berlin Archives, Rep. XI, 140 c, Vol. I.*) Schulenburg had difficulty in getting the Regency to countermand their orders to the Hanoverian troops to fight if the Danes advanced. Haugwitz and Köckeritz had even more difficulty in getting King Fredk. Wm. III. to oppose the Danish aggression.

² Whether this was the original intention, I do not know. He was recalled one week after the news of the death of Paul, and was used later to organize the provinces assigned to Prussia as an indemnity.

³ So bitter was the feeling against the Prussians that von Schulenburg was socially ostracised in Hanover, and persons such as von Ompteda, who had known him in Berlin and felt inclined to show him ordinary civilities, were treated as abettors of invasion. Schulenburg represented to the Regency that faction in Berlin which stood for a temporary occupation and exploitation of Hanover under the pretext of indemnity for English seizures of Prussian vessels. (See von Reden's despatch of March 2, 1801, in *no. 584.*) Von Helbig, the Saxon envoy, writing in 1803 on the unpopularity of von Schulenburg and Frederick William's dislike and fear of him, adds, “Il joint une excellente tête à une ambition démesurée et une mauvaise cœur.” (Feb. 6, 1803—*Dresden Archives.*) Schulenburg was back in Berlin by April 19.

⁴ *Berlin Archives. Rep. XI, 140 c, Vol. I.*

the outcome of the situation as it was on the third of April; for within twenty-four hours after the submission of the Regency, the kaleidoscope of European politics had shifted. April 4,¹ racing Russian and Prussian messengers arrived with the news of the death of the Czar Paul on the night of March 23-24—a stroke of apoplexy²—a stroke of Fate! The despairing cry of Napoleon,³ the wild rejoicings at Vienna, the relief in London, and the confusion of plans in Berlin, as the news of the death of Paul swept from capital to capital, are striking tributes to the power and place of the realm of Peter the Great, even when ruled by a madman. In a twinkling the card house of the Maritime League had come tumbling down.⁴ Napoleon must wait until the day of Tilsit to perfect the plans he had seen so fairly under way. England halted the triumphant fleet of Parker and Nelson, and sought to resume the friendly relations which the personal program of the late Czar had so suddenly interrupted. And Prussia—she might well indulge in vain regrets that the assassins had not acted two months, or even two weeks earlier. The situation in which she was placed by the change at St. Petersburg seemed fully as untenable as the one she had tried to occupy since her entrance into the Maritime League. From the Prussian point of view, the accession of Alexander I. removed the danger from the side of Russia, but only after that long threatening danger had committed the reluctant Frederick William III, to a step often delayed, ever regretted.

¹ Carysfort's despatch of that date.

² This was the rumor the first despatches brought.

³ Lucchesini's report of April 17, Bailleu, ii, 38.

⁴ " . . . ce prince n'existant plus, la convention maritime était presque dissoute." Haugwitz to Beurnonville, Bailleu, ii, 43.

It was the irony of fate that the same issue of the London dailies contained the details of Nelson's victory at Copenhagen, of the assassination of Paul I., and a copy of the proclamation which the king of Prussia sent ahead of the army occupying Hanover. The problem which this combination of circumstances placed before the Prussian king and cabinet was how to get out of Hanover without disgrace, or remain in it with peace and honor.

Let us take up the history of Prussia's stay in Hanover from April to November, 1801, from that point of view which will at least help us to understand the attitude of the majority of the powers interested in ousting her, while we leave the presentation of the evidence to throw what light it may on the motives controlling the action of Prussia in these months.

The summer of 1801 is a period that any self-respecting German may well wish to blot out of the history of the Fatherland. War had at last ceased for a time on the continent. The treaty of Lunéville gave Austria and the weary Empire the long desired and long deferred peace. But to what purpose did the renewal of amicable relations between the European courts serve? The answer is the record of a traffic in lands and peoples such as Europe had never before seen.¹ The first year of the new century saw in its fullest fruition the eighteenth century idea that princes might barter in peoples, and measure and apportion countries by acreage and population. Most shameful of all, the crowded mart in which German sovereigns traded was on foreign soil—in the

¹Von Reden wrote from Berlin, March 17, 1801, "Indemnity (Tausch) projects are rising and dying every day." (No. 584, *Hanover Archives*.)

capital of the French.¹ Secularization and indemnification proved to be two ideas more demoralizing to the Germany of 1801 than any other propaganda of Revolutionary France. They were the rope with which the already moribund Empire might end its career.²

It is the fear that she is to form part of the Prussian indemnification which haunts Hanover during the period of Prussian occupation. It is this interpretation that England,³ Russia and Austria are all too ready to put on Frederick William's delay in evacuating the Electorate. It is the desirable indemnity towards which Napoleon and self-interest pushed the group of advisers next to the king in Berlin. Might not the statesmanship of opportunism urge the ruler of Prussia to accept the rich return that occasion had brought within his grasp?

In the secret articles of the treaty of August 5, 1796, Prussia had received the promise of complete indemnity for its lost trans-Rhenane provinces. Since then the question had never ceased to interest the Prussian cabinet. After due consideration the king of Prussia, on the advice of Haugwitz following the plan urged by Hardenberg, had asked Napoleon to assign him his indemnity

¹All these evils are even more pronounced in 1802. See Treitschke, *Deutsche Gesch.*, i, 184, 185.

²It is to be regretted that there is no general history of the idea of secularization from the period of the Lutheran revolt nor any extended account of its combination in 1795-1803, with the idea of indemnifying German states for their losses beyond the Rhine and in Italy. Häusser, ii, pp. 333-435, is the best brief account available. A considerable amount of material is given in E. A. von Hoff, *Das teutsche Reich vor der französischen Revolution und nach dem Frieden von Lunéville*. (Gotha, 1801.)

³*Cf.* despatches to and from Lord Carysfort. Of the London dailies, the *Porcupine* is most certain that the whole project existed anterior to the Maritime League. *Cf.*, *e. g.*, issue of March 16, 1801.

in Franconia, that is, the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg. Napoleon delayed on the pretext that he wished to learn the opinion of Russia in the matter. Prussia, fearful that Austria was being favored, increased her claims and renewed her urgency. The French leaders had a different view of their policy in Germany than that maintained up to 1797. Instead of increasing Prussia and creating a balance to Austrian power,¹ they had felt the reasoning of such statesmen as Sieyès, who urged that French interest lay in building up a number of small states which could be formed into confederations under French influence.² Russia had made known its views in Berlin on March 25, when Krüdener had presented to Haugwitz the idea that Prussia was to seek its indemnity in Hanover. This was the opportunity the French had long waited.³ With Russian coöperation they might well hope to force Prussia to seat itself forever in the German lands of the English royal family. Despite the tempting offers of Hanover, Prussia continued to urge the powers to assign its indemnity in Franconia.⁴ On the thirteenth of April, Talleyrand told the Prussian ambassador, Lucchesini, that Napoleon did not approve of Prussia's petition to be allowed to occupy the Franconian bishoprics.⁵ Napoleon, hoping for the new Czar's coöperation in this part of Paul's indemnity plan,⁶ urged that Prussia accept Hanover as a recompense

¹ See Carnot's views as expressed in Aug., 1796. Bailleu, i, 87.

² Cf. his report of July 14, 1798, in Bailleu, i, 481.

³ Lucchesini, April 5, Bailleu, ii, 37.

⁴ Lucchesini, after explaining to Talleyrand Paul's indemnity plan and the reasons for rejecting it, renews the demand for the S. German bishoprics, April 10, 1801, in Bailleu, ii, 37, 38.

⁵ Bailleu, ii, 38.

⁶ Lucchesini, April 24, Bailleu, ii, 40.

for the loss of its provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.¹

There was much in the situation that seemingly made it easy for Prussia to yield to the formal offer of Hanover made from St. Petersburg and then from Paris.² It hardly needed a Talleyrand to point out to such a group as Häugwitz, Lombard, Hardenberg, and Köckeritz the advantages of acquiring such an increase of power and territory in North Germany.³ The idea was not new in Berlin, and before the occupation there had been influential advisers who felt Prussia should enter Hanover never to withdraw. Their logic was strengthened by the easy opportunity which Napoleon's offer gave them of shifting the responsibility. If France offered Hanover, why not accept it, said this group.⁴ Besides the manifest increase in territory, Hanover would serve to unite the scattered Prussian possessions in lower Saxony and Westphalia. It needs no direct quotations from the

¹ Lucchesini, in his dispatch of April 24, details the interview with Talleyrand. Bailleu, ii, 39-40.

² May 2, 1801, Talleyrand directed Beurnonville to make a tender of Hanover as Prussia's indemnity. The French offer specified the independence of the Hanseatic cities, the renunciation of all the claims to indemnity, that the electoral title of Hanover was to pass to Hesse-Cassel, and France was to be confirmed in its rights to dispose of Neuchâtel and Valengin. See Bailleu, ii, 40-41.

³ Von Reden (dispatches of March 2 and 15, 1801, in *no. 584, Hanover Archives*) says there are two groups in Berlin, each having a different view of the occupation. The military party and finance ministers, led by von Schulenberg, believe in temporary occupation and the exploitation of the province. The second group, Lombard, Beyme, Häugwitz and Colonel Köckeritz, favor the union of Hanover with Prussia.

⁴ Von Reden's dispatch of June 30. The only difficulty this group recognized was the opposition of the king. (*Hanover Archives.*)

political discussions of that time to make it clear how strong a case such a group might present.¹

There were features of the case not fully known to Napoleon which gave Prussia reason to pause and consider before accepting Hanover as an indemnity. It is a tribute to the well-meaning character of King Frederick William that one must recall first of all his solemn assurances to Prince Adolphus and Lord Carysfort that he had no ulterior aims in occupying Hanover. The promises which he had then made, the king might be expected to keep,² even if his opposition to the aggressive elements in his cabinet had not been fortified by the attitude of England and Russia and the vigorous protests of the Electorate itself against Prussian occupation after the Maritime League was practically dissolved.³

Since it was Russia whose precipitancy had put Hanover into Prussia's hands, it was natural that the Berlin Cabinet should look to Alexander I. to support them in a step which had been taken with a view to treating Hanover as a part of the indemnity fund.

Their fears that the death of Paul had deranged all plans fathered by him did not long lack confirmation.⁴ The young Czar found in his own realm all the problems

¹ This importance of Hanover to Prussia is shown by Haugwitz when, in discussing the indemnity question, he says that if they take Hildesheim it will bring Hanover more under Prussian control. Bailleu, ii, 27.

² When the French in June renewed their proposal that Prussia keep Hanover, Köckeritz wrote Haugwitz that he thought the idea would be very acceptable to the king, if the changed circumstances allowed and it did not run counter to the treaty of Lunéville. Köckeritz had not talked with the king on the subject. Bailleu, ii, 50.

³ June 17, von Lenthe handed a vigorous protest to Jacobi in London.

⁴ Köckeritz to Haugwitz, April 4, adds, "Jedoch die Vorsehung weiss am Besten was gut ist." (*Berlin Archives.*)

he desired to solve, and was in no mood to continue a hopeless crusade for the maritime principles which his father had espoused. Sweden and Denmark had already been humbled by the fleet of Parker and Nelson, then on its way up the Baltic. Alexander hastily opened communication with these commanders and with their government. Negotiations were soon opened by England through Lord St. Helens in St. Petersburg, and Prussia, without a single war vessel, found herself the unsupported defender of maritime neutrality.¹

The answer which Haugwitz made to the French ambassador would naturally, under the circumstances detailed above, be fully as cautious as the reply given Paul when he made a similar offer two months before. In March, Prussia could have counted on two great powers favoring Hanover as a Prussian acquisition. Now (May) there was only France to look to, or rather the hard cold egoism of Napoleon, who might make them his tool only to abandon them at a critical juncture. Haugwitz let it be seen that nothing would suit the king of Prussia better than Hanover as his indemnity, but his acceptance of the French offer was conditional. Prussia was still occupying Hanover as a pledge for the protection of English commerce, Haugwitz said, and would retain it as her indemnity if England persisted in her opposition to the principles of the Maritime League after France had made

¹ In G. Martens, *Recueil*, etc., *Suppl.* ii, 461, is part of a letter purporting to be from Czar Alexander to King Frederick William demanding that Hanover and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser be evacuated. Baron Reden, in his report of July 22, 1801, says that among other correspondence shown him by Krüdener in proof of Russia's friendly efforts on the Electorate's behalf was a letter from the Czar to the king dated May 6. Dr. Bailleu assures me that in gathering material for volume 29 of the *Pub. a. den K. preuss. Archiven* no such letter could be found.

it clear to England that such obstinacy would result in the Prussian retention of Hanover. As such action of Prussia's might lead to difficulty, King Frederick William was not ready to involve himself unless he was sure Napoleon was so in earnest about the plan that he would not be deterred by possible consequences in carrying it through. All the conditions attached to the French offer are swallowed without a grimace. If Hanover falls to Prussia as a result of the French action, her gratitude will be boundless. Such in substance was the answer that Prussia made *mutatis mutandis* to both Russia and France when they offered her Hanover. The reply to Russia, reaching St. Petersburg several days after Paul's death, had been passed over in silence by the new Czar and his ministry.¹ There can be no more satisfactory comment on Prussia's attitude in the whole matter than that made by the disgusted Bonaparte. "The First Consul thinks he sees in the answer of the Berlin Cabinet," said Talleyrand to Lucchesini, "a desire to have, and a fear to show this desire, a will subordinated to reservations that are rather embarrassing. One would say that you desire what France offers you, but you wish France to take the lead and secure it for you."² One might have replied that Napoleon could not object if the power which had found itself a cat's-paw for Russia and France showed that it had learned, and wished to practice, this lesson of its experience.

Meanwhile Haugwitz, in reply to the clamoring of the Hanoverian Regency and the inquiries of Carysfort, shifted, with a suspicious readiness, the ground on which he based a continued occupation. He first urged the

¹ Beurnonville to Talleyrand, May 24, in Bailleu, ii, 41-43.

² Bailleu, ii, 43, footnote 1.

continuance of the neutrality of North Germany after the Maritime League was inactive and then gave the fumbling excuse that Prussia could do nothing towards removing its troops until it had notification from Russia that friendly relations had been resumed with England. Allusions were made to possible dangers from the French, but that was scarcely urged as a reason. Meanwhile, as has been pointed out, the Berlin cabinet was listening to Napoleon's offers of Hanover, and hoping that England might be brought to sacrifice Hanover in return for some grant of colonial possessions.¹ Who was to pay this price for Prussia's indemnity does not appear. In London, Jacobi was following his instructions and dodging all discussion of Hanover. Plainly, the government in Berlin meant to maintain its advantageous position in Hanover until something turned up. They were counting on the weakness of the new Czar's policy and the necessity in Russia of bringing order out of the chaos created by the late Czar.² England, too, had seldom been known to exert itself on behalf of King George's German states.³ Austria, by its own confession, was too weak to interfere with Prussia's ambitious plans.⁴ To that in-

¹ Instructions for LeCoq, Prussia's agent in St. Petersburg, May 18, 1801, and LeCoq's reply, May 21/June 2. LeCoq suggested Osnabrück, etc., as indemnities for the king of England. Despatches to and from LeCoq who left Berlin, March 13, to arrange with Paul indemnity matters and measures necessitated by the armed neutrality are in *Rep. XI, Russland, 149 D, March, 1801, to January, 1802. (Berlin Archives.)*

² See Lusi's dispatch of April 5/12 (?), 1801. April 26/May 8, Russia rejected Prussia's plans of indemnity in Franconia.

³ Lord St. Helens, then (June, 1801) in St. Petersburg, repeated the oft-made declaration that the English cabinet did not let considerations about Hanover affect its actions.

⁴ Count Stadion's remark to von Reden. See latter's despatch of May 23, 1801, in *no. 589, Hanover Archives.*

creasing group among the king's advisers who desired to retain Hanover, the outlook must have seemed at first rather hopeful. If England and Russia were really indifferent to the annexation of Hanover, France eager for it, and Austria weak enough to feel that she must make the most of the inevitable by accepting all that was offered her in return,¹ the Electorate would be left to face its fate single-handed. King Frederick William's sense of honor remained to be dealt with, but that problem had been solved before.²

The summer of 1801 was to reveal something seldom paralleled in the history of the one hundred and twenty-five years of Hanoverian-English connection. For once, the English cabinet, with Lord Hawkesbury as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, directed its policy with a view to the preservation of the Electorate, which was now unjustly suffering for England's opinions on international law.³ On the eighth of May the English ministry for the first time mentions Hanover in its despatches to the ambassador in Berlin. The able and disinterested Carysfort, who had already raised his voice in Hanover's behalf,⁴ was to convey to Prussia the assurance that there could be no resumption of friendly relations between England and Prussia

¹ Carysfort felt that Austria needed to be braced up by being told England's view of the continued occupation. Cf. Carysfort to Hawkesbury, June 23.

² See notes of Köckeritz to Haugwitz on the matter of getting King Frederick William III. to oust the Danes from Lauenburg for an example of the king's ways and Köckeritz's management of him. April 2, 4, 9, 12. *Rep. XI, N. 140 C. 1, Vol. I. (Berlin Archives.)*

³ V. Lenthe, in his defence, elaborates on England's fear of Hanoverian influence and general indifference to Hanover's fate. He says this was the case in 1801. Cf. *Zeit. d. hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, pp. 162-164.

⁴ See his dispatches of March 26 and April 19, 1801.

"as long as his Prussian Majesty's conduct is in the least degree equivocal respecting Hanover."¹ Every consideration of honor and policy was put at Carysfort's disposal, that he might the better accomplish his end. The directions could have been sent to no more earnest friend of Hanover than Lord Carysfort. From this day until the twenty-fifth of October, when his last official despatch conveys the news that the Prussian troops are ordered to leave Hanover, the activity of Lord Carysfort in behalf of the Electorate is incessant. To his mind, "the government of the united kingdom was bound by every principle of Honor and Policy to support and vindicate by the exertion of all its Power and resources, a people invaded in such a manner and upon such pretences as had been alleged in the case of Hanover."² He supported with vigor and persistency the protests of the Hanoverian Regency against the Prussian financial exactions³ in raising support for their force of about 25,000 men.⁴ He saw Haugwitz often in the name of the king of Great Britain, and drove the minister from point to point in his shifting defence of the Prussian retention of the Electorate. Early convinced of Frederick William's good intentions,⁵ he came to fear that the

¹ Instructions to Carysfort, May 8, 1801. (*Eng. Record Office.*)

² Carysfort's dispatch of July 8, 1801.

³ Carysfort's dispatch of June 20.

⁴ The Regency protested to von Dohm on June 14, and on June 17, v. Lenthe in London and von Reden in Berlin handed the representatives of Prussia demands in the name of the king for the evacuation. See *Des. II, no. 70, Rescripte des Ministeriums zu Hannover an den Gesandten v. Ompteda zu Regensburg, etc.* (*Hanover Archives*), for copies of these memorials and correspondence with von Dohm during the summer.

⁵ Lord Carysfort, May 17: "Whatever may have been the secret intentions of some members of the Prussian Ministry respecting Hanover,

cabinet had only used the Maritime Convention as an excuse for the annexation plans they cherished.¹ Intermittently and weakly supported by the Russian ambassador, Krüdener,² all the protests of Carysfort and von Reden were unsuccessful in getting the Prussian government to declare its intentions, or even arrange for a continued occupation under a joint agreement between England and Hanover. The failure is to be attributed less to the zeal of the English ministry and its representative³ than to two other noteworthy causes. As Russian urgency had been foremost in pushing Frederick William III. into the occupation, equally vigorous Russian action might have hurried Prussia out of the Electorate. It was this withdrawal of Russia from European interests, and particularly from a situation she had cre-

the King, I am fully persuaded, has never entertained the idea of appropriating it to Himself, and the Sentiments of the Cabinet on the subject I now believe to be one with his Majesty's." Czar Alexander I. had the same trust in Frederick William's good intentions, but was suspicious of his advisers. Von Reden, Aug. 1. (*Hanover Archives.*) Duke of Oldenburg, who had been to St. Petersburg, brought this message to von Reden.

¹ Carysfort, June 30, 1801. (*English Record Office.*)

² Russia did not seek to make effective its desires as to Hanover until July, 1801. Von Reden, July 21 (*No. 589*), and Carysfort, July 8, 1801.

³ Downing St., July 18 (Hawkesbury to Carysfort), ". . . and although there is no intention on the part of this country to interfere in the Internal concerns of the Electorate no steps can be taken towards adjusting the differences which have arisen between Great Britain and Prussia so long as His Prussian Majesty continues to menace the king's Electoral Dominions. As soon as he had explained Himself on this point to the satisfaction of the Hanoverian government and comes to an amicable understanding with them, there will, I trust, be found no serious obstacle to the return of perfect harmony and cordiality between the Courts of Berlin and St. James." Rec'd in Berlin, July 26. (*English Record Office.*) See von Reden's despatch of July 28. (*Han. Archives.*)

ated, that nullified Carysfort's efforts.¹ The second reason for Prussia's hesitancy in giving England any pledges, or entering into any agreement concerning the integrity of Hanover, was the fear that England was seeking to draw her into entanglements that would excite Napoleon's wrath. It was a reasonable fear, and the action of England in its various proposals concerning the evacuation or further occupation of Hanover, bore sometimes the stamp of activity in the Electorate's behalf, with a view to a future English-Prussian *rapprochement* against France.²

With the conclusion of the Russian-English negotiations³ from which Prussia had been excluded, there was a change in the attitude of both Russia and Prussia. The Prussian government was now left with no excuse for continued occupation except to exclude a possible French invasion, a danger which had been hinted at,⁴ but which does not appear in the foreground until all

¹ See his dispatches of June 30, July 8, July 16, August 5, *et al.* (*English Record Office.*)

² Carysfort has the point in mind in his negotiations and proposals. *Cf.* his dispatches of April 8, July 8, July 22, etc. (*English Record Office.*) Haugwitz was fully conscious of this. "... Count Haugwitz dwelt upon the suspicions which hung over all their transactions with Great Britain, that there was always at bottom a design to draw them into open hostilities against France" (Lord Carysfort, July 22, and to same effect, August 5.)

³ The Russian-English treaty was signed in St. Petersburg, June 17, and acceded to by Denmark and Sweden. *Cf.* Martens, *Suppl. au Recueil, etc.*, ii, 476 and 484.

⁴ As early as April 8, Carysfort admitted that the fear of the French was not ungrounded. He again considers it as worth reckoning with (June 30), but no line to him from the British ministry ever considers this danger worth mention other than as a ground for urging Prussia to prepare to oppose France with English co-operation. (*English Record Office.*)

other excuses have failed one by one. Coincident with the disappearance of Prussia's proclaimed grounds for continuing to hold Hanover came greater efforts on behalf of Hanover by the Russian ambassador, Krüdener. It needed but a hint to this strenuous envoy, who had been waiting a chance to prove himself as serviceable to the new régime in St. Petersburg as he had been to the ministry of Paul I. Soon he was fairly outdoing Carysfort.¹ His readiness to present joint notes with Carysfort, and to confer with and advise von Reden, marked not only the stimulated activity of a single diplomat, but the resumption by Russia of her normal policy in North German affairs. The blindness with which Paul had thrown Hanover into Prussia's lap—a gift that not only enriched Prussia immoderately, but greatly endangered the Russian influence in East Frisia, Oldenburg, Meck-

¹ Very likely Krüdener was put *en rapport* with the changed attitude in St. Petersburg at the same time that Woronzow in London received the following instructions dated June 10, 1801: "... il serait superflu de rappeler ici les motifs qui déterminèrent mon auguste prédécesseur à remettre l'électorat Hanovre entre les mains de la Prusse. Cette prise de possession devait cependant être momentanée et servir de gage jusqu'à l'arrangement définitif des affaires du Nord. Aujourd'hui qu'elles sont terminées par mon entremise, j'ai fait valoir ce titre pour insister sur l'évacuation du pays de Hanovre, et la réponse que j'attends encore à cette juste demande servira de règle à mes relations ultérieures avec la cour de Berlin." The instructions go on with a rather bombastic statement of Alexander's system. Desiring to maintain the balance in Germany between Austria and Prussia, he has rejected the excessive indemnity demands of Prussia. For the instructions quoted, see *Woronzow Archives*, vol. x, 264 ff. For Woronzow's tart comments on the system they exploit, see same volume, pp. 286 ff. Any investigator whose work touches Russia in the latter part of the eighteenth or earlier part of the nineteenth century will find these *Woronzow Family Archives* a mine of material. For an appreciative summary of their contents, see Brückners review of the thirty volumes in *Hist. Zeit.*, vol. lv, 207-261. On Simon Woronzow, the Russian minister in London, see *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski*, i, 287-288. (London, 1888.)

lenburg and the Hanseatic cities—was succeeded by the policy of balancing Austria against Prussia while keeping the latter from becoming too powerful in North Germany. The net result of the constant protests and threats of the Regency in Hanover,¹ backed up by the representations of Carysfort for England and Krüdener for Russia, was to make it as hard for the Prussian cabinet to keep Frederick William's troops in Hanover as it had been to get the king to order them sent there. The last vestige of a reason based on obligations to its northern ally² disappeared, when, early in July, Krüdener

¹ Their plans for evacuation and threats to cut off the supplies for the Prussian troops are incessant at this period, with the possible exception of the last three weeks of August and the first part of September. No utterance of theirs ever manifests any fear of the French, or any other view than that it was a Prussian excuse. Their clamorings were stilled in the weeks mentioned by the visit of v. Reden to Hanover to assure them of his own conviction that there was a real danger at that time, that Augereau's troops would move in if Prussia evacuated the Electorate.

² Jacobi in London after handing in an evasive reply to Carysfort's energetic representations on the matter, refrained, as instructed, from further discussion. See his despatches of June 5, 19, 21. July 6, Haugwitz instructs him to plead lack of instructions if von Lenthe wished to discuss the matter. These directions are repeated August 28, 1801. Balan (acting in Jacobi's absence) is told to maintain an absolutely passive conduct and report his observations to the king. See also Haugwitz to Balan, Sept. 4 and October 2. *R. XI, 173, England, Conv., 175, Vol. III. (Berlin Archives.)* Haugwitz told v. Reden in Berlin that he could only discuss the matter with the principal in the case, England. This was the attitude he assumed from the date of the Prussian note of Feb. 12 until the Prussian troops withdrew in Nov., 1801. At the same time that v. Reden and v. Lenthe were passed over because England was the principal in the case (*cf.* Carysfort's dispatch of June 20) Carysfort was informed that Haugwitz could "under no circumstances treat of any matter touching the Maritime League until he had received authentic and direct communication as to the sentiments of its members." Carysfort's protests that the Maritime League, and with it Prussia's excuse for seizing Hanover, had fallen, and that Prussia

was instructed "to express to the King, his Imperial Majesty's wish that the restoration of Hanover may be effected."¹

Whatever hopes of retaining Hanover Haugwitz and his associates had cherished, they must now have perceived difficulties that lay in the way of their realization. The situation was an anxious one, for they had staked their hope on a rich indemnity for the comparatively trivial losses beyond the Rhine. They had chosen wealthy bishoprics in Franconia only to have them put beyond their grasp, while Hanover, an unexpected plum, was placed within their reach. Now that, too, was slipping from them. The king, disgusted with the whole indemnity business, was becoming more unmanageable as England and Russia pressed for at least a declaration of his intentions in continuing the Hanoverian occupation; moreover, Russia was not now likely to forward a plan that called for any indemnity approaching the value of Hanover; the French, long suspicious of a Prussian-English understanding² concerning the continued occu-

was left standing alone in contradiction to all she had hitherto avowed, brought Haugwitz to some cautious inquiries about the king of England's desires in the matter considering the danger from France. (See Carysfort's dispatch of June 23.) The flimsiness of Haugwitz referring to matters of the Maritime League is too evident. The Czar Alexander had already indicated his divergence from the policy of Paul (Martens, *Recueil, Suppl.*, ii, 461), and all three of the northern powers had entered into negotiations, from which Prussia had been excluded by the action of England's representative, Lord St. Helens. It is much more likely that Haugwitz was still awaiting a definite answer to his inquiry of May 18, as to whether Russia would include Hanover in the indemnity fund or England cede it in return for colonial possessions. This assumption is not invalidated by the lapse of time since it was made. It then took dispatches three to four weeks to pass between Berlin and St. Petersburg and return.

¹ Carysfort's dispatch, no. 62, of July 8. (*English Record Office*.)

² Bailleu, ii, 44.

pation of Hanover, were growing harder to satisfy and manifesting less likelihood of giving their support to an extensive indemnity for Prussia. Lastly, the renewal of friendly relations with Austria in order to effect a division of the promised spoils had not ended favorably for projects on Hanover. It again appears in the accounts given by the Austrian agent, Count Stadion, that Prussia would have been glad of Hanover above every other recompense, and that Austria wanted Bavaria as badly. But neither power played its game with an open hand. Neither would take the odium of proposing what they both wished, for fear the other might only be drawing them out in order to discredit them in the eyes of the rest of Germany.¹ The crisis in the situation came the first week in August. After several months of feinting and dodging, the Prussian cabinet was brought up with a halt and forced to reveal its hand, to make known its intentions as to Hanover and its plans for an indemnity. To this result several influences contributed.

The English ministry had remained unaffected by Haugwitz's assurances that there was a pressing danger from the French if Prussia should evacuate Hanover.² King George had in no way indicated that he desired a continuation of the occupation, and Frederick William had declared, despite Haugwitz's opposition, that this occupation would cease if the king of England desired

¹ See facts given by A. Beer, *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, vol. lii, p. 492 ff, particularly p. 497. It is noticeable that all through June, Prussia keeps Hanover in mind and only by July 20, comes to the definite discussion of another indemnity.

² See Carysfort's despatches of June 23 and 30, and Hawkesbury's instructions to him dated London, July 18. (*English Record Office.*)

it.¹ The English cabinet, though anxious to get a hold on Prussia, rejected the idea of paying her subsidies for continuing an occupation which originated in hostility to Great Britain,² and they made the renewal of English intercourse with Prussia depend on the evacuation of the Electorate.³ Krüdener, on behalf of Russia, though more readily convinced of the French danger, was now conferring daily with Carysfort.⁴ The Austrian negotiations had failed to bring the two German rivals to mutual good will.⁵ The Regency at Hanover had on July 25, declared that the support of the Prussian troops would cease August 21, and Gen. Kleist had threatened to forage if supplies were not forthcoming.⁶ Napoleon, convinced that the Prussian occupation of the mouths of the Elbe, Ems and Weser meant no real hostility to England, was formulating plans which, if executed, would

¹ Carysfort's dispatch of July 16. Haugwitz tried to impress Carysfort with the great interest that George, as king of Great Britain, had in having the occupation continued. Haugwitz declared, "that his own sense of the danger was such that if it depended on him the occupation of the Electorate should be continued even at the risk of the present displeasure of Great Britain; for that he was convinced he should ultimately obtain the thanks of His Britannic Majesty by such a conduct; but that the King, His Master, was determined not to retain possession of the country without His Majesty's express consent."

² Haugwitz had suggested £30,000 a month. (Cf. Carysfort's dispatch of July 16 quoted above.) Carysfort favored it if it would in any way draw Prussia to the English side.

³ Instructions to Carysfort, July 18, 1801.

⁴ He is certainly a very active man in this period, both as a channel between Haugwitz and Carysfort and in co-operating with Carysfort. See Carysfort's despatches of July 25, August 5 and August 8. (*English Record Office*.)

⁵ Cf. article by A. Beer, *Archiv für oesterr. Gesch.*, vol. lii.

⁶ See von Reden's report of July 28, in No. 589 (*Hanover Archives*). Haugwitz and Carysfort had both been to him to urge that support of troops be continued. Haugwitz called it a case of "periculum in mora."

only increase Prussia's embarrassment. Not even the neutrality system, which had gathered the minor powers of North Germany around her, remained to conceal the weakness of her position.¹ She stood practically alone in Europe.

August 8, 1801, marks the turning point in the history of the complications of this year. First, Prussia, after much wavering, declared its intentions as to Hanover in most unequivocal language, though refusing to enter into any written agreement with Great Britain as to the further occupation necessitated by the French danger. King Frederick William let it be known that "he abhorred the thought of usurping King George's Electoral Dominions upon any pretext whatever," and that "his certain knowledge of the French intention to invade the Electorate when the Prussians should be withdrawn was the sole reason of his ordering them to remain." Second, it removed the chief reason for doubting the sincerity of its good intentions in Hanover by specifying at the Diet in Regensburg the indemnity it desired.² Third, it was successful in convincing von Reden, the Hanoverian envoy, that the danger from France was so pressing that he should take advantage of the permission the Regency gave him, proceed to Hanover, and lay the necessity of continued occupation before the King-Elector's advisers. Lastly, on the day which the despatches of von Reden and Carysfort mark as revealing Prussia's purposes, Talleyrand, speaking for the First Consul, despatched the draft of a convention with Prussia

¹ Lucchesini, *Hist. of the Confederation of the Rhine*. From the Italian, by J. D. Dwyer (London, 1821). See pp. 110-111 for comment's on Prussia's forfeiture of the confidence of the minor states as a result of the occupation.

² Carysfort's dispatch of August 8, 1801.

which called for the remission into French hands of the electorate of Hanover.¹

The details of the four important considerations thus conjoined can only be sketched. The declaration of King Frederick William's good intentions towards Hanover was produced by the combined Hanoverian-English pressure. The situation late in July had become so critical that Haugwitz indicated through Baron Krüdener, the Russian ambassador, that, in order to satisfy the Regency which had refused further supplies, he would be willing to enter into special engagements to defend the Electorate and to withdraw when King George should request it.² Hopeful of having at last attained his double object of securing Hanover's safety and establishing an English-Prussian understanding, Carysfort drafted a series of four articles in accordance with what Baron Krüdener said Haugwitz would be willing to accept. But Haugwitz had gone farther than his royal master would follow. Frederick William stood on his dignity and refused any written guarantee, holding that his word freely pledged to Prince Adolphus and confirmed by his ministry's assurances of good intentions must suffice.³ Though convinced that there was a real danger from the French, Carysfort felt that the failure of his treaty proposals gave him no excuse for ceasing to obey the instructions laid down by the English ministry. Instead of helping Haugwitz placate von Reden and the Hanoverian Regency, Carysfort insisted with them that the

¹ Bailleu, ii, 52.

² Carysfort's dispatch of July 25, 1801.

³ I feel that this reason offered by Haugwitz is worth more credence than Carysfort gave it. Undoubtedly both king and Cabinet feared that England would use any agreement to embroil Prussia with France.

Electorate should be evacuated.¹ Most uncomfortable of all, he had at his command the services of the Russian minister. The longer Prussia delayed revealing her intentions, the greater was the distrust of these three powers, and the more insistent their demands. August 8, the dispatches of von Reden and Carysfort show Prussia's concerted effort to get into shape to face the danger from France. Baron Jacobi, then in Berlin on leave of absence, went to both Carysfort and von Reden,² and assured them in the king's name that the king had but one purpose, and that was to hold Hanover for its own good and restore it when the danger was past. These assurances the king repeated in person to Carysfort.³ At the same time Baron Krüdener, probably at Haugwitz's suggestion, showed the English ambassador all the correspondence between St. Petersburg and Berlin on the matter of Hanover. This confidence furnished to Carysfort further proof of the steadiness with which

¹ Carysfort's dispatch of August 5.

² See their despatches of this date. V. Reden's is in No. 587 (*Han. Archives*). The plan had been to send Jacobi or Alvensleben to Hanover but this was abandoned for fear of exciting the French. V. Reden, as above. Jacobi told Carysfort that King Frederick William was so convinced of the danger from France that he desired only that his troops might be supported. Further than that, "he made no conditions whatever and particularly as to the questions of Maritime law and commerce upon which objects he should make no propositions to his Majesty . . ." Compare this with Beurnonville's report of August 24. Bailleu, ii, 55 *et seq.*

³ His Majesty had concluded in these words: "J'espère, Monsieur, que vous êtes content de ce que Je vous ai fait dire par [sic] le Baron de Jacobi, et que sa Majesté Britannique croira au vrai désir que J'ai de cultiver l'amitié et la bonne Intelligence avec elle. Dans les circonstances où nous sommes il faut agir avec circonspection, et si Sa Majesté trouve à propos, Je pense que nous ferons bien de rester encore quelque peu de Temps dans le Hanovre." Carysfort, Aug. 8, 1801 (*English Record Office*).

King Frederick William had asserted fair purposes as the basis of his conduct.¹ Von Reden was attacked as skillfully. Lützow, the minister of Oldenburg, who had served as a go-between for England and Russia in March, wrote in behalf of the Czar and Lord St. Helens an assurance of Prussia's good intentions and France's evil designs. Other good friends of Hanover, such as the Bishop of Lübeck, and the Dukes of Holstein and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, represented the fear of Auge-reau's army as well-grounded.² Hanover would be inevitably lost if the support of the Prussian troops ceased. Haugwitz, Krüdener and Carysfort all urged that von Reden should go to Hanover and lay before the Regency the many considerations that necessitated a continuance of the supplies for the army.³ As a final stroke, the man whose uncertain diplomacy had engendered the distrust that was now hampering every move he might hope to make, put himself on record as agreeing with all that his royal master had promised. The faithful old Deluc, whom Haugwitz had used for the last four years as a confidant and messenger in matters between England and Prussia, was summoned to Charlottenburg. There Haugwitz talked over with him the whole subject of Prussian policy towards France and England, and allowed Deluc to make a minute of the conversation, which,

¹ Carysfort, Aug. 8, 1801. There are two despatches on this date with numerous enclosures.

² V. Reden's dispatch of Aug. 3, 1801 [*no.* 587] and August 8(?). Von Reden encloses an unsigned letter from Charlottenburg dated Aug. 7, and written by the king's authority. It deals with the serious situation created by the Hanoverian refusal to support Prussian troops after Aug. 21. Hanover will inevitably be lost if the Prussians withdraw. It announced that von Alvensleben will be sent to Hanover to treat with the Regency. (*Hanover Archives*, *no.* 589.)

³ V. Reden, Aug. 8 (*sup. cit.*)

after Haugwitz had corrected it, Deluc transmitted to Carysfort.¹ The concerted effort was successful. Von Reden was able now to satisfy the Regency that they should support the occupation yet a while longer. The English and Russian ministers might at least be expected to grant the Prussian monarch a respite while he faced the difficulty Napoleon's plans were preparing for him.

The French had applauded the occupation of the Electorate,² only to be disappointed in all the results

¹ In this conversation Haugwitz, after referring to the very candid and friendly way in which the two men had always discussed matters, asks Deluc's testimony as follows: "... m'avez-vous jamais vu varier un instant sur ces points fondamentales: 1. Nulle relation plus intime avec les françois que celle de la paix où nous sommes avec eux et qu'il convient à la Prusse de maintenir, si elle le peut avec honneur et sûreté. 2. Relations au contraire très intimes avec l'Angleterre, tant à cause de ses principes que par un intérêt commun évident et par les liaisons de parenté et d'amitié. 3. Défense par la Prusse, à tout prix du Nord d'Allemagne et en particulier de la côte de la Mer du Nord compris [sic] les embouchures des rivières depuis l'Ems, moyennant s'il faut des efforts extraordinaires à la part de la Prusse, secours de finance à la part d'Angleterre, vu son intérêt sur cette côte. Vous savez que plusieurs [fois] j'aurais désiré vous d'aller plus loin et que je l'ai tenté; mais que sur ces points je n'ai jamais varié, et que si je ne n'avois pas cru pouvoir les maintenir, je ne serais pas resté dans le ministère. Voici l'époque où cela devient d'une grande importance, pensez-vous qu'après avoir constamment soutenu ce système je puisse en changer? et que si je n'étais pas sûr qu'il sera soutenu ici je-voulusse en donner l'assurance?" Haugwitz then goes on to urge that there is no necessity of a written agreement between Prussia and England, the parole of the respective ministers being sufficient "... et que tout ce qui serait convenu et déterminé de cette manière seroit regardée comme engagement formel à la part de Sa Majesté britannique par la bouche de My Ld. Carysfort." This would seem to indicate that there had been no exchange of assurances between the two sovereigns since the king of Prussia's letter to Prince Adolphus. It is to that letter that the king and Haugwitz refer later in the same report of Deluc, as a basis for the confidence which they expect from England.

² Napoleon spoke of it as an act worthy the successor of the great Frederick. Lucchesini (undated), in *R. XI, 89 Frankreich, Lucchesini*,

flowing from it. English commerce went on undisturbed by the Prussian troops at the mouths of the Elbe, Weser and Ems.¹ The flimsiness of the Maritime League and the pseudo-hostility against a power whose representative never left Berlin, could not but have been plain to Napoleon. Suspicion that Prussia was playing a double game in its attitude toward England² was con-

1801, Vol. II. (*Berlin Archives*). May 12, v. Reden reports that Duroc thanked King Frederick William III. in behalf of Napoleon for the occupation, but the king abruptly broke off the conversation. (*No. 589, Hanover Archives*).

¹There are several assurances to Lusi that nothing is being done to interfere with English commerce.

In the volumes marked *Rep. XI, 140 C. 1*, is a copy of an order to the Prussian generals to let all commerce go on undisturbed and to treat with consideration English war ships that may be wrecked on the coast but to report such cases that orders shaped with a view to political circumstances may be issued. They are warned to strictest secrecy as to these orders. They are enclosed with a communication of Col. Zastrow's dated April 23, 1801. The instability of the Maritime League is evident when one considers the character of its founder, the unwillingness with which Sweden and Denmark were brought into it, the variant view Prussia had of her duties as a member and her general disinclination to serve Russia's and France's plans on Malta. The whole Napoleonic hope, of making commerce manoeuvre like a regiment in 1801, and later in the Continental system, is nowhere more keenly criticized than in the despatch of Lord Minto from Vienna, March 1, 1801 (*English Record Office*), commenting on the Maritime League: "... the attempt to seclude one of the greatest and most extensive Empires on the Globe, I mean that of His Majesty from the fellowship and even acquaintance of Europe will be found one of those idle and chimerical projects which are conceived by Vanity during the intoxication of Success and will prove as impossible to be realized as it is unfit to be so. The mutual wants of nations will break these unnatural and momentary fetters. The trade of England and the necessities of the Continent will find each other out in defiance of prohibitions and in spite of Fleets, Armies and Confederacies. Not one of these Confederates, whether voluntary or compelled, whether Principals or accessories will be true to the Gang and I have very little doubt of our trade penetrating into France herself and thriving at Paris."

²Lucchesini, May 25, 1801. Bailleu, ii, 44-45.

firmed by the conditions under which Prussia had said she would accept Hanover as her indemnity.¹ August 17, the demand already referred to,² that Hanover should be turned over to France, was presented in Berlin by Beurnonville.³ Weak as was Prussia from the military point of view, Haugwitz preferred to risk the results of Napoleon's anger rather than embroil himself with England, Russia and Austria by such a disloyal act.⁴ Haugwitz, of whom an arch-enemy said that as a school-boy he had acquired the habit of lying so that he had never been cured,⁵ blandly pointed out to Beurnonville that Prussia, which still firmly adhered to the principles of the Maritime League,⁶ must have some pledge by which to guarantee its commerce against English excesses. Other plausible excuses were added, but they did not conceal the fact that the last of the Northern powers which six months before were in seeming co-operation with Napoleon's plan had decidedly withdrawn itself from French domination.⁷

¹ Instructions to Lucchesini, July 10. In Bailleu, ii, 50-51.

² Printed in Bailleu, ii, 52.

³ Haugwitz tells Carysfort, reported in C.'s dispatch of Aug. 27 and von Reden's of Sept. 3 (*Han. Archives*), Lucchesini's dispatch of Sept. 9, 1801, suggests as an explanation of Napoleon's desire to get hold of Hanover (1) the need of contributions in view of the exhaustion of Italy, the resistance of Holland and Switzerland and his arrears in paying French troops; (2) the loss of Egypt, the dissolution of the Maritime League and the failure of the plan to invade England left this the only mode of reaching England and forcing her to peace. Bailleu, ii, pp. 58-59.

⁴ Memoir of Haugwitz, dated Aug. 21. Bailleu, ii, 53.

⁵ Simon Woronzow. Cf. *Das Archiv des Fürsten Woronzow* (Moscow, 1870-1884), vol. x, p. 190. Cf., also, p. 178.

⁶ See Carysfort, Aug. 8, *Despatch no. 71*.

⁷ Beurnonville to Talleyrand, Aug. 24. Bailleu, ii, 55-57. Haugwitz expected Napoleon to proceed to war measures as a result of Prussia's refusal. See Deluc's report of interview with Haugwitz enclosed with Carysfort's dispatch, no. 73, August 8, 1801. (*English Record Office*.)

The successful issue of the French-English negotiations in London brought to an end this complication of Hanoverian-Prussian interests.¹ October 1, 1801, M. Otto signed in behalf of France the preliminaries of a truce, whose terms were fixed at Amiens the following year. After waiting a short time, in order that the

¹This is passing over two months during which the suspicions and bickerings due to the continued occupation and the support of the troops continue between the Regency and von Dohm. England again rejected any idea of subsidy when Prussia refused to bind herself by any sort of written agreement. (Instructions to Carysfort, Sept. 22.) Carysfort supported the Hanoverian demands that the burden of expense be lightened. See Carysfort's and von Dohm's dispatches during Sept. and Oct., in *English Record Office* and *Hanover Archives* respectively. Napoleon did not cease his urging that Hanover be turned over to him.

See P. S. to Carysfort's despatch of Sept. 22, 1801. In December, Talleyrand had another scheme for including it in the indemnity fund assigned to Prussia. Then Prussia, by an exchange of Hanover for Mecklenburg, was to be removed from proximity to the French in the lower Rhine region. Cf. Bailleu, ii, 63. Austria and Russia kept up their interest in the fate of Hanover, as is attested by their agreement on the outline of a plan for indemnity proposed by Russia and approved by Austria. The part of the note referring to Hanover reads: "Tertio, Fixer d'après le même principe le lot de la Prusse sans qu'elle puisse en aucun Cas obtenir comme dédommagement l'Electorat d'Hannovre le danger d'une semblable possession entre les mains du Roi de Prusse est aisé à sentir. Ce seroit attenter de la manière la plus arbitraire à l'expence de la Constitution Germanique, en s'emparant de toute une Souveraineté qui en fait une partie intégrante, outre que la richesse effective et ses moyens de puissances réels et relatifs ne sont en aucun proportion avec les pertes de la Cour de Berlin. Ce seroit rester en guerre avec une grande Puissance dont le concours peut influer sur les négociations des Puissances continentales."

See von Reden's dispatch, October 27, no. 589 (*Hanover*). Despatches of October 1 and 13, referred to as important in this connection, were not found. On October 16, Carysfort was instructed to bring the Prussians to action by concerting with Baron Krüdener a joint official note demanding, in the name of the Czar and of the king of Great Britain, the evacuation of Hanover. This was never done, as the action of Prussia rendered it unnecessary. Cf. Casamajor's dispatch, no. 1, October 28, 1801. (*Eng. Rec. Off.*)

French might not be strengthened in their suspicion that the occupation was due to an English-Prussian agreement, the Prussian troops were withdrawn from the Electorate (Nov. 6), and amid indescribable public rejoicing the Hanoverian troops returned to occupy their posts.¹ After seven months of nominal suspension the Regency took up its normal functions and the connection with the minister and king in London was officially resumed.

As an international episode the Prussian occupation of Hanover was ended with the parting exchange of civilities between General Kleist and the Regency, but its effects survived in the relations between the states they represented. If the treaty of Lunéville had not ended all reason for continuing the Neutrality System, the Prussian occupation at least, had made it impossible. The confidence of the smaller states was weakened,² Hanover was embittered, suspicious³ and burdened with

¹*Hamburg Staats, und Gelehrte, Zeitung*, Dec. 4, 1801.

²Lucchesini, *Hist. of the Confederation of the Rhine*, p. 110.

³It has been pointed out that frequently, after the English-Prussian reconciliation, Haugwitz declared that the evacuation of Hanover would take place if the King of England desired it. Now unless Deluc was made the medium of communication between George III. and Frederick William III., without the knowledge of either the English and Hanoverian ministers, the king of Prussia on the basis of what the envoys of both governments of the king of England presented, could have had no doubt that George III. desired the evacuation. From the date of von Lenthe's note of June 17, *Des. XI, no. 70*, when directly and in the strongest language he demanded the evacuation in the king's name, until November, von Reden and Carysfort were acting under instructions to secure the evacuation at the earliest possible moment, or some guarantee of the Electorate's independence if it were to continue. But once in that whole period (August) do they relax their efforts, and that is when they are personally convinced of the danger from France if Prussia withdraws. By September 1, both are again active along the lines laid down by their instructions. Neither government, certainly

debt.¹ The Hanoverian contingent had been furloughed, so that with the withdrawal of the Prussian troops the Observation Army was practically dissolved. The Electorate had again been the victim of its connection with England, and the provincial estates were not slow in showing their discontent and the particularistic spirit which was too often substituted by them for patriotism.² Most serious of all, Prussia had discovered her weakness to the world.³ The fact that a Prussian occupation of Hanover had maintained the neutrality of the Electorate

not the English, ever betrays by its instructions the least belief in the French danger. Haugwitz writing later of this period says he knows from the worthy Deluc, the confidant of the king and queen of England, that they were very thankful that Prussia had taken Hanover under its protection. But such sentiments, if ever expressed by King George, can in no way be interpreted as an approval of the continued Prussian occupation. Ranke, *Works*, vol. 47, p. 292. Of this use of Deluc as a private messenger of George III.'s, neither the *English Record Office* nor the king's correspondence in the *British Museum* (MSS. Dept.) show any trace.

¹The occupation cost Hanover about 180,000 rixdalers per month from May to September inclusive. To this should be added the cost of 13,000 troops quartered in private families at 6 gros. per month. See v. Münster's memorial of Dec. 16/4, 1801, in *Cal. Br. Des.* 24. *Russia* 127 (*Hanover*).

²Certain provinces voted supplies only after they had learned what the others had done. Celle and Luneburg refused to continue "weil die Besitznahme der Kurlande eine bloss England betreffende Differenz zum Grunde habe und von Seiten hiesiger Lande als eine Personal-Sache des allerhöchsten Landesherrn anzusehen sei; mithin billiger Weise keine Hannoveraner, ein Beytrag abgefordert dürfe." Bremen and Verden advanced their share of the amount demanded by the Prussians as a loan. Hoya protested but borrowed enough to meet its assigned share. Cf. *National Zeitung der Deutschen*, June 4, 1801.

³It is well to remind the reader, however, that the period just sketched is the best possible example "der Politik des Durchwindens." Haugwitz looked back on it with pride when he thought that amid all the difficulties he had yet been successful in securing Prussia an ample indemnity. Ranke, *Works*, vol. 47, 292.

by saving it from a French invasion, was not the impression that had been made on the Europe of 1801. Diplomats talked openly of other motives not so honorable; they saw Prussia as the tool of Russia and France laying hands on the supporting column of its own policy since the treaty of Basel.¹ After having advertised to the world for six years that Hanover ought not to be treated as an English continental possession, Prussia had been compelled to occupy the Electorate because Paul I. and Napoleon wished to punish England. She had continued that occupation long after the circumstances producing it had ceased to exist. Prussia had meanwhile solicited a large indemnity at the hands of the powers whose mandates it had obeyed. These are the facts as the Europe of that day saw them, and Prussia, her king and his ministers were judged accordingly. No wonder that the whole matter had left in the mind of the Prussian king a pronounced aversion to further interference in Hanoverian affairs. Conscious of his own good intentions, and ever holding in mind the pledges he had made to Prince Adolphus, he experienced the deepest chagrin at seeing his motives aspersed. It was with tears in his eyes that he consented to the occupation, but the deepest humiliation had come when he found that Austria, England and Hanover itself regarded his self-sacrificing act as the result of an insatiable greed for territory.

¹Carysfort among others, pointed this out to Haugwitz. See his despatch of July 8. King Frederick William in 1803 admitted that his occupation in 1801 had furnished the French with the precedent they needed to excuse their own occupation of Hanover. Ballieu, ii, 160, 161. Hardenberg's words (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 13) in referring, evidently, to the events of a later period, are even more true of 1801: "Wir zerstörten bei der ersten Anforderung unser eignes mit so viel Mühe und Kosten aufgerichtetes Werk und mit ihm fiel das ganze schöne System."

But here we are suggesting a line of thought that leads to the serious events of 1803, when all the powers whom we have seen so active in Hanover's behalf stood by in irresolution or indifference, while Napoleon drew the timid and wavering Electorate into his net. We may, then, properly view the Prussian occupation of 1801, as the prelude to the French occupation of June, 1803, which itself brought such disaster upon Europe. It is in the story of this final catastrophe that the account of Hanoverian-Prussian relations between 1795 and 1803 will find its fitting conclusion.

CHAPTER VIII—APPENDIX A

Haugwitz's memoirs published in *Bran's Minerva*, 1837, and separately as *Fragment des Memoirs du Comte Haugwitz*, contains the following account of the occupation of 1801. The extract below includes pp. 55-57:

“Voici le fait, tel qu'il peut être garanti aujourd'hui encore par les personnes les plus respectables. Le Prince Adolphe d'Angleterre et le Duc de Bronsvic se trouvaient à Potsdam; le Cte Haugwitz y fut, lorsqu'un matin le Baron Krüdener, ministre de la Russie, s'annonce chez lui à l'aube du jour.

“Pardon, dit-il, en entrant chez le Ministre, je n'ignore pas que j'agis contre l'étiquette établie en me présentant à vous pendant que le Roi est en retraite; mais soyez mon juge. Il lui communiqua alors une lettre autographe de l'Empereur Paul. Elle contenait une proposition des plus pressantes, pour engager la Prusse à occuper le pays d'Hanovre et même sans le moindre délai. Paul déclara qu'il était prêt à lui en garantir la possession. Le courrier qui devait apporter la réponse, déciderait des mesures, auxquelles la Russie et la France réunies se porteraient, pour disposer des possessions allemandes du Roi d'Angleterre.

“Le Cte de Haugwitz logeait à l'auberge. Se trouvant sur un pied de confiance avec M. de Krüdener, il lui montra les deux portes opposées de son salon. Vous êtes plus près que vous ne pensez Mr. l'envoyé, pour traiter vous même l'objet qui vous amène. Voici la porte qui conduit à l'appartement de S. A. R. le prince Adolphe d'Angleterre et cette autre est l'entrée de celui de Duc de Bronsvic. Choisissez! C'était bon pour la plaisanterie mais le cas était grave et le ministre se rendit sur le champ chez le Roi. On consulta, et après avoir informé les deux Princes dont on vient de parler, de la proposition faite par l'Empereur Paul il fut décidé, que les troupes sous les ordres du Duc de Bronsvic, iraient prendre possession du pays d'Hanovre. Cet acte fut précédé et accompagné de procédés, qui ont été de leur tems appréciés par l'auguste chef de la maison d'Hanovre et par toutes les personnes de sa famille, qui ont été dans le cas d'en connaître les circonstances.

“Le Cte de Haugwitz, peu sensible aux diatribes que lançaient contre lui les gazettiers de Londres, l'était d'autant moins qu'il avait près de lui un sûr garant des sentiments personnels de L. L. M. M. Britanniques, une circonstance qui n'a plus besoin d'être voilée dans le morning cronicle. La voici :

“Peu après l'avènement au trône du Roi de Prusse actuellement regnant, s'annonça chez le Comte Haugwitz M. DeLuc, lecteur de la Reine d'Angleterre. Il était porteur d'une lettre de la Reine pour sa nièce la Reine de Prusse et d'une autre de Lord Grenville pour le Ministre. Le but de cette mission entretenue pendant près de dix ans fut de nourrir les relations intimes personnelles entre ces augustes personnages par les moyens d'une personne qu'elles honoraient de leur estime et de leur confiance.

“En se servant pour cet effet [de] M. DeLuc (voyez la correspondance avec le Duc de Bronsvic) on n'aurait pu faire un meilleur choix. Une dispute littéraire qu'il entretenait tout exprès avec quelques hommes de lettres à Berlin, pour couvrir sa mission le consolait en même tems quand, comme il aimait à s'exprimer, les affaires n'aboutissaient pas à leur fin. On conçoit sans peine que ce fut par son vénérable ami que Haugwitz transmit à leur L. L. M. M. Britanniques l'avis et les circonstances, qui allaient accompagner l'occupation de leur patrimoine. Du reste on avait su rendre en général cette démarche qui ne pouvait que causer de la peine aux Princes de la Maison de Bronsvic, aussi peu acerbe, en autant au moins que les circonstances le permettaient.

“Mais Haugwitz avait fourni à des gazettiers de Londres, qui à tort peut-être se nommaient ministériels, un autre motif pour s'acharner contre ce qu'ils appellaient sa politique.”

Since his entry into the ministry, Haugwitz says he had supported the principles of the Armed Neutrality “Mais dès ce moment John Bull ne tenait plus de mesure.” The English accused Haugwitz of venality “ou telle autre gentillesse semblable.”

CHAPTER IX

THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF HANOVER IN 1803

It is seldom that any great national policy is blocked out and developed along lines and toward ends clearly realized from the beginning. World politics have given us but few Richelieus. The history of the programs of cabinets and rulers through any period of time, is an account of the growth of certain germ ideas distinctly modified, sometimes transformed, by circumstances. In a large degree this is true of that Prussian policy we have called the Neutrality System. Unable through the inefficiency of its financial system to realize on its resources, the Prussian state was brought by the expenditures of the Seven Years War of Frederick William II., (1757-63) to the verge of bankruptcy. The necessity of protecting its interests in Poland had further inclined it toward that conciliation with France in the Rhine region which the withdrawal of English subsidies made almost unavoidable. The idea of standing forth as the peace-maker if not of Europe, at least of the Empire, had, like a will-o-the-wisp, led the Prussian king to abandon his crusade and to make peace with the regicides on the Seine. The tentatives of Basel failing, the exigencies of securing neutrality and assured position in at least its own neighborhood, had led Prussia to the treaty of August 5, 1796, which, while it recognized her hegemony in North Germany, drew her farther along the road of territorial

development through indemnification.¹ But as the security of her neutrality towards the East and the West depended on Russia and France respectively, so in seeking further her own interests amid the dissolution of the old Empire, she found herself obliged to court the favor of France and Russia in order to get the large indemnity she sought. This combination of fear and favor-seeking had drawn her into a maritime union with Russia from which she was freed only after she had been forced unexpectedly into measures hostile to the province whose hearty co-operation meant so much for Prussian leadership. Obligated by the change of circumstances to stifle whatever hopes of territorial gain the temporary occupation of Hanover may have aroused, Prussia was inevitably drawn in 1802 more and more toward the power which was dispensing German bishoprics to the hungry horde of German princes gathered at Paris.²

¹ Prof. Seeley, in his *Life and Times of Stein*, pt. 2, chap. iv, gives a review of the period of neutrality and of the effects of the French occupation of Hanover in 1803. For the views of the chief exponent of the system, the reader is again referred to Haugwitz's exposé published by Ranke in his *Complete Works*, vol. xlvii, p. 303 ff. After mentioning some of the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality, Haugwitz says: "Les liens qui réunissaient la Saxe, le Hanovre, la Hesse et les autres princes dont les états se trouvaient à l'abri de la ligne de démarcation se basaient sur le sûreté et l'intérêt commun. Revenu de ces fausses idées dont autrefois on avait farci les têtes, de ces idées extravagantes, prétendue dignité et de gloire, l'aigle prussien couvrait de ses ailes ses états voisins sans charger le sien du poids de ses efforts. Ce fut alors qu'il remplissait sa haute destinée."

² After making due allowance for his point of view, there still remains a great deal of truth in the despatches of Mr. Jackson, the English ambassador, in which he points out how Prussia's weakness in 1801 and desire for indemnity in 1802 had brought her under French dominance. See, e. g., despatch of Mr. Jackson, Nov. 26, 1802, and his private letter to Lord Hawkesbury, Nov. 25, 1802 (*English Record Office*), for pictures of Prussia's humiliation.

Of all the German powers seeking recompense for their losses in the French appropriation of the left bank of the Rhine, none sought that indemnity more singly at French hands than Prussia.¹ While desiring to placate Russia,² it was with France that they settled their account and received by the treaty of May 23, 1802, a rich return for their lost provinces. With exultant joy the Prussian king, cabinet and public hailed the diplomacy of Lucchesini,³ their envoy in Paris, whose successful negotiations had given them the ecclesiastical states of Hildesheim and Quedlinburg and the cities of Nordhausen, Mühlhausen and Goslar in Lower Saxony and in Westphalia, besides several municipalities, and the greater part of Münster and Paderborn.⁴

There was, however, a reverse side to this successful activity of Prussia during the years 1800-1802 when Europe was, for the first time during a decade, enjoying a brief period of general peace; and that reverse side was turned toward the second member of the two powers whose relations we are following. The bitterness and suspicion aroused by the Prussian occupation of 1801 was increased in Hanover by the success of the Prussians in securing Hildesheim as part of their indemnity; for Hanover, though it had not lost an acre or a shadow of a claim to territory on the further bank of the

¹ Instructions from Berlin to Lucchesini in Paris, Nov. 16, 1801. Bailleu, ii, 61. Beurnonville to Napoleon, Jan. 19, 1802. Bailleu, ii, 72-73. On the failure of the Prussian-Austrian indemnity negotiations, see A. Beer, in *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, vol. lii, 475 ff.

² Lombard to Lucchesini, March 5, 1802. Bailleu, ii, 76.

³ Bailleu, ii, 100-101, 103.

⁴ Cf. copy of treaty in DeClerq, i, 583-587, or the summary in Beer's article, *sup. cit.*, 516.

Rhine,¹ had resolved to grab while France and Russia were holding the bag open. The prizes they sought were, in part, the same principalities that Prussia had selected, namely, Hildesheim and Osnabrück, the latter a bishopric in which the Hanoverian-Brunswick line already exercised, in alternation with the cathedral chapter, the right to select the ruling bishop; thus the Elector and Regency were inclined to regard Osnabrück as practically a Hanoverian possession. That all the Hanoverian plans for territorial increase and their efforts at Regensburg, Berlin and St. Petersburg came to naught, is to be attributed to the success of Prussia in gaining Napoleon for its plans. How extensive those plans were, the Hanoverians could only guess, but there was small comfort in surmises based on the fact that Hildesheim, while it did not round out Prussian territory, did bring Prussia within a few miles of the Electorate's capital. Thus advantageously situated, Prussia could hopefully await any opportunity to increase still further its dominance over its neighbor.²

It would scarce profit us in the present discussion to attempt to summarize the ins and outs of the subject of indemnity through secularization as it is revealed in the archival material in Hanover, London and Berlin. A drearier subject, and one more unrefreshing in all its

¹ Mr. Garlike, the English chargé-d'affaires in Berlin, gives in his no. 13, March 8, 1802, a complete table of the estimated losses in square miles, inhabitants and revenue of 36 temporal powers of the empire, 13 ecclesiastical princes and 4 immediate seigneuries. (*English Record Office*.)

² Cf. v. Lenthe's defense in *Zeit. des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, 159. More emphatic are the memorials of Capt. Decken, Jan. 26, and of the Regency (Rudloff), March 16, 1803. *Hanover Archives*, Des. 9, *Hildesheim*, no. 162. That this was Haugwitz's intention is shown by his memorial of Feb. 20, 1801. See Bailleu, ii, 27.

endless details, could hardly be conceived.¹ Hanover, supported by Saxony, at first sought to maintain the Empire under its old constitution and with the old territorial decentralization, but as the scheme of indemnity, in some form or other, became inevitable, the Hanoverian government entered the struggle for plunder.² From the first it saw in Prussia its natural rival in the areas the Regency sought to acquire.³ Not only that, but, as we have seen, the suspicion that the Electorate itself might be drawn into Prussia's net was fully voiced at Hanover and in London.⁴

The Regency, in order to avoid arousing any suspicions in France, had hastened to approve the treaty concluded at Lunéville by the Emperor in the name of the Empire.⁵ But their efforts to have the indemnities which had been approved in that treaty settled by the Imperial Diet in Regensburg were vain.⁶ And as they

¹ Havemann, *Gesch. Hanover*, vol. iii, gives a brief summary of Hanover's interests.

² See King George's *note verbale* of May, 1797, in *Cal. Br. Des.* 11, E. I, no. 1128. In no. 1183 (see below) is an interesting letter from King George (v. Lenthe), Jan. 15, 1802, acknowledging that he has no interest in preserving the archbishoprics of Trier, Mainz and Cologne.

³ See Regency to Wallmoden, as early as April 19, 1795.

⁴ Their suspicions were active after April, 1797, when they learned the secret provisions of the treaty of Aug. 5, 1796. Von Reden gave these suspicions frequent expression in 1801. See, for example, his despatch of Aug. 8, 1801, in no. 1183. When convinced that King Frederick William III. had no intentions on Hanover, he hoped that nothing "den hiesigen raubgierigen Rathgebern Gelegenheit geben möge Veränderungen in diesem System hervorzubringen." During the struggle for Hildesheim, Prussia, in replying to Hanover's claims, handed in a memoir at St. Petersburg, saying that on the same basis Prussia could lay claim to Hanover. This was not forgotten in the crisis of 1803. Ompfeda to the Regency, May 31, 1803, no. 600 (*Hanover*).

⁵ Regency to king, March 8, 1801. *Cal. Br. Des.* XI, E. I, No. 1182.

⁶ See, e. g., Regency to King George, March 26, 1801. *Cal. Br. Des.*

were not allowed by King George to send a representative to Paris, the Regency sought to gain Russia for their plans. Fortunately Hanover had at St. Petersburg an able representative, Count Münster,¹ who had been there since the coronation of Alexander I.² If St. Petersburg, rather than Paris, had been the clearing house in which indemnity claims were equated, Münster, with his able memoirs and protests, might have hoped to effect something against Prussia's intentions on Hildesheim.³ As it was, no hand was raised to prevent the execution of the French-Prussian treaty of May 23, 1802, and the Prussian troops with General Schulenburg-Kehnert at their head occupied, during the summer of 1802, the provinces and municipalities assigned to Prussia. Hanover, with no definite support for its plans,⁴

XI, E. I, no. 1183. The action taken in Regensburg was strikingly like the instructions sent von Ompteda. *Cf.* Regency to king, May 14, 1801, *no. 1183.*

¹On Münster see article by Ulmann in *Hist. Zeit.*, 1868. Both Ulmann and the article in the *Allg. Deutsche Biog.* pass over Münster's career before 1809 too lightly.

²On Münster's mission in St. Petersburg from Dec. 1, 1801, to 1804, see *Hannover, Des. 91, no. 6; Cal. Br. Des. 24, Russia, 127 and 131a, and no. 1183 sup. cit.*, and material cited below. The real object of his mission was this subject of securing Hildesheim.

³King George wrote a personal letter to the Czar. See von Lenthe's despatch of Oct. 12, 1801, and the outline of Russia's answer in Münster's despatch of Dec. 22/10, 1801, in *no. 1183.* This despatch as well as others shows Russia's desire to curb Prussia's demands and see, "dass endlich das System von Unterdrückung und Beraubung kleiner Staate ein Ende nehme."

⁴Count Münster writes February 15/3, 1802: "Wass kann man von Russland fordern wenn dieses sieht, dass das Englische Ministerium sich nicht für den König interessiren will?" *Hannover, Des. 92, no. V. Bd. 2.* Conditions in St. Petersburg and at the court are sketched in an interesting letter of Münster's April 2/March 21, 1802, in this package. V. Lenthe attempted some correspondence with the French government but received no encouragement. See his letters of May 20 and June 29, 1802.

had to content itself with acquiring the bishopric of Osnabrück¹ which they vainly sought to exchange for the bishopric of Hildesheim.² With extreme blindness to matters really important, the Regency engaged in these tiresome and petty affairs while a storm was gathering, even breaking over their defenceless heads—we mean the French occupation of 1803, “an event whose significance is not the result of a passing interest of a momentary or local character, but is an event closely connected with the great occurrences of that time, and forms in more than one regard, a turning point” in the events that lead to the catastrophe of 1806 and the fall of the Napoleonic Empire.³

While Germany was thus being re-arranged for the benefit of the stronger states, England and France were hurrying on toward the outbreak of that great struggle which ended only at Waterloo. The treaty of Amiens (March 25, 1802) had given both a breathing spell, but nothing more. Of the points left undecided in the treaty, the possession of the island of Malta was the most irritating. England refused to withdraw from the island despite Napoleon's demands, and replied to his reproaches by pointing to French aggression in Italy and Switzerland.⁴ The inevitable drew on. Each power saw the breach coming and sought by elaborate proposals and counterproposals to brand the other as the

¹In March, 1800, Hanoverian troops occupied Hildesheim, but the arrangements after the treaty of Lunéville made its retention impossible. See Hassell, *Das Kurfürstenthum Hannover*, p. 28.

²Hassell, *sup. cit.*, 51 ff.

³See these views in Häusser's essay: *Zur Geschichte des Jahres 1803*, in *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, vol. iii, 239 ff.

⁴On the events of these years, see any standard history of the period, e. g., Ranke, *Hardenberg*, i, 453 ff.

disturber of Europe's peace. On March 8, King George's message to Parliament asking that body, in view of certain hostile French movements, to appropriate funds for the national defense, warned Europe that the hour of peace had struck.¹ And yet the giants hesitated. Did they feel it was to be a death-grapple? For two months more England's representative, Lord Whitworth, remained in Paris.²

Here again we must leave the larger field to notice one of the inevitable results of the great world-struggle on which England was entering. The purpose of this chapter is to tell briefly the story of the diplomatic preliminaries to the French occupation of Hanover in 1803. As this monograph is chiefly interested in those events and policies where Prussian action affected or determined Hanoverian history,³ this interest will furnish the

¹French translation of the message in Thiers, *Hist. du Consulat et de l'Empire*, iv, 308-309.

²*Cf.* O. Browning, *England and Napoleon in 1803, being the Despatches of Lord Whitworth and Others* (London, 1887).

³The subject of the French occupation has already produced a considerable literature. At the time, it brought on a pamphlet war—attacks on those held responsible for the disaster and their defences. These pamphlets, of which Columbia University has a considerable collection, are catalogued and reviewed in the *Jenäische Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb.-May, 1806. The defence of von Lenthe, the Hanoverian Minister in London, was not printed until 1856 in the *Zeit. des Vereins für niedersächsische Gesch.* The whole subject is treated at length in F. v. Ompteda's *Die Überwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen*. Hanover, 1862. 362 pp. Ompteda has made excellent use of archival material, much of which he has quoted or printed in appendices. Most of the material used by Ompteda is in *Cal. Br. Des. 11, E. I., no. 1198*, and *Cal. Br. Des. 24, Brandenburg-Preussen, nos. 600 and 601*. For Duroc's mission, see also *Hanover, Des. 92, XXXVII A. no. 11, B., 2*. Münster's reports from St. Petersburg are in *Cal. Br. Arch. Des. 24, Russia, nos. 127, 128, 131a and 134a*, and *Hannover, Des. 91, Nr. 6 and 7*, and *Des. 92, Nr. V. B., 2*. Having tested Ompteda's accuracy in transcribing from these documents, I feel at liberty to refer

criterion in treating Prussia's relations with other European powers.

On March 20, a hurrying courier dashed into Berlin bearing a message of warning from Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador in Paris. Duroc, a trusted aid of Napoleon, was coming as special messenger to the king of Prussia.¹ The message of King George to Parliament,

frequently to his book, rather than to the inaccessible archival material. The quotation on page 23 of Ompteda is one of the very few cases in which I found him using quotation marks while giving in his own language the sense of a despatch. Dr. Bailleu in his introduction to Volume 29 of the *Publicationen aus den Kgl. Preussischen Archiven* (referred to as Bailleu, ii.) has given an excellent account from the standpoint of French-Prussian interests, and has selected and printed the most important communications between Paris and Berlin touching the subject. Häusser's twenty-page study in the *Forschungen zur deutsch. Gesch.*, vol. iii has already been mentioned. Hassell, *Das Kurfürstenthum Hannover vom Baseler Frieden bis zur preuss. Occupation im Jahre, 1806*. (Hanover, 1894) in pp. 168-325, wanders over the subject with the help of Ompteda's book. As I have not taken space to review Hassell's book on the topics covered by his work and this monograph, I must leave the reader to get an idea of Hassell's method and accuracy from the reviews of his work. See *Hist. Zeit.*, 1895, pp. 126-128, *Jahresberichte*, etc. (1894), ii, 257. *Mitt. a. d. Hist. Litteratur* (1897), vol. 25, 336. For the Russian phase, the reader will perceive I am indebted to the notes in F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vol. vi. These I have supplemented and in some cases corrected by a personal examination of the despatches of the Prussian ministry to Count Goltz, then representative in St. Petersburg, and by other material in the Berlin Archives, in the two fascicles designated *Rep. XI, Russland, 152 A*, and *152 B*. The despatches to and from Mr. Jackson, English ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Paget, ambassador in Vienna, and Sir John Warren in St. Petersburg in the *English Record Office* contain some supplementary material of value. From the Russian-Prussian side, Dr. H. Ulmann's *Russisch-Preussische Politik unter Alexander I. und Friedrich Wilhelm III. bis 1806* (Leipzig, 1899), furnishes more light than any other treatment for the correct interpretation of Russian-Prussian relations in 1803. *Pub. aus den Kgl. Preuss. Archiven*, vol. 75 (ed. Bailleu) gives the correspondence between Alexander I. and Frederick William III.

¹ For Duroc's character and activity, see Bignon, *Hist. du France*, etc., i, 70-78; ii, 3.

the hurried conferences in Paris, the plans of Napoleon on Hanover, the possibility of an appeal to Prussia to guarantee the neutrality of Malta—on all these points the messenger who had braved the perils of snows and flooded Rhine carried the first news to Frederick William III. and his cabinet.¹ Three hours later, the carriage of the French special envoy rolled into the Prussian capital. The diplomatic world of Berlin was in a flutter. What did it all mean? No one knew until evening when other hastening messengers had brought the latest Hamburg and London papers containing the message of the English king asking Parliament to give him funds for the national defence. A tyro in diplomacy could have guessed the import of Duroc's mission now—it was war, and Prussia was to be asked to decide at once on the proposals made by Napoleon—to *decide*, Frederick William III. to *decide*—but what, and how?

On April 4, the energetic envoy of the First Consul was back in Paris.² What had he accomplished in his fifteen days of absence? Did he bear any more definite message than the windy nothings in the personal letter of Frederick William to Napoleon?³ His own despatches from Berlin (March 20–27), and Haugwitz's letters and instructions to the Prussian ambassadors in London, Paris and St. Petersburg, tell the story of his mission and of the tentatives of the embarrassed king and his advisers. The letter from Napoleon to King Frederick William and the interviews of Duroc with the king and Haugwitz, painted all the iniquities of England's conduct in not meekly accepting the interpretations which the

¹ Bailleu, ii, 124–125.

² Bailleu, ii, p. 136.

³ Letter in Bailleu, ii, 132–133.

imperious First Consul put on the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, particularly on those which concerned Malta. Prussia, as one of the nations whose guarantee of the treaty had been stipulated but never given, was appealed to by Napoleon as an ally, who, by acting with Russia, might secure the English evacuation of Malta. Hanover, the pawn in the international game of war, was to be swept into the French possession; for the mouths of the Elbe and Weser must be closed to English commerce. Thus concretely was the immediate fate of Hanover¹ and the ultimate destruction of Prussia announced to the dismayed statesmen in Berlin. Haugwitz mustered all the well-known arguments against French aggression in Northern Germany; for he saw more clearly than Lombard, his rival in the king's councils, that to allow the French to enter Hanover was the beginning of the end for Prussia, whose sole advantage would consist in seeing itself the last victim to be devoured by the boundless ambition of Bonaparte.² The Prussian commerce on the Elbe and Weser and through the Hanseatic ports, all of it carried on largely in Prussian bottoms, was of incalculable advantage to France, who, Haugwitz argued, would see these sources of supplies closed by the fleets of England³ if France committed

¹The mission of Duroc was kept very quiet, but Ompteda in Berlin easily solved its purpose and early pointed out that the king would hardly occupy Hanover in the face of the French. See his letters of March 22 and April 2 in *Hannover, Des. 92, XXXVII A., Vol. I.* But von Reden, who was the regular Hanoverian envoy is less clear in his views and more suspicious of Prussia. Cf. his reports of April 2 and 23 in the same package.

²F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vi, 310.

³It was this commerce, a great part of it with England, that the English might hope to see Prussia endeavor to protect against French oppression. "I have M. de Struensee's authority for saying . . . that with-

any act of aggression against Hanover. He could see but one guarantee for the undisturbed continuance of the Prussian neutral trade with France, and that was Prussia's ability to hold off the English attacks or indemnify herself for them by seizing Hanover. To the larger proposition of preventing hostilities, the Prussian government addressed itself with feverish eagerness.¹

The chief interest of our study is in the fate of Hanover, but it is now, as often before, that we turn our attention, not to London or Hanover, but to the events and policies in Berlin. It is now, as in 1801, that we find, however, that Berlin is not, after all, the ultimate in Prussian policy. An irresolute, peace-loving king, divided councils, empty treasury and unprepared army are not in 1803 any more than in 1801, a combination that generates the energy necessary to a strong initiative. Before we know what Prussia will do to save Hanover from the French we must await, as they did in Berlin, the result of the Prussian representations made at London and St. Petersburg. Duroc was told what steps Prussia would take to bring England into the ways of peace, and with this indefinite evasion of his attempt to ensnare Prussia, the First Consul had to seem content.²

out the Importations from Great Britain the manufactures here and the operations of the Maritime Society must very shortly come to a stand. Of the considerable quantity of Cotton manufactured by the Prussian Dominions about 4/5s are woven from British yarn. The wants of the Cloth Manufactories are still greater—and they have as yet received no supply of Colonial Produce but what has come through the Hands of British Merchants." Jackson's despatch of May 16. [*Eng. Record Office*]. The English minister warned his government, however, that commerce and every other consideration would be sacrificed by Prussia rather than undertake a war against France.

¹ On Duroc's mission, see his reports published in Bailleu, ii, 127-132.

² Report of Lucchesini, April 11. Bailleu, ii, 136-137.

The instructions that were sent by Haugwitz to Jacobi, the Prussian ambassador, in London, contained a compound attempt to secure, not so much universal peace, for its own sake, as peace for the sake of an unmolested Northern Germany and an undisturbed Prussian commerce on the Elbe and the Weser.¹ Prussia acceded at once to the treaty of Amiens, and offered, in conjunction with Russia, to assure the neutrality of Malta from which England was expected to withdraw. In the alternative of war, the instructions continued, Prussia, with its wealth embarked on the high seas, must have from England, not an unqualified acknowledgment of the principles of the maritime neutrality of 1781, but such an understanding as would secure the neutral trade carried on in Prussian bottoms. The alternative was the seizure of the king's German lands, which were to be held by Prussia as an indemnity for her losses on the high seas; in other words, Prussia would again occupy Hanover. On that point Haugwitz at least was clear. To St. Petersburg, through Alopäus, the Russian ambassador in Berlin, and Goltz, the Prussian envoy to the Czar, an appeal was made for the Russian support and co-operation without which Prussia could do nothing. Whatever may have been the answer expected from London, the Russian interest which had been so often expressed in the neutrality of the north of Germany, and particularly in that of the Hanseatic cities, in whose great banking-houses Russia and her merchants had immediate concern, seemed to assure King Frederick William that Russia, "the mountain of snow," would move at his call.

In London, the Prussian propositions, however, did

¹Instructions dated March 28, 1803, in *R. XI, 73, England Conv., 177 (Berlin Archives)*.

not receive the slightest support from the Russian ambassador, Woronzow, who told the astounded Jacobi that he had no instructions to offer a joint Russian-Prussian mediation; consequently, they fell on deaf ears.¹ Lord Hawkesbury would only reply to the Prussian propositions about neutral commerce and the seizure of Hanover by regretful and deprecatory shrugs of the shoulders, and by unyielding assertions of England's indifference to the fate of Hanover when great principles of international law touching England's very existence were at stake.²

Turning from the unsolved problem of why Prussia, if she seriously hoped to save Hanover from the French, proposed her protection on terms which she knew from her experience in 1801, were wholly unacceptable,³ we

¹For evidence that Woronzow and Jacobi were working at cross purposes and that Alopäus and Woronzow did not act like representatives of the same (Russian) government, see Jacobi's letters of May 5 and 24, Haugwitz's of June 14, 1803, in *R. XI, 73, England Conv., 73*, and instructions to Goltz, June 2 [*Berlin Archives*].

²Häusser, *Deutsche Gesch.*, ii⁴, 447 and *Forschungen zur deutschen Gesch.*, iii, 245. See expression of King George's interest in Ompteda, 63. Some particular favors to Prussian commerce would be given but no general concessions. The Addington Ministry seems to have expected that the Northern powers (Russian and Prussia?) would not allow the French invasion, and was surprised when the news of the convention of Suhlingen came. (Cf. Jacobi's despatch of June 14-16, 1803, *Berlin Archives*.) Hawkesbury's reply to Jacobi leads Prussian historians into long denunciations of England for abandoning Hanover when England was to blame for the approaching catastrophe. Cf. e. g., Oncken, *Das Zeitalter der Revolution*, vol. ii, pp. 91 ff. The reader will notice that the English ministers vigorously supported the Hanoverian envoys and this, in view of the fact that there was no alliance between the two powers, is as much as it was possible for England to do since her strength was on the sea.

³Haugwitz seems to have been in earnest in the matter, though Prussia had in 1802 forfeited English confidence (Cf. Thiers, iv, 244, 255, 256), and the English ambassador gave Haugwitz no grounds for hope.

come next to a consideration of the attitude and action of Russia. As in 1801, so in 1803, the views at St. Petersburg are of prime importance.

Since the accession of the young Czar, Alexander I.,¹ Russia had, to a large extent, abandoned her attempts to play the game of European politics. The inexperience of the young ruler, his pacific inclinations, the influence of his advisers, and the internal interests of the country which had been left in disorder by the vagaries of Paul, had combined to make Russia content for a time to work out her own home problems before entering upon any attempt to control the course of events in Europe.² Not even the question of Malta, about which Paul had personally concerned himself, had moved his son to accede to the guarantee of the island's neutrality according to Article X. of the treaty of Amiens. But there was one phase of European politics between 1801 and 1803 in which Alexander manifested, not only the beginnings of his interest in the peace and good order of Germany, but also his altruistic desire to pose as the protector of weaker powers. The question of indemnities in Germany was the subject in which the Czar sought to make his influence felt.³ Though the seat of

(Cf. Jackson's despatch of May 16, 1803, in *English Record Office*). May 17, Haugwitz wrote a personal letter to Jacobi, suggesting that a very small concession to Prussian commerce would suffice. *R. XI, 73, England Conv., 77, Berlin Archives*. Cf. also *Zeit. d. hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, p. 176.

¹See Bailleu's characterization of Alexander. *Pub. aus den Kgl. Preuss. Archiven*, 75, p. xiii.

²Cf. Bernhardi, *Gesch. Russlands*, 4th Bk., Chs. 1 and 2. Note the manifesto of July 1/13, 1801, (Cf. Bernhardi, as cited, p. 451). See Ulmann, 25, and F. Martens, *Recueil*, ii, 375.

³See his correspondence with Frederick William III. in *Publicationen aus den kgl. Preuss. Archiven*, vol. 75.

the negotiations concerning indemnities had been removed to Paris, Russia still sought to make her influence effective.¹ In the course of these negotiations the successor of Paul, who had once offered Hanover to Prussia as an indemnity, had come to feel that Prussia's extensive claims needed to be moderated² in order that she might not outweigh Austria in the Empire and thus become a too powerful neighbor of Russia.³ The success of Prussia in secretly negotiating with Napoleon for an area that was "rather a conquest than an indemnity,"⁴ had increased the uneasiness at St. Petersburg. The Czar had not only his own interests and plans to consider in the question of Prussia's indemnity, but must have heard the fears of such small powers as Holstein and Mecklenburg to whose reigning families he was related. On Hanover's appeal to him through Count Münster he had attempted to arrange with Prussia the exchange of Osnabrück for Hildesheim. The representations of both parties had given the St. Petersburg cabinet a glimpse of Prussia's interests in Westphalia, where, by the indemnities of 1802, she was promised a western extent comparable to her Polish acquisitions. Further, the strategic importance to Prussia of Hanover which now, more than in 1801, was in the centre of Prussian possessions, must have been equally clear to the Russian cabinet. Nor had the Russian intercession in behalf of Hanover in the indemnity matter had pleasant results; for even at the interview in Memel (June, 1802) which was to cement the fraternal relations be-

¹ Ulmann, *Russisch-preussische Politik*, 27.

² See instructions to Krüdener, Dec. 5/17, 1801. F. Martens, *sup. cit.*, vi, 296.

³ Cf. *Sbornik*, 70, 193.

⁴ Häusser, *Deutsche Gesch.*, ii⁴, 371.

tween the two monarchs, the subject of Hanover had proved the Banquo's ghost of the diplomatic festivities. Politics were tabooed in the conferences between the sovereigns, but Kotschubey, the Russian minister, took occasion to present the justice of Hanover's desire to exchange Osnabrück for Hildesheim. To this Lombard replied, supposedly in the king's name, that his Majesty would willingly make such an arrangement. The Prussian king later denied ever having authorized such a promise. Despite this denial, however, the Russian ambassador was instructed to support Hanover's plans by appealing "to the positive assurances made in the king's name by Lombard." Thus the bickering had continued until shortly before the crisis of March, 1803.¹ Nor had the confidence and good feeling between the two countries been increased by Alopäus, the Russian minister, who was decidedly skeptical as to Prussia's ability to embark on a policy of energy and force. It is evident, then, that the atmosphere in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1803, despite the personal friendship of the sovereigns,² was not favorable to that confidence so necessary for the Prusso-Russian unity, which alone could give security to the threatened neutrality of North Germany.

In 1801, Frederick William III., after long delay, had been forced by Russia to occupy Hanover. In 1803, Haugwitz, who was firm in his determination to exclude the French from Hanover, realized that the co-operation of Russia was the only influence that might induce his

¹Ulmann, 40-41.

²The divergence of Prussian and Russian policies should not be obscured by the relations between the King and Czar. Cf. *Hardenberg's Denkwürdigkeiten* (ed. Ranke), ii, 40. Ulmann in his *Russisch-preussische Politik, . . . bis 1806*, 31, 41-43, emphasizes this crossing of dynastic and state interests.

master to save again the neutrality of North Germany. Coincident with the representations which Ambassador Jacobi made in London, Count Goltz, the Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg, was instructed to inform Russia of Prussia's intention to seize Hanover if England did not concede the maritime principles of 1781, in which case Prussia would find itself obliged by the war, to have some way of collecting from England an indemnity for the losses to Prussia's shipping trade.¹ In addition, Haugwitz laid before Alopäus, the Russian ambassador, the absolute necessity of Russia's support should England reject these propositions, and assured him of Prussia's earnestness in interceding for neutrality. But despite the apparent sincerity of Haugwitz, Alopäus felt that Prussian energy would exhaust itself in negotiations.² Before a definite reply had come from St. Petersburg, he was able to confirm out of Haugwitz's own mouth, his conclusions as to the essential weakness of the Prussian government. The king had vetoed Haugwitz's proposition to occupy the Electorate of Hanover before the French advanced. The king did not desire to be again under the suspicion so often expressed in 1801, namely, that he then sought only selfish acquisitions in occupying Hanover.³ Haugwitz, though con-

¹It is noticeable that Jacobi in London was instructed to modify his language to suit the occasion, and he only spoke of the "protection" of Hanover, whereas Goltz spoke in St. Petersburg of "occupation" if England did not concede what every one knew she would not concede, so that when that concession was not made, Prussia could hold Hanover for losses which she alone would reckon. The attitude of the Russian government could hardly have been favorable to such an arrangement.

²Alopäus to Chancellor A. Woronzow. Berlin, March 17/29, in F. Martens, *Recueil*, etc., vi, 309.

³The effect of 1801 on the king is shown in his remark to Gen. Möllendorf: "Bei dem verdamnten Kriege womit man jetzt wieder bedrohet

scious that the French in Hanover would be at the gates of Magdeburg and pushing for an alliance, was too uncertain of his own influence,¹ and held it better to renounce his project and obey the king.² His one hope was that the Czar, on whose decision hung the fate of Europe, would come to Prussia's support, and that not too late. Together, they might hold off Napoleon from carrying war into the heart of the hitherto neutralized area.³ Again and again Haugwitz brought up the subject nearest his heart and expressed the hope that Russia might yet render possible his plan of preventing a French occupation.⁴ Meanwhile, Count Goltz in St. Petersburg was urging before Alexander I. the cause of German neutrality and calling attention to the importance to Russia of the commerce of the Elbe and Weser, and the safety of the Hanseatic cities. The voice from "the mountain of snow" in the North was awaited impatiently in Berlin and in Hanover. For now, as ever, the Electorate was seeking to guide its own course despite the inevitableness with which its weakness, political isolation and geographical position drew it into the course steered by Prussia.

sei, werde er abermals durch ein Land in Verlegenheit gesetzt werden, dass sein Interesse nicht einmal verdiene, da es dasjenige was er Anno 1801 bei dem Drange der Umstände für selbiges gethan mit so vielen Undank belohnt, und ihn noch hinterher deswegen verläumdert habe." Ompteda to Rudloff, April 3, 1803. *Hannover, Des. 92, XXXVII, A.* [*Han. Archives.*]

¹ See his own complaints to Hardenberg at this period. *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 29.

² On this pliability of Haugwitz's, see the view of Bray, Bavarian envoy, in Bailleu, ii, 623.

³ Alopäus, April 25/May 7, F. Martens, *sup. cit.*, vi, 310.

⁴ F. Martens, etc., vi, 311. "Haugwitz fit l'impossible pour empêcher que les Français vinssent à Hanovre." Lombard, Aug. 20, 1806. Bailleu, ii, 615.

If the Prussian occupation of 1801 and the haggling with Prussia over indemnities had prepared the soil of suspicion in St. Petersburg, Vienna and London,¹ and left the sensitive Prussian monarch more than ever inclined to limit himself to the household economies of his own state, it had to a no less degree scarred and warped Hanoverian opinion of Prussian policy.² Von Lenthe, the Hanoverian minister in London, though representing the extreme of anti-Prussian sentiment, probably voiced more than his own views, when in October, 1801, he expressed his gratitude to Carysfort for securing what, without his aid, might never have been accomplished, that is, the withdrawal of the Prussian troops from the Electorate. The insistence of Prussia on the bishopric of Hildesheim as part of its indemnity, had, as already remarked, particularly aroused political and military circles in Hanover; for Hildesheim, while it did not round out Prussian territory, did bring the Prussian boundary within striking distance of the Hanoverian capital, and rendered it easy for Prussia to cut off the southern principalities of Göttingen and Grubenhagen.³

The efforts of the Regency to remove this danger through the negotiations of Ompteda in Berlin and Münster in St. Petersburg, remained seemingly ineffectual. It is only when we come to sum up the anti-Prussian influences at the Russian court that we see that

¹ V. Reden reports April 16, 1803, that Ambassador Jackson said to him, "So lange Preussen diese Grundsätze (idea of Hanover as an English dependency) aufrecht erhält, wird man nie auf diese Macht zählen können sondern sie stets als ein heimlicher Alliirter Frankreichs zu betrachten genötigt sein." *Des.* 24, no. 600 [*Hanoverian Archives*].

² See *Hardenberg's Denkwürdigkeiten* (Ranke, ed.), ii, 18.

³ Cf. e. g., such a map as No. 41 in Schrader's *Atlas Historique*.

Münster's work contributed to effect what he and his Electorate would have given everything to undo. That Russia did not act promptly in approving the Prussian plan of occupation has hitherto been often attributed to the efforts of Münster acting under instructions from von Lenthe in London. But as we shall see, this is seeking in a wholly false way to explain what truth there is in the much exaggerated influence of Count Münster, in hastening the fall of the power he represented. What he did, and did with all the energy of a good hater of Prussia, is not to be found in his actions under orders from London after war was certain, but in his influence exerted steadily for sixteen months before in strengthening the anti-Prussian attitude of the Russian government.¹

To have been in any way involved by the policies of England during "the Second Hundred Years War" (1688-1815), was to be under the necessity of keeping one's hand on the pulse of the French-English relations. Such a training the diplomats and ministries of Hanover had been offered during the eighteenth century and particularly in the years since 1792. The insignificance and insecurity of their own position, the presence of the French in Holland on their western border, their geographical connection with the fate of Prussia and with

¹For instance, in December, 1801, he handed in a copy of von Dohm's plan for a North German Confederation (see the note at the close of Chap. V.) as evidence that Prussia was attempting to increase her power in a way inimical to the interests of Russia and North Germany. Münster particularly dwelt on von Dohm's suggestion that the matter of indemnities be regulated with a view less to making up losses than to the consolidating of the region in such a way as to facilitate his plan of confederation. Münster dates the plan of von Dohm, September, 1800, and says it has been submitted to the consideration of the Berlin cabinet. See *Calenberg Briefe, Designation 24, Russia, no. 127 (Hanover Archives)*.

the war for the commerce of the great rivers flowing through Hanover, their membership in the German Empire and their undefined and uncomfortable connection with the crown of England placed the responsible ministers of Hanover where broad views and eternal vigilance seemed, not only indispensable, but inevitable. For a century Hanover had been, as Cobenzl once said of Austria "à la bouche du canon."¹ One who had not known Hanoverian history before 1803, might come to the study of the events of that year with the expectation that the Regency in Hanover and the minister in London would have prepared their land and defined their policies with the renewal of a French-English war in view, knowing that such a storm would find them unprotected by any demarcation line.² But we who know the years since the treaty of Basel, are fortified against such disappointment.

Historians and pamphleteers who have dealt with the events of 1803 from the Hanoverian point of view, have fallen into the fundamental error of treating the actions of the Electorate as definitive in relation to the outcome. They have then lost themselves in an effort to apportion the blame for the catastrophe which delivered the Electorate without resistance into the hands of Napoleon's general, Mortier. In such treatments of the subject the reader may find duly set forth all the acts and omissions of King George III., the minister in London, the Regency in Hanover, and the commanding general of the Hanoverian army. It is, however, one advantage of the point of view maintained in this monograph that, while

¹*Hist. Zeit.* for 1903, p. 480.

²The treaty of Lunéville in February, 1801, had abrogated the Demarcation Line between the combatant and non-combatant states of the Empire. This view is expressed by Ranke, Bailleu and Thimme.

not neglecting the events in Hanover, the writer will not here be compelled to drag the reader through a long disquisition on what a Rudloff, a von Lenthe or a Wallmoden-Gimborn did or did not do. Our energies may be reserved for the consideration of the field where things were really determined.

Though not blind to the danger or probability of a renewed French-English war,¹ neither the Regency nor the responsible Hanoverian minister in London, von Lenthe, had done anything to put the small Hanoverian army in efficient condition.² No understanding had been reached with any great power as to what would be done for Hanover. The occupation of 1801 and the aggressive indemnity policy of Prussia had rendered von Lenthe so suspicious of Prussia that in the crisis of 1803 he preferred a French to a Prussian occupation,³ and wavered in his plans between disposing the Hanoverian army to resist a Prussian or a French invasion.⁴ The absence of any Hanoverian delegate at the negotiations in

¹In March, 1802, von Lenthe in London in a letter to Münster pointed out the danger to Hanover from a breach of the treaty of Amiens. See his defence in *Zeit. d. hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, 164.

²See (Gen. Wallmoden) *Darstellung der Lage worin sich das hannoversche Militair in den Monathen May, Juny und July sich befand*, passim. General Wallmoden's letter to the king, April 27, 1803, published in Ompteda's *Überwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen*, 324 ff, is a sufficient summary. On the views and morale of the army during the important period see F. von Ompteda, Das hannoversche Regiment Fuss-garde im Jahre, 1803, in *Zeitschrift des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1860, 274 ff. A large part of the letters included in this essay are republished in Ompteda, *Überwältigung*, etc., 213 ff.

³V. Lenthe's defence, *sup. cit.*, 175. Other expressions of his anti-Prussian feelings on pp. 169-170.

⁴V. Lenthe's defence, *sup. cit.*, 177. The Regency preferred a Prussian occupation. Cf. Ompteda, 86.

Amiens¹ or later in Paris,² had left Hanover unsecured by any direct agreement with the French. The Hanoverian desertion of the Empire since 1795 and the ineffectiveness of that organization, even had it been disposed to act, made any guarantee of Hanover's neutrality by the Empire out of the question. The Imperial court of Vienna was so disgruntled at both Prussia and Hanover, that, like von Lenthe, it rather preferred a French to a Prussian occupation.³ There still remained Russia distant in the North almost a month's journey from London, and at least a fortnight by courier from Berlin.⁴

It was to Russia, then, that von Lenthe turned in the serious situation created by the, to him, unexpected royal

¹This was due to English jealousy. Cf. *Zeitschrift des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, p. 163. Note 1.

²In March, 1803, when the danger was clear, it was proposed to send v. der Decken to Paris. He left by way of London but the rush of events, if not the opposition of Geo. III., rendered such a mission untimely. Cf. Ompteda's *Ueberwältigung*, 18. It would not be exceptional if von Lenthe had no information of such threats as Napoleon made in November, 1802, against Hanover. Cf. Thiers, *Hist. du Consulat et de l'Empire*, iv, 248-249.

³Cf. A. Fournier, *Gentz und Cobenzl*. Note 1, 77 (Vienna, 1880). After the French had entered Hanover, the Regency issued a declaration of neutrality, May 28 (in Ompteda, Appendix X), and sent this with an appeal for help to the Emperor in Vienna, but Hardenberg never had an opportunity to plead his case to the Emperor. Cf. Ompteda, 193-194.

⁴Anyone who has not convinced themselves by actual examination of despatches, how important the time element was in the negotiations of those days and how constantly the investigator must keep it in mind, will be aided by examining the time table between diplomatic centres given in Hüffer, *Der Rastatter Congress*, Pt. I, p. 32. It took a courier about a week between London and Hanover, five days being exceptionally fast time. Cf. *Zeit. d. hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, pp. 188-189. The time between Berlin and Hanover was 2-3 days.

message to Parliament, March 8.¹ With the advice and consent of King George, who seems to have been as unconscious as his minister of the rapidity with which Napoleon, though perhaps preferring peace, would push hostile measures, an appeal was made to the Czar to protect Hanover from a French invasion. The success of such an appeal seemed practically certain if one accepted the assurances of Count Woronzow as the voice of his government. He was positive that no one need be solicitous about the neutrality of North Germany which his master, the Czar, would protect against either French or Prussian aggression.² But Simon Woronzow, though his brother was the Russian chancellor, had been too long in London and had become too decidedly pro-English and anti-Prussian in his sympathies to be a trustworthy mouthpiece of the new government on the distant Neva.³ The instructions to Count Münster to lay the cause of Hanover before the Czar, left London on March 18.⁴ They arrived in St. Petersburg on April

¹ V. Lenthe's defence, *sup. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

² V. Lenthe's defence, *sup. cit.*, 171, 172. Ompteda's *Ueberwältigung*, 20-21.

³ It was unfortunate for Prussia that in the crisis when the possibility of her acting depended on Russia's co-operation, the Russian ambassadors at the important posts in London, Paris and Vienna should have been anti-Prussian in their views. Cf. Ulmann, *Russisch-preussische Politik bis 1806*, pp. 31, 48-49. The blame which von Lenthe in his defence lays on Woronzow for having misled him as to Russia's readiness to protect the neutrality of North Germany, is echoed in the complaints of Best, Hanoverian attaché, to Jacobi after the surrender of the Hanoverians. Cf. Jacobi's despatch of July 26, 1803. (*Berlin Archives*.)

⁴ Von Lenthe's defence, *sup. cit.*, 172. Lenthe's idea seemed to be that a Prussian invasion would surely come, and that Russia ought at least to co-operate in order to guarantee Hanover's future when the occasion for occupation was gone. The long occupation of 1801 and

12, but a series of intervening circumstances, Russian holidays and Münster's absence on a hunting trip, prevented an audience with the Russian chancellor until May 10. In the meantime, Sir John Warren had received instructions which were sent a month after Münster's, directing him to co-operate with the latter, and to claim, on behalf of England, Russia's good offices in keeping the north of Germany undisturbed. To Münster was left the editorship of the joint note, and a very mild one it was. Sir John's instructions¹ did not permit his suggesting specific measures, and Münster, having little hope that Russia could be brought to take any positive steps, had felt it better to present in general the importance of the neutrality of North Germany and to refrain from definite proposals in the first interview.² He therefore framed his communication, keeping in view the probability that Hanover might yet have to depend on Prussia's co-operation.³ To this mild and belated representation of Münster and Warren,⁴ much importance is

the absurdity of thinking that Prussia could be expected to march in and out of Hanover as each new turn of English policy endangered Hanover and with it all North Germany, might well make both von Lenthe and the Regency anxious to avoid an unconditional Prussian occupation.

¹In the *English Record Office* under date of April 19, 1803. They reached St. Petersburg in the remarkably short time of seventeen days. April 8, Warren reports having talked over the exigencies of the approaching struggle, and Chancellor Woronzow said in his pompous style "that in the proposed invasion of Hanover respect must be paid to the opinion of Russia." Warren was decidedly anti-Prussian and the general English feeling was that Prussia's proposals had been approved by Duroc for Napoleon.

²Münster's despatch of April 29/17. [*Hanover Archives.*]

³Oempteda, 87. See footnote 1.

⁴Münster supplemented it on the following day by more specific objections to Prussia's proposals, and he again agitated the subject of the exchange of Hildesheim. Münster to the king, May 12/24.

attached by those who explain Prussia's inaction by Russia's opposition.¹ But any comparison of dates and distances will show how little influence these representations of the Hanoverian and English envoys, which were made on May 10, could have exercised upon the instructions sent from St. Petersburg to the Russian ambassadors in Berlin and Paris; for these instructions, which, as we have seen, were in Paris by the middle of May, must have left St. Petersburg certainly as early as the first of May in order to have reached either Paris or Berlin by the date mentioned. Indeed, after the sketch that has been given of the situation in St. Petersburg, it does not need the exploitation of the above action of the two envoys of George III. in order to explain what attitude a friendly and interested power such as Russia, would be likely to assume toward an invasion of Hanover—an invasion which even the Prussian king himself termed a "mesure de rigueur."²

The truth is that Russia was well prepared to put her own interpretation on Prussia's plans. It must not be forgotten that Russia had learned in 1801 how willingly Prussia would retain Hanover, if, when England refused just such a proposition as Prussia was now making, France and Russia would unite to support her against England. England refused to entertain Prussian views of maritime neutrality in 1801, and Russia knew from her experience in negotiating the convention of June 17, 1801, that England's views were unchanged. Since then,

¹See for example Treitschke, i, 214. Up to May 24, Chancellor Woronzow had vouchsafed no reply to either Münster or Warren. On that date he told Münster that as Russia had taken steps towards maintaining peace, he could take no such action as Münster had suggested, as that could only be justified by the war they were working to avoid. Münster's despatch of May 24. (*Hanover Archives*.)

²King to Goltz, March 28 (*Berlin Archives*).

Russia, after seeking for some time to modify Prussia's indemnities, had seen her enter into possession of her claims by virtue of a treaty with France. Can there be any doubt that Russia would see in this combination of French patronage and Prussian desires and interests the keynote to any Prussian proposition about saving Hanover from the French¹ or holding it if England, by not recognizing "free ships, free goods," should inflict losses on Prussian commerce?² Such a move would mean the destruction of the recently restored order and balance in the Empire, which the Czar might regard as in part his work.³ Chancellor Woronzow and his master desired to

¹This Russian suspicion that Prussia was acting in collusion with France is attested by Goltz's despatches, *cf. e. g.*, April 27/May 9 (*Berlin Archives*). See also Ulmann, *Russisch-Preussische Politik*, pp. 53, 54, 61 (note 3), 62, 66.

²In a despatch to Alopäus from St. Petersburg, May 25/June 6, Chancellor Woronzow acknowledges the receipt of Alopäus' despatch of May 10, reporting an interview with Haugwitz in which the latter blamed Russia for not supporting Prussia's proposals in London and attributed Prussia's failure to act energetically to Russia's silence. Woronzow explains that Russia was silent because she knew that the demand for the principles of 1781 would never be acceded to by England, and that "Quelque importante que puisse être pour le Roi d'Angleterre la possession de l'Electorat de Hanovre, elle lui est cependant purement personnelle et ne saurait engager le Ministre Britannique à la mettre en equivalent avec un objet qu'une raison d'état majeure Lui fera toujours défendre à toute extrémité. La Prusse en faisant ces propositions a abondé dans le sens de la France et est devenu ainsi l'exécuteur des volontés de Bonaparte; nous ne pouvons sous aucun rapport suivre son exemple." A copy of this despatch was evidently sent to Haugwitz by Alopäus on May 31, when he notified the former that if Prussia was prepared to adopt an independent policy and sustain it by force of arms, Russia was "prête à la soutenir de tous nos moyens et même avec nos troupes." *Cf. Rep. XI, Russland, 152A (Berlin Archives)*.

³It was to this side of the Czar's pride that the Hanoverian appeals were made. The French and Russians had forced their plan of indemnity on the Reichsdeputation. Russia was interested in keeping an equilibrium between Prussia and Austria.

have Russia play a large part in settling the difficulties between England and France without, however, involving Russia in war. They were piqued at seeing Prussia, possibly in collusion with France, rushing forward to mediate and that without consulting Russia.¹ Russia was not blind to the seriousness of the situation and the need of haste, but she most seriously doubted Prussia's motives and she overestimated her ability to restrain the French. Had not the intercession of Russia been effectual when she spoke for Piedmont and Naples?² These motives³ in whatever combination they are placed were all effective before Münster's interview of May 10, 1803. They enable us to understand why Russia assumed a position that embarrassed and mystified the Prussian king and cabinet, until they learned by the indirect route of Markoff's utterances to Lucchesini in Paris, that Russia not only did not favor a Prussian occupation of Hanover, but was revealing to Napoleon the lack of harmony between the two great powers from whom he might in any way expect opposition to his plans on the Electorate.⁴

¹ Goltz, April 12/30 (*Berlin Archives*) and Münster (Tatter, chargé), April 7/19, *Cal. Br. Des. 24, Russland, 131a* (*Hanover Archives*).

² *Archiv. für österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 52, 513-14.

³ Alexander's recent disenchantment as to Prussia's military strength should be mentioned in this connection. See his utterances after the Memel interview in Ulmann, 42.

⁴ F. Martens, *Recueil*, etc., vi, 312. This was reported by Alopäus on May 23 as a result of an interview in which Haugwitz complained of Russia's action. If one notices that it took at that time about one week between Paris and Berlin, and at least three weeks between St. Petersburg and Paris, one can see that Markoff was acting on instructions antedating any interview of Münster's. That Alopäus had similar instructions is clearly indicated by Simon Woronzow's communications to von Lenthe, May 15, of a section of his brother's letter to Alopäus. The matter and date are cited by von Lenthe (*Zeit. d. hist*

Meanwhile affairs in Berlin had taken such a turn that in any attempt to apportion the responsibility for the inaction of Prussia in 1803, one can only say, not that Russia's attitude caused Frederick William to abandon Hanover, but rather, that if Russia had been an aggressive supporter of Prussia's first proposal, Haugwitz might have been enabled to bring the king to execute, even in the face of Napoleon's *Armée d'Hanovre*,¹ the measures which he advocated. By April 22, Frederick William knew that his overtures in London had been rejected,² and that his well meant plans were regarded in Hanover in much the same light as the occupation of 1801. The king was aggrieved and all too

Verein für Niedersachsen, 1856, p. 176) as proof that Hanover's action at St. Petersburg was not responsible for Russia's action. Alopäus evidently did not act on the instructions which he received after he had become convinced that Prussia was in earnest in its desire to protect the neutrality of North Germany, and about the time Hanover, through Capt. Decken, was urging Prussia to save it from the French. The account above makes no reference to a letter from Alexander to Frederick William III. opposing the Prussian occupation, and hinting that Prussia had ulterior aims in its plans for such occupation. Hardenberg (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 18) quotes such a letter. The evidence for such a letter, of which there was much talk at that time, is given by Ulmann, p. 65, note 2. To the evidence given there I would add that of Mr. Jackson. Cf. his important despatch of July 16, 1803, in the *English Record Office*. Such a letter was not found by Dr. Bailleu while editing the correspondence between the two rulers. Cf. *Publicationen aus den kgl. preuss. Archiven*, vol. 75, p. xiv.

¹ The army was then being assembled in Holland. On March 20, Napoleon had ordered Citizen Lacuée to reconnoitre the whole Westphalian region. "Vous verrez en Hanovre le nombre de troupes qui y est, les obstacles qu'on pourrait opposer à une invasion." *Correspondance*, VIII, 329-330. On April 18, 1803, he issued an order to assemble the French troops at Nymwegen "without noise or ostentation." *Correspondance*, VIII, 357.

² Postscript to despatch to Goltz of that date. Jacobi had presented his note on April 9, and Lord Hawkesbury replied on the 16th.

ready to substitute his injured pride for reasons of state. The uncertainty of peace or war and the silence of the Russian government allowed him to postpone all aggressive measures,¹ and Haugwitz and the party of action² could not, without some definite external impetus, overcome the inertia of the king weighed down as he was by such councillors as Beyme, Lombard and Köckeritz; the king would take no action that might involve him in war.³

The cause of Hanover pleaded in Paris in the name of the king of Prussia⁴ had failed to move Napoleon from a policy long determined.⁵ It was just at this juncture—Napoleon firm to invade Hanover and close the Elbe and Weser, England selfishly indifferent, Russia disapprovingly silent,⁶ Prussia unsupported and undecided—that Captain Decken, this time in the suite of the Duke of Gloucester, arrived in Berlin to plead for a second time the cause of his country.⁷ In 1801, he had come to stay a Prussian occupation, which Russia was

¹ Ompteda, *Ueberwältigung*, etc., 91, 94, 96, 98.

² Haugwitz, Möllendorf, Schulenburg, Struensee, Hohenlohe and Gen. Rückel. The military men were unanimous in urging the king to prevent a French occupation but the king made all military measures dependent on the approval of the Duke of Brunswick. See Mr. Jackson's despatches of March 22 and 29, May 10, 24, 28, 31 and June 28. (*English Record Office*.) Hardenberg, who was also for an aggressive program, was not consulted at all. *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 13 ff, 23.

³ Ompteda, p. 23.

⁴ See Lucchesini's memorial of April 7, in Häusser, ii, 445.

⁵ Lucchesini's report of May 3, 1803. Bailleu, ii, 139.

⁶ By May 5, Alopäus, though personally interested in the cause of Hanover, had felt that his instructions required him to say that Russia, having offered his mediation, could not take measures that presupposed the outbreak of war. Ompteda, 75-104.

⁷ For a full account of Decken's mission see Ompteda, 83 ff. V. d. Decken's reports are in *Cal.Br. Arch. Des.* 24, No. 601 (*Hanover Archives*).

urging. In 1803 he came to ask a Prussian occupation, which Russia disapproved.¹ Would the request of the Hanoverian Regency in 1803 prove any more effective than their protest in 1801?

The Regency had despatched Captain Decken on their own responsibility. The letter of King George to Duke Adolphus of Cambridge had left them without any hope of peace.² Russia, in whom they, like von Lenthe, placed confidence, was too far away to make effective the goodwill its minister in London so loudly proclaimed, and, whatever the absent Elector and his minister thought, the Regency had their own views of a French occupation.³ So they had taken matters in their own hands, and the sending of Captain Decken was the result. Decken having oriented himself in the situation at Berlin by interviews with the Duke of Brunswick⁴ and the English minister, succeeded, through the good offices of Queen Louise, in obtaining an interview with King Frederick William.⁵ The result but confirmed the fore-

¹ V. d. Decken's instructions in Ompteda, 85, 86. Prussian occupation was the third and last alternative and was to be arranged with Russian co-operation. Decken was fresh from London where he had imbibed from Woronzow unjustified confidence in Russia and von Lenthe's suspicions of the Prussian Ministry. May 18, he wrote "Der König hat gewiss die besten Absichten, von dem Ministerio müssen wir leider das Gegenteil erwarten."

² Letter arrived in Hanover, April 29. *Zeit. des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1856, p. 188.

³ Regency to king, May 8, in Ompteda, 86.

⁴ The Duke declared that he would not mix in the affair as he feared for his own possessions. But he did later and at a most inopportune time, *i. e.*, the conference at Cörbelitz, May 28.

⁵ The report of the interview with the king is printed by Ompteda, 92 ff. Queen Louise is named by Alopäus with Beyme and Köckeritz as being opposed to any energetic measure. Cf. his despatch, May 2/14, in F. Martens, *Recueil*, vi, 311.

cast of the situation which his friends had given the optimistic envoy. The king considered it to be his policy to avoid in every way a war with France, and France would not consent to a Prussian occupation. Interviews with Haugwitz showed that minister bitter against England for her rejection of his proposition, disgruntled at Russia for her cold indifference, which he attributed to Münster's influence,¹ but anxious by every

¹ Alopäus was of the same opinion (Oempteda, 104). He told Decken about May 19, that three weeks before, he, as well as Woronzow in London, had received instructions to oppose a Prussian occupation. Evidently the instructions to Markoff in Paris are of the same date. I have found no evidence to indicate that Alopäus obeyed his instructions, but the indications are rather that Alopäus, a Finnish Protestant, of liberal views, guarded Russia's interests as he understood them. But with positive instructions in his pocket he had evidently only talked to Haugwitz of general policies, and thus left that minister without any grounds for assuring Frederick William that if he occupied Hanover he would have Russia's unqualified support. On May 7, Jackson reports Haugwitz as complaining to Alopäus of Russia's indifference and lack of energy. (*English Record Office*.) Did Russia express her disapproval to Goltz, the Prussian ambassador? Alexander Woronzow told Sir John Warren that Russia had passed over Prussia's first proposals in marked silence; "that on a subsequent reference to them the Prussian government had been informed as well through Count Goltz as by M. Alopäus at Berlin that His Imperial Majesty could not consent to any change in the present state of the North of Germany, and that he trusted His Prussian Majesty would endeavor to preserve the peace of the Empire as any invasion of it could not be seen by His Imperial Majesty with indifference." Sir John Warren to Hawkesbury, May 24, 1803 (*English Record Office*). But Count Goltz's despatches, while pointing out Russia's desire to play the leading part herself, do not show this disapproval clearly. His despatch of April 23/II (arriving in Berlin, May 6), shows that though Chancellor Woronzow possibly did not like some features of Jacobi's instructions, Goltz thought that, as to measures regarding Hanover, "Sa Majesté Imperiale les justifie et les approuve d'avance par l'importance de leurs motifs qui les dictent." Replying the same day (May 6) King Frederick William assures Goltz "Vous vous êtes heureusement trompé en vous s'imaginant que vos premières communications ont donné de l'humeur à la Cour de Peters-

bourg. Celle que Je viens de recevoir de sa part me prouvent bien le contraire, et mes démarches dictées par les vues les plus pures ayant été représentées d'ailleurs dans les rapports du Sr. d'Alopäus sous leur véritable point de vue, il était impossible qu'elles fussent mal interprétées à Petersbourg." Goltz's despatch of May 9/April 27, containing an account of a friendly conversation with Woronzow in which the chancellor had asked Goltz not to press him for a categorical answer, concludes " . . . mais il ne faut malgré cela ne pas prendre le change sur la jalousie que les mesures éventuelles de Votre Majesté ont excitée." The cause of this lies in the Russian fear of French influence, Goltz says. This despatch, however, did not reach Berlin till May 31. A still better proof that no definite Russian opposition to Prussia's proposals had been expressed to Goltz or through Alopäus before the king of Prussia had practically decided on his course, is the despatch from the king to Goltz, May 23, 1803. (*Berlin Archives.*) "Le Comte de Markoff a eu une communication d'une dépêche adressée par le Chancelier Comte de Woronzow au Sr. d'Alopäus et il en fait part au Marquis de Lucchesini pour lui observer que la Cour de Russie n' a pas approuvé ma déclaration au Roi d'Angleterre ni mes idées relativement au pays d'Hanovre. Il paroît ainsi que les ouvertures dont Je vous ai chargé à la suite de la mission du general Duroc n'ont pas été interprétées à Petersbourg dans leur véritable sens et J'en suis vivement affecté car Je n'ai jamais eu d'autre but que de sauver la tranquillité du Nord de l'Allemagne et je ne connaissais d'autre moyen pour y parvenir que d'écarter les François de l'Electorat de Hanovre." After the English rejection and before the news above given, the king had been brought to consider only a proposition for a cordon to protect the Elbe and Weser, and his action on this was conditional on the approval of the Duke of Brunswick (Jackson's despatches of May 18 and 28). All this simply emphasizes the fact that the importance of Russia's position consists in this; that during the decisive weeks it left Prussia to act alone, and unsupported action in opposition to France was beyond the powers of King Frederick William III.

Such light on Russia's attitude received in Berlin as late as May 23, only helped to confirm the king and the party of inaction in a policy that had, since May 1, pointed straight to such a decision as that reached at the conference in Cörbelitz. It is as an excuse for inaction and a return blow at England that one must understand such passages as the following in the king's (Haugwitz's) instructions to Jacobi, May 31: "Je ne devais pas m'attendre à une sollicitation de cette nature après que les Ministres d' Angleterre et de Hanovre avaient remué ciel et terre à Petersbourg pour y représenter dans un faux jour mes premières bonnes intentions et qu'ils avaient effectivement réussi à leur attirer l'improbation de la Cour de Russie. Il en est résulté que J'ai été obligé

means to forward Decken's plans.¹ Alopäus, the Russian ambassador, was personally so interested that he offered to go into the French camp and negotiate the Hanoverian surrender if things came to such a pass. The English ambassador, Jackson, was willing to send his private secretary to London with a Hanoverian appeal to the English Cabinet for maritime concessions that might purchase a Prussian occupation.² But out of all this and a second interview with the king,³ nothing definite came. The king in his embarrassment and indecision had fallen upon the idea—all his own—of having the Hanoverian Regency offer Napoleon a sum equivalent to what he might expect to get from the land. And this suggestion was the most positive comfort the king offered Captain Decken.⁴ The opportunity

d'affaiblir l'intérêt que J'aurais pu manifester ultérieurement en faveur du pays de Hanovre. . . ." In succeeding despatches (June 6 and 18), Haugwitz lays the blame on the English ministry and its rejection of the proposals made by Jacobi in April. At other times and to other parties, Haugwitz blamed the ministry in Hanover, and to trusted persons, the king and the opposition clique in the cabinet. Schulenburg, in a letter to Haugwitz, May 22, said: "Die Schuld fällt wirklich allein auf England." *R. XI, n. 140, C. 2, Vol. I (Berlin Archives)*.

¹ Decken's report of May 12. *Cf.* Ompteda, 95.

² The long memorial in favor of Hanover that Jackson prepared and read to Decken, is not in the English Record Office.

³ May 17. Ompteda, 99.

⁴ Decken told the Russian ambassador, "que le roi, après avoir pris connaissance de la lettre du duc, était visiblement touché et s'était écrié: 'C'est trop tard, je ne puis pas entreprendre seul la guerre contre la France, et il le faudrait, si actuellement je m'opposais à l'entrée des Français dans votre pays. Je m'en suis assez occupé; j'ai fait faire les démarches les plus promptes, mais elles n'ont mené à rien; de Londres j'ai reçu une réponse insignifiante; je n'ose pas compter sur la Russie si contre l'aveu de l'Empereur je m'embarque. Que voulez-vous donc que je fasse?'" Alopäus despatch of May 2/14, 1803. *Cf.* F. Martens, *Recueil, etc.*, vi, 311.

for successful, decisive action on Prussia's part had passed. On May 12, the English ambassador left Paris, and six days later war was declared. On May 22, the French army under General Mortier began its march against Hanover.¹ The rapidity of its movements and the weakness of the Hanoverian defence, rendered untimely Frederick William's futile offer to become the French tax-collector in Hanover and thus guarantee to Napoleon a certain tribute from the Electorate, if Mortier and his men were kept back.² The conference at Cörbelitz, near Magdeburg, May 28, where this synonym for inaction was decreed by the king, marks a turning point in Prussian history for the next decade.³ Haugwitz, with the same clearness and breadth of vision that had signalized his attitude throughout the crisis, pleaded with earnestness the cause of Prussia's very existence. France must not be admitted into the heart of Prussia's dominions—almost to the gates of Magdeburg.⁴ The effort of

¹ On May 27, Talleyrand informed Lucchesini of the French military plans (Bailleu, ii, 148) which had been dissembled (Bailleu, ii, 142-145), despite assurances that Prussia should be informed of everything.

² The proposition is contained in the instructions despatched immediately to Lucchesini, Bailleu, ii, 145 ff.

³ The only military measure the king would approve was the placing of a weak cordon of Prussian troops on the side next to the invaded territory. This measure was humbly explained to Bonaparte and then abandoned. The immeasurable weakness of Frederick William III. in this crisis again warns to caution in attributing his inaction solely to Russia's negative attitude.

⁴ Max Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, 336: "Sie (Prussian government) liess zu, dass ein französisches Heer von Hannover Besitz ergriff. Was das sagen wollte, ermessen wir wenn wir bedenken, dass der Kurstaat im Osten an das Stammland des brandenburgisch-preussischen Staates grenzte, Hamburg und Bremen umklammerte, die untere Weser und Elbe beherrschte, bis fast an die Thore von Lübeck und die Gestade der Ostsee reichte. Frankreich war der Nachbar von Dänemark geworden, von Schweden nur durch die Breite von Mecklenburg getrennt; sein

that day is the fairest incident in the career of the Minister of Neutrality. But deserted by the Duke of Brunswick in the crucial moment, the efforts of Haugwitz in favor of an aggressive policy were more than nullified by the king's ineradicable preference for peace at any price, strengthened as it was by the party of Beyme, Lombard and Köckeritz. The only influence from which any result might have been expected was silenced. Alopäus, the Czar's envoy, was still bound by instructions which he had never approved,¹ and that no longer represented his master's sentiments, for the views of the Russian government had undergone a revolution so sudden and decisive as to be almost inexplicable.

Three days after the conference at Cörbelitz, Alopäus received from St. Petersburg orders to arrange with Prussia a joint Russian-Prussian protection for the neutrality of North Germany and the Hansa cities.²

Haugwitz's despairing exclamation, "Why did you not come to me with such a proposition a fortnight, even a week ago? It is all over with Hanover now," was truer than that minister knew. Russia's conviction that Prus-

Heer stand zwei Märsche von Magdeburg, fünf Märsche von Berlin, sieben Märsche von Stettin. Dass die ganze rhenisch-westfälische Stellung im Rücken umgangen war, war ein Nachtheil der hierneben nahezu verschwand."

¹ May 12, he was doing all he could to forward Decken's plans. Ompteda, 94. Cf. also Ulmann, 72, 73 (foot-notes).

² F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vi, 313 ff. The instructions are dated May 6/18. A second and more definite set were sent May 12/24. Marten's discussion gives the mistaken impression that Alopäus had received the latter when he went to Haugwitz, May 31. Martens misdates later correspondence between Alexander and Frederick William, as may be seen by comparing his material with the letters as given in *Publicationen aus den kgl. preussischen Archiven*, vol. 75 (edited by Dr. Paul Bailieu).

sia was truly in earnest in its opposition to France, and that the occasion for action was a real one, requiring such expedition and such measures as Prussia had proposed in good faith, had come too late to save the Electorate and the Hanseatic cities, in whose fate Russia was indeed deeply interested.¹

Indecision at Berlin had decided the fate of Hanover, where equal indecision prevailed. The orders from King George through the minister in London to the Regency in Hanover concerning the resistance to be offered to a French invasion, had been necessarily conditioned by lack of knowledge and a desire not to hamper the Regency and General Wallmoden by rigid directions unsuited to meet rapidly-changing conditions.² They were elastic enough to have justified aggressive action on the part of a strong Regency and a vigorous commanding general.³ But it was the indefiniteness of the instructions from London that the Hanoverian ministers

¹ It is likely that Alopäus's reports produced a more favorable view of Haugwitz's plans and a realization that Frederick William needed to be pushed on rather than restrained. Prussia had so often proclaimed the inviolability of the neutrality of North Germany that it might well have been expected to do something in such a crisis. Appeals from related houses (Holstein and Mecklenburg. Münster's despatch of May 24/12, *Des. 24, 131*^a [*Hanover Archives*]) and the Hanseatic cities may have helped show the widespread danger of a French occupation of Hanover.

² V. Lenthe wrote to Wallmoden, April 5, 1803: "Meines Ermessens werden Sie sich auf die möglichen Fälle zum voraus fassen müssen, und dabei niemahls auf bestimmte Vorschriften von hieraus rechnen dürfen, da die Entfernung dergleichen nicht zulässt, und es viel mehr äusserst bedenklich sein würde Ihnen dadurch die Entschliessung zu erschweren wozu hier unbekannte oder nicht erwartete Umstände Sie nöthigen können." No. 1198 (*Hanover Archives*).

³ I refer to the orders of May 13. Appendix II to Wallmoden's *Darstellung der Lage*, etc.

assimilated.¹ General Wallmoden, who commanded the poorly-equipped and ill-organized Hanoverian army of ten thousand, was an old man with no great decision or energy.² The result of the shifting of responsibility between the three possible sources of authority, each weak in itself, was that the Hanoverian army after retreating from position to position was saved a definite engagement with Mortier's corps by the convention of Suhlingen, June 3, 1803.³ This capitulation was negotiated by a delegation sent out by the Regency.⁴ According to its terms, the Electorate was delivered over to a French occupation, the Hanoverian army retiring with the honors of war to an assigned area beyond the Elbe, where they were pledged to remain until exchanged against French soldiers cap-

¹In an informal note (Collegialschreiben), von Lenthe, in London, writes to the Regency, May 10, 1803, about the distribution of the troops to oppose a Prussian invasion. Ompteda, Appendix VI. In the preceding week the Regency had sent Decken to Berlin to ask for a Prussian occupation as a final measure.

²In a letter to Lord Malmesbury, Paget writes from Embden, Jan. 31, 1795: "Walmoden is irresolute and uncertain. . . . He is desirous of throwing as much responsibility as possible on the Generals under his command." *Paget Papers*, vol. i. Cf. also the material in Wallmoden's defense (*Darstellung der Lage*, etc.). See, for example, his letter to the Regency, April 20. Appendix II. On the same date the Regency wrote to ask Wallmoden what should be done. On the 22nd, they replied to Wallmoden's appeal for directions with the much-quoted sentence, "dass mann zur Zeit vermeiden müsse, was Ombrage und Aufsehen erwecken könnte." Wallmoden showed more energy and spirit than the Regency. Cf. his note of May 5, 1803, Appendix VII. to *Darstellung*, etc.

³Published in facsimile by Ompteda in his *Überwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen*, p. 362. For the clearest sketch of the events in Hanover during April-July, 1803, see F. Thimme: *Innere Zustände des Kurfürstentums Hannover*, 1806-1813, vol. i, 35-59.

⁴The Regency tried to get either a Prussian representative or the Russian ambassador to come on and conduct the negotiations with or for them.

tured by the English. On the anniversary of the King-Elector's birthday the French army entered the capital city. The shame of Kloster-Zeven had come again.¹ Napoleon, either unsatisfied with its provisions, or desiring to compromise George III., made his ratification of the convention conditional on the ratification by that monarch as king of England. King George very properly refused his ratification.² General Mortier immediately renewed his advance. The natural timidity of General Wallmoden was increased by the traitorous conduct of some of the provincial estates who refused longer to support his army, and by mutiny among his own troops. Immediate submission seemed to him the only course, and thus the Hanoverian army was not given the opportunity to make a defence;³ for on July 5, he arranged

¹ During the Seven Years' War the attempt of George II. to support Frederick the Great by the operations of an independent Hanoverian army was brought to a disastrous close by the defeat of the Duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck and his weak surrender to the French at Kloster-Zeven, Sept. 8, 1757. See Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans. Les Debuts*, ch. ix.

² Hawkesbury to Talleyrand, June 15, 1803, in O. Browning, *England and Napoleon in 1803*, 290. This despatch illustrates as no other document can, the peculiarity of the king's double sovereignty.

³ That the resistance would have been as effective as indicated by some of the military pamphleteers who later attacked their commander and the Regency, is very doubtful. When the recruiting was going on in May, young men fled the country and several communities created such disorder that troops were needed to quiet them. Several cavalry regiments mutinied while the troops were disposed for battle on July 3. One should not draw any sweeping conclusion from these facts as there were mitigating circumstances and much both in 1803 and in the years of foreign domination which followed that showed the loyalty of army and people to their absent ruler. Cf. Ompteda's *Überwältigung*, etc., 52 *et seq.*, and the letters of Major Ompteda published in *Zeitschrift des hist. Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1860, 274 ff, for some idea of the spirit of 1803. The pamphlet literature called out by the disaster has some value from this point of view. On the action of the Estates, cf. Häusser, ii, 461 ff, and Hassell, *Das Kurfürstentum Hannover*, etc., p. 281.

with Mortier an almost unconditional surrender, and Hanover entered on its decade of submission to foreign rule.¹

Prussia, too, had chosen the part of humiliation. After the conference at Cörbelitz, King Frederick William had started south on a visit to his newly-acquired possessions. With him went Lombard and the group that had dashed any hope of action. Haugwitz, dissatisfied to the point of resignation, was left in Berlin, from which place he sent urgent memorials based on the changed attitude of Russia.² But King Frederick William could not be aroused.³ In these trying days he proved himself in truth "a lamb that carried anger as a flint bears fire." He sought only to avoid the alliances that France⁴ on the one hand, and Russia on the other,⁵ were urging upon him. Point by point he yielded before the French autocrat,⁶ who in these weeks might well

¹In 1741, when Hanover was threatened by the danger of a French invasion, George II. had concluded in Hanover's behalf a special neutrality treaty with the French. Prof. Ward (*Hanover and Great Britain*, p. 147) calls the treaty of 1741, "the first time in the history of the Personal Union when the interests of the Hanoverian Electorate were openly and in a most marked fashion treated as separate from those of Great Britain."

²See the memorial of June 4, in Bailleu, ii, 152-154.

³*Cf.* king to Haugwitz, June 9, Bailleu, ii, 159.

⁴Instructions to Laforest, French envoy in Berlin, Bailleu, ii, 144-145.

⁵*Cf.* Ulmann, 68 *et seq.* Also *Pub. aus den kgl. preuss. Archiven*, vol. 75. The English offer of subsidy accompanied by a guarded offer to refer any ulterior matter, by which the subject of Hanover is meant, was never presented. *Cf.* Instructions to Jackson, June 28, and his reply July 16, 1803. *F. O. Prussia*, no. 63 (*English Record Office*).

⁶See Frederick William's despatches in June, 1803, published in Bailleu, ii. Napoleon broke his promises to tell the king his plans before executing them, and disregarded his own solemn assertions that the Hanseatic cities would not be disturbed.

find justification for his often manifested contempt of Prussia. What Frederick William gave to his advisers as his ultimatum—that only the death at an invader's hands of a Prussian on Prussian soil, could justify the abandonment of neutrality¹—was made patent to the world through his retreat in the face of French aggression. The Prussian king had failed to meet the first great crisis of his reign.² He had given to Europe the measure of Prussia's weakness. In the story of 1803, Frederick William III. is the one determining factor, and with him lies the ultimate responsibility for the initiation of the disasters that followed his unwillingness to pay the price of national honor and self-respect.³ For him and his state was reserved the privilege of Polyphemus's cave, that of being devoured last.⁴

¹ Hardenberg, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 22.

² Cf. Max Lenz in *Cosmopolis* for 1898, 586, 587. For a further discussion of the views contained in this article cf. *Hist. Zeit.*, vol. 81, 56, and vol. 82, 188. Bailleu, in his introduction to volume 29 of the *Publicationen aus den kgl. preussischen Archiven*, p. xxxv, points out the general discontent in Berlin and throughout North Germany at the weakness of the Prussian policy. In confirmation of my disinclination to excuse King Frederick William on the ground of Russia's inaction, I may cite the opinion of Hardenberg in his *Denkwürdigkeiten* (ed. Rank), ii, 18, 19. Prof. Ulmann, in his *Russisch-Preussische Politik bis 1806*, p. 57, indicates a similar view of the king's character. Lombard, in his memorial (Aug. 20, 1806), shares the view of that day as to Russian influence. Cf. Bailleu, ii, 615.

³ What might have happened if he had opposed the French is suggested by Hardenberg, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii, 14, 15. What did happen was that before the year ended, Prussia's position became so untenable that she was obliged to consider a French alliance as a way out. Cf. Bailleu, ii, p. xliii.

⁴ Frederick the Great, in his circular letter, in 1784, urging such a union as the Fürstenbund, had used this figure, and Alopäus now turned it on Frederick William. Cf. Jackson's despatch of June 28, 1803. (*English Record Office*.) In a conversation with the Russian ambassador, early in May, Haugwitz had said: "Nous serons les derniers à être

It is with this sketch of the oft-told story of 1803,¹ that this study of selected phases of Hanoverian-Prussian relations may well close. At this one point we may group all the threads of influence that have from time to time affected the relations between the powers. The collapse of the Electorate before the French invasion, leads us not to an apportionment of responsibility² between individual members of the Electoral government, but to a clearer impression of the essential weakness of a system which in the absence of the ruler, made possible the division of power and thus of responsibility. The very fact of a French invasion reminds us that we are

mangés; voila le seul avantage de la Prusse. Que les Anglais exercent le despotisme sur les mers, c'est un très grand inconvénient, je l'avoue, mais le despotisme continental est infiniment plus dangereux." Alopäus despatch to Chancellor Woronzow, April 25/May 7. Cf. F. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, vi, 310.

¹The reader is reminded that the incident here treated has been elaborated in the studies of Bailleu, Ompteda, Martens, Thimme, Ulmann, Häusser and Hassell. This chapter makes a redistribution of emphasis on some matters, *e. g.*, the indemnity negotiations as the basis of Russian and Hanoverian views of Prussia's intentions in its offer of occupation, Hanover's influence at St. Petersburg and the degree of Russia's responsibility for King Frederick William's practically unalterable neutrality. It furnishes, I believe, the only account in English of the occupation of 1803, and gives the monograph its fitting conclusion.

Addendum. Since this note was put in type, there has come into my hands, *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany*. Herbert A. L. Fisher (Oxford, 1903). Chapter three, pages 48-67, of this work, are on Hanover and the French occupation of 1803. Most of this limited treatment is devoted to Hanover before 1803 and to the occupation after July 5, 1803.

²Ompteda attempts such an apportionment of his fault-finding, *cf. Die Ueberwältigung Hannovers*, etc., pp. 48, 49. He is, in general, altogether too favorable to the Regency. Cf., *e. g.*, pp. 34, 36, 43, 49, 56, 68, *et passim*. When one considers the almost independent power that the Regency exercised in the absence of the Elector, one must lay upon them a proportionate share of responsibility for conditions in the Electorate.

only seeing the execution of a long cherished plan, whose existence had always been a threat against the Prussian policy of neutrality for North Germany. The nullity of the Empire, which made possible the neutrality of Hanover in 1795, while the Empire was at war, made possible the destruction of that neutrality in 1803 when the Empire was at peace. Prussia and Prussia's king reveal in their action their dependence on Russia in any attempt to make headway against Napoleon.¹ The events of 1801 and the baleful influence of the dissensions over indemnity are the seed whose fruit is reaped in the paralyzing Russian and Hanoverian distrust of King Frederick William III., who, by the same events, had been made extraordinarily sensitive to suspicion and misinterpretation, while the increase of Prussian territory by the large indemnities she had obtained in Westphalia, made him, more than in 1801, responsible for the protection of Hanover and Northwestern Germany.² With the occupation of 1803 ceases for a time at least, the activity of Count Haugwitz,³ and with him goes the neutrality which, though it had shown itself a political

¹ Haugwitz's words, in speaking of the period after March, 1801, bear quoting here: "La cruelle catastrophe, dira-t-on, qui termina les jours de Paul aura soulagé la Prusse d'un poids qui à la longue aurait eu encore pour elle des suites assez gênantes. Mais enfin délivrée des embarras qui lui venaient du côté de la Russie, il restait ce colosse qui semblait ne pouvoir s'arrêter qu'en roulant sous ses pas tout ce qu'il approchait." See his *Memoires* in Ranke, *Works*, 47, 313.

² Max Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, i, 334.

³ Haugwitz was more than disappointed at the king's desertion of him and his "cheval de bataille . . . dont il est si glorieux." (Baillet, I, 539.) See his exposé in Ranke, *Works*, 47, p. 298. He attempted to resign (see Jackson's despatches in June and July in 1803, in *English Record Office*) but the king kept him in office. Hardenberg substituted for him in August, 1803, and succeeded him early in 1804. See Hardenberg's *Denkwürdigkeiten* [Ranke], ii, pp. 1-30.

system for the days when France was militarily weak, proved in the hands of such a ruler as Frederick William III. unfit to bulwark Prussia against the power of a France armed and led by Napoleon Bonaparte. All this in retrospect over the years since the treaty of Basel. From the view-point of 1803, the events of 1806, 1813, even to 1866, stretch forward, inviting one to further study of the relations between Prussia and Hanover.

ADDENDA

To p. 115, note 1. An English translation of the proclamation issued by King George III. disbanding and expelling hostile forces in Hanover is given in "*The Political State of Europe . . . [1792-95].*" Vol. x, 443 (London, 1795).

To the evidence cited on p. 182 to show Prussia's material prosperity during the neutrality period, should be added the statistics on trade and shipping in Berner: *Gesch. d. preuss. Staats*, p. 492, and in Philipppson, *Gesch. d. preuss. Staatswesens*, ii, 164.

Attention should have been called in note 1, p. 158, to Haugwitz's reply of Dec. 14, 1800 (see Häusser, ii, 492, note 1), praising von Dohm's plan for a North German Confederation, but rejecting it. The reason given, *i. e.*, that the uncertainty of prevailing conditions did not allow Prussia to fix on a definite plan, illustrates again the inability of the statesmen of the period to carry out logically and ruthlessly any policy.

One must recall again the quotations given in note 2, p. 123, and note 2, p. 226, and place them in conjunction with the dictum of Hertzberg in 1791: "Le système de la Prusse . . . est de n'en avoir aucun et de se conduire d'après les occurrences." Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, i, 523.

To p. 155. A re-reading of Meier's *Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte*, i, 319, and ii, 211, leads me to doubt the correctness of my identification of Graf Hardenberg with the Prussian statesman then in Hanover.


To p. 45. Alvensleben, Prussian minister of state, was a native of Hanover. Meier, *sup. cit.*, ii, 204.

VITA

THE writer of this dissertation, son of Thos. D. Ford and Helen Shumway, was born in Salem, Wisconsin, May 9, 1873. His early education was received in the country schools of Kenosha County, Wisconsin, and O'Brien County, Iowa, and in the graded schools of Plainfield, Iowa. In 1888, he entered the preparatory department of Upper Iowa University, Fayette, Iowa, remaining there until the spring term of 1891. During the school year 1891-92, he taught in the country schools of Bremer County, Iowa. In the fall of 1892, he entered the University of Wisconsin in the Civic-Historic course. He received the degree of bachelor of letters in June, 1895, writing his bachelor's thesis under Prof. F. J. Turner on "The Economic Teachings of Thomas Jefferson." From 1895-1898, he was city superintendent of schools in Grand Rapids, Wisconsin. In 1898, he took up graduate work at the University of Wisconsin, studying under Professors Haskins, Turner, Coffin, Reinsch and Ely. In 1899-1900, he continued his studies abroad, hearing lectures at Berlin under Professors Harnack, Delbrück, Lenz, Schiemann, and others, and was a member of the seminars conducted by Professors Delbrück and Lenz. His observation of foreign universities included, besides the work done in Berlin, the universities of Leipzig and Göttingen in Germany, and the university at Nancy, France. In the fall of 1900 he entered Columbia University as scholar in European


history, and continued his studies under Professors Sloane, Robinson, Osgood, Moore and Burgess. In May, 1901, he passed the preliminary examinations for the doctor's degree, offering European history as his major, and American history and international law as minors. Since October, 1901, he has been an instructor in history in Yale University. The archival material for this dissertation was gathered during the summers of 1900 and 1902.

He has published an article on Connecticut Town Rule in *Municipal Affairs*, Vol. VI, and minor articles on school administration and economic subjects in several Wisconsin magazines.










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